

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

July 7, 2014
14.2

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: BOMB SQUAD INSPECTION (IAID No. 14-035)

RECOMMENDED ACTION

It is recommended that the Board of Police Commissioners REVIEW and APPROVE the attached Bomb Squad Inspection.

DISCUSSION

Internal Audits and Inspections Division conducted the Bomb Squad Inspection to follow up on audit recommendations made within the previously approved Bomb Squad Audit (IAID No. 13-004).

If additional information regarding this audit is required, please contact Arif Alikhan, Special Assistant for Constitutional Policing, at (213) 486-8730.

Respectfully,



CHARLIE BECK
Chief of Police

Attachments

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

BOMB SQUAD INSPECTION

(IAID No. 14-035)



CHARLIE BECK
Chief of Police

June 2014

BOMB SQUAD INSPECTION
Conducted by
Internal Audits and Inspections Division
Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2013/2014

PURPOSE

Internal Audits and Inspections Division (IAID) conducted the Bomb Squad Inspection to determine the status of recommendations issued as a result of findings identified in the Bomb Squad Audit conducted during Fiscal Year 2012/2013 (IAID No. 13-004).

BACKGROUND/PRIOR AUDIT

Internal Audits and Inspections Division conducted the previous audit, which was the first Bomb Squad Audit during Fiscal Year 2012/2013, to evaluate adherence with Department policies and procedures, as well as with Bomb Squad Standard Operating Procedures. The audit was directly requested by the Commanding Officer (C/O), Emergency Services Division (ESD).

The Hazardous Devices/Materials Section, ESD is made up of the Explosives Unit (Bomb Squad) and the Hazardous Materials Unit. The primary focus of the previous audit and this inspection was the Bomb Squad.

During the audit time period, the Bomb Squad was operating under Standard Operating Procedures 2006 (SOP 2006), which was last revised on November 28, 2006. The SOP 2006 delivered operational and administrative procedures, which were both comprehensively examined and reviewed by IAID. It was determined that the high risk elements contained in SOP 2006, would be considered for the audit objectives.

The audit determined that the internal controls outlined in SOP 2006, particularly for high risk elements, should be revisited. This meant changes to both the operational and administrative procedures of SOP 2006. This inspection reviewed the implementation of those changes. At the time of this inspection, the Bomb Squad was operating under a new SOP dated October 2, 2013 (SOP 2013).

METHODOLOGY

Internal Audits and Inspections Division conducted this inspection by meeting with the C/O and staff members from ESD, visiting sites of concern, and reviewing the newly implemented SOP 2013. Auditors reviewed the implemented changes resulting from the previous audit. During the site visits, the presence of scales were documented, evidence locker control sheets were reviewed for appropriate adjustments, and the on-site security modifications were examined. A review which included comparing the SOP 2006 to the newly implemented SOP 2013 was also conducted in order to articulate the distinct changes. This inspection was performed during March 2014.

INSPECTION

- **Recommendation No. 1 – It is recommended that the Commanding Officer, Emergency Services Division, review its respective Bomb Squad Standard Operating Procedures, and revise them accordingly to reflect feasibility and best practices, while maintaining appropriate internal controls over the use and inventory of the Department explosives and their current operations.**

Current Status: Implemented.

The previous audit determined that SOP 2006 should be revised to reflect current administrative and operating procedures. The Bomb Squad provided a revised copy of SOP 2013 to IAID at the commencement of this inspection.

The Bomb Squad implemented a new SOP dated October 2, 2013. The changes presented in the SOP 2013 were feasible and consistent with best practices, while delivering the level of internal controls requested for the operation of the Bomb Squad. Moreover, the SOP addressed the findings identified in the previous Bomb Squad Audit.

- **Recommendation No. 2 - It is recommended that a scale be maintained at the Metropolitan Bomb Facility (MBF) and Davis Facility to ensure the amount of explosives stored in the Day Magazines does not exceed the maximum weight amount indicated in the Bomb Squad Standard Operating Procedures.**

Current Status: Implemented.

The previous audit determined that a weight measurement was not included for the explosives in Day Magazines, thereby making it impossible to determine whether the weight of the explosive was the amount indicated in the SOP 2006.

The Bomb Squad's SOP 2013 states that "only small quantities (less than 10 pounds)" could be stored in the Day Magazines, and that "the combined weight of the items booked in the day magazines shall be listed on the sign-in log." Thereby, these policies necessitated the presence of a scale at Day Magazines.

The Bomb Squad provided a photograph of the scale located at the Davis Facility; IAID examined the photograph and determined the presence of a scale.

- **Recommendation No. 3 - It is recommended that the MBF Bomb Squad Day Magazine Log and the Davis Facility Bomb Squad Evidence Locker Control Sheet be revised to include: a field/box to reflect the amount of explosives stored into the Day Magazines; and, a field/box to reflect the supervisor's name and serial number of the supervisor giving approval for overnight storage.**

Current Status: Implemented.

The previous audit determined that two field/boxes needed to be added to the control sheets at the MBF Bomb Squad Day Magazine and the Davis Facility Bomb Squad Evidence Locker. One field/box would be for the amount of explosives stored and the second one would list the supervisor giving overnight approval.

The Bomb Squad's SOP 2013 was reviewed to determine whether a change to policy had been made to reflect the amount of explosives stored in Day Magazines. The MBF Bomb Squad Day Magazine Log was examined, which determined the explosive amount field/box had been incorporated. The Evidence Locker Valley Bomb Squad Facility Log was also reviewed, which determined the explosive amount field/box had been incorporated.¹

The Bomb Squad's SOP 2013 was further reviewed to determine that a change to the policy had been made to reflect the name and serial number of the supervisor giving approval for overnight storage. The MBF Bomb Squad Day Magazine Log was reviewed, which determined a supervisor field/box had been incorporated. The Evidence Locker Valley Bomb Squad Facility Log was also reviewed, which determined the supervisor field/box had been incorporated.

- **Recommendation No. 4 - It is recommended that the control sheets, at MBF Bomb Squad Evidence Locker and the Davis Facility Bomb Squad Evidence Locker, be revised to include a field/box for supervisory approval (Objective No. 7).**

Current Status: Implemented.

The previous audit determined that the SOP 2006 denoted that evidence could be stored at the Office Evidence Storage Lockers for ten days. Any period beyond ten days required supervisor approval. During the audit, IAID did not find any location where a supervisor was required to indicate approval of the extended period.

The SOP 2013 provides direction for the Bomb Squad duty supervisor to inspect both office Evidence Lockers and Day Magazines every seven days to ensure all of the evidence is properly logged in and/or transferred within ten calendar days. It also requires that the supervisor documents the information in the locker and magazine control sheets and on the Supervisor's Daily Report.

¹ The "Davis Facility Bomb Squad Evidence Locker Control Sheets" were renamed the "Evidence Locker Valley Bomb Squad Facility Log."

Internal Audits and Inspections Division examined logs at the MBF Bomb Squad and the Davis Facility Bomb Squad Evidence Lockers to verify implementation of policy as directed by the newly revised SOP.

- **Recommendation No. 5 – The Addition of a Gate to Secure Primary Inventory - It is recommended that the Department install a security gate within A Magazine to restrict access to the primary inventory of explosives, but allowing access to the requested explosives that would be set aside by the magazine control officers.**

Current Status: Implemented.

During the previous audit's site visit to A and B magazine, it was determined that access to all the explosives should be limited. The locations are accessed periodically by officers other than the magazine control officers. These visits are intended to collect explosives for training, bomb call outs, or SWAT call outs. During these periodic visits, all explosives were accessible to all bomb technicians. A gate securing all explosives except those being collected by the bomb technicians was recommended.

A site visit to 'A' Magazine concluded that a security gate had been installed to secure primary inventory.

CONCLUSION

Based on the corrective actions taken by the Bomb Squad, it is IAID's request to close out these recommendations as implemented.