

**ABRIDGED SUMMARY OF CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND
FINDINGS BY THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS**

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING – 001-25

<u>Division</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Duty-On (X) Off ()</u>	<u>Uniform-Yes (X) No ()</u>
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Southwest	01/11/25		
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<u>Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force</u>	<u>Length of Service</u>
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Officer B	3 years, 1 months
Officer C	2 years, 2 months

Reason for Police Contact

Southwest Patrol Division uniformed officers responded to an “Assault with a Deadly Weapon stabbing,” radio call. As the officers arrived at scene, they were directed to the Subject’s last known location. While positioned outside an apartment complex, officers encountered the Subject after he exited an adjacent building armed with a knife. The Subject ignored commands, and an officer utilized intermediate force. The Subject then advanced toward the officers with the knife, which resulted in an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS).

<u>Subject(s)</u>	<u>Deceased (X)</u>	<u>Wounded ()</u>	<u>Non-Hit ()</u>
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Subject: Male, 43 years of age.

Board of Police Commissioners’ Review

This is a brief summary designed only to enumerate salient points regarding this Categorical Use of Force incident and does not reflect the entirety of the extensive investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department (Department) or the deliberations by the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC or Board). In evaluating this matter, the BOPC considered the following: the complete Force Investigation Division investigation (including all of the transcribed statements of witnesses, pertinent subject criminal history, and addenda items); the relevant Training Evaluation and Management System materials of the involved officers; the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) recommendations, including any Minority Opinions; the report and recommendations of the Chief of Police; and the report and recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General. The Department Command staff presented the matter to the BOPC and made itself available for any inquiries by the BOPC.

The following incident was adjudicated by the BOPC on December 16, 2025.

Incident Summary

On Saturday, January 11, 2025, at approximately 1052 hours, Victim 1 was in the process of preparing lunch for the residents of a transitional housing facility. Victim 1 was an employee working at the facility.

The Subject was a male, 5 feet, 11 inches tall, 208 pounds, and a resident of the facility.

While in the kitchen, the Subject approached Victim 1, produced a knife, and stabbed Victim 1 in the neck. Victim 1 screamed and attempted to defend him/herself. The commotion attracted the attention of Victim 2, who was also a resident of the facility. Victim 1 was struggling with the Subject when Victim 2 entered the kitchen and attempted to intervene.

Victim 2 exited the kitchen and notified Witness A of the attack. Victim 2 then returned to the kitchen and assisted Victim 1 with restraining the Subject. Victim 1 then fled the facility and called 911.

At approximately 1055 hours, Communications Division (CD) received the first of several 911 calls related to the incident. Victim 2 called 911 and stated, "Emergency," before the line disconnected. As a result of that call, CD generated an unknown trouble radio call at the location.

The call was assigned to uniformed Officers A and B, who responded to the location.

While the officers were enroute to the call, CD received an additional 911 call from the same location. Witness B, also a resident at the facility, advised the Emergency Board Operator (EBO), "Someone was getting attacked" and provided the address. As a result of that call, CD broadcast that the unknown trouble radio call was being upgraded to an "Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) Subject there now" call.

At approximately 1101 hours, Victim 1 called 911 and stated that the Subject was trying to kill people at the facility and that the Subject had stabbed him/her. Victim 1 stated that the Subject was "just trying to kill people." Victim 1 provided the Subject's physical and clothing description as well as his name. Communications Division upgraded the radio call to an ambulance cutting and broadcast the description of the Subject to responding units.

In accordance with the Department's Edged Weapon Protocol, CD dispatched the incident to Southwest Patrol Division uniformed Sergeant A.

The following personnel were among the officers who also responded to the call: Officers C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, and O.

At approximately 1105 hours, Officers A and B arrived at scene. Officer B obtained the beanbag shotgun from his/her vehicle and chambered a round. The shotgun was loaded with four super-sock beanbag rounds in the magazine with two additional super-sock beanbag rounds in the sidesaddle. As officers approached, a police helicopter (Air Unit), piloted by Officer N and Tactical Flight Officer O, arrived overhead.

The officers entered the property and walked toward the rear of the location, where they met with Victims 1 and 2, and Witnesses A, B, and C, who were standing near the parking area. Officer A asked, "Who has a knife?" Victim 2 immediately provided a physical description of the Subject as Victim 1 stated, "He tried killing me," and showed the officers his/her injuries. Victim 1 stated the Subject was armed with "a little box cutter," and that he had additional weapons. Officers A and B were advised that the Subject was inside the facility in a specific unit number.

The officers unholstered their pistols and faced the front door as Officer B broadcast that the Subject was locked inside the unit and requested that the additional units respond to the area. Shortly after Officer B completed the broadcast, Officer A knocked on the door, announced, "LAPD," and directed the Subject to come outside.

As Officers A and B stood outside the unit, Officers E, F, and Sergeant A arrived at scene. Officer E met with Victim 1 and obtained additional information about the Subject, and Officer B requested that officers cover the rear of the location. Officer F then unholstered his/her pistol and moved to one end of the parking area and faced the rear of the unit. Victim 1 went on to inform Officer E that the Subject had two weapons that he pulled out. Officer E then broadcast the Subject was "armed with multiple knives," as he/she joined Officer F at the end of the parking area and unholstered his/her pistol.

While Officers E and F covered the rear of the location, Sergeant A met with Officers A and B outside the unit. Sergeant A directed Officer A to call the Subject out of the location.

As Officer A called the Subject out, Officers K and L, followed by Officers C and D, arrived at scene. Sergeant A directed Officers C and D to join Officers A and B outside the apartment. Officers K and L remained on the street with the victims and witnesses. At 1110 hours, Officer L requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA) to respond for Victim 1. Officers C and D unholstered their pistols and stood with Officers A and B.

Simultaneously, Officers G, H, I, and J arrived at scene. Officer H was equipped with a 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher (LLL). Officers G and H assumed a position in the walkway, outside the apartment, to the left of Officers A, B, C, and D. Officers G and H unholstered their pistols based on comments of the radio call. Officers I and J assumed a position at the end of the parking area with Officers E and F. Officer I remained at the rear of the location with Officers E and F as Officer J met with witnesses to gather additional information on the Subject.

At the direction of Sergeant A, Officer D asked the Air Unit to call the Subject out of the location. At approximately 1113 hours, the Air Unit utilized the public address system to order the Subject to put down all weapons and exit the location.

According to the facility's surveillance video, approximately two minutes after the Air Unit completed the announcement, and unbeknownst to the officers at scene, the Subject exited a second story apartment in the adjacent building. The Subject stood on the balcony and appeared to look in the officers' direction for approximately 10 seconds before he moved toward a staircase.

The Subject then began walking down the stairs toward the officers. Witness A, who was speaking with Sergeant A on the sidewalk, pointed at the Subject and alerted him/her to the Subject's presence. Witness A stated that the Subject was still armed with the knife in his hand.

According to Sergeant A, he/she observed the Subject walking down the stairs armed with a knife in his right hand.

As the Subject continued down the steps, Sergeant A shouted toward the team of officers, "Hey guys, this is him right here." Officers A, B, C, D, and G immediately moved toward the parking area in the Subject's direction. As the Subject exited the staircase onto the ground level, Officer G pointed his/her pistol at the Subject and ordered him to face the wall. The Subject then faced Officer G with a knife raised in his right hand.

The Subject began to move in the officers' direction as Officer G shouted, "Hey, back up," multiple times. Officer G backed away from the Subject into the roadway and alerted the officers that the Subject had a knife.

As the Subject entered the parking area, he began to walk in the direction of Officers E, F, and I, who were positioned behind a parked vehicle.

Officer F raised his/her pistol, pointed it in the Subject's direction, and stated, "backup," "watch the crossfire," and "drop the [expletive] knife." Officer F advised that he/she held his/her pistol at a high ready position, with his/her finger off the trigger.

As the Subject closed the distance on the officers, Officer B fired one super-sock beanbag round, which appeared to strike the Subject in the right shoulder area. The Subject's legs buckled; however, he continued moving toward Officers E, F, and I with the knife raised in his right hand. Officer B then fired a second super-sock beanbag round, after which the Subject fell to the ground. FID investigators were unable to determine where either round struck the Subject. Officer B fired the first and second rounds from the beanbag shotgun from an approximate distance of 15 and 19 feet, respectively.

As the Subject was on the ground, Officer C stood to the right of Officer B, and faced the direction of Officers E, F, and I with his/her pistol at a low-ready position.

As the officers attempted to gain the Subject's compliance, Sergeant A shouted, "Watch for crossfire." Officers A, B, C, and F then redeployed to the side of the parking area while multiple officers ordered the Subject to "drop it" several times.

The Subject continued to ignore the officers' commands and stood up with the knife in his right hand and redirected his attention toward Officer B. The Subject then walked toward Officers A, B, C, D, G, H, J, K, and Sergeant A, as they backed away from him. As the Subject closed the distance on the officers, Sergeant A shouted, "Beanbag up." Officer B then cycled the action on the beanbag shotgun and fired a third super-sock round, which struck the Subject on the upper torso.

After being struck by the third round, the Subject faced the officers with the knife raised in his right hand, when Officer B fired a fourth beanbag round. The round struck the Subject on the upper torso, which caused him to fall to the ground for a second time.

According to Officer B, he/she aimed the beanbag shotgun at the Subject's shoulder area when he/she fired the third and fourth super-sock rounds. Officer B believed both rounds struck the Subject on the shoulder. Officer B advised that, due to the circumstances, he/she was unable to issue the Subject a warning prior to the utilization of the intermediate force.

The investigation determined that Officer B fired the third and fourth rounds from the beanbag shotgun from an approximate distance of 19 and 18 feet, respectively.

Immediately after the Subject fell to the ground, the Subject stood up once again with the knife in his right hand. Officer D redeployed from the roadway, behind Officer B, and unholstered his/her pistol. The Subject then exited the parking area and walked toward Officers A, C, H, J, and K with the knife raised at shoulder level. While in the roadway, Officers A and H holstered their pistols. Officer H transitioned to the 40mm LLL as Officer A transitioned to the TASER.

Officer C advised investigators that officers had bean-bagged the Subject approximately four times, and he was still willing to walk in their direction knowing that there was a row of armed officers. Officer C stated that the Subject was not rational and he was just staring at all the officers.

As the Subject closed the distance, Sergeant A shouted, "less lethal, less lethal, TASER, TASER." Officer B slung the beanbag shotgun and unholstered his/her pistol as he/she backed away from the Subject along the pedestrian walkway, along with Officer D and Sergeant A.

As the Subject advanced toward the officers with the knife in his right hand, Officer C continued to back away from him, along the sidewalk. Officer C believed the Subject's knife had a 3-to-4-inch blade. Officer C utilized a two-handed grip, pointed his/her pistol at the Subject, and fired one round. The Subject was struck in the chest and immediately fell to the ground with the knife still clenched in his right hand.

According to Officer C, the Subject walked in the officers' direction with the knife raised and the blade pointed upward. Officer C estimated that the Subject was within five to eight feet of the officers. The investigation subsequently determined that Officer C fired from an approximate distance of 13 feet. The background at the time Officer C fired was the vehicles parked along the side of the street.

According to Officer C, he/she did not want to risk his/her life or the lives of other officers, so he/she fired with the fear that had he/she allowed the Subject to move any further forward, the Subject was going to hurt or kill someone.

Post-OIS and Arrest Tactics

After the OIS, Officer F shouted, "Shots fired." As the Subject lay on the ground, the officers ordered him to drop the knife numerous times. Approximately 15 seconds after the OIS, the Air Unit broadcast a request for a Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) RA to respond to the incident.

At 1117:53 hours, the officers formulated a tactical plan and approached the Subject. During the approach, Officer I utilized the ballistic shield to immobilize the Subject's right arm as Officer D removed the knife clenched in his right hand.

At 1118:40 hours, the Subject was taken into custody without further incident. Immediately after the Subject was handcuffed, he was placed in a left lateral recovery position. Officers conducted a pat-down search, assessed his injuries, and rendered medical aid. Officers continuously rendered aid until LAFD personnel arrived at scene and assumed the Subject's care.

At 1128 hours, LAFD arrived at the scene and treated the Subject at scene. The Subject was subsequently transported to a nearby hospital where he was treated for a gunshot wound to the chest by Doctor A. Despite life-saving efforts, Doctor A pronounced the Subject deceased at 1148 hours.

BWV and DICVS Policy Compliance

NAME	TIMELY BWV ACTIVATION	FULL 2- MINUTE BUFFER	BWV RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT	TIMELY DICVS ACTIVATION	DICVS RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT
Sergeant A	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Officer B	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Officer C	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A

Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners' Findings

The BOPC reviews each Categorical Use of Force incident based upon the totality of the circumstances, namely all of the facts, evidence, statements and all other pertinent material relating to the particular incident. In every case, the BOPC makes specific findings in three areas: Tactics of the involved officer(s); Drawing/Exhibiting of a firearm by any involved officer(s); and the Use of Force by any involved officer(s). Based on the BOPC's review of the instant case, the BOPC made the following findings:

A. Tactics

The BOPC found Officers B, C, and Sergeant A's tactics to warrant a finding of Tactical Debrief.

B. Drawing and Exhibiting

The BOPC found Officers B and C's drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be In Policy.

C. Intermediate Use of Force

The BOPC found Officer B's intermediate use of force to be In Policy.

D. Lethal Use of Force

The BOPC found Officer C's lethal use of force to be In Policy.

Basis for Findings

In making its decision in this matter, the Commission is mindful that every "use of force by members of law enforcement is a matter of critical concern both to the public and the law enforcement community. It is recognized that some individuals will not comply with the law or submit to control unless compelled to do so by the use of force; therefore, law enforcement officers are sometimes called upon to use force in the performance of their duties. The Los Angeles Police Department also recognizes that members of law enforcement derive their authority from the public and therefore must be ever mindful that they are not only the guardians, but also the servants of the public.

The Department's guiding principle when using force shall be reverence for human life. Officers shall attempt to control an incident by using time, distance, communications, and available resources in an effort to de-escalate the situation, whenever it is safe, feasible, and reasonable to do so. As stated below, when warranted, Department personnel may use objectively reasonable force to carry out their duties. Officers may use deadly force only when they reasonably believe, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary in defense of human life. Officers who use unreasonable force degrade the confidence of the community we serve, expose the Department and fellow officers to physical hazards, violate the law and rights of individuals upon whom unreasonable force or unnecessary deadly force is used, and

subject the Department and themselves to potential civil and criminal liability. Conversely, officers who fail to use force when warranted may endanger themselves, the community and fellow officers.” (Special Order No. 23, 2020, Policy on the Use of Force - Revised.)

The Commission is cognizant of the legal framework that exists in evaluating use of force cases, including the United States Supreme Court decision in *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), stating that:

“The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

The Commission is further mindful that it must evaluate the actions in this case in accordance with existing Department policies. Relevant to our review are Department policies that relate to the use of force:

Use of De-Escalation Techniques: It is the policy of this Department that, whenever practicable, officers shall use techniques and tools consistent with Department de-escalation training to reduce the intensity of any encounter with a Subject and enable an officer to have additional options to mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Verbal Warnings: Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of any force, make reasonable efforts to identify themselves as a peace officer and to warn that force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the person is already aware of those facts.

Proportionality: Officers may only use a level of force that they reasonably believe is proportional to the seriousness of the suspected offense or the reasonably perceived level of actual or threatened resistance.

Fair and Unbiased Policing: Officers shall carry out their duties, including use of force, in a manner that is fair and unbiased. Discriminatory conduct on the basis of race, religion, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, gender, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, housing status, or disability while performing any law enforcement activity is prohibited.

Use of Force – Non-Deadly: It is the policy of the Department that personnel may use only that force which is “objectively reasonable” to:

- Defend themselves;
- Defend others;
- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

Factors Used to Determine Objective Reasonableness: Pursuant to the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor*, the Department examines the reasonableness of any particular force used: a) from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience, in the same situation; and b) based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- The feasibility of using de-escalation tactics, crisis intervention or other alternatives to force;
- The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;
- The level of threat or resistance presented by the Subject;
- Whether the Subject was posing an immediate threat to the officers or a danger to the community;
- The potential for injury to citizens, officers or Subjects;
- The risk or apparent attempt by the Subject to escape;
- The conduct of the Subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);
- The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;
- The availability of other resources;
- The training and experience of the officer;
- The proximity or access of weapons to the Subject;
- Officer versus Subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number of officers versus Subjects;
- The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances; and,
- Whether a person is a member of a vulnerable population.

Drawing or Exhibiting Firearms: Unnecessarily or prematurely drawing or exhibiting a firearm limits an officer’s alternatives in controlling a situation, creates unnecessary anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm. Officers shall not draw or exhibit a firearm unless the circumstances surrounding the incident create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary to use the firearm. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm. Any drawing and exhibiting of a firearm shall conform with this policy on the use of firearms. Moreover, any intentional pointing of a firearm at a person by an officer shall be reported. Such reporting will be published in the Department’s year-end use of force report.

Intermediate Use of Force: *Use of an Electronic Control Device (i.e. TASER), Impact Device (e.g., Baton), Kinetic Energy Projectile (e.g., Beanbag Shotgun, 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher, FN 303), or certain Chemical Agents (e.g., Oleoresin Capsicum) is an appropriate force option when an officer reasonably believes either of the following:*

- *There is an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; or,*
- *If the threat is not immediately addressed, there is an articulable risk the incident could escalate to the use of deadly force.*

Intermediate force options should not be used on a suspect or subject who is believed to be unarmed, and, is passively resisting or merely failing to comply with commands. Verbal threats of violence alone do not justify the use of an intermediate force option.

Use of Force – Deadly: It is the policy of the Department that officers shall use deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary for either of the following reasons:

- To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the Officer or another person; or,
- To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended.

In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible. Before discharging a firearm, officers shall consider their surroundings and potential risks to bystanders to the extent feasible under the circumstances.

Note: Because the application of deadly force is limited to the above scenarios, an officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the Officer or another person.

The Department's Evaluation of Deadly Force: The Department will analyze an officer's use of deadly force by evaluating the totality of the circumstances of each case consistent with the California Penal Code Section 835(a), as well as the factors articulated in *Graham v. Connor*.

Rendering Aid: After any use of force, officers shall immediately request a rescue ambulance for any person injured. In addition, officers shall promptly provide basic and emergency medical assistance to all members of the community, including victims, witnesses, subjects, suspects, persons in custody, suspects of a use of force and fellow officers:

- To the extent of the officer's training and experience in first aid/CPR/AED; and
- To the level of equipment available to the officer at the time assistance is needed.

Warning Shots: It is the policy of this Department that warning shots shall only be used in exceptional circumstances where it might reasonably be expected to avoid the need to use deadly force. Generally, warning shots shall be directed in a manner that minimizes the risk of injury to innocent persons, ricochet dangers and property damage.

Shooting at or From Moving Vehicles: It is the policy of this Department that firearms shall not be discharged at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the officer or another person with deadly force by means other than the vehicle. The moving vehicle itself shall not presumptively constitute a threat that justifies an officer's use of deadly force. An officer threatened by an oncoming vehicle shall move out of its path instead of discharging a firearm at it or any of its occupants. Firearms shall not be discharged from a moving vehicle, except in exigent circumstances and consistent with this policy regarding the use of Deadly Force.

Note: It is understood that the policy regarding discharging a firearm at or from a moving vehicle may not cover every situation that may arise. In all situations, officers are expected to act with intelligence and exercise sound judgement, attending to the spirit of this policy. Any deviations from the provisions of this policy shall be examined rigorously on a case by case basis. The involved officer must be able to clearly articulate the reasons for the use of deadly force. Factors that may be considered include whether the officer's life or the lives of others were in immediate peril and there was no reasonable or apparent means of escape.

Requirement to Report Potential Excessive Force: An officer who is present and observes another officer using force that the present and observing officer believes to be beyond that which is necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances based upon the totality of information actually known to the officer, shall report such force to a superior officer.

Requirement to Intercede When Excessive Force is Observed: An officer shall intercede when present and observing another officer using force that is clearly beyond that which is necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances, taking into account the possibility that other officers may have additional information regarding the threat posed by a Subject.

Definitions

Deadly Force: Deadly force is defined as any use of force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury, including but not limited to, the discharge of a firearm.

Feasible: Feasible means reasonably capable of being done or carried out under the circumstances to successfully achieve the arrest or lawful objective without increasing risk to the officer or another person.

Imminent: Pursuant to California Penal Code 835a(e)(2), “[A] threat of death or serious bodily injury is “imminent” when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to a peace officer or another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.”

Necessary: In addition to California Penal Code 835(a), the Department shall evaluate whether deadly force was necessary by looking at: a) the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience; b) the factors used to evaluate whether force is objectively reasonable; c) an evaluation of whether the officer exhausted the available and feasible alternatives to deadly force; and d) whether a warning was feasible and/or given.

Objectively Reasonable: The legal standard used to determine the lawfulness of a use of force is based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). *Graham* states, in part, “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” The force must be reasonable under the circumstances known to or reasonably believed by the officer at the time the force was used. Therefore, the Department examines all uses of force from an objective standard rather than a subjective standard.

Serious Bodily Injury: Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 243(f)(4) Serious Bodily Injury includes but is not limited to:

- Loss of consciousness;
- Concussion;
- Bone Fracture;
- Protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ;
- A wound requiring extensive suturing; and,
- Serious disfigurement.

Totality of the Circumstances: All facts known to or reasonably perceived by the officer at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the Subject leading up to the use of force.

Vulnerable Population: Vulnerable populations include, but are not limited to, children, elderly persons, people who are pregnant, and people with physical, mental, and developmental disabilities.

Warning Shots: The intentional discharge of a firearm off target not intended to hit a person, to warn others that deadly force is imminent.

A. Tactics

Tactical De-Escalation

- *Tactical De-Escalation Techniques*
 - *Planning*
 - *Assessment*
 - *Time*
 - *Redeployment and/or Containment*
 - *Other Resources*
 - *Lines of Communication*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – This was Officers A and B's first shift working together, as it was for Officers C and D. The partners discussed tactics, including contact and cover roles, as well as the potential for these roles to evolve during the incident. While enroute to the location, Officer B read the comments of the call to Officer A, while Officer D also read the comments of the call to Officer C. The comments indicated that the Subject had stabbed another male. Officers A and B discussed use of force options. As a result, Officer B retrieved the Beanbag Shotgun.

After the OIS, officers formulated a tactical plan to approach the Subject and take him into custody. Part of that plan included Officer I using the ballistic shield to secure the Subject's right hand as Officer D extracted the knife out of his hand, thus mitigating the potential risk of additional force applications.

Assessment – Prior to their arrival at scene, Officers A and B evaluated the possibility of the Subject being armed based on the comments of the call. After speaking with Victim 1 at scene and verifying he had been the victim of a crime, Officers A and B requested additional resources and then quickly responded to the apartment unit to verify if there were additional victims inside and to contain the Subject.

As the Subject emerged from a different location, while armed with a knife, the officers assessed the Subject's actions and concluded he posed an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death to community members and themselves if not immediately addressed.

Time, Redeployment and/or Containment – Believing the Subject was inside the apartment unit, officers established containment around the unit. Upon realizing the Subject was in an adjacent building, officers adjusted their positions and continually redeployed and repositioned themselves in response to his movements.

Additionally, Officer B sought to gain time by employing intermediate force and discharged the Beanbag Shotgun four times at the Subject, which were temporarily successful as the Subject fell to the ground after being struck; however, he stood back up and continued advancing towards officers while still armed with the knife. The Subject's continued advancement diminished the officers' ability to capitalize on time and eliminated their opportunity to employ further de-escalation techniques.

Other Resources – Upon arrival to the scene, Officer B ensured the Beanbag Shotgun was ready as an intermediate force option. The Air Unit arrived overhead as Officers A and B approached the location. Officer B requested additional units to respond. Officer L requested an RA to provide medical attention to Victim 1, while an RA was requested for the Subject subsequent to the OIS for medical care.

Lines of Communication – When the Subject was believed to be in a specific apartment unit, Officer A knocked on the door and announced, "LAPD man, come outside." At the direction of Sergeant A, the Air Unit utilized the public address (PA) system to call the Subject out of the location. After observing the Subject armed with a knife, officers ordered the Subject several times to drop the knife. As the Subject advanced on officers, officers communicated with one another regarding crossfire issues and the deployment of intermediate force.

- During its review of this incident, the BOPC noted the following tactical considerations:

1. Use of Force Warning

As the Subject approached the officers with a knife in his right hand, Officer B discharged four super-sock beanbag rounds at him. According to Officer B, given the circumstances of the incident, with the Subject closing the distance and being perceived as an immediate threat of serious bodily injury to the officers and him/her, it was not feasible to provide a use of force warning. The dynamic nature of the situation and the Subject's actions escalated the situation before a verbal warning could be provided.

The BOPC assessed Officer B's lack of providing a verbal warning prior to deploying the Beanbag Shotgun. The Board noted at the time Officer B discharged the Beanbag Shotgun, that the Subject was armed with a knife, posing an immediate threat. Furthermore, the Board also noted, despite the numerous attempts ordering the Subject to drop the knife, he refused to comply.

The Board noted the Department's Use of Force Policy specifically indicates that a warning is only required when feasible. Due to the rapid nature of this encounter, the Board noted that a use of force warning was not feasible due to the short window of opportunity the officers had to make the decision to use the Beanbag Shotgun, acquire a target and fire. The Board noted that Officer B discharged four super-sock Beanbag Shotgun rounds from approximate distances between 15 to 19 feet as the Subject rapidly continued to close the distance on multiple officers. As such, the Board opined that the Subject's advancement on officers diminished Officer B's time to provide a use of force warning prior to the application of force; therefore, a use of force warning was not feasible.

Based upon the totality of circumstances, the BOPC determined the tactics employed by Officer B were not a substantial deviation from Department-approved tactical training.

Additional Tactical Debriefing Topics

- **Cover and Concealment** – As the Subject unexpectedly appeared from a different building, officers had to promptly adjust, redeploy and reposition themselves accordingly. Though Officers B and C attempted to utilize distance to gain time, they were without the benefit of cover while deploying force.

The Board noted the Subject remained armed with a knife and heightened the situation with his erratic deadly behavior, ultimately resulting in an OIS. The officers strived to modify their positions and gain distance in response to the Subject's movements as they sought to de-escalate the situation.

Therefore, the BOPC found that the officers' actions did not deviate from Department-approved training.

- **Crossfire** – As the Subject exited from a second-story apartment and officers became aware of his location, they immediately repositioned themselves to triangulate on him. During the redeployment, they recognized the risk of a possible crossfire situation. The officers quickly adjusted their positions to ensure they managed the direction of their muzzles and communicated with each other.

Sergeant A cautioned officers to be vigilant regarding the crossfire; concurrently, Officer F repositioned and adopted a "high ready" stance to mitigate the risk of crossfire. As Officer B discharged the initial two beanbag rounds, Officer C positioned him/herself to the right of Officer B and faced the direction of Officers E,

F, and I, while holding his/her pistol in a low-ready position. When questioned about the possibility of crossfire, Officer C informed FID that he/she acknowledged the crossfire situation and promptly lowered his/her muzzle towards the ground to prevent any crossfire incidents.

Command and Control

- Sergeant A responded to the radio call and upon arrival, assessed the situation and began requesting additional resources. Sergeant A directed officers to ensure an RA was requested for Victim 1 and instructed officers to call out the Subject from the unit where he was believed to be located. Additionally, Sergeant A directed Officer D to have the Air Unit make an announcement using the PA system. As the Subject exited the second-story apartment in the adjacent building and began descending the stairs towards the officers, Sergeant A promptly informed officers of the Subject's location. When officers redeployed as they contacted the Subject, Sergeant A recognized the Subject had placed officers in a potential crossfire situation and instructed officers be vigilant about the crossfire. Despite the officers' commands for the Subject to drop the knife, the Subject continued to grip the knife and advance towards them. As a result, Sergeant A directed the officers to deploy the Beanbag Shotgun and utilize intermediate force options.

According to Officer B, he/she discharged the Beanbag Shotgun based on his/her own independent assessment.

When the Subject fell to the ground after being struck by gunfire and Officer F advised there had been shots fired, Sergeant A broadcast, "shots fired," and requested an RA to standby for the Subject. With the assistance of Officer F, the officers formulated a tactical plan to approach, disarm and take the Subject into custody. Once the Subject was taken into custody, Sergeant A directed officers place the Subject in a recovery position and render aid.

During the incident, Sergeant A performed multiple supervisory tasks such as separating and monitoring the involved officers, directing officers to set up a crime scene, canvass for witnesses, and establish a Command Post.

The BOPC evaluated the command and control employed by Sergeant A. The Board noted that Sergeant A effectively took control of a volatile situation using active leadership and was able to delegate tasks to officers at scene, which included permitting Officer F to develop a plan to effectively take the Subject into custody.

The Board acknowledged Sergeant A effectively accomplished multiple tasks simultaneously with clear and concise communication. The Board commended the command and control exhibited by Sergeant A at scene for prioritizing reverence for human life as officers implemented lifesaving methods for the Subject.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined the overall actions of Sergeant A were consistent with Department supervisory training for a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

- In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the BOPC determined the actions of Officers B, C, and Sergeant A did not deviate from Department-approved tactical training.

Each tactical incident merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved officers and sergeant to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, Officers B, C, and Sergeant A were directed to attend a Tactical Debrief, where the specific identified topics would be discussed.

B. Drawing and Exhibiting

- **Officer C** (1st Occurrence)

According to Officer C, the comments of the radio call indicated the Subject had stabbed the victim. Based on the nature of the call, Officer C unholstered his/her service pistol when he/she approached the Subject's believed location as he/she believed the situation could escalate to one involving the use of deadly force.

- **Officer C** (2nd Occurrence)

According to Officer C, after retrieving the ballistic shield from Officers K and L's police vehicle, he/she became the designated cover officer (DCO) outside of the apartment unit. Officer C unholstered his/her service pistol because he/she believed the situation could escalate to one involving the use of deadly force.

- **Officer C** (3rd Occurrence)

According to Officer C, as the team of officers initially moved in the Subject's direction, he/she heard officers state that the Subject was armed with a knife. Officer C grounded the ballistic shield and became Officer B's DCO as he/she deployed the Beanbag Shotgun. Officer C unholstered his/her service pistol to provide Officer B with lethal cover and because he/she believed the situation could escalate to one involving the use of deadly force.

- **Officer B (1st Occurrence)**

According to Officer B, the comments of the radio call indicated it was an ADW stabbing involving a knife, which had the potential to inflict serious bodily injury or even result in death. Officer B unholstered his/her service pistol because he/she believed the situation could escalate to one involving the use of deadly force.

- **Officer B (2nd Occurrence)**

According to Officer B, upon being advised the Subject was in a specific apartment unit, he/she and Officer A established containment. Officer B unholstered his/her service pistol for the second time as he/she believed the Subject was armed with several knives and believed the situation could escalate to one involving the use of deadly force.

- **Officer B (3rd Occurrence)**

According to Officer B, following the discharge of the fourth Beanbag Shotgun round, the Subject continued to advance toward him/her and his/her partner officers. Believing it was not feasible for him/her to reload the Beanbag Shotgun, he/she slung his/her Beanbag Shotgun and transitioned to his/her service pistol. Officer B unholstered his/her service pistol because he/she believed the situation could escalate to one involving the use of deadly force.

The BOPC assessed Officers B and C's drawing and exhibiting of their service pistols. Based on the comments of the radio call and the information provided by the victims and witnesses at scene, the Board noted that both Officers B and C were well informed the incident involved an ADW Subject armed with a knife. The Board also noted that upon officers encountering the Subject, from a different location, Officers B and C observed him armed with a knife in his right hand furthering the Board's belief the Subject remained a deadly threat throughout the incident. The Board concluded that Officers B and C's drawing and exhibiting of their service pistols were reasonable and appropriate, as the circumstances surrounding the incident created a reasonable belief amongst the officers that the situation could escalate to one where lethal force could be justified.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers B and C would reasonably believe the situation could escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, the BOPC found Officers B and C's drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be In Policy, for all occurrences.

C. Intermediate Use of Force

- **Officer B** – (Beanbag Shotgun, four super-sock rounds from approximate distances of 15 to 19 feet)

Background – Officer B's BWV depicted a yellow cement wall of an apartment building and a parked vehicle in the background during the use of force.

First Round – Discharged from an approximate distance of 15 feet.

According to Officer B, he/she observed the Subject closing the distance on Officers E, F, and I. Believing the Subject posed an immediate threat to the officers' safety, Officer B aimed at the Subject's shoulder and discharged one super-sock beanbag round. The round appeared to strike the Subject's right shoulder area. After Officer B discharged the first super-sock beanbag round, the Subject's legs buckled, but he continued to hold the knife in a forward grip.

Second Round – Discharged from an approximate distance of 19 feet.

According to Officer B, he/she assessed after discharging his/her first super-sock beanbag round and observed the Subject continue to move forward toward the officers with the knife raised in his right hand. Believing the Subject continued to pose an immediate threat to the officers' safety, Officer B discharged a second round from his/her Beanbag Shotgun, aiming at the Subject's shoulder. The round struck the Subject, causing him to fall to the ground.

Third Round – Discharged from an approximate distance of 19 feet.

As officers attempted to gain the Subject's compliance, Officer B redeployed to the south side of the parking area. The Subject continued to ignore officers' commands, stood up with the knife in his right hand, and redirected his attention to Officer B. Believing the Subject posed an immediate threat to his/her and the officers' safety, Officer B cycled the action of the Beanbag Shotgun and discharged a third super-sock round, which struck the Subject on the upper torso.

Fourth Round – Discharged from an approximate distance of 18 feet.

According to Officer B, the Subject continued to hold the knife and refused to comply with commands. The Subject faced the officers with the knife raised in his right hand. As the Subject continued to pose an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death, Officer B discharged a fourth round from the Beanbag Shotgun, striking the Subject on the upper torso, which caused him to fall to the ground. Immediately after the Subject fell to the ground, he stood up again with the knife in his right hand. Officer B transitioned and unholstered his/her service pistol.

Officer B stated while he/she discharged his/her beanbag rounds, he/she aimed at the Subject's shoulder.

The BOPC discussed Officer B's use of intermediate force. The Board considered that each time Officer B discharged his/her Beanbag Shotgun, the Subject was armed with a knife posing an immediate threat to the officers' safety. Despite several attempts to persuade the Subject to relinquish the knife, he failed to comply. As a result, the Board noted that all four rounds Officer B discharged from his/her Beanbag Shotgun were in response to the Subject's erratic and deadly behavior as he continued to be armed and posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers. The Board acknowledged and praised the officers for their efforts to de-escalate the situation by utilizing the Beanbag Shotgun. Their actions reflected their discipline, restraint and respect for human life; however, the Subject's erratic behavior ultimately intensified the incident. The Board also discussed Officer B's targeting of the Subject's shoulder and noted that the primary target area is the navel area or beltline, but officers may target the Subject's arms, hands or legs when practical.

The Board concluded the targeting of the Subject's shoulder was appropriate, considering the way the Subject was positioned and what target areas were presented to Officer B.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer B, in the same situation, would reasonably believe the use of intermediate force was proportional and objectively reasonable.

Therefore, the BOPC found Officer B's use of intermediate force to be In Policy.

D. Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer C** – Pistol, one round from an approximate distance of 13 feet.

Background – The investigation determined the background for the round discharged by Officer C consisted of vehicles parked along the side of the street.

As officers gave the Subject commands to drop the knife, he disregarded their commands and continued to advance towards them. According to Officer C, he/she observed the Subject approaching with the knife raised and the blade pointed upward. Officer C proceeded to redeploy by backpedaling along the sidewalk. Believing the Subject was attempting to attack him/her, Officer C discharged one round from his/her service pistol at the Subject to protect him/herself and others from the imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death. The Subject was struck in the chest and immediately collapsed to the ground with the knife still clenched in his right hand. Officer C ceased firing after the initial shot when he/she assessed that the Subject had fallen and was no longer moving.

The BOPC assessed Officer C's use of lethal force. The Board noted that officers had attempted to de-escalate the incident with the Subject by ordering him to drop the knife and stop his advancement toward them, as well as employing intermediate force. Despite the officers' efforts, the Board noted that the Subject refused to follow their directions and instead chose to remain armed as he held the knife over his head and advanced toward them. The Board opined that the Subject quickly escalated the situation and posed an imminent threat to the officers, including Officer C, as he continued to reduce the distance between them and was in close proximity.

The Board also noted prior to Officer C discharging his/her service pistol, Officer C considered that the Subject was not going to stop his deadly actions as he had already been struck by several beanbag rounds and still refused to drop the knife as he advanced toward him/her.

The BOPC concluded that Officer C was in a situation that lacked alternative options and therefore found Officer C's use of lethal force to be objectively reasonable, proportional and necessary based upon the Subject's imminent, deadly actions. Officer C stopped firing upon the Subject falling to the ground and the imminent threat ending.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer C, in the same situation, would believe the use of deadly force to be objectively reasonable, proportional, and necessary.

Therefore, the BOPC found Officer C's lethal use of force to be In Policy.