

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

2023

USE OF FORCE  
YEAR-END REVIEW



CHIEF OF POLICE MICHEL R. MOORE



# LOS ANGELES POLICE

*“to protect and to serve”*

It is the mission of the Los Angeles Police Department to safeguard the lives and property of the people we serve, to reduce the incidence and fear of crime, and to enhance public safety while working with the diverse communities to improve their quality of life. Our mandate is to do so with honor and integrity, while at all times conducting ourselves with the highest ethical standards to maintain public confidence.





# DEPARTMENT





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# UNIT OF TALENT



6	8	12	14	16	26
Introduction	A message from the Chief of Police	Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners	Department Core Values	Department Structure and Resources	Mental Illness and Department Initiatives
	30	32	38	48	58
	The Unsheltered and Policing Initiatives	The Use of Force: Legality and Policy	Department Training and Development	Command and Control	Intermediate Force Deployment and Development
		64	68	70	72
		K-9 Platoon Developments and The Use of Force	Medical Care of Detainees and Arrestees	Body Worn Video and Digital In-Car Video System Policy and Procedures	Critical Incident Community Briefing
			74	86	90
			The Use of Force Investigation, Review, and Adjudication Process	Complaint Process The Use of Force	Officer Wellness Resources and The Use of Force
		92	94	108	110
		2023 Statistical Snapshot	Violent Crime in Perspective	Suspect Weapons or Actions by Percent	The Use of Force in Perspective For Public Contacts in 2023
	112	114	116	125	130
	Agency to Agency Comparison	Agency to Agency Use of Force Comparison	Data Mapping By Reporting District	Categorical Use of Force Highlights	2023 Public Contacts, Crime, Personnel and Arrests Highlights
133	134	244	266	274	286
Statistical Analysis	Categorical Use of Force Highlights Statistical Analysis 2019-2023	Non-Categorical Use of Force Statistical Analysis 2019-2023	Officer-Involved Shooting Synopses and Photographs of Recovered Suspect Weapons	Definitions Acronyms - 278 Methodology - 280 Index - 284	Acknowledgements



# INTRODUCTION

Transparency • Accountability • Trust





# Raising Our Standards FOR THE COMMUNITY

*The City of Los Angeles is constantly changing but our Department's commitment to transparency, accountability, public trust, and building partnerships remain unchanged.*

It is the vision of the Los Angeles Police Department to, as closely as possible, achieve a City free from crime and public disorder. While fruition of that vision may seem distant, the men and women of the Los Angeles Police Department work toward that goal, every day, at every level. Their efforts, however, are just one step towards the solution. Without the cooperation and support of the communities we serve, those efforts will not be nearly as effective. Community–Police partnerships, grounded in trust and stewardship, are the only path to achieving the Department's vision of a City free from crime and disorder. History has taught us that a key element in the maintenance of that trust is transparency and accountability. In no arena is it more important than in the topic of law enforcement. In pursuit of full transparency, each year since 2015, the Department has compiled data and statistics relating to Departmental uses of force and published them in the Use of Force Year End Review (Report). This comprehensive document provides an in-depth critical look at the preceding five-years of data relating to the use of force by Los Angeles Police Officers.

The use of force (UOF) by law enforcement is a matter of critical concern both to the public and to law enforcement. The Department recognizes the importance of engaging in an open


and honest dialogue about the use of force by our officers. This publication allows for a thorough internal examination of the data, as well as provides an opportunity for the public to make their own assessment. This document is a demonstration of the Department's commitment to our Core Value of Quality Through Continuous Improvement. By turning a critical eye to this information, we are able to identify any patterns or outliers that might be cause for further examination, while also identifying areas where policy changes and updates have positively impacted the way our officers do their work.

In addition to data on UOF, this Report also provides extensive background and information on Department policies, procedures, entities, services, tools, and equipment. Also featured are data on crime and crime trends across the city, comparisons with other agencies across the nation, and demographic information for the Department and the City of Los Angeles.

As we move into 2024, the Department continues to be a leader in innovative practices, policies, technologies, and approaches to community engagement.







*A Message from the*  
**CHIEF OF POLICE**  
*Michel R. Moore*



*The Los Angeles Police Department constantly strives to improve and to meet the needs of our community members. We work with our communities to identify opportunities for growth and cooperation in the hope that we continue to build and maintain the trust and confidence of the people we serve.*

**F**inishing my tenure as Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), I remain committed to constitutional policing through a community-based approach. As Chief, I maintain my unwavering commitment to achieving a City free of crime and public disorder. As such, I understand the importance of forming connections with the communities we serve, to building relationships, and establishing public trust while working together to create a safer City. Through a collaborative approach with community leaders and our City partners, the Department emphasizes a relationship-based policing model which is built around meaningful engagement with the communities we serve. As a result, we have incorporated these principles into the fabric of our organization, promoting accountability and respect with every public encounter.

Our efforts to better engage and empower our communities as our partners in public safety has resulted in a marked decrease in all violent crime City-wide, including homicides, shooting victims, and robberies. Additionally, we also experienced a decrease in gang-related crime city-wide. Many of these successes can be attributed to our officers' focus on community policing, including our commitment to the Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) program and the implementation of our Community Safety Partnership Bureau's (CSPB) Neighborhood Engagement Areas (NEAs). Notably, half of our NEAs experienced zero homicides, with a decrease in shooting victims across all NEAs. In addition, nighttime Public Safety Meetings (PSMs) take place quarterly, allowing the community's voice to be heard to help focus the Department's efforts towards meaningful impact in the diverse communities we serve.

One of the important aspects of promoting transparency and accountability involves a critical review of our use of force incidents. To safely and effectively police our communities, officers must occasionally use force in the performance of their duties. During these dangerous field encounters, de-escalation principles are of the utmost importance as our officers work to resolve volatile situations while using the least amount of force possible. In all things, particularly uses of force, officers are expected to make decisions firmly guided by the intent to protect and to preserve human life. We understand use of force incidents involving community members are points of concern for the public subject to a high level of scrutiny both

from within and from outside of the Department. Because of this, the Department's Use of Force policy is centered around de-escalation techniques up to and including the use of lethal force as a last resort.

A challenge we faced in 2023 was an increase in officer-involved shooting incidents and categorical use of force incidents. In 2023, we had 34 officer-involved shootings, compared to 31 in 2022. Additionally, we experienced 70 categorical use of force incidents, an increase of 17 from 2022, when there were 53. In the officer-involved shootings, all the suspects were armed with a weapon or object that posed a threat to officers, with the majority of those weapons being firearms 13 and 12 being edged weapons. One data point of note is six of the firearms were ghost guns. In 2023, there were 1,610 incidents where officers used force, as opposed to 2,253 in 2022. The 1,610 incidents where officers used force resulted in 938 suspects being injured and 16 suspects succumbing to those injuries.

Through 2023, the Department continued its ongoing efforts to improve and update our Department-wide trainings. With the implementation of our Virtual Reality Training System, we can further develop our use of force de-escalation techniques, particularly with those subjects suffering from mental illness, within a virtual reality environment. The Virtual Reality Training Unit oversees this course which is a State of California, Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) certified training. This training is a crucial portion of the Department's Mental Health Intervention Training (MHIT) and provides officers with invaluable experience interacting with persons who are suffering from mental illness. In 2023, 1,309 officers completed various virtual reality trainings.

*"Forming meaningful connections and establishing trust with the communities we protect and serve are critical components in effective policing."*

In response to several after-action reports which were developed as a result of the civil unrest in the city during 2020, the Department has prioritized training our personnel on our updated Mobile Field Force for Patrol course. This is a demonstration of the Department's commitment to training our officers in the effective use of crowd management and control. The Department's Metropolitan Division has a cadre of dedicated instructors that is tasked with the responsibility for conducting this training Department-wide. In 2023, 1,093 officers completed the Mobile Field Force for Patrol training course.

As part of our ongoing pursuit of quality through continuous improvement, the Department finalized a biennial Intermediate



Force Recertification Program, which is scheduled to begin in the summer of 2024. This recertification includes qualifying with the 40mm Less Lethal Launcher and the beanbag shotgun while conducting a comprehensive review of the laws and policies related to the use of force. The goal of this training is to ensure our officers have a thorough understanding of the available intermediate force options, as well as how to use those options effectively and safely.

Finally, the Department understands the importance of building relationships and employing community policing principles. Implementing relevant trainings to achieve those goals has remained an utmost priority for the Department. The CSPB regularly facilitates Community Safety Partnership (CSP) trainings, which focus on relationship building between officers and community members. In 2023, a total of 37 trainings were conducted, including (9) nine Supervisor Schools, (6) six Watch Commander Schools, (7) seven LAPD Leadership Courses, (6) six GRYD Schools, and (9) nine Police Sciences and Leadership Programs. In addition to these trainings, CSPB developed two separate CSP-focused training concepts: an online Learning Management System (LMS) training and a roll call training presentation. These trainings are designed to bolster understanding of CSP principles among sworn employees assigned outside of CSPB. Both training concepts, titled “Community Safety Partnership: Foundations for Patrol,” were launched in 2023 and have been completed by 7,024 officers.

In addition to our ongoing training efforts, the Department recognizes the importance of utilizing cutting edge technology in the performance of our duties. In 2023, Innovation Management Division (IMD) assisted Traffic Group (TRFG) in obtaining a pilot for Axon Respond. Axon Respond is a function that allows Department supervisors to monitor vehicle pursuits through the Department’s Fleet 3 Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS). This allows the watch commander in charge of the division of occurrence to communicate directly in real-time with the officers in a pursuit, allowing for greater oversight and increased public safety.

Forming meaningful connections and establishing trust with the communities we protect and serve are critical components in effective policing. When officers use force, it has the potential to strain our relationship with the community, reducing public trust and our effectiveness as law enforcement professionals. To this end, it is crucial that we maintain accountability and transparency in our examination of every application of force, to include use of force trends and patterns as we strive to continuously improve as a police department. Through continuous training, community policing initiatives, and critical analysis, I remain committed to ensuring that all our officers uphold our Core Values while maintaining the highest ethical standards as we protect and serve the City of Los Angeles.









# BOARD OF POLICE *Commissioners*

Governed by the Los Angeles City Charter, the Board of Police Commissioners functions as the civilian head of the Los Angeles Police Department. The Commissioners are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council.

The Board of Police Commissioners, originally created in the 1920s, is comprised of five civilians who donate their time to the City. The Commissioners serve a maximum of two five-year terms, as well as up to two years of an unexpired term.

The Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC or Commission) serves as the Department's oversight body. The BOPC is responsible for establishing policy, implementing necessary reform measures, improving the Department's service to the community, and enhancing community policing programs.

The Commission also reviews and adjudicates Categorical Uses of Force by Department employees, including officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, and uses of force resulting in a person's admission to a hospital due to injury. In adjudicating each of these critical incidents, the Commission considers whether the actions of the involved officers adhered to all relevant Department policies and training. Should the Commission find any of the actions of the involved officers out of policy, the authority for the administration of discipline under the City Charter rests with the Chief of Police.

Additionally, the Commission regularly directs the Office of the Inspector General to investigate the conduct and performance of the Department. These investigations, which include recommendations for improvement when warranted, cover a wide variety of areas such as adherence to national best practices, reviews of the Department's specialized units, assessments of jail and holding tank procedures, etc.

## DR. ERROLL G. SOUTHERS *President*



Commission President, Dr. Erroll G. Southers, was appointed to the Commission in March 2023. He was elected to serve as President in August 2023. Dr. Southers is an Associate Senior Vice President at the University of Southern California (USC), professor and veteran of three law enforcement agencies including the FBI. He is a former presidential nominee, who has served at every level of government, including the Schwarzenegger and Newsom administrations, before being appointed to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners by Mayor Karen Bass. Dr. Southers is a noted counterterrorism expert, security analyst to media networks, who lectures and consults around the world. He earned his undergraduate degree from Brown University, and he holds masters and doctoral degrees in public policy from USC.

## RASHA GERGES SHIELDS *Vice-President*



Commission Vice President, Rasha Gerges Shields, was appointed to the Commission in March 2023. She was elected as Vice President in August 2023. Commissioner Shields is a Partner at Jones Day and a former federal prosecutor with nearly 20 years of first-chair trial and appellate experience. She defends companies and executives in high-stakes civil and criminal matters, including DOJ and State Attorneys General enforcement actions. She also helps companies conduct internal investigations and develop effective compliance programs. She has been the lead trial counsel in federal court, has argued before the California Supreme Court and federal/state appellate courts, and has submitted amicus briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court as lead counsel.

Commissioner Shields has significant experience litigating complex civil cases both affirmatively and defensively, involving a broad spectrum of claims, including contractual disputes, trade secret theft, product liability, fraud, antitrust and unfair business practices, racketeering, and claims against financial institutions. She has also represented clients in government investigations relating to public corruption, tax, civil rights, fraud, health care, and cybersecurity. Commissioner Shields serves on the Jones Day's diversity committee and on the Constitutional Policing and Civil Justice Reform Task Force. She immigrated from Egypt and is a first generation professional.

## MARIA LOU CALANCHE

### *Commissioner*



Commissioner Calanche was appointed to the Commission in August 2020. Commissioner Calanche is the Founder and Executive Director of Legacy LA, a youth development organization providing support to at-risk youth living in the Ramona Gardens community of Boyle Heights. Prior to Legacy LA, she was a Political Science professor at East Los Angeles Community College. She served as a Council Deputy for City of Los Angeles Councilmember Richard Alatorre, the Director of Community Outreach for the University of Southern California Health Sciences Campus and has also served on several community nonprofit boards and City of Los Angeles Commissions including El Pueblo de Los Angeles Historical Park and the City's Housing Authority. Commissioner Calanche has an undergraduate degree from Loyola Marymount University and a Master of Public Administration Degree from University of Southern California, where she is also a Doctoral Candidate focusing her research on land-use policy and citizen participation.

## WILLIAM J. BRIGGS II

### *Commissioner*



Commissioner Briggs was appointed to the Commission in December 2020. Upon his appointment, he was elected Vice-President by his fellow Commissioners and subsequently elected President in July 2021. Commissioner Briggs is a trial lawyer and civil litigator with a broad experience in the entertainment industry. His trial experience has been in state and federal courts, involving intellectual property disputes, complex entertainment contract disputes, partnership disputes, rights of publicity and First Amendment issues, and employment matters. Commissioner Briggs has substantial courtroom experience in disputes that involve trademarks, copyrights, the First Amendment, defamation, invasion of privacy, right of publicity, guild disputes, profit participation, royalty payments, violations of the Talent Agencies Act, and interpretation and enforcement of talent, executive, distribution, film, and recording contracts. Commissioner Briggs is active in the local community, serving on the Sierra Canyon School Board of Directors. Additionally, he provides pro bono legal services to the Alliance for Children's Rights. Commissioner Briggs obtained his education from Bethune-Cookman College in 1978 and his J.D., from Georgetown University Law Center, in 1988. He is also a recipient of the American Jurisprudence Award in Civil Rights.

## FABIAN GARCIA

### *Commissioner*



Commissioner Garcia was appointed to the Commission in August 2023. He is currently Director of Government Relations at Homeboy Industries. Fabian provides strategic guidance on policy and advocacy issues critical to the organization's mission. Prior to transitioning to Homeboy Industries, Fabian served as Senior Regional Program Coordinator for Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) under Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa's and Mayor Eric Garcetti's administrations. Fabian played an instrumental role in the development of the City's Gang Prevention, Gang Intervention, Re-entry, and Tattoo Removal Programs. He provided regional oversight of contracts between the City of Los Angeles and community-based service providers. Oversight included providing technical assistance, training on model fidelity, advising on budget management, and developing community and law enforcement partnerships. He has also worked for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). Fabian has dedicated himself to empowering communities and creating opportunities for closing the equity gaps.



# DEPARTMENT

## CORE VALUES



## ***COMMITMENT TO LEADERSHIP***

We believe the Los Angeles Police Department should be a leader in law enforcement. We also believe that each individual needs to be a leader in his or her area of responsibility. Making sure that our values become part of our day-to-day work life is our mandate. We must each work to ensure that our co-workers, our professional colleagues and our communities have the highest respect for the Los Angeles Police Department.

## ***RESPECT FOR PEOPLE***

Working with the Los Angeles Police Department should be challenging and rewarding. Our people are our most important resource. We can best serve the many and varied needs of our communities by empowering our employees to fulfill their responsibilities with knowledge, authority, and appropriate discretion. We encourage our people to submit ideas, we listen to their suggestions, and we help them develop to their maximum potential. We believe in treating all people with respect and dignity. We show concern and empathy for the victims of crime and treat violators of the law with fairness and dignity. By demonstrating respect for others, we will earn respect for the Los Angeles Police Department.

## ***QUALITY THROUGH CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT***

We will strive to achieve the highest level of quality in all aspects of our work. We can never be satisfied with the “status quo.” We must aim for continuous improvement in serving the people in our communities. We value innovation and support creativity. We realize that constant change is a way of life in a dynamic city like Los Angeles, and we dedicate ourselves to proactively seeking new and better ways to serve.

## ***SERVICE TO OUR COMMUNITIES***

We are dedicated to enhancing public safety and reducing the fear and the incidence of crime. People in our communities are our most important customers. Our motto “To Protect and to Serve” is not just a slogan - it is our way of life. We will work in partnership with the people in our communities and do our best, within the law, to solve community problems that affect public safety. We value the great diversity of people in both our residential and business communities and serve all with equal dedication.

## ***REVERENCE FOR THE LAW***

We have been given the honor and privilege of enforcing the law. We must always exercise integrity in the use of the power and authority that have been given to us by the people. Our personal and professional behavior should be a model for all to follow. We will obey and support the letter and spirit of the law.

## ***INTEGRITY IN ALL WE SAY AND DO***

Integrity is our standard. We are proud of our profession and will conduct ourselves in a manner that merits the respect of all people. We will demonstrate honest, ethical behavior in all our interactions. Our actions will match our words. We must have the courage to stand up for our beliefs and do what is right. Throughout the ranks, the Los Angeles Police Department has a long history of integrity and freedom from corruption. Upholding this proud tradition is a challenge we must all continue to meet.






# DEPARTMENT

STRUCTURE AND RESOURCES



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE  
**MICHEL R. MOORE**

*Chief of Police*







## CHIEF OF STAFF **DANIEL RANDOLPH**

*Deputy Chief*

The Office of the Chief of Police, Chief of Staff, is responsible for the coordination and dissemination of information from the Department to command and staff officers. Additionally, the Chief of Staff coordinates projects, investigations, and boards of inquiry on behalf of the Chief of Police. The Chief of Staff also serves as the Department's liaison with the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC). The Office of the Chief of Police, Chief of Staff, is overseen by Deputy Chief Daniel Randolph.

- **PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS GROUP**

Media Relations Division

- **EMPLOYEE RELATIONS GROUP**

- **BOPC LIAISON**

- **MAYOR'S SECURITY DETAIL**

- **GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SECTION**



## OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

### ROBERT E. MARINO

*Assistant Chief, Director*

The Department's general policing activities are managed through the Office of Operations (OO), which is responsible for the majority of the Department's sworn personnel. In addition to South Bureau Homicide Division, LAX Field Services Division, and the Department Homeless Coordinator, there are four Bureaus within OO, which are further divided into 21 geographic areas. The Office of Operations is overseen by Assistant Chief Robert E. Marino.

- **OPERATIONS  
CENTRAL BUREAU (OCB)**
  - Central Area
  - Rampart Area
  - Hollenbeck Area
  - Northeast Area
  - Newton Area
- **OPERATIONS  
WEST BUREAU (OWB)**
  - Wilshire Area
  - Hollywood Area
  - West Los Angeles Area
  - Olympic Area
  - Pacific Area
  - LAX Field Services
- **OPERATIONS  
VALLEY BUREAU (OVB)**
  - Van Nuys Area
  - Mission Area
  - North Hollywood Area
  - Foothill Area
  - Devonshire Area
  - West Valley Area
  - Topanga Area
- **OPERATIONS  
SOUTH BUREAU (OSB)**
  - 77th Street Area
  - Southwest Area
  - Harbor Area
  - Southeast Area
  - South Bureau Homicide Division
- **HOMELESS COORDINATOR**





## OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS **BLAKE CHOW**

*Assistant Chief, Director*

The Office of Special Operations (OSO), is overseen by Assistant Chief Blake Chow and is responsible for various specialized uniformed and investigative resources, detective investigations, along with transit and traffic resources within the Department.

### ○ **TRANSIT SERVICES BUREAU**

Transit Services Group  
Transit Services Division

Traffic Group  
Central Traffic Division  
South Traffic Division  
West Traffic Division  
Valley Traffic Division

### ○ **COUNTER-TERRORISM & SPECIAL OPERATIONS BUREAU**

Major Crimes Division  
Emergency Services Division  
Metropolitan Division  
Air Support Division  
Security Services Division

### ○ **DETECTIVE BUREAU**

COMPSTAT Division  
Detective Services Group  
Robbery-Homicide Division  
Juvenile Division  
Gang and Narcotics Division  
Commercial Crimes Division  
Detective Support and Vice Division  
Forensic Science Division  
Technical Investigation Division



## OFFICE OF SUPPORT SERVICES

**DOMINIC H. CHOI**

*Assistant Chief, Director*

The Office of Support Services (OSS), is overseen by Assistant Chief Dominic H. Choi and is responsible for various administrative, training and support functions of the Department. Assistant Chief Choi also serves as the Chair of the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB).

○ **ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES BUREAU**

Fiscal Group  
Personnel Division  
Facilities Management Division

○ **SUPPORT SERVICES GROUP**

Communications Division  
Custody Services Division  
Motor Transport Division  
Records and Identification Division  
Evidence and Property Management Division

○ **TRAINING BUREAU**

Officer Representation Unit  
Employee Assistance Unit  
Police Training and Education  
Training Division  
Recruitment & Employment Division

○ **CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW DIVISION  
(CIRD)**

○ **BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE SERVICES (BSS)**





## OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING & POLICY

**LIZABETH A. RHODES**

*Police Administrator III, Director*

The Office of Constitutional Policing & Policy (OCP) promotes the Department's steadfast commitment to building public trust through accountability, and effective policies and procedures that protect and serve the City. The OCP performs essential Department functions including policy development and coordination, risk management, internal audits, compliance with legal and community requests for information, legislative affairs, and interdepartmental relations. The OCP is overseen by Police Administrator III Lizabeth Rhodes, who holds a civilian rank equivalent to that of an Assistant Chief.

- **RISK MANAGEMENT & LEGAL AFFAIRS DIVISION**
- **DIVERSITY, EQUITY, & INCLUSION GROUP**  
Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion Division
- **STRATEGIC PLANNING SECTION**
- **OMBUDS SECTION**
- **AUDIT DIVISION**



- INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION

## PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU

**MICHAEL P. RIMKUNAS**

*Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer*

Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) oversees all internal administrative and criminal investigations as well as external criminal investigations that are related to Categorical Uses of Force (CUOF).

When a personnel complaint is generated as a result of an Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy finding for a Use of Force (UOF), or for any misconduct discovered during the UOF investigation, PSB assumes investigative responsibility of the complaint. Once the investigative process is complete, the findings are forwarded through the respective chain of command to the Chief of Police (COP) for final disposition. Additionally, PSB oversees both the administrative and criminal aspects of an Officer Involved Shooting (OIS) and other CUOF investigations, and ensures all OIS occurrences are presented to the Los Angeles County District Attorney (LACDA) for evaluation of any criminal allegations pertaining to the involved officer(s). Professional Standards Bureau is overseen by Deputy Chief Michael P. Rimkunas.





## COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP BUREAU

### **BILLY BROCKWAY**

*Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer*

It is the vision of the Community Safety Partnership (CSP) Bureau for the communities in and around the CSP Neighborhood Engagement Areas to sustain long term community development and to maintain safe, thriving and healthy communities. It is our belief that all families should live in peace, feel safe in their surroundings, and experience a healthy quality of life.

The mission of the Community Safety Partnership Bureau is to use community relationship strategies to strengthen trust between law enforcement and the community. The development of long term relationships, enhanced community capacity, and community partnering lead to decreased crime and improved community perception of safety. The CSP Bureau is overseen by Deputy Chief Billy Brockway.

#### ○ **COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP**

South Bureau  
Central Bureau  
Valley Bureau



## INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY BUREAU

**JOHN J. MCMAHON**

*Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer*

Information Technology Bureau (ITB) implements technology for the Department and is responsible for technology-related initiatives, computer systems, and network support Department-wide. The ITB also oversees all Department communication systems, including dispatch and the 9-1-1 system. The ITB is overseen by Deputy Chief John J. McMahon.

- **INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  
DIVISION**
- **APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT &  
SUPPORT DIVISION**
- **EMERGENCY COMMAND CONTROL  
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS  
DIVISION (ECCCS)**
- **INNOVATION MANAGEMENT  
DIVISION**





# MENTAL ILLNESS

AND DEPARTMENT INITIATIVES



## MENTAL EVALUATION UNIT

The Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) is a Department component that works with people experiencing mental illness or a mental health crisis. The mission of MEU is to reduce the potential for violence during police contacts involving people experiencing mental illness while simultaneously assessing the mental health services available to assist them. The Mental Evaluation Unit responds and assists with mental illness crisis calls-for-service in support of field operations. In police contacts with persons suspected to be experiencing mental illness or a mental health crisis, the Department's goal is to provide a humane, cooperative, compassionate, and effective law enforcement response. This requires a commitment to problem solving, partnerships, and supporting a coordinated effort from law enforcement, mental health services, and the greater community of Los Angeles.

The Mental Evaluation Unit evaluates if individuals suspected of experiencing a mental health crisis are a danger to themselves, to others, or are gravely disabled due to mental illness, as per Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) §5150. If so, MEU can assist with:

- Providing resources and referrals to field personnel;
- Preventing unnecessary incarceration and/or hospitalization;
- Preventing the duplication of mental health service requests;
- Providing alternate care in the least restrictive environment through a coordinated and comprehensive systemwide approach; and
- Providing intervention, referral, or placement, allowing patrol personnel to return to other field duties.

To accomplish this, the MEU deploys System-wide Mental Assessment Response Teams (SMART). A SMART team is comprised of a specially trained police officer and a clinician from the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health (DMH). This team works with individuals experiencing a mental health crisis and provides intervention, when appropriate.

The Case Assessment Management Program (CAMP) was added to the MEU as a mental illness investigative follow-up team. Staffed by LAPD Detectives and DMH clinicians, CAMP's mission is to assess and manage complex and high-risk cases of people with mental illness that are brought to the attention of the LAPD and DMH. The CAMP assesses individuals presenting a high risk of violence or self-harm and frequent contact with emergency responders. They mitigate and manage risk in these cases through linkage to appropriate services and removal of deadly means such as weapons. Furthermore, the CAMP referral takes into consideration the criteria and factors if a follow-up is required (See page 29 for CAMP criteria or factors).

As a resource to Department personnel, MEU has a 24-hour 7-day-a-week Triage Desk which assesses all Department contacts with persons who are experiencing a mental health crisis. The MEU Triage Desk advises field personnel and documents the incident.

Mental health professionals may work alongside police officers during the triage process and query the DMH database for an individual's prior history. The MEU Triage Desk or

Communications Division may dispatch a SMART unit. The MEU Triage Desk may direct field personnel to transport the individual directly to a mental health facility. If the Triage Desk determines that a person has repeatedly contacted police or has demonstrated high-risk behaviors, the case will be referred to CAMP for more intensive case management.

In 2023, the Department received approximately 42,980 calls for service involving persons with a mental illness or persons experiencing a mental health crisis. MEU responded and handled approximately 6,534 of those calls. Of those calls-for-service, approximately 4,665 resulted in a §5150 WIC hold application. Approximately 1,860 cases were referred to CAMP and 662 weapons were seized Citywide per §8102 WIC.

Additionally, the Department has mandated that when a person is arrested for a criminal offense and is also suspected of having a mental illness, MEU shall be contacted prior to the person being booked into a jail. Officers shall also contact MEU if the person indicates that he or she has ever sought or obtained mental health treatment.

In 2014, the Department reviewed its mental health training and initiated a redesign. At the end of 2014, the Department presented its newly developed Mental Health Intervention Training (MHIT), a 40-hour course delivered 25 times a year to field personnel who have the greatest likelihood of interaction with persons who are experiencing mental illness or a mental health crisis. Since then, the MHIT course has been provided to all new police officers prior to completing their probationary year in the field. From 2014 through December 2023, approximately 5,451 LAPD officers have completed MHIT training. The MHIT students also include Field Training Officers, and officers assigned to homeless outreach units. The Federal Consent Decree that once guided the Department considered it a best practice for 10 percent of patrol officers to receive specialized training such as MHIT. In 2023, approximately 93 percent of patrol officers responding to calls were MHIT-trained. By mandating MHIT during the probationary year for new sworn personnel, the Department committed to increasing the quality of service to individuals affected by mental illness. The eventual goal is the reduction in crime and UOF in the City.

By increasing mental health training and working with our partners, including those with the DMH, the Department has enhanced the ability of field personnel to recognize symptoms of mental illness and more accurately triage the growing number of calls for service involving individuals with a mental illness by connecting those individuals and their families with support services for long-term solutions.

## DEPARTMENT MENTAL HEALTH INITIATIVES

In furtherance of the Department's efforts to address mental health, specifically as it relates to UOF incidents, the Department continued its efforts to provide resources to individuals with mental illness in 2023. Those ongoing efforts include:

1. The Department continues to provide new officers, and those working in assignments interacting primarily with persons experiencing homelessness, with the 40-hour MHIT course;





2. Department personnel work alongside professionals from the DMH, Autism Society Los Angeles (ASLA), and the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) to broaden expertise and resources;
3. In February 2021, MEU SMART transitioned from a secondary responder to a co-responder model. The SMART units now deploy to certain high-risk calls involving mental illness at the same time as a patrol unit, instead of having patrol respond first, and then calling for SMART support;
4. Tactical de-escalation training, established Department protocols [including the Office of Operations (OO) Communications Division – Divisional Order No. 8, Response Protocol for Calls Involving Knives, Swords, or any Edged Weapon, and No. 9, Response Protocols for Calls Involving Mental Illness], a newly established training bulletin on encounters with suicidal or self-mutilating subjects, tactical disengagement, and the deployment of more effective less-lethal devices in recent years continues to have a positive impact on the disposition of mental health-related calls for service.
5. Community Call Re-Direction to Ensure Suicide Safety (CRESS). In February 2021, the Department and Didi Hirsch Mental Health Services implemented CRESS as a pilot program. With CRESS, Communications Division dispatchers divert 9-1-1 calls involving non-imminent suicidal or potentially suicidal individuals to the Didi Hirsch Suicide Prevention Center instead of initiating a police response. In July 2021, CRESS was funded and became 24/7. Through December 31, 2022, 1,365 such calls were diverted.
6. On July 16, 2022, the 9-8-8 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline (formerly known as the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline) went into effect nationwide. The 9-8-8 line was established to improve and facilitate access to crisis, mental health and emotional services and resources. The 9-8-8 line diverts these calls to highly trained mental health counselors who assist individuals in emotional distress or suicidal crisis. Officers are sharing this resource in the field, empowering the community and diverting calls from 9-1-1.
7. On February 1, 2023, a community “Mental Health Resources” QR code was created by the MEU Training Unit. The QR code connects people directly to the Los Angeles Police Department’s Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) Community Resources page, with a curated homepage of reliable mental health resources that includes DMH, 9-8-8, NAMI, and others. In March 2023, the QR Code icon was added on City cell phones for patrol officers to share with the community. The QR code can also be found in the 21 geographic Areas’ front lobbies.

## CONSIDERING FACTORS FOR CAMP REFERRALS

- 01 The subject has been the focus of a barricaded suspect scenario or critical incident and suffers from mental illness;
- 02 The subject has been placed on a minimum of six mental health holds within one year and been the focus of repeated contacts with emergency services. The catalyst of these contacts shall be the subject’s mental health history. Each case shall be evaluated independently, and six contacts shall only be used as a guide for accepting cases;
- 03 The subject has made threats or engaged in behaviors indicative of Targeted Mass/School Violence;
- 04 Contacts with emergency services and members of the community where the subject’s behavior is becoming increasingly violent due to their mental illness, including being involved in a UOF;
- 05 The subject has attempted suicide at the hands of law enforcement (Police-Assisted Suicide or Suicide by Cop);
- 06 Firearms or other deadly weapons are in the possession of or seized from the person with mental illness;
- 07 School Bullying; or,
- 08 The subject is a military veteran who may have a mental illness.





# THE UNSHELTERED

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## AND POLICING INITIATIVES

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## THE DEPARTMENT'S ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH HOMELESSNESS<sup>1,2</sup>

On her first day in office, Mayor Karen Bass declared a state of emergency to confront the homelessness crisis. The Mayor also signed an updated local emergency declaration to allow the City to continue to respond urgently and aggressively to the crisis, including expedited contracting and streamlined processing of temporary housing and affordable housing projects. In response to the emergency order signed by Mayor Bass, the Department, and other City partners continue to take significant steps to efficiently coordinate and implement the City's homeless strategy with a services-led approach. The Department remains committed to providing instruction and education when interacting with People Experiencing Homelessness (PEH), with voluntary compliance being the primary goal and enforcement being utilized only as a last resort.

The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) conducts an annual Greater Los Angeles Homeless Count. The 2023 count revealed there were 46,260 PEH on a given night within the City of Los Angeles. This was a 10 percent increase from the 41,980 people recorded in the 2022 count.

To protect the most vulnerable in our community, the Department has committed resources, trained personnel, and remains dedicated to the roles and responsibilities articulated in the City's Homeless Strategy.

### SUPPORT OF CARE/CARE PLUS OPERATIONS

The Comprehensive Cleaning and Rapid Engagement (CARE / CARE+) teams are comprised of the Los Angeles Department of Public Works, Los Angeles Sanitation & Environment (LASAN), LAHSA, and Department of Transportation (DOT) employees. These operations use data-driven tools to provide public health services to encampments, identify areas of highest need, and ensure that the most impacted areas receive regularly scheduled CARE operations accompanied by outreach and hygiene services.

Department Area patrol resources support these operations, which serve to "keep the peace" by de-escalating confrontations between PEH and LASAN and LAHSA employees. These ongoing operations have achieved a balance of maintaining public health and providing access to services in this underserved community.

### THE UNIFIED HOMELESSNESS RESPONSE CENTER

The Unified Homelessness Response Center (UHRC) is now a virtual hub for the City's efforts to provide a timely, effective, and coordinated street-level response to unsheltered homelessness across the City. The UHRC assists City entities and resources involved with PEH. The primary functions include outreach, engagement, scheduling CARE and CARE+ operations, and acting as the operations center during Red Flag Alerts to safely and proactively minimize the fire risks involving PEH in restricted areas within the Very High Fire Severity Zone (VHFSZ). The Department supports the UHRC with dedicated personnel and coordinating operational support.

The Department Homeless Coordinator's Office, in tandem with the Office of the City Administrator, coordinates with patrol resources to ensure the safety of the CARE teams. These coordination efforts include meetings between the Council Districts, City entities, and outreach efforts for all Council District concerns.

### LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE 41.18 AND THE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE

The Department considers LAMC Section 41.18 one of the most vital and effective instruments in maintaining the safety and integrity of the public rights of way throughout the City. The Department recognizes the positive effects that LAMC Section 41.18 has on both public safety and public access.

The Department will continue to support the use of LAMC Section 41.18 by educating the public on the section and utilizing a progressive enforcement model only after exhausting all attempts to achieve voluntary compliance.

### RESOURCES ENHANCEMENT SERVICES ENFORCEMENT TEAM

Due to the history of the Skid Row area, there is a heavy concentration of outreach and shelter services for PEH and other at-risk community members. The Resources Enhancement Services Enforcement Team (RESET) was created in 2015 to address this community's unique circumstances. Its primary mission is to respond to service calls within a 54-square block (3.4 sq. miles) area known as Skid Row, provide uniform foot beats, conduct homeless outreach, code enforcement, and scene security for LASAN's CARE+ team. The RESET is a critical component of reducing the incidence and fear of crime in the Skid Row area.

### TRANSIT SERVICES DIVISION HOPE TEAM

In 2017, the Los Angeles Police Department began providing security services on the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) buses and trains within the City limits. One of the biggest challenges in providing services was addressing the homeless population within the bus and rail systems. A dedicated Homeless Outreach Proactive Engagement (HOPE) unit was created for the Transit Services Bureau (TSB) to focus on this population. The TSB HOPE unit contacts those who are experiencing homelessness and using the MTA system as a means of shelter. TSB HOPE members work to connect PEH with outreach programs and services.



<sup>1</sup> Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority. "Data". Website: <https://www.lahsa.org/data?id=44-2020-homeless-county-by-city-council-district>

<sup>2</sup> MO 1218\_Vict Homeless.xls (lacity.org) (Data extracted October 4, 2022)





# THE USE OF FORCE

LEGALITY AND POLICY

## LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal and State law defines general UOF policy standards and practices for all law enforcement agencies. The City's civilian police oversight body, the BOPC further refines the Department's UOF policy by establishing administrative standards. As a result, the Department's prescribed policies and procedures can be more restrictive when compared to the broader legal guidelines. Therefore, OIS incidents and other applications of force utilized by Department personnel can be adjudicated as Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy by the BOPC, irrespective of the lawfulness of an officer's decisions or actions.

## FEDERAL LEGAL STANDARDS

The United States (U.S.) Constitution and extensive case law dictates how all law enforcement organizations across the nation establish and maintain their UOF policies. The federal legal standard used to determine the lawfulness of a UOF is the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In *Graham v. Connor*, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that an objective reasonableness standard should apply to a civilian's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, conducting an investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of his/her person. *Graham* states in part:

*The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.*

In essence, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling established that the force used must be reasonable under the circumstances known to the officer at the time. Therefore, the Department examines all UOF incidents from an objective, rather than a subjective, reasonableness standard.

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA LEGAL STANDARDS

In accordance with California Penal Code Section 835(a), law enforcement personnel may only use the amount of force that is "objectively reasonable" to:

- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not retreat or desist from their efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested; nor shall such officer be deemed an aggressor or lose their right to self-defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance. On August 19, 2013, the California State Supreme Court held, in the case of *Hayes v. County of San Diego*, that under California negligence law, liability can arise from tactical conduct and decisions employed by law enforcement preceding the use of deadly force. As such, officers' tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly force are evaluated to determine the objective reasonableness of an incident.

## THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT USE OF FORCE POLICY

### *Preamble to the Use of Force Policy*

The UOF by members of law enforcement is a matter of critical concern both to the public and the law enforcement community. It is recognized that some individuals will not comply with the law or submit to control unless compelled to do so by the UOF; therefore, law enforcement officers are sometimes called upon to use force in the performance of their duties. The LAPD also recognizes that members of law enforcement derive their authority from the public and therefore must be ever mindful that they are not only the guardians, but also the servants of the public.

The Department's guiding principle when using force shall be reverence for human life. Officers shall attempt to control an incident by using time, distance, communications, and available resources in an effort to de-escalate the situation, whenever it is safe, feasible and reasonable to do so. As stated below, when warranted, Department personnel may use objectively reasonable force to carry out their duties. Officers may use deadly force only when they reasonably believe, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary in defense of human life. Officers who use unreasonable force degrade the confidence of the community we serve, expose fellow officers to physical hazards, violate the law and rights of individuals upon whom unreasonable force or unnecessary deadly force is used, and subject the Department and themselves to potential civil and criminal liability. Conversely, officers who fail to use force when warranted may endanger themselves, the community and fellow officers.

## POLICY

**Use of de-escalation techniques** - It is the policy of this Department that, whenever feasible, officers shall use techniques and tools consistent with Department de-escalation training to reduce the intensity of any encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to mitigate the need to use a higher level of any force, while maintaining control of the situation.

**Verbal Warnings** - Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of any force, make reasonable efforts to identify themselves as a peace officer and to warn that force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the person is aware of those facts.

**Proportionality** - Officers may only use a level of force that they reasonably believe is proportional to the seriousness of the suspected offense or the reasonably perceived level of actual or threatened resistance.

**Fair and Unbiased Policing** - Officers shall carry out their duties, including use of force, in a manner that is fair and unbiased. Discriminatory conduct on the basis of race, religion, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, gender, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, housing status, or disability while performing any law enforcement activity is prohibited.



**Requirement to Report Potential Excessive Force** - An officer who is present and observes another officer using force that the present and observing officer believes to be beyond that which is necessary, shall report such force to a superior officer. This determination shall be made based upon an objectively reasonable officer under the same circumstances and based upon the totality of information actually known to the officer.

**Requirement to Intercede When Excessive Force is Observed** - An officer shall intercede when present and observing another officer using force that is clearly beyond that which is necessary. This determination shall be made based upon an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances, taking into account the possibility that other officers may have additional information regarding the threat posed by a subject.

**Rendering Aid** - After any use of force, officers shall immediately request a rescue ambulance for any person injured. In addition, officers shall promptly provide basic and emergency medical assistance to all members of the community, including victims, witnesses, subjects, suspects, persons in custody, subjects of a use of force and fellow officers:

- To the extent of the officer's training and experience in first aid/Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)/automated external defibrillator (AED); and,
- To the level of equipment available to an officer at the time assistance is needed.

#### **NON-DEADLY FORCE**

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- Defend themselves;
- Defend others;
- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

The Department examines the reasonableness of any particular use of force pursuant to the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor* from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience, in the same situation; and, based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- The feasibility of using de-escalation tactics, crisis intervention, or other alternatives to force;
- The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;
- The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;
- Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;
- The potential for injury to community members, officers or subjects;
- The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;
- The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);
- The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;
- The availability of other resources;
- The training and experience of the officer;

- The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;
- Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number of officers versus subjects;
- The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances; and,
- Whether a person is a member of a vulnerable population.

#### **DRAWING AND/OR EXHIBITING FIREARMS**

Unnecessarily or prematurely drawing or exhibiting a firearm limits an officer's alternatives in controlling a situation, creates unnecessary anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm. Officers shall not draw or exhibit a firearm unless the circumstances surrounding the incident create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary to use the firearm. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm. Any drawing and exhibiting of a firearm shall conform with this policy on the use of firearms. Moreover, any intentional pointing of a firearm at a person by an officer shall be reported. Such reporting will be published in the Department's year-end use of force report.

#### **SERIOUS BODILY INJURY**

Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 243(f)(4), serious bodily injury includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Loss of consciousness;
- Concussion;
- Bone fracture;
- Protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ;
- A wound requiring extensive suturing; and; or,
- Serious disfigurement.

#### **DEADLY FORCE**

It is the policy of this Department that officers shall use deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary for either of the following reasons:

- To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person; or,
- To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended.

In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of particular circumstances of each case and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible.<sup>3</sup> Before discharging a firearm, officers shall consider their surroundings and potential risk to bystanders to the extent reasonable under the circumstances. Because the application of deadly force is

<sup>3</sup> California Assembly Bill No. 392, signed by Governor Gavin Newsom on August 19, 2019, and enacted on January 1, 2020, modified California Penal Code Section 835(a) and redefined the circumstances under which a homicide by a peace officer is deemed justifiable.



limited to the above scenarios, an officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.

### WARNING SHOTS

It is the policy of this Department that warning shots shall only be used in exceptional circumstances where it might reasonably be expected to avoid the need to use deadly force.

### SHOOTING AT OR FROM MOVING VEHICLES

It is the policy of this Department that firearms shall not be discharged at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the officer or another person with deadly force by means other than the vehicle. The moving vehicle itself shall not presumptively constitute a threat that justifies an officer's use of deadly force. An officer threatened by an oncoming vehicle shall move out of its path instead of discharging a firearm at it or any of its occupants. Firearms shall not be discharged from a moving vehicle, except in exigent circumstances and consistent with this policy in regard to the use of deadly force.<sup>4</sup>

### DEPARTMENT CATEGORIZATION OF UOF INCIDENTS

The Department classifies UOF incidents as either a Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) or a Non-Categorical Use of Force (NCUOF), depending on the level of force used or severity of injuries sustained by the suspect and/or officer.

### CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

A CUOF is defined as:

- An incident involving the use of deadly force (e.g., discharge of a firearm) by a Department employee;
- All deaths while the arrestee or detainee is in the custody of the Department (also known as an In-Custody Death or ICD);
- A UOF incident resulting in death;
- A UOF incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization, commonly referred to as a Law Enforcement Related Injury or LERI;
- Officer-involved animal shootings;
- Unintentional discharges;
- A K-9 bite or contact where hospitalization is required;

**Note:** A K-9 contact occurs when a Department K-9 strikes or makes forcible contact with a person other than a bite that results in a complained of or visible injury.

- Any use of an upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the modified carotid, full carotid, and locked carotid hold (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05); and,

<sup>4</sup> California State Senate Bill No. 230, signed by Governor Gavin Newsom on September 12, 2019, and enacted on January 1, 2021, required law enforcement agencies to maintain a policy that provides guidelines on the use of force, utilizing de-escalation techniques and other alternatives to force when feasible, specific guidelines for the factors for evaluating and reviewing all use of force incidents, among other things.



**Note:** A carotid restraint is defined as a vascular neck restraint or any similar restraint, hold, or other defensive tactic, including a c-clamp in which pressure is applied to the sides of a person's neck that involves a substantial risk of restricting blood flow and may render the person unconscious in order to subdue or control the person (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

A choke hold is defined as “any defensive tactic or force option in which direct pressure is applied to a person’s trachea or windpipe.”<sup>5</sup>

**Note:** The department does not authorize the use of upper body control holds, including the use of a modified carotid, full carotid, or locked carotid hold; therefore, any use is unauthorized and shall be investigated as a categorical use of force.

- All intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death.

**Note:** All other unintentional head strikes shall be investigated as Level I Non-Categorical Use of Force incidents.

## NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

A NCUOF is defined as an incident in which any on-duty or off-duty Department employee whose occupation as a Department employee is a factor, uses physical force or a control device to:

- Compel a person to comply with the employee's direction;
- Defend themselves;
- Defend others;
- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

## Non-Categorical Use of Force Levels

All NCUOF incidents shall be initially classified by the investigating supervisor as either a Level I, Level II, or Level III incident.

A NCUOF shall be reported as a **Level I** incident under the following circumstances:

- An allegation of unauthorized force is made regarding the force used by a Department employee(s); or,
- The force used results in a serious bodily injury, as defined by California Penal Code Section 243 (f) (4): Loss of consciousness; Concussion, Bone Fracture; Protracted loss of impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; A wound requiring extensive suturing; or, Serious disfigurement.

**Note:** If the investigating supervisor is unable to verify the seriousness of an injury or complained of injury, it shall be reported as a Level I incident. If the injury requires admission to a hospital, the incident becomes a CUOF and will be investigated by Force Investigation Division.

- The injuries to the person upon whom force was used are inconsistent with the amount or type of force reported by involved Department employee(s); or,
- Any use of force to the neck of the person that does not rise to the level of a Categorical Use of Force; or,
- Accounts of the incident provided by witnesses and/or the subject of the UOF substantially conflict with the involved employee(s) account;
- Body Worn Video, Digital In-Car Video, third-party video, or other physical evidence substantially differs from the involved employee(s) account; or,
- Any unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strike(s) with an impact weapon or device, which does not result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death, and is approved to be handled as a NCUOF by the Commanding Officer, FID.

If the use of an impact device or intermediate force munitions causes a serious injury such as a broken bone, dislocation, or an injury requiring sutures, etc., and does not rise to the level of a CUOF, it shall be reported as a Level I incident.

A NCUOF shall be reported as a **Level II** incident under any of the following circumstances:

- The force used included any intermediate force munitions (Bean Bag Shotgun, 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher, TASER, Oleoresin Capsicum Spray, and/or baton) that contact a suspect or their clothing;
- A K-9 Bite or K-9 Contact that does not require hospitalization;
- Strike, punch, elbow;
- Kick, knee strike, or leg sweep; or,
- Any takedown.

**Note:** Any of the above uses of force that result in serious bodily injury (as defined above) shall be investigated as a Level I incident.

A NCUOF shall be reported as a **Level III** incident under any of the following circumstances:

- Any wrist lock, joint lock, C-grip, firm grip, walk down, push, pull, or bodyweight that results in an injury or complained of injury to the subject, excluding injuries that would be reportable as a Categorical Use of Force, or a Level I use of force;
- The discharge of a projectile weapon (e.g., beanbag shotgun, 37mm or 40mm projectile launcher or Compressor Air Projectile System), electronic control device (TASER), or OC Spray that does not make contact with an individual or their clothing, excluding tactical discharges, as defined in Department Manual Section 4/245.05; or,

<sup>5</sup> California State Assembly Bill No. 1196, signed by Governor Gavin Newsom on August 31, 2020, and enacted on January 1, 2021 prohibits a law enforcement agency from authorizing the use of a carotid restraint or choke hold by any peace officer employed by that agency. **Note:** The Department does not authorize the use of upper body control holds, including the use of a modified carotid, full carotid, or locked carotid hold; therefore, any use is unauthorized and shall be investigated as a CUOF.

- Any use of force in a crowd control situation to include any discharge of a projectile weapon, baton strike, punch, elbow strike, kick, knee strike, leg sweep, takedown, or the use of chemical agents, including OC on a crowd as a whole, which does not go beyond the mission of the skirmish line, excluding injuries that would be reportable as a Categorical or Level I Use of Force.

Note: Any use of force in a crowd control situation where officer(s) become involved in an isolated incident with an individual which goes beyond the mission of the skirmish line shall be reported at the appropriate level (Level I, II, or III). An example of such an isolated incident would be when an officer leaves the skirmish line and uses reportable force to effect an arrest on a person who is behind the skirmish line committing vandalism on a police vehicle.

Note: The use of chemical agents, including OC on a crowd as a whole, during crowd control situations shall be approved by a commander or above.

#### ASSEMBLY BILL 1506 (2021)

Effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill (AB) 1506 added Section 12525.3 to the Government Code which designated the California State Attorney General (AG) as the state prosecutor. The AG will supply their own investigative team and will conduct the forensic recovery and analysis of evidence on any case under their purview.

As California's chief law enforcement officer, the AG is committed to strengthening trust between law enforcement and the communities we serve. This policy is vital to increasing transparency throughout the criminal justice system and will assist the AG in making recommendations that will improve police practices across California. The Department is fully supportive of this mission and is committed to complying with the AG's office in their investigation of officer involved shootings.

Upon implementation by the California Department of Justice, AB 1506 requires the state prosecutor to investigate incidents of an officer involved shooting resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian and authorizes him or her to initiate and prosecute a criminal action against the involved officer. Pursuant to Government Code Section 12525.3(a), an unarmed civilian is "anyone who is not in possession of a deadly weapon." A deadly weapon "includes, but is not limited to, any loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal knuckle knife, dagger, billy, blackjack, plastic knuckles, or metal knuckles."

## THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS ARE NOT REPORTABLE AS A NCUOF INCIDENT:

### FID INVESTIGATION

01

Any incident investigated by FID;

### NO INJURY OR COMPLAINT OF INJURY

02

The use of a C-grip, firm grip, joint lock walk-down, push, pull, or bodyweight which does not result in an injury or complained of injury to the subject;

### FORCE USED DURING A CROWD-CONTROL SITUATION OR RIOTS

03

A push or baton push used by an officer working in an organized squad directly involved in a crowd control mission that does not result in injury or complained of injury to the subject; and,

Note: Isolated incidents resulting from a crowd control situation may require a UOF investigation as determined by a supervisor at the scene.

### TACTICAL DISCHARGE

04

The tactical discharge of a projectile weapon (e.g., beanbag shotgun, 37mm or 40mm projectile launcher, or Compressed Air Projectile System), electronic control device (TASER), or any chemical agent that does not make contact with an individual.

Note: A tactical discharge is defined as any projectile from a less lethal control device launched with the intent to gain a tactical advantage by creating a distraction, removing obstacles, or altering the environment, and not directed at an individual (e.g., use of a baton or beanbag shotgun to break a window, or deployment of a chemical agent during a barricaded suspect incident).





# DEPARTMENT

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

## DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TRAINING

The Department is committed to delivering the highest quality training with an unwavering resolve to reshape the national discussion on law enforcement training and development. There are seven key training topics that continue to serve as a platform for how the Department designs and implements training:

1. Expanding UOF De-escalation Techniques;
2. Building Public Trust and Reverence for Human Life;
3. Serving the People and Systems Impacted by Mental Illness;
4. Mastering Laws of Arrest, and Search and Seizure;
5. Incorporating Procedural Justice best practices;
6. Identifying, Testing, and Piloting of Non-Lethal Munitions; and,
7. Reinforcing Employee and Organizational Wellness.

## EXPANDING THE USE OF DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES

Guided by the reverence for human life standard, the Department has consistently upheld the expectation that officers may only use that force which is objectively reasonable to effect an arrest, prevent the escape of suspects, or overcome resistance. It is also the Department's expectation that officers only resort to the use of force when de-escalation attempts are ineffective or not feasible. The Department recognized that elements of de-escalation had to be embodied in a comprehensive framework in order to ensure consistency from training through application in the field. In April of 2017, the Department formally incorporated the concept of de-escalation in the preamble to the UOF policy. Since then, training curriculum and other Department reference materials have been amended to include de-escalation principles. To date, de-escalation principles have been integrated into all training related to the Use of Force.

Building on the research from the use of force review process, officer feedback from training, and the need to reinforce the Use of Force Policy, a new course, Critical Thinking and Force Options (CTFO) was designed and implemented in March 2022. This course emphasizes communication skills used by crisis negotiators and integrates Department policy and tactics on the use of Intermediate Force options tools during scenarios based on real and complex encounters from the field. The duty to intervene is not only discussed in the classroom as part of the Department's Use of Force Policy but also practiced within the scenarios. To ensure the continuity of this content across the Department, the Chief of Police required all Command Officers to attend a management version of this course.

Given the increased number of school shootings across the country, the Department is responding by updating officers on how to respond to an active shooting incident. Mass Violence Tactical Response (MVTR) is another scenario-based course that prepares officers for how to respond quickly and in a coordinated manner. In this course, officers review what has been learned from other national incidents and receive training in the proper techniques for rendering life saving aid.

## TRAINING WAS A PRIORITY IN 2023.

Two new exciting advances in de-escalation training will be addressed in the IN-SERVICE TRAINING section of this report: I) Virtual Reality (VR) Training and II) De-escalation Lab.

## BUILDING PUBLIC TRUST AND REVERENCE FOR HUMAN LIFE

In order to comply with California Senate Bill 230, the Department thoroughly reviewed the Academy curriculum and all existing courses for the integration of the new UOF policy. The new UOF policy was initially distributed to all employees through mandated e-learning, and then integrated into broader Department training lesson plans. In total, 78 courses were identified as requiring modification. At the close of 2021, all of the identified courses had been updated and modified. The new UOF policy emphasizes reverence for human life and rendering aid as soon as possible, the evaluation of necessity and proportionality when using force, and the requirement to both intervene, stop, and report force which is clearly excessive.

## MASTERING LAWS OF ARREST: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

During the Academy, recruit officers are exposed to numerous training scenarios where they apply and refine the concepts discussed in classroom instruction in a live action setting. Simply having an intellectual understanding of the material is often insufficient. Officers are faced with dynamic and volatile real-life situations in the field, particularly those incidents which result in the UOF. Scenario-based training creates realistic situations in a managed and controlled setting which facilitates officers' learning how to address high-stress incidents. Additionally, scenario-based training allows for academy instructors to better assess recruit officers' understanding of the academic curriculum. It also reinforces understanding with the goal of the successful application of learned material when recruit officers transition to the field.

As recruit officers progress through the Academy, they are exposed to increasingly complex training in both classroom and scenario-based settings. This continued enrichment covers the concepts of law, arrest, preservation of life, de-escalation, tactical decision making, and use of force. In 2017, to comply with new POST benchmarks, the Academy curriculum was enhanced with the incorporation of distinct blocks of instruction covering procedural justice, mental illness, and de-escalation. This same educational framework is built into all LAPD coursework, from Academy to Command Staff.

## INCORPORATING PROCEDURAL JUSTICE BEST PRACTICES

Procedural Justice can be defined as a consistent method of operation in which community members are treated fairly, with dignity and respect, in every law enforcement encounter. The ultimate goal is that every Department member recognizes every encounter as an opportunity to build trust and community connection. Procedural Justice promotes the use of internal procedural justice (how Department members treat each other) to support the use of procedural justice community exchange.



# TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR 2023



**EXPANDING** ..... Expanding use of force de-escalation techniques.

**BUILDING** ..... Building public trust and Reverence for Human Life.

**SERVING** ..... Serving the people and systems impacted by mental illness.

**MASTERING** ..... Mastering laws of Arrest, Search and Seizure.

**INCORPORATING** ..... Incorporating Procedural Justice best practices.

**IDENTIFYING** ..... Identifying, testing, and piloting of non-lethal munitions.

**REINFORCING** ..... Reinforcing employee and organizational wellness.

**The four tenets of Procedural Justice include:**

**Voice** - Having a voice in the process increases the personal investment of the person involved and allows the officer to ensure that mutual goals are being accomplished. Being heard is one of the ways in which people feel respected in the process, even when the outcome is not favorable for them. To give people a voice in the process requires actively listening to an individual during an encounter.

**Neutrality** - When decisions are explained, and the use of facts and legal principles are consistently applied to all, it demonstrates that law enforcement actions are based on the law and not personal bias. Officers must remember that their decisions can only be neutral when guided by the evidence and the law.

**Respect** - Displaying respect for another person shows awareness of the value of every individual. Treating a person with dignity validates that individual as a human being. Respect is one of the most critical components cited by community members in determining whether they have been treated in a fair and impartial manner.

**Trustworthiness** - The ultimate goal of every encounter between the Department and community members should be to increase trust. This can be done by simply ensuring the first three tenets of Procedural Justice are followed. By building the use of Voice, Neutrality, and Respect into every encounter, it increases the likelihood that the community member will gain understanding and view law enforcement actions as legitimate.

**REINFORCING EMPLOYEE AND ORGANIZATIONAL WELLNESS**

During 2021, the Arrest and Control/Lifetime Fitness Unit began a systematic, objective, impartial, expert-driven examination and evaluation of how effectively their Lifetime Fitness program was working. This review focused on ensuring recruit officers were receiving physical fitness training which would not only enable them to safely and effectively perform peace officer duties, but also promote a healthy lifestyle after they completed their Police Academy training. Additionally, the Arrest and Control/Lifetime Fitness Unit also examined strategies to promote a healthy lifestyle for police candidates and in-service personnel. The results of this review led to modifications of the Lifetime Fitness program which focused on encouraging Lifetime Fitness habits and using contemporary and functional exercises during physical fitness training at the Police Academy.

The Arrest and Control/Lifetime Fitness Unit also worked with BSS in creating basic workout videos for use by all Department personnel. Additionally, similar videos were made for police candidates who are in the process of being hired onto the Department. These changes have continued to be emphasized in 2023 with the previously mentioned effort to share Department resources and support employee and organizational health and wellness.

During 2023, POST was focused on developing new curriculum on Employee and Organizational Wellness to enhance Academy training. The LAPD collaborated with POST and subject matter experts from across California to enhance Academy curriculum to include:

- a) Emotional Intelligence;
- b) Mental Health Awareness;
- c) Financial Health;
- d) Awareness on Substance Use and Abuse; and,
- e) Resiliency.

In 2023, LAPD became one of the first academies to pilot the new curriculum and provide feedback to POST for State-wide implementation.

**POLICE ACADEMY TRAINING**

In 2008, the Department implemented a completely redesigned Academy curriculum, which was geared toward problem-based learning (PBL). The Department recognized that the Academy's tradition of strong, tactical skill training must continue, but acknowledged that improvements had to be made to maximize critical thinking and capitalize on personal initiative and human potential. As such, the enhancement and implementation of the modified curriculum compliments tactical performance with the development of officers who are self-motivated, independent, community oriented, and problem solvers.

Through the examination of best practices in law enforcement training, three key constructs were identified as a lens for all Department training for recruits, in-service personnel, and civilians. These constructs, as discussed by Doctor Luann Pannell, the former Director of Police Training and Education, in the article, "Changing the Training Paradigm," are as follows:

**Training the Whole Person** - Peak performance is achieved through utilization of all three learning domains: psychomotor domain – physical skills and strength; cognitive domain – critical thinking and problem solving; and affective domain – utilizing emotional intelligence. Preparing people for all facets of their job will develop more resilient individuals, and ultimately, a more resilient workforce.

**In a Team, By a Team, to Be a Team** - Public safety requires team effort. All officers must develop individual skills within the framework of a team. Teamwork should facilitate self-assessment, appreciation for the skills of others, and increase the value of collaboration. Teamwork incorporates respect for other teams both inside the Department and within the community.

**Through an Event, Not to an Event** - To be comprehensively effective, training must be conducted within an experiential learning environment that requires critical thinking all the way through an event. Training "through an event" includes building the skills needed in a crisis but also for the ongoing response once the tactical operation concludes. Leaders must learn to anticipate the ongoing needs of their people, the community, and the necessary resources once the crisis is over. Understanding the context, social and cultural expectations, and ensuring follow-through with key stakeholders will improve the Department's response for future incidents.

**Academy Hours**

The Department's basic police Academy is currently 912 hours in duration, exceeding the POST requirement of 664 hours of



mandated training. Class sizes generally range from 35 to 60 recruit officers. A new recruit class typically starts every four weeks, and each class is in training for a total of six months. The Department's goal is to exceed all POST minimum training requirements.

### **Academy Testing**

The POST utilizes an integrated testing system that emphasizes the importance of critical thinking and problem solving over memorization. This style of integrated testing is consistent with the changes the Department made to the Academy in 2008, emphasizing PBL, critical thinking, and confidence building. Under this system of testing, recruit officers must pass two mid-term examinations and one final examination. The examinations cover material from 42 Learning Domains (LDs) introduced throughout the six months of the Academy program. Questions contained in the written examinations are also integrated into the 13 scenario-based tests which become increasingly complex as the Academy program progresses. The events depicted in each scenario require recruit officers to utilize the techniques, strategies, and course material from previous instruction to successfully resolve each situation. In addition to the written and scenario-based examinations, recruit officers must pass a series of rigorous physical fitness, self-defense, and firearms proficiency examinations before graduating from the Academy and transitioning to field assignments.

### **Academy Training**

In 2020, to maximize the use of new technologies into the Regular Basic Course (RBC), the Academy curriculum was enhanced to implement a live Body Worn Video (BWV) training system during reality-based scenarios. Additionally, the videos generated would be debriefed within the various disciplines covering the following topic areas:

- Appropriate activation of BWV based on Department policy and procedure;
- Legal considerations;
- Officer safety (tactical) considerations;
- Quality of the investigation;
- Quality of the contact and the use of Procedural Justice concepts;
- Decision making and disposition;
- Appropriate deactivation of BWV; and,
- Documentation requirements.

In 2021, Training Division added 25 hours of enhanced training in Community Engagement to the RBC. The newly developed Community Engagement curriculum focuses on LAPD and community history, to include special topics on cultural diversity, homelessness, mental illness, media relations and personal use of social media.

At the conclusion of the RBC, each recruit class participates in a "Days of Dialogue" session with community members. This provides them with the opportunity to apply the skills learned during Academy training as well as become active participants, early on, in helping to build trust and confidence with the community.

In 2022, these curriculum enhancements were continued and evaluations indicate that both recruit officers and community participants find the interaction to be very positive and

informative. The Days of Dialogue was initially funded with outside resources and given the significance of the program, the Department has begun efforts to move funding into the regular Academy budget.

To foster instructional development for the Academy staff, Training Division worked with outside subject matter experts to provide Academy staff with updated skills building related to diversity, equity and inclusion, understanding trauma and managing triggers in the classroom.

## **IN-SERVICE TRAINING**

### ***New Technologies and Developments***

***The following were 2022 additions to the training development of officers:***

#### **I. Virtual Reality Training (VR)**

In 2022, the V-Armed Virtual Reality (VR) training system was successfully installed in the Elysian Park Gym. Fifteen sets of VR equipment consisting of the Head Mounted Display (HMD), backpack mounted computer, Inert Glock, Taser, OC Spray, Inert Rifle, and Flashlight are set up for use in VR. The newly formed VR training team has been focused on learning the new system and is working with Police Training and Education (PTE) to identify how to best incorporate VR scenarios into new and existing training.

Further pending developments for the VR system include BWV support and the use of the 40mm less-lethal launcher. Scenarios can be built to include up to 10 participants, instructor and role-player inclusive. There are several generic environments built, and three LAPD specific environments partially built. The interior environments for Skid Row and Venice Beach are still pending. VR is releasing a new software update soon and will replace all current scenario buildings.

A gradual implementation of the new technology has started by incorporating VR scenarios into the existing scenarios typically role-played in the MHIT. Course coordinators for other classes are collaborating with PTE and the VR team to identify the most productive use of the system for integration into scenario rotations.

#### **II. De-escalation Lab**

Training Division acquired an outside grant, and through the collaboration of the Leadership Unit and the Field Operations Tactics and Concepts Unit, a new framework was created for a de-escalation learning lab. Through working with community partners, existing training facilities were redesigned to be more functional and to create diverse possibilities for varied training scenarios. The design of rooms with movable walls, different entry points and different levels of light will facilitate greater applications of the training to the field. The opportunity to utilize video feedback will also increase the effectiveness of each debrief for every officer involved. The course design for the de-escalation lab provides another opportunity to emphasize the articulation and proper application of the Department's Use of Force Policy. Pilot classes have been conducted for generating course feedback, refining time lines and towards greater implementation in 2024.

### III. Police Sciences and Leadership

As recruit officers progress through the Academy, they are introduced to advanced concepts in policing that will assist them in their field training. Having an understanding of these topics is important. However, once officers are faced with real-life situations, wherein critical thinking and split-second decision making is commonplace, simply understanding concepts is not enough. To assist newer officers with building a strong comprehension of subjects such as procedural justice, mental illness, and de-escalation, the Police Sciences and Leadership (PSL) program was established in 2016. The PSL program delivers courses in a cohort-format bringing officers from the same Academy class back together. These officers have the same level of training and experience and are better able to reflect on each other's experiences in the field to provide dialogue and feedback. Additionally, their familiarity with each other makes for a unique synergy during training.

Police Science and Leadership, was designed to occur 11 months after Academy graduation and immediately before the end of the officer's probationary period. The 84-hour course brings an entire Academy class back together to focus on classroom instruction regarding procedural justice, implicit bias, communication, empathy, legitimacy, guardian or warrior mentality, use of force, and de-escalation. The dichotomy of "guardian or warrior mentality" has taken center-stage in many discussions regarding the national dialogue on policing. The topic was added to the course to discuss varying current and obsolete policing strategies and methods. The course was put on hold during 2020 due to the pandemic but was restarted in 2021. The second week of training required the class members to attend the 40-hour Mental Health Intervention Training hosted in partnership with the Department's Mental Evaluation Unit and the DMH. The combined experience of these two entities creates an interactive and challenging learning environment which addresses topics such as crisis communications, suicide by cop, substance abuse, autism, homelessness, and psychopharmacology.

### IV. Field Training Officers Program

In October 2015, California State Senate Bill 29 was enacted, requiring Field Training Officers (FTOs) to complete a minimum of eight hours of Crisis Intervention Behavioral Health Training. The Department determined that in order to train other officers, all Field Training Officers required a higher level of training and ensured that they completed the 40-hour MHIT course. This requirement continues to ensure all FTOs are trained in managing a mental health crisis prior to teaching another officer. Through 2023, the Department continued its FTO Update course which included mental health awareness, de-escalation, and command and control concepts. Also included are public trust components such as constitutional policing, fair and impartial policing, and lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, transgender, and/or questioning cultural competency. In order to increase training support for FTOs, approved training opportunities were made available within the first six months of being promoted, and additional training every 18 months instead of every three years.

### V. Field Operations Tactics and Concepts

In order to address current trends in law enforcement, the Field Operations Tactics and Concepts (FOTAC) Unit was

created in 2018. The unit is responsible for instructing the Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course (LETAC), a 32- hour class that utilizes a majority of scenario-based training. Various scenarios reflecting current trends reinforce and enhance officers' basic tactical knowledge and skills. The course includes in-depth discussions on the Department's UOF policy, its guiding principle of reverence for human life, various force options, command and control concepts, UOF Tactics Directives, de-escalation, and firearms safety.

The FOTAC instructors provide tactical training for area training coordinators, Reserve Officers, specialized units, tactical enhancement training for field personnel, and general training updates (see below). Personnel from FOTAC also provide instruction to members of the Mayor's Office, City and District Attorney's Offices, and the Office of the Inspector General. Lastly, FOTAC instructors engage with the community by providing demonstrations at community events throughout the City.

### VI. General Training Update

Following a Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) incident, a General Training Update (GTU) is completed to address training needs in a collaborative setting between officers and instructors. General Training Updates are mandatory training sessions for all substantially involved personnel following a CUOF incident. Personnel are not allowed to return to field duties until the GTU has been successfully completed. There are six mandatory topics, in addition to any other topics identified by either the Chief of Police (COP), the concerned area Commanding Officer (CO), Critical Incident Review Division (CIRD), and/or Training Bureau (TRB):

1. Use of Force Policy;
2. Reverence for Human Life;
3. Tactical De-Escalation Techniques;
4. Command and Control;
5. Equipment Required/Maintained; and,
6. Reality-Based Training/FOS (for OIS incidents).

Training Division is tasked with the responsibility of conducting GTUs for all CUOF incidents. General Training Update sessions are administered by instructors from FOTAC, with the assistance of training unit personnel from the concerned area and bureau. In addition to facilitating the actual training, FOTAC is responsible for the documentation and tracking of employees who did not attend the training due to valid temporary exemptions (e.g., on-leave due to injury, scheduled vacation, etc.).

### VII. Tactical Debriefs

All substantially involved personnel in a CUOF incident are required to participate in a Tactical Debrief upon adjudication of the concerned case. The Tactical Debrief affords all involved personnel an opportunity to participate in collaborative training to enhance their performance, identify lessons learned, and understand the adjudication of the CUOF incident. The Tactical Debrief serves as the final training after the adjudication of a CUOF incident. It is administered by a Tactics Supervisor familiar with the incident and who served as a resource in the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) process.





### VIII. Force Options Simulator

The Department relies on additional training platforms to uphold proficiency standards for sworn personnel. Force Options Simulators (FOS) present situations in a virtual reality/ scenario-based environment, which requires officers to rely on their skills, knowledge, and experience in addressing challenging situations that may or may not require the UOF.

The Department has continued to use the FOS system for Department-wide qualification during which instructors will conduct debriefs after each scenario. All officers are required to utilize sound tactics and techniques in an attempt to de-escalate each incident, when feasible. The goal is to use techniques involved in tactical de-escalation to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options. In 2021, this course was updated to incorporate the new POST requirements for the mandated four-hour, perishable skills training on Use of Force/De-escalation. This new State-wide requirement will ensure that all officers complete a UOF/De-escalation course every two years.

### IX. Standardized Roll Call Training

During 2022, the Department leveraged the use of technology and video to ensure that all officers would receive Standardized Roll Call training. The use of video media would introduce new topics and reinforce best practices. Each video is accompanied with an outline for generating facilitated discussions on current events and issues. Generally, one to five videos will be viewed every deployment period (four weeks) and watched at the start of watch. Topics range from legal updates, new mandates, new training bulletins, and always include the most recent Chief's Message.

### FIREARMS

#### Qualification Requirements

The Department requires its sworn personnel to qualify with their primary duty weapons on a regular basis to ensure shooting proficiencies and the development of sound judgment with the use of lethal force. A qualification schedule has been created, which includes a combination of handgun, shotgun, and FOS qualification.

#### 2023 Qualification Cycle Schedule

Cycle	Month	Required Qualification
1	January	Shotgun
2	February/ March	Handgun - Duty Ammunition
3	April/May	Handgun - Practice Ammunition
4	June/July	Force Option Simulator
5	September/ October	Handgun – Practice Ammunition
6	November/ December	Handgun – Practice Ammunition

Sworn employees (lieutenants and below), reserve officers, and security officers with 20 to 29 years of service qualify as follows:

Cycle	Month	Required Qualification
1	Jan	Shotgun
2	Feb/Mar	Handgun – Duty Ammunition
5	Sept/Oct	Handgun – Practice Ammunition

All sworn employees (regardless of rank), reserve officers, and security officers with 30 years or more of service are required to qualify once per calendar year at their convenience during Cycles 2, 3, 5, or 6. This requirement shall be met with their primary duty handgun and duty ammunition.

To qualify on the handgun combat course, sworn employees, reserve officers, and security officers shall meet the minimum qualification requirements. Personnel who fail to achieve a qualifying score shall repeat the course until the minimum score for each target is attained in one relay. The maximum score is 300 points. When sufficient daylight exists, the minimum passing score is 210 points, with a minimum of 105 points on each target. During the hours of darkness, the minimum passing score is 180 points, with a minimum of 90 points on each target.

The shotgun qualification course is not scored; however, personnel must demonstrate proficiency with the shotgun to satisfy the qualification requirement.

### Multiple Attempts to Qualify

Officers who fail to receive a minimum passing score in a second attempt during a qualification cycle are required to attend a two-hour Enhanced Marksmanship Overview Workshop at Elysian Park Academy.

Employees with three or more attempts are required to attend remedial training, regardless of whether they passed in subsequent attempts. Employees will receive a two-hour Enhanced Marksmanship Overview Workshop at Elysian Park Academy or a four-hour Firearms Reintegration course at Davis Training Facility to fulfill the remedial training requirement. Training is documented on an In-Service Training Section (ISTS) Record of Remediation.

During both the Enhanced Marksmanship Overview Workshop and Firearms Reintegration, the Firearms Instructor observes, diagnoses, and remediates the employee. Once the Firearms Instructor believes the officer is prepared to qualify, the employee shoots the Department's qualification course again to demonstrate proficiency. Both the Enhanced Marksmanship Overview Workshop and Firearms Reintegration training is entered into the Learning Management System (LMS) and the Shooting Qualification and Bonus (SQUAB) computer system.

If an employee is unable to receive a passing qualification score during training, they are given additional remedial training at the conclusion of the course. If attempts to remediate are unsuccessful, the employee is brought back to Elysian Park Academy or Davis Training Facility for one-on-one training with a Firearms Instructor.

### Failure to Qualify

A Department Failure to Qualify (FTQ) report is generated for officers who Fail To Qualify and is sent to Internal Affairs Division (IAD). The IAD's Annual Complaint Report contains information on actions taken for FTQs. When a Commanding Officer (CO) is notified that an officer, reserve officer, or security officer under his or her command fails to meet qualification requirements set forth by the Department and lacks a valid exemption, the concerned CO may initiate a personnel complaint. Commanding officers shall be responsible for administering disciplinary action for personnel who FTQ.

The SQUAB system computer application was developed to document shooting and FOS qualification, firearms training, and bonus scores for sworn and armed civilian personnel. The application is used at the four range locations (Davis Training Facility, Elysian Park Academy, Harbor Range, and Oaktree Range) by the Firearms Training Section, FOTAC Unit, and Harbor Range personnel.

The information entered into SQUAB appears on an employee's Training Evaluation and Management System (TEAMS) II Report, showing a record of the employee's qualification history for the last five years. The system generates the Department's FTQ report after each qualification cycle. That report is forwarded by Application Development and Support Division (ADSD) to the IAD upon request of the concerned CO.

### Medical Exemptions

Sworn personnel who are unable to qualify due to an injury shall

be examined by a physician. A statement shall be obtained from the physician imposing the medical restriction with an estimated time for which the officer should be exempt from qualification requirements.

**Note:** Temporary medical restrictions are valid for 30 days only. If a medical condition persists past 30 days and continues to inhibit an officer from meeting Department qualification standards, the officer must obtain a subsequent doctor's statement every 30 days until the restriction is rescinded or is classified as permanent and stationary.

An officer with a medical exemption who has not qualified with his or her duty firearm for one calendar year shall be served with a "Notice to Meet Firearm Qualification Requirements within 30 Calendar Days" (30-Day Notice). Once served, the officer has 30 days to determine if he or she is medically fit to qualify and successfully pass the minimum firearm qualification standards. If the officer is unable to qualify with his or her duty firearm by the expiration of the 30-Day Notice, the officer shall be served with an "Order to Relinquish City-Issued Duty Firearm and Police Identification Card, and Restriction of Peace Officer Powers" (Order to Relinquish).

**Note:** If an officer with either a temporary or permanent restriction believes that he or she is medically fit to meet Department firearm qualification standards, the officer is encouraged to make an appointment with his or her doctor and have the restrictions re-evaluated and possibly rescinded.

### Vacation Exemptions

Officers are not exempt from qualification requirements due to vacation. Exemptions for qualification requirements may be granted for approved extended absences at the discretion of the concerned CO.

### REINTEGRATION

A sworn employee who has returned to work from a temporary relief from duty, or inactive duty in excess of 365 calendar days, shall meet with his/her Commanding Officer to begin the reintegration process and accomplish all reintegration tasks as directed by the Department. In-Service Training Section is responsible for determining what training is necessary to bring the employee into compliance with the POST requirements and other Department requirements that are consistent with the employee's work restrictions. Training Division will reissue all City-issued equipment and will periodically update the returning employee's Commanding Officer as to the status of the employee in the reintegration process.


### DEPARTMENT FIREARM QUALIFICATION STATISTICS

As a result of upgrades to the software and infrastructure which tracks and reports Department personnel qualification records, the data reported for "Firearms Qualifications, Three or More Attempts, Failure Rate, and Failure to Qualify Complaints", has been updated for the five-year period beginning in 2019. This updated data includes additional personnel which may have




been omitted in previous years' reports.

### Handgun Qualification (by Cycle) - Sworn Personnel



In 2023, Department personnel qualified with their handguns 24,846 times. Qualification Cycle two contained the highest number of Department personnel with 7,517 employees completing qualification. This number represented 30 percent of the total annual handgun qualifications.


### Three or More Attempts




In 2023, 70 Department personnel failed to successfully qualify three or more times in one of the four handgun qualification cycles throughout the year. There was no change when compared to the 70 total personnel that failed to successfully qualify three or more times in one of the four handgun qualification cycles in 2022. In comparison to the 2019, 2021, and 2022 annual aggregate average of 58 Department personnel, 2023 had an increase of 12 personnel or 21 percent (2020 qualification was canceled in response to safety concerns due to the COVID-19 pandemic).

### Failure Rate


The failure rate is calculated based on the number of personnel who failed to successfully qualify three or more times within a year compared to the total number of personnel attempting to qualify, in 2023, an average of 0.28 percent of Department personnel failed to successfully qualify through the year, this represented an 18 percent decrease when compared to 0.34 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate failure rate percentage from 2019, 2021 and 2022 of 0.26 percent, 2023 had a 0.02 percentage point increase, or eight percent.



### Failure to Qualify Complaints – Issued vs. Sustained



In 2023, eight personnel complaints were generated for FTQs. At the time of this publication, the 2023 complaints generated for FTQs are currently being adjudicated. In 2022, there were 14 FTQ complaints generated which resulted in two sustained allegations for neglecting to abide by the Department's Qualification policy. Nine FTQ related complaints received a disposition of "employees actions could be different" and one FTQ complaint received a disposition of "unfounded." Additionally, from 2019-2023, there were a total of 57 FTQ complaints generated, 22 of those complaints, or 39 percent, were sustained.




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


# COMM

Command and Control is the use of *active leadership* to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks, and minimize risk.



# COMMAND *and* CONTROL



## COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Department's guiding principle when an officer considers using force is reverence for human life. The Department worked to create a defining framework that clearly and thoroughly conveyed all of the training and practices which incorporated the reverence for human life. As noted by former Chief of Police Charlie Beck, "Although the term 'tactical de-escalation' was not specifically used by the Department in the past, many of the fundamental techniques and concepts that fall under the tactical de-escalation umbrella have long been incorporated in training curricula and successfully utilized by personnel in the field."

The Department's official definition of tactical de-escalation strategies and techniques and their inclusion in the UOF policy, paired with correlative training curriculum, provides officers a uniform and well-articulated framework to reduce the intensity of an encounter. While officers regularly exercise tactical de-escalation techniques during intense encounters in the field, the need to use some level of force, whether intermediate or lethal, may arise. As a situation unfolds, it is important for officers and supervisors to exercise effective leadership and decision-making at the scene in order to control the incident. To assist in the implementation of this expectation,

the Department established the concept of "Command and Control." The concept of Command and Control provides personnel with guidelines to follow in their efforts to contain, de-escalate, and minimize the negative impact of an incident.

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks, and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives, and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident (Training Bulletin Volume XLVII, Issue 4, July 2018, "Command and Control.")

## INITIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The senior officer, or any officer on-scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness, shall establish Command and Control and begin the process to develop a plan of action. Although awareness can begin while responding to an incident





(e.g., radio calls and broadcasts), situational awareness best occurs after arrival on scene, when conditions are witnessed firsthand. Generally, the person responsible for establishing Command and Control will declare themselves the Incident Commander (IC) and initiate the Incident Command System (ICS).

One of the primary responsibilities for the officer initiating Command and Control is the direction and guidance of personnel, which includes, but is not limited to:

- Ensuring reasonable numbers of Designated Cover Officers (DCO) for both intermediate force and lethal cover options.

**Note:** Reverence for human life, and the safety of the officers, and the public are the key considerations in developing tactics and strategies to resolve critical incidents. Regarding lethal force, an essential goal of Command and Control includes managing the number of officers who are assigned lethal cover responsibilities. In the event of an officer-involved shooting, the reasonable management of lethal cover will help lessen both the number of officers who discharge their firearms and the number of rounds fired during the incident. Consequently, danger to the community may also be reduced by minimizing the number of rounds fired. Although guided by the person who has assumed Command and Control, the individual officer is ultimately responsible for articulating the reasonableness of their decision to draw, exhibit, and/or discharge their firearm.

- Reducing over-response or over-deployment to specific duties and responsibilities; and,
- Maintaining officer safety through personnel location and assignment.

### INDIVIDUAL OFFICER RESPONSIBILITY

The initial officers at the scene of any incident are responsible for Command and Control of an incident until relieved by a more senior officer or supervisor. In addition to their initial assessment, individual officers must identify the IC, generally whomever is the most senior officer at that time, unless a supervisor is present. While taking appropriate action based on their assessments, officers must be ready for, and receptive to, direction and orders from the IC. Every officer plays a crucial role in the management and handling of critical incidents and must understand their role within the Command and Control system. Officers should be ready to deploy or re-deploy as necessary.

In September of 2022, the Department published the Designated Cover Officer, Training Bulletin, Volume LI, Issue 5. This training bulletin expanded on and reinforced the principles articulated in the Command and Control, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, that was published by the Department in July of 2018. The purpose of the Designated Cover Officer Training Bulletin was to establish a framework for understanding the duties of a Designated Cover Officer

and the expectation that officers should engage in thoughtful decision-making when determining whether to draw and exhibit their firearm. This training bulletin further emphasized the Department's guiding principle of reverence for human life.

### PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Concurrent with the goal of containment, officers must assess any immediate danger to the community and to initial responders. During the assessment, the IC must direct available personnel and coordinate appropriate resources to mitigate the threat. After appropriate measures have been taken to mitigate risks and preserve human life, the officer who established Command and Control should update the responding supervisor, who will continue to develop the plan. The plan should include the assignment of tasks to available personnel and the organized use of available resources.

### ESTABLISHING COMMAND AND CONTROL

Implementing Command and Control involves utilizing active leadership to use available resources, to accomplish tasks, and minimize risk. Major events or incidents that require Command and Control include everyday tactical situations, up to natural disasters. Existing Department concepts can be used as tools to aid in establishing Command and Control, based on the type and complexity of the incident. Examples include the PATROL acronym and the Tactical Four C's.

### SUPERVISOR'S RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility for Command and Control lies with the senior officer or any officer on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness. Supervisors shall take responsibility for exercising Command and Control when they arrive to the scene of an incident. Supervisors shall also declare themselves the IC until relieved by a higher authority. It is the expectation of this Department that the highest-ranking supervisor at scene assume the role of IC and communicate the transfer of command to all personnel involved.

In July 2018, the Department published the Command and Control Training Bulletin and in March of 2019, implemented training on the Advanced Strategies of Command and Control (ASCC). The Department will remain focused on further refining the concept of Command and Control, while continuing to train officers on the ASCC. Critical concepts, such as the Designated Cover Officer, Tactical De-Escalation, and Active Leadership, will continue to be reinforced throughout the Department in an effort to prevent or minimize uses of force.

**THE  
TACTICAL  
FOUR C'S**  
**Control**  
**Communicate**  
**Coordinate**  
**Contain**

**All officers** at the scene of any incident, at some level, are responsible for Command and Control. In addition to their initial assessment, individual officers must identify the IC - or whomever is responsible for command and control at that time. While taking appropriate action based on their assessments, officers must be ready for, and receptive to, direction and orders from the IC. Every officer plays a crucial role in the management and handling of critical incidents and must understand their role within the command and control framework. Officers should be ready to deploy or re-deploy as necessary.



### **Additional Officers/Units/ Specialized Unit Request(s):**

If needed, officers working patrol can request additional resources to an incident. These resources can vary from incident to incident and are dependent on the circumstances of a specific event. Resources can include: Airship, K-9/Bloodhound, SWAT, Bomb Squad, Hazmat, Fire Department, MEU, Dive Team, Traffic, Mutual Aid (i.e. neighboring police departments), etc.



**Debrief:** After certain incidents (e.g. foot pursuits, vehicle pursuits, building searches, etc.) a debrief is held to discuss and evaluate the incident among involved personnel. The debrief is usually led by a supervisor or an involved senior officer.

**Use of Force (UOF):** Under rapidly evolving circumstances, especially when a suspect poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, officers may not have sufficient time or reasonable options to resolve the situation without the need to use objectively reasonable force.

**Tactical de-escalation:** Involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.



**Command Post (CP):** When there is a critical incident a CP is established at a nearby safe location and coordinates resources as needed.





Under rapidly evolving circumstances, especially when a suspect poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, officers may not have sufficient time or reasonable options to resolve the situation without the need to use objectively reasonable force.



# PATROL

PLANNING

ASSESSMENT

TIME





**RE-DEPLOYMENT  
AND/OR CONTAINMENT**

**OTHER  
RESOURCES**

**LINES OF  
COMMUNICATION**



# TACTICAL DE-ESCALATION

**Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.**

## SOME DE-ESCALATION OPTIONS

- Tactical Planning
- Giving Clear & Direct Orders
- Intermediate Force Options (when applicable)
- Empathy
- Persuasion
- Re-Deployment
- Redirecting
- Building Rapport
- Deflection
- Verbal Warnings
- Handcuffing
- Additional Resources





# PICCAL

## ALATION







# INTERMEDIATE FORCE

DEPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT



The Department's guiding principle when utilizing force shall always be the Reverence for Human Life. When a situation warrants the use of intermediate force, personnel, when practicable, can utilize a variety of intermediate force options to attempt to safely defuse a situation.

Intermediate Force options as defined by recent court decisions, shall not be used on a suspect or subject who is passively resisting or merely failing to comply with commands. Verbal threats of violence or mere non-compliance alone do not justify the use of intermediate force. Personnel may use Intermediate Force options when they have a reasonable belief that a suspect or subject is violently resisting arrest or poses an immediate threat of violence or physical harm.

The Department constantly examines  
new, innovative, and more effective  
less-lethal systems to prevent volatile  
situations or suspects' actions from  
escalating.

Intermediate Force option devices can afford officers the opportunity to seek cover and maintain distance between themselves and suspects. The use of cover and distance are fundamental concepts that create time to allow for tactical decision-making. When officers are able to safely and effectively deploy Intermediate Force option devices, the risk of injury to themselves, the suspect(s), and the public can be reduced. Intermediate Force option devices can also be effective tools to prevent the escalation of an incident to a higher, more serious level of force. The Department currently has a variety of Intermediate Force option devices available to personnel for daily field operations and other tactical situations.

#### **40-MILLIMETER (MM) LESS-LETHAL LAUNCHER**

The Defense Technology Model 1425LA Less-Lethal Launcher is a single shot, 40mm launcher configured with a green stock and pistol grip, a rifled barrel, picatinny rail mounting system, and Department-approved optic. The green coloring of the launcher is consistent with the Department's color coded system for Intermediate Force option devices and signifies that the 40mm launcher is for the Less-Lethal 40mm eXact iMPact round only. The 40mm eXact iMPact round is a point-of-aim, point-of-impact, direct fire round consisting of a plastic body and a sponge nose. It can be identified by its silver metal case and blue sponge material nose. These sponge rounds are designed to be non-penetrating and upon striking a target, distribute energy over a broad surface area. Due to the smokeless powder propellant, it has velocities that are extremely consistent.

Originally authorized for use only by Metropolitan Division, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), the 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher was later approved in a pilot program for deployment by patrol personnel in 2016 and 2017. The purpose of the pilot program was to evaluate the effectiveness and functionality of the device in a patrol setting. In 2018, the Department authorized

Department-wide use of the 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher for all sworn personnel who have received the required training.

#### **BEANBAG SHOTGUN**

The Department's beanbag shotgun is a Remington 870 shotgun that has been reconfigured for use with less-lethal rounds. The beanbag shotgun is equipped with a green slide handle and stock, rifled barrel, and side saddle ammunition holder. The green coloring is consistent with the Department's color code system for less-lethal devices and signifies that the beanbag shotgun is for use with the Less-Lethal LAPD Super-Sock round only. The LAPD Super-Sock round is a 12-gauge, clear-hulled cartridge, containing a shot-filled fabric bag. It can be identified by its clear plastic hull containing a yellow fabric bag. These rounds are designed to be non-penetrating and distribute energy over a broad surface area upon striking a target.

#### **OLEORESIN CAPSICUM SPRAY**

Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray is a chemical agent that is either extracted from cayenne pepper plants or produced by synthetic means. Oleoresin Capsicum spray primarily affects the eyes, the respiratory system, and the skin by generating an intense burning sensation. The mucous membranes may swell, causing uncontrollable coughing, gagging, and/or gasping. Oleoresin Capsicum spray can be an effective tool for law enforcement. However, it has proven to have varying degrees of effectiveness on individuals, with some even being unaffected or immune. Additionally, OC spray may contaminate enclosed areas, is susceptible to wind and other weather factors, and can have unintended effects on officers and/or the public in close proximity.

#### **TASER 7**

The Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle (TASER) or Electronic Control Device (ECD), is a conducted electrical device that has the ability to cause the neuromuscular incapacitation (NMI) of a subject. Neuromuscular incapacitation is the involuntary stimulation of both the sensory and motor nerves, causing uncontrollable muscle contractions that inhibit a subject's ability to perform coordinated movement, thereby reducing the subject's ability to harm themselves or others. The Department issued TASER features a green body and removable black cartridge, which houses the probes and wires.

The green coloring is consistent with the Department's color code system for Intermediate Force option device and signifies that the TASER is a Intermediate Force option device.

*The TASER has three activation techniques, listed below:*

**Probe Mode:** This is the most effective way to deploy the TASER and provides officers the ability to maintain distance from the intended target. This method utilizes the TASER cartridge to deploy two metal probes attached to wires towards a subject. Once both probes make contact with the subject, NMI is possible.

**Drive-Stun/Direct-Stun:** This method is used in close-quarters situations and requires the device to be brought into direct contact with the subject's body or clothing. As soon as the TASER is moved away from the subject's body, the energy being delivered to the subject stops. This feature may be used with or without a cartridge in place. If a cartridge is in place, the probes

will deploy into the subject when the TASER is activated. The drive-stun mode generally will not cause NMI and is primarily a pain compliance option.

**Three-Point Drive-Stun:** This is a technique where a drive-stun is applied with a cartridge in place. After deploying the probes from the cartridge into the body of the subject at a minimum of two inches, the officer applies a drive-stun to an area of the body away from the probe impact site. The drive stun paired with the two deployed probes creates NMI in the area of the body between the contact locations.

As of September 2015, all uniformed officers assigned to the Office of Operations are required to carry a TASER on their person while working any field assignment (OO Order No. 4, dated September 21, 2015).

In 2016, the Department approved the use of a new redesigned TASER cartridge. This redesigned cartridge features 25-foot long probe wires which offer an additional four-feet of deployment distance, a redesigned longer probe point to better penetrate clothing, and green exterior cartridge doors (blast doors).

The current model of ECD deployed by the Department is the TASER 7, manufactured by Axon, previously known as TASER International. The TASER 7 was approved for duty use in August of 2021 but was deployed to the field in 2022. It was an upgrade from the previously authorized TASER X26P.

The TASER 7 is a two-shot device that was designed to improve performance of the previous TASER models by reducing the number of misses, clothing disconnects, and close probe spreads. These issues were the most common reasons the TASER was ineffective in obtaining the desired or involuntary stimulation of both the sensory and motor nerves, which inhibit the subject's movement. Like the X26P, the TASER 7 features a green body, consistent with the Department's color code, indicating that it is a less-lethal device. The TASER 7 is equipped with two cartridges that contain both wires and probes, and which are capable of being deployed at different ranges. The objective of this less-lethal device is to allow officers to maintain a safe distance, up to a maximum of 22 feet depending on the cartridge selected, thus potentially providing the officers an opportunity to de-escalate dangerous situations. This model has the following additions:

- Two cartridge system allows officers to determine to use stand-off or short-range cartridges, increasing the ability to achieve dart spread to cause NMI;
- Both cartridges can be deployed, and, when an officer does so, all four darts communicate and work together to increase NMI;
- Rechargeable and downloadable battery (much like that of the Body Worn Video camera) to assist supervision with timely Use of Force investigations. Pre-watch activation will indicate that it was not an actual activation, but a system check only; and,
- LED screen that assures the officer that the TASER and cartridges are in good working order.

### **FN-303 LESS-LETHAL LAUNCHER**

The FN-303 Less-Lethal Launcher is a semi-automatic, shoulder fired device that fires non-lethal munitions and liquids. The device is powered by compressed air to fire the projectiles, which are loaded into an attached 15-round drum magazine. The Department, with the approval of the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC), initiated a limited-time pilot program for the device in 2016. At the conclusion of the pilot program, the Department determined that additional testing and data gathering was necessary for a more comprehensive analysis. In July 2017, the Department re-initiated the pilot program for two divisions: Metropolitan Division and Custody Services Division. At the conclusion of 2018, the FN-303 Less-Lethal Launcher was recommended for deployment by Metropolitan Division, K-9, and SWAT. In November 2019, the Department approved the FN-303 Less-Lethal Launcher to be utilized by Metropolitan Division (Metropolitan line platoons, K-9, and SWAT) and Custody Services Division.

### **37-MILLIMETER PROJECTILE LAUNCHER**

The 37mm Projectile Launcher is a less-lethal shoulder fired device that can fire various types of munitions. A rifled barrel, coupled with a calibrated sighting system, such as a mounted optical sight or iron sighting system, makes the device highly accurate when delivering rounds to its intended target. When deployed by specially trained personnel or Metropolitan Division personnel, typical munitions include blunt force and chemical agent ordinance.

The 37mm Projectile Launcher is deployed during incidents where the circumstances require a crowd to be dispersed and immediate action is necessary to stop violence, stop property damage, and/or sufficient resources are not present to ensure public safety. When deployed, the 37mm foam rubber baton round is a non-target specific round used for crowd control. The foam rubber rounds are intended to be fired at the ground, (skip fired).

### **BATON**

A baton is an impact and/or control device used to push, move, or strike individuals who exhibit unlawful or hostile behavior. Currently, the Department authorizes three versions of the baton for Department-wide use: a collapsible baton, a side handle baton and a collapsible side handle baton. In 2017, the Department transitioned to the Peacekeeper Rapid Containment Baton (RCB) collapsible baton as the preferred and standard-issued model. When compared to previous models, the Peacekeeper RCB has a more durable and functional design. Additionally, the Department authorizes a straight baton for Metropolitan Division personnel only.

### **LAPD BALLISTIC SHIELD**

Ballistic shields have historically been deployed by specialized entities, such as Metropolitan Division. To provide additional resources for officers, the Department tested and evaluated several different ballistic shields. In 2016, the ASPIS X Level III Ballistic Shield, manufactured by Point Blank, was also approved for use by certified officers assigned to patrol operations.



### BOLAWRAP REMOTE RESTRAINT DEVICE


In 2019, the Department began pilot testing a non-lethal force option, the BolaWrap 100 remote restraint device. The handheld device discharges an eight-foot tether at 513 feet per second from a range of 10-25 feet. The tool was developed to restrain subjects without injury, while still maintaining a safe distance between the suspect and the officer. The BolaWrap does not rely on pain compliance and is intended to be deployed early in an engagement.

The BolaWrap pilot program began on February 6, 2020. There were too few uses of the device to make a determination on the effectiveness of the BolaWrap; thus, the Board of Police Commissioners approved an indefinite extension of the pilot program. Rather than deploying them to all Areas, it was determined that the pilot program would continue at Hollywood and Central Areas, and all 400 devices would be concentrated in these Areas. The Los Angeles Police Department made recommendations to Wrap Technologies on improvements to the device. Wrap Technologies instituted the Department's recommendations and released the BolaWrap 150. The pilot program resumed in September 2022 and throughout 2023 within the Hollywood and Central Areas.

### TASER 10

The Department has designed a 12-month pilot program for the Axon TASER 10, a new Electronic Control Device (ECD). The TASER 10 offers greater flexibility as an intermediate force option than the model currently being utilized by the Department, the TASER 7. The TASER 10 has a maximum deployment range of 45 feet versus the maximum range of the TASER 7, which is 22 feet. This increase in range permits officers to maintain a greater distance from the suspect or subject, which will allow for enhanced time for decision-making, redeployment, and use of barriers, which improves an officer's ability to utilize de-escalation techniques preventing the potential need for the use of higher levels of force. Additionally, the cartridge now contains 10 probes, versus the traditional two-probe cartridge used in the TASER 7, which gives the operator up to nine opportunities to achieve neuro-muscular incapacitation (NMI). This should dramatically improve the effectiveness of the TASER as an intermediate force option.

Additionally, Drive Stun mode is not available on the TASER 10 due to the "point of aim, point of impact" options, which allow the user to create their own spread with the probes. The device energizes up to four probes at once, automatically finding the optimally spaced probes.



Photograph: **TASER 7**



## 40-MILLIMETER LESS-LETHAL LAUNCHER

The 40-millimeter (40mm) Less-Lethal Launcher is a direct impact device that delivers a foam or sponge type round at the desired target. Originally authorized for use by Metropolitan Division, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), the 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher was later approved for deployment by normal patrol functions in 2016.

That year, the Department initiated a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness and functionality of the device in a patrol setting. At the conclusion of the pilot program, the Department adopted the 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher and issued them to all patrol and traffic divisions. The 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher's maximum effective range is 75 feet.

## BEANBAG

The Department's beanbag shotgun is a Remington 870 shotgun that has been reconfigured for use with less-lethal rounds. The beanbag shotgun is equipped with a green slide handle and stock, rifled barrel, and side saddle ammunition holder. The beanbag shotgun ammunition is the LAPD Super-Sock 12-gauge round that can be identified by its clear-hulled plastic cartridge, containing a shot-filled fabric bag. The beanbag shotgun's recommended deployment range is five to 30 feet. On September 28, 2021, the Chief of Police released a notice advising that the Beanbag shotgun shall not be used in a crowd-control situation.



## BOLAWRAP

The BolaWrap 100 is a remote restraint device. The handheld device discharges an eight-foot tether at 513 feet per second

from a range of 10-25 feet. The tool was developed to restrain subjects without injury, while still maintaining a safe distance between the suspect and the officer. Wrap Technologies instituted the Department's recommendations and released the BolaWrap 150. The pilot program resumed in September 2022 and through 2023 within the Hollywood and Central Areas.





## BATON

The baton is an impact/control device used to push, move, or strike individuals who exhibit unlawful or hostile behavior. Currently, the Department authorizes three versions of the baton for Departmentwide use: a collapsible baton, a side handle baton, and a collapsible side handle baton.



## OLEORESIN CAPSICUM SPRAY



Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray is a chemical agent that is extracted from cayenne pepper plants or produced synthetically. The OC spray primarily affects the eyes, respiratory system and skin by causing an intense burning sensation. The OC spray has been proven to have varying degrees of effectiveness and can cause unintended effects to officers and the public if deployed in enclosed areas. The maximum effective range of the OC spray is 12 feet.

## TASER 7



During 2023, the Department completed the transition to the Axon TASER 7. The TASER 7 is a two-shot ECD device that was designed to improve on the performance of the previous TASER models by reducing the number of misses, clothing disconnects, and close probe spreads. These issues were the most common reasons the TASER was ineffective in obtaining the desired NMI. The TASER 7 features a green body, with the option to deploy two different range cartridges that contain both wires and probes. The objective of this less-lethal device is to allow officers to maintain a safe distance, up to a maximum of 22-feet depending on the cartridge selected, thus potentially providing the officers an opportunity to de-escalate dangerous situations.



## 37-MILLIMETER PROJECTILE LAUNCHER

The 37-millimeter (37mm) Projectile Launcher is a less-lethal device that can fire various types of munitions (blunt force and chemical agents). The 37mm Projectile Launcher is normally deployed by Metropolitan Division or specially trained personnel and can be utilized with non-target specific munitions for crowd dispersal. The 37mm Projectile Launcher's maximum effective range is 50 feet.



# K-9 PLATOON DEVELOPMENTS

AND THE USE OF FORCE



In November of 1979, two police officers recognized that the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department needed assistance with conducting searches for dangerous suspects. These searches often ended with suspects eluding detention despite the large deployment of personnel being utilized and community members being inconvenienced for an extended period. In April of 1980, the Department approved training two dogs to be utilized in a one-year pilot program within Operations - West Bureau. Within two months, the achievements of these two dogs were so astounding that the one-year pilot program was declared a success. Over the last 40 years, the program has been formalized and expanded into the current Metropolitan Division, K-9 Platoon. The K-9 Platoon now provides the Department with rapid response to search with K-9s on a Citywide basis, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

The mission of the Metropolitan Division's K-9 Platoon is to support the Department's field and detective operations in the search for outstanding felony suspects, misdemeanor suspects who are reasonably believed to be armed with a firearm or other deadly weapon, and the search for firearms and firearm-related evidence (e.g., ammunition, magazines, etc.).

There are currently 18 police officers assigned as K-9 handlers in the Metropolitan Division K-9 Platoon. Each of these 18 officers is assigned one Police Service Dog (PSD). Five of the 18 officers are also assigned a second dog that is trained to detect firearms and firearm-related evidence. The Department's K-9 program is one of the few that trains and certifies its PSDs in the "find and bark" method. In the "find and bark" method, the PSD will search an identified area, and upon locating a suspect, the PSD will alert the K-9 handler by barking or other positive alert methods. The PSDs are trained to take a bite hold on a suspect in response to a movement that may constitute an aggressive, threatening, or evasive action that poses a threat of harm to the PSDs, the K-9 handler, and other personnel or community members in the area. The bite hold is considered a K-9 contact, which occurs when a person is bitten or injured by a deployed K-9. Training in this method is more labor intensive; however, it has resulted in higher instances of finds and lower instances of K-9 contacts or bites, as compared to other departments.

Metropolitan Division, K-9 Platoon personnel, are commonly used in instances where a suspect flees from officers and a perimeter is established to contain the suspect in a designated area. Once containment is set, the Incident Commander coordinates the response of Metropolitan Division K-9 personnel. Upon arrival, K-9 personnel are briefed on the circumstances of the perimeter, such as the type of crime the suspect committed and whether the suspect is armed. Once it is determined that the circumstances meet the established K-9 deployment criteria, a tactical plan is developed by the K-9 handler with concurrence from the K-9 supervisor and approval of the Incident Commander.

Prior to initiating a K-9 search, K-9 officers ensure that K-9 announcements and warnings are given. The announcements and warnings are intended to notify persons within the search area of the intent to use a PSD. This announcement affords the suspect(s) an opportunity to surrender and allows community members to enter their homes and businesses or leave the area. In situations where noise or perimeter size is a factor, officers will use amplified sound systems such as bullhorns or the public address systems on Department vehicles or helicopters to make the announcement. The search announcement and warning are additional attempts to de-escalate the situation and encourage the suspect(s) to voluntarily surrender before the PSD is used. The search announcement and warning are as follows: "This is the Los Angeles Police Department; we are searching for a suspect and are preparing to use a police dog. For your safety, please go inside your home or business and stay inside until we have completed our search. To the person or persons who are hiding from the police, make your location known to us immediately. Put down all weapons, come out with your hands raised, and follow directions. If you do not, a police dog will be used to find you. When the dog finds you, do not move or you may be bitten. Surrender now and the dog will not be used."

As multiple announcements are made at various locations throughout the perimeter, an officer will document the time, location, and the person who confirmed that the announcement was made. If there is no response from the suspect and there is no indication that the suspect(s) will surrender, the K-9 search will commence.

The K-9 search team is comprised of the K-9 handler, his PSD and, depending on the nature and circumstances presented by the search, two to four additional officers. All search team personnel are briefed on the tactical search plan and their specific roles during the search. The K-9 handler will also ensure that at least one team member is equipped with a intermediate force option before the search begins. Multiple K-9 search teams may be utilized depending on the size, geography, or other factors presented by the perimeter. As the PSD utilizes its capabilities, the search team will continually look for evidence that could prove vital in pinpointing the suspect's location or direction of travel. During the search, officers will also interview witnesses and attempt to locate surveillance cameras near the suspect's direction of travel.

When a PSD is deployed, the K-9 handler is expected to exercise control in a manner that enhances the safety of the search team and community, while efficiently utilizing the detection capabilities of the PSD. Additionally, the K-9 handler maintains the sole responsibility for the control and direction of their PSD.

When the PSD locates a suspect, the handler will recall the PSD to their side to hold and control the PSD. Verbal orders will then

"The LAPD's K-9 program is one of the few agencies that trains and certifies their PSDs in the "find and bark" method. It has resulted in a higher percentage of finds while simultaneously lowering instances of K-9 contacts and bites."

be given to the suspect to surrender and submit to arrest. If it is determined that the PSD has bitten or injured the suspect (K-9 contact), an ambulance is requested, and the suspect is transported to a hospital for further evaluation and treatment. If the suspect is admitted to a hospital due to the injury from the K-9 contact, the incident is investigated as a Categorical Use of Force, and proper protocols are initiated.

As the Department moves forward into the new year, it has begun the process of updating the K-9 Manual. It has taken steps to improve the training of both K-9 handlers and

supervisors. The Department is developing a risk mitigation system for K-9 handlers, as well as reexamining the training criteria for new PSD's. In addition, the Department is evaluating new technology to increase situational awareness during K-9 searches.

## 2019-2023 K-9 DEPLOYMENTS

Year	Deployments	Finds	Find Pct	Contacts	Contacts Pct	CUOF	CUOF Pct
2019	421	333	79%	81	24%	4	5%
2020	323	248	77%	61	25%	1	2%
2021	367	296	81%	59	20%	0	0%
2022	350	330	94%	63	19%	1	2%
2023	348	332	95%	80	24%	6	8%









# MEDICAL CARE

OF DETAINEES AND ARRESTEES



Upon the detention and transportation of an arrestee to a geographic Area, a watch commander will visually inspect the arrestee and inquire whether they have any medical conditions or medical complaints. Medical conditions declared by the arrestee are documented on the detention log and are addressed prior to booking into the care and custody of either Custody Services Division (CSD) or the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD). Any medical conditions which are life-threatening or require immediate emergency medical care are addressed by requesting the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) who assess, treat, and/or transport the arrestee to the appropriate hospital. Medical conditions which are pre-existing or non-life threatening are addressed at a detention facility dispensary by the Department approved medical staff.

Once booking approval has been obtained by the arresting officer at the geographic Area, the arrestee is transported by officers to a detention facility, where the arrestee is provided any necessary medical treatment prior to being booked. While at the facility, arresting officers complete a standardized medical questionnaire. The questionnaire is utilized to identify and assess the arrestee's medical concerns, mental health status, use of prescribed medication, and substance abuse. All arrestees who exhibit objective symptoms of being under the influence of Phencyclidine (PCP), or who register a Gas Chromatography Intoximeter (GCI) reading of 30 percent or higher, must be examined by medical staff. Additionally, the questionnaire is used to document observations made by the arresting officers that describe the arrestee's level of impairment and any medical condition, along with documenting any injuries or medical history that may require the arrestee to receive an increased level of care.

Onsite Medical Services Division (MSD) staff examine any arrestee who reports or displays the need for medical treatment. The staff utilize the medical questionnaire along with an in-person assessment to conduct an evaluation of the arrestee.

An arrestee who has medications for a pre-existing condition may have their medications stored with MSD. Any medications brought into the detention facility must be inspected by staff prior to booking. If the arrestee's medication is unable to be dispensed by medical staff, the medicine is itemized and stored with the arrestee's personal property package. If the arrestee requires medication which is not available at the dispensary or if the level of care the arrestee needs is greater than what the onsite facility can provide, the arrestee is transferred to a contract hospital or county jail for further treatment. If the treating physician at a contract hospital clears the arrestee for booking, a secondary evaluation at the detention facility is conducted. Medical Services Division will then continue to monitor the arrestee and the level of care provided until the arrestee is transferred to another facility.

After the MSD staff has cleared the arrestee for booking, arresting officers will present the arrestee and the booking paperwork to staff from CSD. All documents are reviewed and an additional evaluation by CSD staff is completed to determine if any special housing arrangements are required for the arrestee. Once the arrestee is accepted by the detention facility, CSD personnel conduct in-person welfare checks on the arrestee at a minimum of twice per hour.

While in custody, arrestees with medical conditions are seen by MSD staff during Sick-Call twice per day. Personnel assigned to CSD document the date and times Sick-Calls were conducted each day. Medical Services Division staff also use this time to address any new medical concerns that appear while the arrestee is in custody at the facility. Additionally, those arrestees requesting medical attention during Sick-Call are evaluated by a Department-approved physician.





# BODY WORN VIDEO AND DIGITAL IN-CAR VIDEO SYSTEM

———— POLICY & PROCEDURES ————



***The BWV video and audio recordings are stored digitally on the BWV camera and can be viewed on a Department-issued smartphone, tablet, or an authorized computer. The DICV and audio recordings are stored digitally on the DICV in-car module and are uploaded for viewing on an authorized computer.***

#### OVERVIEW OF DEPARTMENT VIDEO SYSTEMS

The Los Angeles Police Department currently deploys two types of video recording devices in field operations, the Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) and the Body Worn Video (BWV) camera. These camera platforms have proven to be powerful policing tools that enhance community relations through transparency, improve both operational and administrative oversight and assist in resolving criminal matters more effectively.

The Department has incorporated video and audio evidence in the investigative, review, and adjudication processes of internal investigations, including UOF investigations, for many years. It should be noted however, that the legal basis used

to determine the lawfulness of an officer's actions during a use of force incident still remains the standard of objective reasonableness, as detailed in *Graham v. Connor* 490 U.S. 386 (1989). As such, events captured on DICVS and/or BWV are only one source of evidence and should not be used as the sole factor in determining the lawfulness of an officer's actions.

To date, both video-based platforms have continued to be instrumental in daily police activities and serve the interest of all stakeholders. The technology platform continues to be updated and enhanced. In 2022, DICV and BWV systems were integrated into one interface which enabled storage and retrieval of video from a single cloud-based repository.



**The implementation of technology based video recordings in the City was established primarily to further the Department's community policing efforts by promoting accountability and to build public trust through transparency.**



# CRITICAL INCIDENT

COMMUNITY BRIEFING



California Senate Bill 1421, enacted on January 1, 2019, which amended Penal Code Section 832.7, mandated that police departments release previously privileged information related to any incident where personnel used deadly force or any incident in which the use of force resulted in death or in great bodily injury. Additionally, California Assembly Bill 748, mandated disclosure of any associated video and audio recordings related to any of these critical incidents.

In response, the Los Angeles Police Department Board of Police Commissioners adopted Administrative Order No. 6, and subsequently, Administrative Order No. 14 (2020), which mandated that the Department release relevant video footage and details of critical use of force incidents within 45 days of the incident and set forth the standards and criteria for the public release of these video recordings. These orders took into consideration the public's interest in transparency and police accountability, as well as the privacy interests of the individuals depicted in the videos. At the same time, there is consideration for the preservation of the integrity of the related investigations.

Since the first video release on June 20, 2018, Critical Incident Community Briefings have generated approximately 6.5 million views with a combined approximate watch time of over 89.5 million minutes.

These analytics reinforce part of the purpose of this policy, which states, "The people of Los Angeles have an undeniable interest in being informed in a timely fashion and based on the most accurate information available, about how their police department conducts its business, especially when officers use lethal force or the use of force by the police result in the death or serious injury of a civilian."

Moving toward the future, the release of these videos will aid in transparency. The videos will also provide a training forum to improve upon our tactics in dealing with incidents that have an impact upon the lives of the people that we have sworn to protect and to serve. These videos can be viewed by visiting [www.LAPDOnline.org](http://www.LAPDOnline.org) and [lapdonline1](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCvW00000000000000000000) on youtube.com.

ALL CRITICAL INCIDENT VIDEOS ARE AVAILABLE TO VIEW ONLINE AT [LAPDONLINE.ORG](http://LAPDONLINE.ORG)





# THE USE OF FORCE

## — INVESTIGATION, REVIEW, AND ADJUDICATION PROCESS —

### **NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE PROCESS**

The investigation and adjudication process for a Non-Categorical Use of Force (NCUOF), while different in structure, is no less rigorous or thorough than the investigation into a CUOF. Each NCUOF investigation is subject to multiple levels of review and critical examination. Through a standardized system, all NCUOF cases undergo intense evaluation which results in a proper and fair adjudication by the Department.

#### **Investigation of a NCUOF Incident**

When an officer has been involved in a NCUOF, he or she shall notify a Department supervisor without delay. An uninvolved Department supervisor will respond to the scene in order to initiate the NCUOF Investigation. During the investigation the Department supervisor will establish if the Use of Force should be classified as a Level I, Level II, or as a Level III. See page 36 for the definition of a Level I, Level II and Level III incidents.

#### **Investigation of a NCUOF Level II and III Incident**

When conducting an investigation of a Level II NCUOF the Department Supervisor shall:

- Collect and preserve all appropriate evidence and canvas the scene to locate witnesses;
- Conduct independent interviews with all involved and witnessing Department employees, non-Department

witnesses, and the person(s) against whom force was used;

- Determine an initial classification of the NCUOF as either a Level I, Level II, or Level III incident;
- Review all audio and video recordings of the use of force and state in the report that recordings were reviewed;
- Identify the time frames relevant to the use of force and electronically “bookmark” the relevant portions of any video recordings collected (i.e., BWV) for subsequent reviewers;
- Verify whether all statements obtained are consistent with the arrest report or related reports; and,
- Identify and document any inconsistencies or conflicts between the accounts of the officers, the suspect(s), and/or the witness(es), and attempt to resolve those differences.

#### **Investigation of a NCUOF Level I Incident**

During the course of their investigation into a NCUOF, the Department supervisor may determine that the use of force meets the criteria for a Level I Incident. If this proves to be the case, there are additional specific steps the supervisor must take as a part of their investigation. These steps include:



- Review any related crime and/or arrest report or Employee's Report, to ensure that the related reports contain a complete account of the incident. A Follow-up Investigation, Form 03.14.00, may be used to make any necessary corrections to the related report(s) or to provide additional information;
- Record all statements obtained from non-Department witnesses, and the subject of the use of force;
- Document the vantage point of officers and witness(es), as well as any part of the force observed;
- Document all visible and complained of injuries, including any medical treatment provided; and,
- Provide an "Incident Overview" documenting the investigation, including a summary of any non-Department and Department witness statements, and any statements obtained from the subject of the use of force.

## *Watch Commander Responsibility*

A Watch Commander reviewing a NCUOF investigation shall document his or her insight in the "Findings" section of the NCUOF Report. As part of this evaluation, watch commanders shall:

- Evaluate whether or not the force used was objectively reasonable and ensure that all relevant tactical, use of force, and policy issues are addressed;
- Evaluate each force option used by each officer and determine if it was reasonable based on the actions of the subject of the force used (i.e., suspect);
- Evaluate the officer's efforts at tactical de-escalation and provide a rationale if tactical de-escalation was not feasible;
- Ensure that all supervisors are interviewed regarding their actions at the scene during the incident;
- Evaluate the actions of each of these supervisors and the existence and effectiveness of supervisory command and control;
- Level I issues need to be identified and addressed in the "Insight" section, such as how the inconsistencies or conflicts were resolved (e.g., independent witnesses corroborated the officer's or subject's account, a lack of injuries one would expect to see with the force reported by the subject, or video/audio corroborated or refuted the subject's allegation); and,
- Review the relevant recordings of the incident "bookmarked" by the investigating supervisor and certify that this has been completed.

## *Area Commanding Officer (CO) Responsibility*

Upon receipt of a NCUOF investigation, the CO of the concerned Bureau/Area/Division shall:

- Utilize the Area/division Training Coordinator to evaluate the incident;
- Contact subject matter experts (e.g., Training Division) to obtain additional information, as needed;
- Review all reports and make a recommendation on the disposition;
- Notify the employee of Critical Incident Review Division's (CIRD) final disposition as soon as practicable; and,

- Ensure the officer is served with a copy of the Non-Categorical Use of Force Administrative Disapproval Internal Process Receipt, Form 01.67.07, when the final disposition for tactics and/or the use of force is Administrative Disapproval.

## *Bureau Commanding Officer Responsibility*

Upon receipt of a Non-Categorical use of force investigation, the bureau commanding officer shall:

- Cross-staff with Internal Affairs Division (IAD) to determine if a related complaint investigation has been initiated regarding the use of force incident and, if so, take that information into consideration;
- Review all reports and make a recommendation on the disposition;
- Sign the Internal Process Report (IPR);
- Forward the IPR, with all related reports attached, to the CO of CIRD, within 45 calendar days of receipt; and,
- Upon receipt of the disposition from CIRD notify the employee's commanding officer of that disposition.

## *CIRD Commanding Officer (CO) Responsibility*

The Director of the Office of Support Services (OSS) is the Department's review authority for the administrative review of all UOF incidents. For NCUOF incidents, that authority is generally exercised through the CO of CIRD, who shall:

- Review the NCUOF investigation and all related reports to ensure compliance with Department policy and procedure;
- Approve or disapprove the recommended disposition and provide a written rationale for any finding that differs from that of the bureau CO;
- Retain the original Non-Categorical Use of Force Internal Process Report and copies of all related reports; and,
- Forward a copy of the completed Internal Process Report to the bureau CO; and,
- If the CO of CIRD requires further information prior to adjudication, such a request shall be submitted to the employee's bureau CO.

*Following adjudication of a NCUOF incident, the following shall occur:*

- Possible adjudications for a NCUOF are: In Policy – Administrative Approval, or Out of Policy – Administrative Disapproval;
- Possible dispositions are as follows: No Action, Incident Debrief, Counseling, Divisional Training, Formal training, Notice to Correct Deficiencies, or Personnel Complaint; and,
- The final adjudication and disposition, and any training provided shall be recorded into the concerned employee's TEAMS II Report.

# NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE REVIEW AND ADJUDICATION PROCESS

STEP

1

## NCUOF INCIDENT OCCURS

All involved personnel will be part of the NCUOF investigation.

STEP

2

## SUPERVISOR

The supervisor responds and determines if a reportable Use of Force incident occurred, or the appropriate level of investigation (Level I, II or III) and the supervisor then conducts the NCUOF investigation.

STEP

3

## WATCH COMMANDER

Watch commander and Training / Teams II Coordinator reviews the supervisor's completed investigation and makes the appropriate finding recommendations.



STEP

4

**AREA COMMANDING OFFICER**

Area / Division Commanding Officer reviews the NCUOF investigation and either closes Level III investigations at the divisional level or, for Level I or II investigations, provides finding recommendations regarding tactics and the force used.

STEP

5

**BUREAU COMMANDING OFFICER**

Bureau Commanding Officer reviews the Level I or II NCUOF investigation and may concur or make alternative recommendations.

STEP

6

**CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW DIVISION**

CIRD reviews the NCUOF investigation on behalf of the Director of the Office of Support Services and concurs with the finding recommendations provided by the Division and Bureau, or determines if alternative findings are more appropriate.

STEP

7

**POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS**

- No Action
- Incident Debrief
- Counseling
- Divisional training
- Formal training
- Notice to correct deficiencies
- Personnel complaint

# CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

STEP

1

## CUOF INCIDENT OCCURS

Force Investigation Division (FID) personnel respond and conduct the CUOF investigation. Office of Inspector General (OIG) responds to the scene, conducts their own independent investigation, and monitors the investigation. Los Angeles County District Attorney (LACDA) or Attorney General (AG), if applicable, conduct their own independent criminal investigation. Substantially Involved Personnel (SIP) are identified by FID and approved by Bureau Commanding Officer (CO)

STEP

2

## 72-HOUR BRIEFING

FID schedules a 72-Hour Brief, when they provide a preliminary presentation of the incident and answer questions directed from the Chief of Police (COP) and other attending staff.

### ATTENDEES

#### at the 72-Hour Brief

- COP
- Assistant Chief
- Bureau CO
- Presenting CO
- CIRD and TD

STEP

3

## GENERAL TRAINING UPDATE

Substantially Involved Personnel attend the General Training Update (GTU) provided by Training Division.

STEP

4

## RETURN TO FIELD DUTY (RTD)

CO's must ensure all 72-Hour Brief restrictions are met and documented per Department orders.

Division CO generates correspondence up the Chain of Command and obtains approval by Chain of Command for an officer's return to field duty.



# REVIEW AND ADJUDICATION PROCESS

STEP

5

## USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD (UOFRB)

The UOFRB is convened and chaired by the Director of OSS.

STEP

6

## CHIEF OF POLICE

The COP receives the UOFRB recommendations and evaluates the incident. The COP reports his recommendations to the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC).

STEP

7

## BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

The BOPC receives the COP recommendations and evaluates the incident. The OIG gives The BOPC their own recommendations.

The BOPC adjudicates the incident.

STEP

8

## CHIEF OF POLICE

The COP determines the outcome for BOPC findings of:

- Administrative Disapproval (AD) - Tactics;
- Out of Policy - Drawing / Exhibiting; and,
- Out of Policy - Use of Force
- Tactical Debrief;
- Notice to correct deficiencies;
- Extensive retraining; or
- Personnel complaint

## CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE PROCESS

Like other law enforcement agencies, the Department is mandated by law to oversee and investigate all UOF incidents by its officers. The adjudication process for Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) incidents involves a precise and systematic process with specific procedures. Officer-involved shootings (OIS), for example, take on a different level of investigation and review compared to NCUOF incidents. All CUOF incidents are followed by a formal adjudication process consisting of a comprehensive investigation, a thorough analysis of the force used by a Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) (UD's), recommended findings presented by the UOFRB to the Chief of Police (COP), recommended findings by the COP to the BOPC, and the findings of the BOPC.

## PUBLIC SAFETY STATEMENT

Following a CUOF incident, specifically an OIS, Department supervisors will obtain a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from the Substantially Involved Personnel (SIP). The PSS is a cursory statement of what occurred to address public safety concerns.

## SEPARATION AND TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL

In addition to obtaining a PSS, supervisors shall also cause the separation of the SIP and/or other witness employees and order them not to discuss the incident with anyone other than the assigned investigators and/or the employee's representative(s). After the PSS has been obtained and all public safety concerns have been addressed (e.g., establishing a perimeter, protecting the crime scene, locating witnesses/victims/suspects/injured bystanders/evidence, managing the response of additional resources, etc.), the Incident Commander shall ensure that all SIP and witnessing employees are transported individually by supervisors to the location of the Force Investigation Division (FID) interview as soon as practicable.

## DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER RESPONSIBILITIES

The Department Operations Center (DOC) is responsible for making the following notifications within 20 minutes of being notified by the Area watch commander/Incident Commander that a CUOF incident has occurred:

- Force Investigation Division;
- Family Liaison Unit;
- Office of the COP or his designee;
- Office of Operations;
- Office of Support Services;
- Chief of Staff; and,
- Office of the Inspector General (acting on behalf of the BOPC).

As soon as possible after being notified of a CUOF incident, the DOC is responsible for making notifications to the following entities:

- Media Relations Division;
- Commanding Officer (CO), Emergency Services Division;
- Commanding Officer, Professional Standards Bureau;

- Involved employee(s)' CO;
- Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy;
- Community Engagement Section; and,
- Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (LACDA) (for those cases identified in the rollout protocol governing such notifications).

## INITIAL NOTIFICATION AND CALL-OUT PROCEDURES

Currently, the DOC notifies the on-call FID Officer-in-Charge (OIC) that a CUOF incident has occurred. The FID OIC then coordinates for FID personnel to respond to the scene within one hour of notification. The first arriving FID investigator ensures that the on-scene personnel have secured the crime scene(s), generated crime scene logs, and established a perimeter.

## FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION

Upon arrival at the scene of a CUOF incident, FID personnel assume responsibility for the overall investigation. As part of the investigation, FID personnel conduct interviews of all involved parties, locate and collect evidence, manage crime scenes, coordinate the acquisition of photographs, and liaise with other relevant Department and non-Department entities.

On August 22, 2004, FID was established as the Department entity responsible for the administrative investigation of all UOF incidents determined to be "Categorical," as defined in the Federal Consent Decree. Force Investigation Division is comprised of four key components: the Administrative/Criminal Section, the Criminal Apprehension Team, the Investigative Support Unit, and the Investigative Support Section.

### *Resources Utilized by FID*

Depending upon the type of CUOF incident, the following Department resources may be utilized:

- Command Post Unit;
- Forensic Science Division (FSD), comprised of Field Investigation, Firearms Analysis, Narcotics Analysis, Quality Assurance, Questioned Documents, Serology/DNA, Toxicology, and Trace Analysis Units;
- Technical Investigation Division (TID) comprised of the Electronics, Latent Print, Photography, and Polygraph Units; and,
- Air Support Division (aerial photographs).

Additionally, the following Department and/or outside entities may respond:

- Media Relations Division;
- Robbery-Homicide Division;
- Office of the Inspector General (OIG);
- Officer Representation Section;
- Los Angeles Police Protective League;
- Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office;
- Justice System Integrity Division/CAL DOJ/AG Office;
- Crimes Against Peace Officers Section (CAPOS); and/or,
- Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner-Coroner.



*Investigative Procedures & Guidelines Following the Field Investigation*

Force Investigation Division is obligated to complete the investigation and forward the case to Critical Incident Review Division (CIRD) within 240 days of the date of the CUOF. If necessary, FID investigators may conduct additional investigative inquiries, as requested by the COP or the BOPC. To ensure that a CUOF is properly reviewed and adjudicated promptly, the COP shall submit all CUOF recommended administrative findings to the BOPC no less than 60 calendar days before the administrative statute date, unless sufficient cause exists for an extension of that deadline. Grounds for such extension are as follows:

- 1) The FID's investigation was not completed at least 125 calendar days before the administrative statute date, delaying the UOFRB process; or,
- 2) The CO of CIRD; the Director, OSS; or the COP identifies a need for additional or supplemental investigation.

**INCLUSION OF OTHER INVESTIGATIVE ENTITIES**

During the initial investigation, evidence and/or other facts about the incident may emerge, warranting joint investigations among several investigative entities. Force Investigation Division typically identifies the need to involve other entities during the preliminary notification of the CUOF by on-scene supervisors or during their initial on-scene investigation. Factors that would impact the decision to involve other investigative entities include, but are not limited to, a police officer sustaining serious bodily injury or death due to a suspect's actions, the identification of a Department employee as the victim of a crime directly related to the incident being investigated, or allegations of serious misconduct against a Department employee. In such events, the Department may involve the following:

- Robbery-Homicide Division;
- Internal Affairs Division;
- Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, CAPOS and/or JSID; and,
- California Department of Justice.

*Forensic Science Division (FSD) & Technical Investigation Division (TID)*

The FSD and TID include the Criminalistics Laboratory and the Technical Laboratory. In the broadest sense, FSD and TID's functions are to facilitate the collection, comparison, and interpretation of all types of physical evidence found at crime scenes, or collected from suspects and victims, and to provide expert testimony in these areas.

The Criminalistics Laboratory is a part of the Hertzberg-Davis Forensic Science Center at the Los Angeles Regional Crime Laboratory. The 180,000-square-foot forensic science facility is located on the campus of California State University, Los Angeles. The facility is shared by the Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California State University, Los Angeles, the California Forensic Science Institute, and the California Criminalistics Institute. The Criminalistics Laboratory is comprised of the following units: Toxicology and Trace Analysis, Field Investigation, Firearm Analysis, Narcotics Analysis, Quality Assurance, Serology/DNA, and Questioned Documents. The Technical Laboratory encompasses the Electronics, Latent Print, Photography, and Polygraph Units.

**BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE SERVICES (BSS)**

As it pertains to CUOF incidents, two situations generate a mandated referral to BSS. These situations include an OIS or a CUOF resulting in death or the substantial possibility of death. Appointments are arranged by the employee's CO and are conducted on-duty.

Any officer who is involved in an OIS is required to attend three mandatory, on-duty sessions with BSS. The first session is generally scheduled within 72 hours of the incident, or as soon as practicable. The second session takes place approximately four to eight weeks after the incident. The last session is scheduled for just before or after the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) has concluded. The officer must attend the first BSS session before returning to full duty.

**72-HOUR BRIEFING**

Within 72 hours of an OIS (or other CUOF if deemed necessary by the COP), an initial briefing is scheduled for the COP. During the briefing, FID provides a preliminary presentation of the incident and answers questions from the COP and attending command staff members. Additionally, the CO of the involved employees conducts a preliminary risk management assessment of the incident including each involved officer's previous training; as well as any Department and community concerns. Although the briefing is an initial assessment of the incident based on preliminary information, many basic facts are available at this stage. The objective of the briefing is to address issues that require immediate Department attention. The employees involved in the incident do not attend the briefing.

**GENERAL TRAINING UPDATE**

The General Training Update (GTU) is a mandatory training session for all SIP following a CUOF incident. Generally, the GTU is completed within two weeks of an incident and before employees return to field duty. During the GTU, the below mandatory topics are covered, as well as any other topics identified by the COP, the concerned area CO, or Training Bureau. The mandatory topics are as follows:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Reverence for Human Life;
- Tactical De-Escalation Techniques;
- Command and Control;
- Equipment Required/Maintained; and,
- If an employee discharges his or her firearm during an OIS other than a negligent discharge, Reality-Based Training/FOS is also a topic.

Starting in 2017, Training Division (TD) was tasked with conducting GTUs for all CUOF incidents. Before 2017, the GTU was conducted by the concerned Area's training coordinators. Currently, the GTU is administered by instructors from TD, with the assistance of training unit personnel from the concerned area and bureau. Training Division is also responsible for documentation and tracking of employees who did not attend the GTU due to valid temporary exemptions (e.g., on-leave due to injury, scheduled vacation, etc.)





### *Statute of Limitations for Adjudication*

To ensure that CUOF incidents are properly reviewed and adjudicated promptly, time limitations are implemented for various levels of investigation and review. These include:

- The statute date, or completion date for the entire process, which is one year from the date of the CUOF incident (or the date the incident is reported to a Department supervisor);
- Force Investigation Division's completion of the entire CUOF incident, which is within 240 calendar days from the date of the incident (or the date the incident is reported to a Department supervisor); and,
- The COP's recommended findings, which shall be submitted to the BOPC 60 calendar days or more before the administrative statute date.

### **Review & Findings**

Upon completion of FID's investigation of a CUOF incident, CIRD receives the investigation and completes a comprehensive review and analysis of the incident. Critical Incident Review Division then schedules the UOFRB.

### **Factors Considered in Determining Appropriate Findings**

In determining the proper adjudication for a CUOF incident, the following sections are extensively evaluated by all levels of review (including the UOFRB, the COP, the OIG, and the BOPC):

- **Tactics:** Was the officer's tactical decision-making appropriate before and during the incident? Were their actions a substantial deviation from Department policy and training and if so, was that deviation justifiable?
- **Drawing/Exhibiting:** Did the officer have a reasonable belief that there was a substantial risk the tactical situation may have escalated to the point where deadly force may have been justified?
- **Use of Force:** Was the force carried out per Department policy? Specifically, was the force used proportional and objectively reasonable? For lethal force, there is also an evaluation to determine if the force used was necessary.

### **TACTICS**

Findings	Outcome
Tactical Debrief	Tactical Debrief
Administrative Disapproval	Tactical Debrief and one or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive Retraining;</li> <li>• Notice to Correct Deficiencies; and/or,</li> <li>• Personnel Complaint.</li> </ul>

**DRAWING/EXHIBITING OF FIREARM**

Findings	Outcome
In Policy/No Further Action	Tactical Debrief
Administrative Disapproval/ Out of Policy	Tactical Debrief and one or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive Retraining;</li> <li>• Notice to Correct Deficiencies; and/or,</li> <li>• Personnel Complaint.</li> </ul>

**USE OF FORCE**

Findings	Outcome
In Policy/No Further Action	Tactical Debrief
Administrative Disapproval/ Out of Policy	Tactical Debrief and one or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive Retraining;</li> <li>• Notice to Correct Deficiencies; and/or,</li> <li>• Personnel Complaint.</li> </ul>

**Note:** Per Department Manual 3/792.10, a finding of Administrative Disapproval in any area will result in one or more of the following:

- Extensive Retraining;
- Notice to Correct Deficiencies; and/or,
- Personnel Complaint.

**USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD**

The UOFRB consists of a representative from each of the following entities:

- Office of Support Services (Chair of the UOFRB);
- The respective Office;
- Training Bureau;
- The concerned geographic or specialized bureau;
- Peer member(s) (similar in rank to the SIP); and,
- A representative from the OIG, in an oversight capacity.

Force Investigation Division personnel present information and analysis regarding the facts of the incident and subsequent investigation to the UOFRB. The CO of the concerned substantially involved employee also attends and provides his assessment of the incident and recommendations regarding Tactics, Drawing and Exhibiting, and the Force used. After careful examination, the UOFRB makes its recommended findings and forwards them to the COP for consideration.

**CHIEF OF POLICE**

Force Investigation Division personnel present information and analysis regarding the facts of the incident and subsequent investigation to the COP. The COP analyzes and examines all the facts presented, including the UOFRB's recommendations, and either adopts in whole or in part their recommendations or comes to a different determination. The COP then submits a correspondence to the BOPC detailing his recommended findings, 60 days before the administrative statute date.

## **LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (LACDA)**

Personnel from LACDA respond to OIS and In-Custody Death (ICD) incidents to assess whether an independent criminal investigation is necessary. The independent criminal investigation is required. Their assessment is twofold: the Justice System Integrity Division (JSID) evaluates the potential criminal culpability of law enforcement, the Crimes Against Peace Officers (CAPOS) evaluates potential criminal culpability of a person suspected of a crime against law enforcement. Additionally, the LACDA is available to provide advice to FID regarding criminal law issues.

## **OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG)**

The OIG closely monitors all FID investigations and UOFRB proceedings. The OIG's oversight begins immediately following the occurrence of a CUOF. The OIG has a 24-hour response capability and is promptly notified following a CUOF. The OIG responds to the scene of CUOF incidents, monitors FID's on-scene investigation, assesses compliance with applicable policy standards, and generally works to ensure the quality of the investigative work being performed. In practice, the OIG works closely with FID and is briefed regularly to ensure that whenever possible, investigative issues identified during the course of the investigation are addressed and resolved.

As it conducts its independent review of each CUOF, the OIG's staff also monitors the progression of the Department's internal review. This monitoring role includes attendance at every UOFRB, where the OIG may ask questions and provide input to the board members.

The OIG reviews the COP's report to the BOPC and evaluates the COP's recommendations and rationale. The OIG's oversight of each investigation culminates in a detailed report to the BOPC. The OIG report reviews every aspect of the case, including an assessment of the quality of the FID investigation, and an analysis of the COP's recommendations. The report also provides the OIG's recommendations regarding Tactics, Drawing and Exhibiting, and Use of Force. In cases where the OIG concurs with the findings of the COP, it will recommend to the BOPC that it adopt those findings. If the OIG believes additional or different analysis is warranted, they provide a supporting rationale in their report to the BOPC. In cases where the OIG determines that the available evidence supports findings other than those recommended by the COP, they will make alternate recommendations and provide supporting analysis and rationale to the BOPC.

## **BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS**

Force Investigation Division personnel present information and analysis regarding the facts of the incident and subsequent investigation to the BOPC. The BOPC reviews and examines the facts of the case while considering the recommended findings proposed by both the COP and OIG. The BOPC adjudicates the case and delivers the adopted findings for each of the concerned Department personnel.

## **POST-ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES**

*Tactical Debrief, Extensive Retraining, & Disciplinary Proceedings*  
Under current policy, an Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy determination will result in one or more of the following: Extensive Retraining, a Notice to Correct Deficiencies, and/or a Personnel

Complaint. If such findings are adopted, the COP will render a decision on which of the outcomes are most suitable to address the employee's actions.

Extensive Retraining is conducted by TD. The facilitator of the Extensive Retraining course tailors the training to be incident specific and verifies that the areas of concern are included in the course curriculum. If a Notice to Correct Deficiencies is served, the CO of the employee will complete and submit the necessary documentation, which is to be recorded on the employee's TEAMS II Report.

In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for the Department to initiate a personnel complaint, such as when training alone is insufficient or has been provided and proven ineffective. When a personnel complaint is initiated, the employee could face an official reprimand, demotion, suspension, or termination.

### *Internal Process Report (IPR)*

Immediately following the adjudication by the BOPC and the decision by the COP regarding outcomes, CIRD forwards an IPR to the involved employee's CO, listing the findings for the involved employee. The CO personally meets with the employee(s) and discusses the incident, the BOPC findings, and COP determination on the outcomes. Additionally, the CO shall discuss any adverse actions related to the incident as a result of a finding of Administrative Disapproval or Out of Policy.

### *Tactical Debrief*

All SIP in a CUOF receive a formal debriefing known as a Tactical Debrief. This Tactical Debrief is a critical part of the process for the employees, the Department, and law enforcement in general. It allows all parties to identify what was successful, as well as which areas require improvement. The Tactical Debrief addresses topics that could assist in the modification or enhancement of the Department's commitment to best practices and overall employee performance. Curriculum and class instruction are formatted to promote dialogue and an open forum between personnel and the instructors, thus allowing a more suitable platform for collaboration and overall enrichment. The Tactical Debrief is facilitated by a member of the Department's Training Division and occurs within 90 days after the BOPC adjudicates the incident.

## **DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL TRACKING & MONITORING**


Following the enactment of the Federal Consent Decree in 2001, the Department was required to implement numerous reform measures to track the trajectory and scope of its performance and consent decree adherence. One such measure was the development of the computerized TEAMS II database.

The TEAMS II is the Department's version of a risk management database, wherein information is collected concerning each officer's UOF involvement, complaints, training activities, commendations, vehicle accidents, and many other performance measures. Once a threshold in any of those fields is reached, the system automatically alerts supervisors about officers whose patterns of activity seem to be outside of the average range of their peers. The TEAMS II system is an effective human resource management tool for the Department and its use promotes transparency and accountability within the organization.









# COMPLAINT PROCESS

## THE USE OF FORCE

Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) has operated as the investigative arm of the COP to identify and report misconduct and employee behavior that violates Department policy or otherwise discredits the organization.

### INITIATION & INVESTIGATION PROCESS

The initiation process for complaints resulting from UOF findings of Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy differs depending on whether the force was classified as a CUOF or NCUOF.

#### *Categorical Use of Force*

The BOPC adjudicates the UOF and determines the findings for each involved employee. If an Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy finding is adopted, the COP determines which of the below listed outcomes is most appropriate to address the employee's actions. Such remedial actions may include:

- Completion of extensive retraining;
- Notice to Correct Deficiencies; and/or,
- Personnel complaint.

If the COP determines a personnel complaint is appropriate, CIRD initiates the complaint through the Complaint Management System (CMS) and transmits it to the Complaint Classifications Section (CCS), PSB. Complaints resulting from CUOF incidents are investigated by CCS.

Due to the extensive FID investigation and subsequent review process, complaints are commonly initiated within two months of the administrative statute date. To complete the complaint investigation within such a short time period, CCS investigators generally use the FID investigation, transcribed interviews, and transcripts to complete the complaint. There are occasions when ancillary allegations and discrepancies necessitate additional investigation by CCS staff.

#### *Non-Categorical Use of Force*

Personnel complaints and/or training resulting from Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy findings for NCUOF incidents may be initiated by one of the following, at any point throughout the UOF review cycle:

- Divisional CO;
- Bureau CO; or,
- Commanding Officer, CIRD.

*Note:* Under the authority of the Director of the Office of Support Services (OSS), the CO of CIRD ultimately approves or disapproves the bureau's recommended disposition. When there is a finding of Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy, CIRD may recommend training and/ or discipline.

Complaints associated with NCUOF incidents are generally investigated by CCS, other PSB investigators, or the involved officer's chain of command. The investigators review all reports and interviews related to the NCUOF, probe ancillary allegations, and address discrepancies as they would any other type of allegation.

### COMPLAINT ADJUDICATION PROCESS

The Department's adjudication process begins with the accused employee's CO and goes through multiple levels of review.

Upon completion of a disciplinary complaint investigation, the employee's CO is responsible for reviewing the investigation, determining whether misconduct occurred, recommending the disposition, and if applicable, the penalty. Consistent with the Department's standards, the adjudicators must determine by a Preponderance of Evidence Standard whether misconduct occurred. Preponderance of Evidence means the weight of evidence on one side is greater than the evidence presented for the other side. The adjudicator must make a determination for each allegation based on factual, reasonable consideration of the evidence, and statements presented in the investigation.

The possible disciplinary dispositions for all complaints of misconduct include:

- Sustained;
- Unfounded (the act did not occur);
- Exonerated (the act occurred but was justified, lawful and proper);
- Not Resolved (when evidence does not clearly prove or disprove the allegation);
- Insufficient Evidence to Adjudicate; or,
- Withdrawn by the COP (used only by the COP when an allegation would be better adjudicated by a court; imposing discipline is legally prohibited; the alleged act is minor misconduct and significant time has passed; or evidence has been lost or destroyed).

The CO submits the adjudication disposition recommendation up the chain of command to the employee's bureau CO. The bureau CO can concur with the recommendation, or if the bureau CO disagrees with the recommended adjudication, the bureau CO will prepare correspondence to PSB documenting the rationale for the bureau's recommended adjudication. This is referred to as a Military Endorsement.

The next level of review for the adjudication process of complaints with a recommended penalty of an Official Reprimand (OR) or greater is done in a group setting. This group consists of the CO and Assistant CO of PSB, the captains assigned to Internal Affairs Division, the Department Advocate, the lieutenants preparing to present sustained cases to the COP, and the Assistant Inspector General. The purpose of the meeting is to provide an opportunity for the presenters to brief the group on each case being presented to the COP. The presenters include a synopsis of the supporting evidence, or lack thereof, discuss errors made by the adjudicator(s) in the findings or recommended penalty, and a risk analysis of the employee which includes disciplinary history and other unusual circumstances that may affect the final decision by the COP. The group asks questions to ensure that all pertinent areas of the investigation were covered and that the final disposition of findings is sound. The recommended penalty is also evaluated to ensure that it is within a range consistent with other similarly situated officers that have received penalties for similar misconduct. After this review, the case is then presented to the COP for final adjudication.

All personnel complaints resulting from CUOF incidents found to be Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy by the BOPC are presented to the COP for final adjudication and penalty.



Complaints resulting from Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy findings for NCUOF incidents are subject to the same review process as all other types of complaints. When the recommended adjudication is sustained with a penalty of an official reprimand or greater, PSB submits the completed investigation and recommendation to the COP for final adjudication and penalty consideration.

### **POSSIBLE OUTCOMES**

When a complaint is sustained, under City Charter Section 1070(b), the COP may:

- Direct the employee to a Board of Rights and temporarily relieve from duty any member pending a hearing and decision by a Board of Rights; or,
- Suspend the employee for a total period not to exceed 22 working days with loss of pay and with or without reprimand; or,
- Demote the employee in rank, with or without suspension or reprimand or both; or,
- Demote the employee in rank, with or without temporary relieved from duty status or cancellation of such relieved from duty status.

If the COP desires to suspend an employee for more than 22 days, or believes removal is the appropriate penalty, the matter is referred to a Board of Rights.

### **BOARD OF RIGHTS**

A Board of Rights is considered a de novo hearing. The Board is composed of a three-member panel. An officer can select a Board with two sworn Department members (at the rank of Captain or above) and one civilian member from the BOPC's list of approved hearing officers or choose an all-civilian member board from the approved list. Members of the Board of Rights must make an independent assessment of the matter based solely on the evidence presented to them at the hearing [City Charter Sections 1070(f), 1070(h), and 1070(x)].

The Board of Rights' will determine, by majority vote, if the officer is guilty or not guilty based on the preponderance of evidence [City Charter Section 1070(l)]. If the Board of Rights finds the officer not guilty, the complaint concludes, and the COP may not impose a penalty.

If the officer is found guilty, under City Charter Section 1070(n), the Board of Rights recommends a penalty which is prescribed by written order of:

- Suspension for a definite period not exceeding 65 working days with total loss of pay, and with or without reprimand; or
- Demotion in rank, with or without suspension or reprimand or both; or
- Reprimand without further penalty; or,
- Removal.

In determining the final penalty, the COP will consider the Board of Rights recommendation, but has the authority to impose a lesser penalty than recommended. The COP, however, may not impose a higher penalty [City Charter Section 1070(p)].

### **APPEAL PROCESS**

The appeal process for complaints resulting from Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy findings on UOF incidents vary depending on the penalty imposed.

If the complaint is sustained with no penalty, a penalty of admonishment, or an official reprimand, the officer may request an Administrative Appeal to be held before a civilian hearing officer selected from the BOPC's list of approved hearing officers. The standard used is a preponderance of the evidence. Within 30 days, the hearing officer's recommendation is provided to the COP for consideration. The decision of the COP is final.

If the penalty imposed is a demotion and/or suspension of one to 22 days, the officer may either appeal using the Administrative Appeal procedure [MOU Article 9] or opt for a Board of Rights [City Charter Section 1070(b)(2)].


If the officer elects an Administrative Appeal, the officer is admitting guilt, and the only issue to be appealed is the degree of penalty. The hearing officer's report is submitted as a recommendation to the COP who makes the final determination. An Administrative Appeal may result in lower level of discipline but may not result in a higher penalty [MOU Article 9].

If the officer opts to appeal to a Board of Rights, the officer may appeal both the sustained finding and the penalty imposed. As explained above, under City Charter Section 1070(n), the Board of Rights can impose a penalty of:


- Suspension for a definite period not exceeding 65 working days with total loss of pay, and with or without reprimand; or,
- Demotion in rank, with or without suspension or reprimand or both; or,
- Reprimand without further penalty; or
- Removal.

The COP shall either uphold the recommendation of the Board of Rights or may, at his discretion, impose a penalty less severe than that ordered by the Board of Rights, but may not impose a greater penalty [City Charter Section 1070(p)].

Officers are also provided an opportunity to appeal the Department's action when a CUOF results in Administrative Disapproval – Extensive Retraining, or a NCUOF results in Administrative Disapproval–Verbal Counseling, Incident Debrief, or Training. As set forth in Article 9 of the MOU, CUOF adjudications of Administrative Disapproval – Extensive Retraining, or a NCUOF adjudications of Administrative Disapproval–Verbal Counseling, Incident Debrief, or Training, are subject to the Administrative Appeal process.







# OFFICER WELLNESS

— RESOURCES AND THE USE OF FORCE —

The Department's Behavioral Science Services is the oldest and most established in-house law enforcement psychological service entity in the United States. They advise whether an officer involved in a Categorical Use of Force is suitable to return to duty.

The field of police psychology was founded in 1968 when the Los Angeles Police Department became the first municipal police agency in the nation to hire a full-time psychologist, thereby establishing the group known as Behavioral Science Services (BSS). Behavioral Science Services has since been a leader in law enforcement wellness programming, driving many innovative practices for improving officer wellness.

The mission of BSS is to promote the health and wellness of sworn and civilian employees primarily through a host of psychological services, including psychotherapy, relationship counseling, psychological first aid/debriefings, crisis intervention, and skill-building groups. With over a dozen full-time, in-house police psychologists, BSS is one of the largest law enforcement psychology entities in the world. Behavioral Science Services also employs the nation's first police dietitian, who provides guidance on nutrition, healthy diet, and disease management to further ensure healthy and resilient personnel. Finally, the Department's Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention Unit operates within BSS and is comprised of sworn peer support members who help triage, guide, support, and educate in matters related to alcohol and other substance use and abuse.

For officers involved in an officer-involved shooting (OIS), BSS provides a series of at least three mandatory appointments with a police psychologist for the officer who discharged his or her weapon. The officer is scheduled no sooner than 48-hours after being released from the scene to ensure some degree of physical, psychological, and social equilibrium is achieved. The purpose of each appointment is to support the officer's resilience by aiming to reduce any distress, assist with current psychological or problem-solving needs, and promote healthy adjustment from a potentially traumatic incident. After the first appointment, the psychologist may recommend that the officer return to pre-incident duties or require additional appointments to achieve the aforementioned aims. At least one appointment will be scheduled to coincide with the release of body worn video (approximately 4-6 weeks after the incident) and another with the convening of the Use of Force Review Board (typically several months after the incident).

Officers who intimately witnessed the OIS or were involved in another type of Categorical Use of Force are seen for at least one mandatory appointment with a police psychologist. Other examples of incidents that may trigger a mandated referral to BSS include those involving head strikes, animal shootings, in-custody deaths, or involvement in a serious traffic collision with injuries that result in death or the substantial possibility of death.

In addition to providing employees with psychological, nutritional, and substance abuse services, BSS oversees the robust LAPD Peer Support Program. Officers who experience critical incidents are encouraged to speak with Peer Support members. In recent years, multiple specialized peer support cadres have been created, including one for officers who have been involved in categorical uses of force.

Behavioral Science Services also provides organizational and operational consultation to entities within the Department. Behavioral Science Services staff design and implement research and training on a variety of law enforcement-related topics, and police psychologists respond with the Special Weapons and Tactics team on every call involving a barricaded subject or hostage situation as part of the Crisis Negotiation Team.

Behavioral Science Services continues to evolve to meet the needs of 21st century policing. Telehealth services, along with the utilization of other digital tools, have gone from being temporary digital solutions during a global pandemic to staples of service delivery that increase utilization and efficiency. Further, BSS has increased its involvement in policy, training, and employee development, establishing key consultations and partnerships that capitalize on the intersection of law enforcement and the behavioral sciences.

The analysis and application of data-driven strategies within the Department, specifically as it relates to the monitoring of crime levels and significant law enforcement-related occurrences enhances accountability and transparency, and allows for a more effective utilization of resources.

# STATISTICS SNAPSHOT







# STATISTICAL



# VIOLENT CRIME

IN PERSPECTIVE



In 2023, there were a total of 30,259 violent crimes that occurred throughout the City, which accounted for a decrease of 1,002 violent crime occurrences, or three percent, compared to 2022. When compared to the 2019 through 2022 annual average of 29,856 violent crime occurrences, 2023 had 403 more violent crimes, or one percent, above the four-year annual average.

In review of the four violent crime categories, homicides experienced a 16 percent decrease along with robberies which experienced a five percent decrease in 2023 when compared to the prior year. Rapes decreased by 14 percent and aggravated assaults decreased by one percent in 2023 when compared to the prior year.



## CITY OF LOS ANGELES VIOLENT CRIME STATISTICS <sup>6</sup>

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Homicide</b>	258	355	402	392	328
<b>Rape</b>	1,904	1,579	1,623	1,581	1,357
<b>Robbery</b>	9,638	8,018	8,498	9,118	8,676
<b>Agg Assault</b>	17,250	18,562	20,074	20,170	19,898
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>29,050</b>	<b>28,514</b>	<b>30,597</b>	<b>31,261</b>	<b>30,259</b>

## OTHER CITY COMPARISON <sup>7, 8, 9, 10</sup>

According to 2023 violent crime data for the year, Houston experienced the highest violent crime rate amongst the five most populous cities in the country, with 97.3 violent crime occurrences per 10,000 individuals. Philadelphia had the second highest rate at 88.7 violent crime occurrences per 10,000 individuals. Los Angeles had the third highest violent crime occurrences at 77.5 violent crimes per 10,000 individuals. Chicago had the fourth highest violent crime occurrences per 10,000 individuals at a rate of 72.9. New York City experienced the fewest violent crime occurrences of the five most populous cities in the country at 53.4 violent crime incidents per 10,000 individuals.

<sup>6</sup> Violent crime totals are based on the date of occurrence, as opposed to United States Department of Justice data, which uses a reporting standard based on the date the crime is reported to the Department.

<sup>7</sup> Chicago Data Portal: <https://data.cityofchicago.org/>



<sup>8</sup> Crime Stats - NYPD COMPSTAT 2.0: <https://compstat.nypdonline.org>

<sup>9</sup> Crime Statistics, City of Houston: [https://www.houstontx.gov/police/cs/Monthly\\_Crime\\_Data\\_by\\_Street\\_and\\_Police\\_Beat.htm](https://www.houstontx.gov/police/cs/Monthly_Crime_Data_by_Street_and_Police_Beat.htm)

<sup>10</sup> Crime Maps & Stats | Philadelphia Police Department: <https://www.phillypolice.com/crime-maps-stats/> <https://data.census.gov>



## 2023 LOS ANGELES VIOLENT CRIME SUSPECT DATA




The Los Angeles Police Department understands that criminality, victimization, and policing often intersect as a result of complex social issues that involve much more than race, ethnicity, and other identifiable characteristics. It adheres to the mandate that policing in the City of Los Angeles be done in an unbiased manner. Demographic data related to crime victims and suspects (Age, Gender, Race, etc.) is gathered from crime reports taken throughout the City of Los Angeles and is based upon the accounts and perceptions of victims and witnesses participating in the reporting process. The demographic data of suspects, victims, and police officers contained in this report is neither intended to draw any conclusions about the criminality of any subset of the population or the legitimacy of policing efforts of any subset of the Department, nor is it used by the Department to influence its policing practices.

In 2023, there were 32,647 total violent crime suspects. Amongst the four cumulative violent crime categories, 893 suspects, or three percent, were classified as Other (includes Asian/Pacific Islander); 3,260 suspects, or ten percent, were classified as Unknown; 12,711 suspects, or 39 percent, were classified as Black; 13,467 suspects, or 41 percent, were classified as Hispanic; and, 2,316 suspects, or seven percent, were classified as White.

	Blk	Hisp	Wht	Other	Unk
<b>Population</b>	8%	48%	28%	16%	N/A
<b>Violent Crime</b>	39%	41%	7%	3%	10%
Homicide	34%	26%	4%	2%	33%
Rape	31%	39%	14%	9%	7%
Robbery	48%	36%	5%	1%	10%
Agg Assault	33%	46%	8%	3%	10%

**Note:** Population percentage data received from the Demographic Research Unit, City of Los Angeles Department of City Planning.

## 2023 LOS ANGELES VIOLENT CRIME VICTIM DATA



Hispanic victims accounted for 15,202 of the four cumulative violent crime categories, which represented 49 percent of the 31,285 total violent crime victims in 2023. Black victims accounted for the second highest group with 6,935 victims, or 22 percent, of the total. White victims had the third highest count with 4,122 victims, or 13 percent, of the total. Other ethnic victims (includes Asian/Pacific Islander) accounted for 2,471 victims, or eight percent, of the total. Victims of unknown ethnicity accounted for 2,555 victims, or eight percent, of the total.


	Blk	Hisp	Wht	Other	Unk
<b>Population</b>	8%	48%	28%	16%	N/A
<b>Violent Crime</b>	22%	49%	13%	8%	8%
Homicide	42%	45%	9%	4%	0%
Rape	23%	43%	25%	8%	1%
Robbery	15%	43%	13%	10%	18%
Agg Assault	27%	49%	13%	7%	3%

*Note: Population percentage data received from the Demographic Research Unit, City of Los Angeles Department of City Planning.*

# CITY STATISTICS

## POPULATION AND AREA<sup>11</sup>

According to the 2021 Census American Community Survey (ACS) estimate, the United States (U.S.) Census Bureau estimated the population of the City of Los Angeles to be approximately 3.9 million residents, living within a geographical area encompassing 468 square miles. Based on current estimates of 3.9 million residents, Los Angeles is California's most populous city and the second most populous city nationally, following New York City.



Ethnicity	No. of Individuals	Percentage
Asian/Pacific Islander	455,631	12%
Black	324,152	8%
Hispanic	1,890,337	48%
White	1,095,259	28%
Other	137,061	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,902,440</b>	<b>100%</b>


Based on the U.S. Census Bureau's ACS estimated population figures for the City, approximately 1.9 million of the 3.9 million residents, or 48 percent, are Hispanic. White residents account for approximately 1.1 million residents, or 28 percent. Asian/Pacific Islander residents account for approximately 455,631 or 12 percent. Black residents account for approximately 324,152 or eight percent. Lastly, approximately 137,061 residents, or four percent, have Other ethnic classifications.

## CITY CRIME STATISTICS

### Violent Crime<sup>12</sup>

In 2023, 30,259 violent crime incidents (consisting of homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults) occurred throughout the City. The 2023 total accounted for a decrease of 1,002 incidents, or approximately three percent, compared to 31,261 incidents in 2022. When compared to the 2019 through 2022 annual average of 29,856 incidents, 2023 was 403 incidents, or approximately one percent, above the four-year annual average. The City experienced 328 homicides in 2023, which was 64 less, or a 16 percent decrease, compared to the 392 homicides in 2022. There were 24 less, or a seven percent decrease, compared to the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average of 352 decedents.

The data below reflects the ethnic breakdown of suspects involved in violent crime incidents during 2023:



Ethnicity	No. of Suspects	Percentage
Black	12,711	39%
Hispanic	13,467	41%
White	2,316	7%
Other	893	3%
Unknown	3,260	10%
<b>Total</b>	<b>32,647</b>	<b>100%</b>

In 2023, 12,711 out of the 32,647 or 39 percent, of the suspects involved in violent crime were Black. During the same period, 13,467, or 41 percent, of the suspects involved in violent crime were Hispanic. Suspects involved in violent crime who were White accounted for 2,316, or seven percent. Lastly, 4,153 suspects, or 13 percent, of the suspects involved in violent crime were classified as Other or Unknown ethnic origins.

### Part I Crime

In 2023, 137,542 Part I Crime incidents (consisting of homicides, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, burglaries/thefts from motor vehicles, personal/other thefts, and auto thefts) occurred throughout the City. This number represents a two percent increase, or 2,730 more incidents, than the 134,812 incidents in 2022. In 2023, there were 13,268, or approximately 11 percent, more incidents than the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average of 124,274 incidents.

### Part II Crime

In 2023, 91,760 Part II Crime incidents (kidnap, other sex crimes, simple assaults, crimes against family/children, weapons violations, identity theft, fraud, forgery/counterfeiting, embezzlement, prostitution, disorderly conduct, and vandalism) occurred throughout the City. The 2023 total was a decrease of 6,414 incidents, or less than seven percent, compared to the 98,174 incidents in 2022.

<sup>11</sup> Los Angeles City Planning Demographics: <https://planning.lacity.org/resources/demographics>

<sup>12</sup> Violent crime totals are based on the date of occurrence, as opposed to United States Department of Justice data, which uses a reporting standard based on the date the crime is reported to the Department.




# LAPD PERSONNEL FIGURES

As of December 31st, 2023, the Department employed 8,965 sworn personnel, making it the third largest municipal police department in the nation behind the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the Chicago Police Department (CPD).

## Sworn Personnel by Ethnicity

Sworn Department personnel of Hispanic descent account for the largest ethnic category of employees in the Department with 4,881 out of the 8,965 total personnel, or 54 percent. The following depicts the remaining Department sworn personnel categories according to ethnicity along with their respective totals and percentage breakdowns:




Ethnicity	No. of Sworn Personnel	Department
American Indian	31	<1%
Asian/Pacific Islander	738	8%
Black	800	9%
Filipino	221	2%
Hispanic	4,881	54%
White	2,252	25%
Other	42	< 1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,965</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Note:** On a per capita basis, the Department has 30.0 officers per 10,000 residents, compared to the CPD and NYPD averages of 43.7 and 39.7 officers per 10,000 residents, respectively. From a geographical perspective, the Department has 17.9 officers per square mile, compared to the CPD with 50.4 officers per square mile, and NYPD with 111.3 officers per square mile.

## Sworn Personnel by Rank

The Department has 6,285 employees that are at the rank of police officer, which represents 70 percent of the 8,965 total Department personnel. The following depicts the remaining Department sworn personnel categories according to rank along with their respective totals and percentage breakdowns:




Rank	No. of Sworn Personnel	Department
Commander & Above	37	<1%
Captain	80	1%
Lieutenant	233	3%
Sergeant	1,085	12%
Detective	1,245	14%
Police Officer	6,285	70%
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,965</b>	<b>100%</b>

## Sworn Personnel by Gender

Males accounted for 7,278 of the 8,965 total Department personnel, or 81 percent, and females accounted for 1,685 employees, or 19 percent. Two officers identified as non-binary.

Gender	No. of Sworn Personnel	Department
Female	1,685	19%
Male	7,278	81%
Non-binary / Other	2	< 1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,965</b>	<b>100%</b>



# LAPD STATISTICS

## Department Calls for Service Information


The Department received 787,089 calls for service in 2023, which was a decrease of 41,322 calls, or approximately five percent, compared to the 828,411 calls for service in 2022. In 2023, there were 119,243, or approximately 13 percent, less calls for service than the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average of 906,332 calls for service.

In 2023, 77th Street Area accounted for the most calls for service with 54,249 out of the total of 787,089, which represented approximately seven percent of all calls for service generated for the Department's 21 geographical Areas and other non-defined City areas. Central Area accounted for the second highest call for service count with 52,310, or seven percent, of the total calls for service. Southwest Area had the third highest radio call count with 42,839 calls, or five percent of the total calls for service.

Based on Bureau totals in 2023, Valley Bureau accounted for the most calls for service with 230,115 calls, or 29 percent, of the 787,089 totals for the year. Central Bureau had the second highest count with 198,559 calls, or 25 percent. West Bureau had the third highest count with 189,356, or 24 percent. Lastly, South Bureau accounted for the lowest radio call count with 167,481 calls, or 21 percent. The remaining 1,578 calls for service, or less than one percent, occurred in non-defined City areas.

**Note:** Non-defined City areas include calls for service handled by the four Traffic Divisions.

## Department Calls for Service By Division



### Department Public Contact Information


Department personnel contacted 1,137,207 individuals in 2023, which includes those detained during field detentions and calls for service. This figure, however, is only a small fraction of the total number of individuals officers interact with on an annual basis, as it does not account for interactions with members of the public other than those detailed above. The 2023 total was a decrease of 22,361 individuals, or two percent, compared to 1,159,568 individuals contacted in 2022. In 2023, there were 267,818 or 19 percent, less individuals contacted than the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average of 1,405,025.

### Department Field Detention Information

Department personnel stopped 350,118 individuals in 2023 during observation-related field detentions (including both vehicle and pedestrian stops). This accounted for an increase of 18,896 individuals, or approximately six percent, compared to 331,222 observation-related field detentions in 2022. In 2023, there were 148,620, or approximately 30 percent, less observation-related field detentions than the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average of 498,738.

In 2023, Hispanic subjects accounted for 183,781, or 52 percent, of the 350,118 individuals stopped during 2023 observation-related field detentions. Black subjects accounted for 78,690, or 22 percent, of the individuals stopped. White subjects accounted for 17 percent with 59,225 of the individuals stopped. American Indian, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Other or Unknown ethnicities accounted for 28,422 individuals, or eight percent, cumulatively.


### Field Detention Information By Race



Ethnicity	No. of Suspects	Percentage
Black	78,690	22%
Hispanic	183,781	52%
White	59,225	17%
Other	28,422	8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>350,118</b>	<b>100%</b>

The data below reflects the ethnic breakdown of violent crime arrestees in 2023:

### Violent Crime Arrestee by Race



Ethnicity	No. of Arrestees	Percentage
Black	3,019	36%
Hispanic	3,986	48%
White	945	11%
Other	381	5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,331</b>	<b>100%</b>

### Attacks on LAPD Officers

In 2023, there were 772 attacks on LAPD officers which was a decrease of 39 incidents, or five percent, compared to 811 incidents in 2022. In 2023, there were 93, or 11 percent less, incidents than the 2019 through 2022 four-year average of 865.

### Department Citation Information

In 2023, a total of 115,674 citations were issued. This total included 100,115 traffic related citations and 15,559 Release from Custody (RFC) arrest reports, which are written in lieu of confinement for certain misdemeanor-related violations. The total citations issued in 2023 was a decrease of 49,864 citations, or 30 percent, compared to the 2019-2022 four-year annual average of 165,538.

### Department Arrest Information

The Department had 42,373 total arrests in 2023, which was a decrease of 1,228, or three percent, less than the 43,601 individuals arrested in 2022. In 2023, there were 6,863, or 14 percent, less individuals arrested than the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average of 49,236.



# LAPD STATISTICS: FIREARMS POINTED AT PERSONS

In 2023, Los Angeles Police Department officers documented 1,137,207 public contacts, which include those detained for calls for service and field detentions. Officers drew and pointed their firearms at a total of 4,949 persons during 3,791 stops, or 0.4 percent of all public contacts. In 2023, officers pointed their firearms at 454 fewer persons, or eight percent less, as compared to 2022. When compared to the four-year annual average of 2019 through 2022, 6,048 persons who had firearms pointed in their direction, 2023 had 1,099 fewer, or 18 percent less incidents.

In 2023, of the total 4,949 persons involved in incidents where firearms were pointed at them, 4,248 were male, or 86 percent, and 699 were female, or 14 percent. Compared to 2022, there was no change in gender category percentages. In 2023, two persons identified as Non-Binary.

In 2023, 2,680 Hispanic persons were involved in incidents where firearms were pointed at them. This represented 54 percent of the 4,949 total persons. This accounted for a two-percentage point decrease compared to 56 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Hispanic persons from 2019 through 2022 of 55 percent, 2023 represented a one-percentage point decrease.

In 2023, 1,527 Black persons were involved in incidents where firearms were pointed at them. This represented 31 percent of the 4,949 total persons. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase compared to 29 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Black persons from 2019 through 2022 of 30 percent, 2023 represented a one-percentage point increase.

In 2023, 557 White persons were involved in incidents where firearms were pointed at them. This represented 11 percent of the 4,949 total persons. This accounted no change when compared to 11 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of White persons from 2019 through 2022 of 11 percent, 2023 had no percentage-point change.

In 2023, of the 4,949 persons that officers pointed their firearms, 3,182 persons were arrested, or 64 percent. Compared to 2022, this was a three-percentage point decrease from 67 percent, where 3,626 persons were arrested. Compared to the aggregate percentage of persons arrested from 2019 through 2022, of 62 percent, 2023 experienced a two-percentage point increase.

In 2023, 261 persons were issued a citation, or five percent. Compared to the 2022 percentage-point of five percent, 2023 experienced no change.

In 2023, 294 persons were warned, or six percent. This was a two-percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2022.

In 2023, 322 persons had “no further enforcement action,” or seven percent. This was a two-percentage point decrease compared to nine percent in 2022.

Firearms Pointed at Person	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Stops	4,171	4,510	4,940	4,161	3,791
Firearms Pointed	6,060	6,325	6,402	5,403	4,949

Firearms Pointed by Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Male	5,068	5,303	5,413	4,641	4,248
Female	991	1022	988	760	699
Non-Binary	1	0	1	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,060</b>	<b>6,325</b>	<b>6,402</b>	<b>5,403</b>	<b>4,949</b>

Firearms Pointed by Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	2	2	4	1	0
Asian	179	191	180	170	164
Black	1,969	1,914	1,873	1,593	1,527
Hispanic	3,242	3,445	3,557	3,018	2,680
White	644	746	756	579	557
Other	24	27	32	42	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,060</b>	<b>6,325</b>	<b>6,402</b>	<b>5,403</b>	<b>4,949</b>

Firearms Pointed Disposition	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Arrested	3,578	3,635	4,089	3,626	3,182
Citation	441	484	331	295	261
Warned	303	297	339	242	294
Other	1,252	1,300	1,008	739	977
No Enforcement Action	486	609	635	501	235
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,060</b>	<b>6,325</b>	<b>6,402</b>	<b>5,403</b>	<b>4,949</b>





# FIREARMS RECOVERED


## Firearms Recovered by the Department

In 2023, there were 8,154 firearms recovered in Department field operations, which was a decrease of 273 or three percent less recovered firearms as compared to the 8,427 in 2022. In 2023, 1,232 of the recovered firearms were “ghost guns,” (unregistered, non-serialized firearms) which was approximately 15 percent of the total recovered firearms in 2023. This was a decrease of 474, or 28 percent as compared to 1,706 in 2022. In 2023, there were 506, or seven percent, more firearms recovered than the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average of 7,648.


**Note:** These figures exclude firearms acquired through the Department’s Gun Buyback Program.

## Department’s Firearms Recovered 2019-2023

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Total Per Year</b>	6,969	6,536	8,661	8,427	8,154



## Department’s Firearms Recovered by Bureau in 2023




BUREAU TOTALS	2023	Percentages
Central	1,997	24%
South	2,288	28%
Valley	2,293	28%
West	1,199	15%
<i>Outside Jurisdiction</i>	377	5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,154</b>	<b>100%</b>

In 2023, a total of 28 percent of all firearms recovered were from Valley Bureau, the highest in comparison to all bureaus. South Bureau also had 28 percent of firearms recovered from within its geographic boundaries. Twenty-four percent of all firearms recovered in 2023 came from Central Bureau, 15 percent from West Bureau and five percent from outside city boundaries.


## Firearms Recovered by Bureau in 2023

CENTRAL BUREAU	2023	Percentages
Central	359	18%
Rampart	285	14%
Hollenbeck	337	17%
Northeast	195	10%
Newton	821	41%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,997</b>	<b>100%</b>



There was a total of 1,997 guns recovered from Central Bureau. Of that total, most firearms were recovered from Newton Division, which was 41 percent of all firearms recovered from Central Bureau.

SOUTH BUREAU	2023	Percentages
Southwest	429	19%
Harbor	361	16%
77th	874	38%
Southeast	624	27%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,288</b>	<b>100%</b>




There was a total of 2,288 firearms recovered from South Bureau. Of that total, most firearms were recovered from 77th Street Division, which were 38 percent of all firearms recovered from South Bureau.

**Note:** Data collected from APIMS by Evidence and Property Management Division.




VALLEY BUREAU	2023	Percentages
Van Nuys	205	9%
West Valley	247	11%
North Hollywood	330	14%
Foothill	433	19%
Devonshire	407	18%
Mission	351	15%
Topanga	320	14%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,293</b>	<b>100%</b>



There was a total of 2,293 firearms recovered from Valley Bureau. Of that total, most firearms were recovered from Foothill Division, which was 19 percent of all firearms recovered from Valley Bureau.

WEST BUREAU	2023	Percentages
Hollywood	390	33%
Wilshire	212	18%
West LA	124	10%
Pacific	271	23%
Olympic	202	17%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,199</b>	<b>100%</b>



There was a total of 1,199 firearms recovered from West Bureau. Of that total, most firearms were recovered from Hollywood Division which were 32 percent of all firearms recovered from West Bureau.

### Firearm Recovery: Ghost Guns

In 2023, there were a total of 1,232 ghost guns recovered. The manufacturing, selling, use, and possession of ghost guns is an epidemic not only in our City, but also nationwide. Our Department continues to focus its efforts on investigating ghost gun manufacturers through street buys, tips, and internet sales. Despite our ongoing efforts, a high percentage of ghost guns recovered are still being constructed from pre-made kits. The Department will continue working with City leaders in the expansion and enforcement of legislative efforts, gun buyback programs, and further community awareness outreach, to combat this ever-growing threat. These leadership efforts will greatly assist our field officers and detectives in gathering valuable information and lead specialized units to those making and distributing ghost guns.




# USE OF FORCE REVIEW

Department personnel were involved in 70 CUOF incidents and 1,560 NCUOF incidents in 2023. The combined total of 1,630 incidents was a decrease of 636 incidents, or 28 percent less, compared to the 2,266 total UOF incidents in 2022.

## Categorical Use of Force Incidents

The table below depicts the CUOF totals for 2023:



Category	2023
OIS - Hit	29
OIS - No Hit	5
OIS - Animal	5
Carotid Restraint Control Hold (CRCH)	2
Head Strike	1
In-Custody Death (ICD)	5
K-9 Contact	6
Law Enforcement Related Injury (LERI)	6
Unintentional Discharge (UD)	10
Warning Shot	0
Chief of Police (COP) Directed	0
Use of Deadly Force (Other)	1
*See page 364 for definition.	
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>


## Source of Activity for CUOF Incidents

In 2023, 35 incidents, or 50 percent of the Department's 70 CUOF incidents, originated from radio calls generated by Communications Division. Fourteen incidents, or 20 percent, occurred during field detentions based on officers' observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). Five incidents originated during off-duty incidents, which represented seven percent.

The following depicts the remaining category totals and their respective percentages:

- On-Duty, Non-Tactical (Unintentional Discharge [UD] incidents): six incidents, or nine percent;
- Citizen Flag Down: six incidents, or nine percent;
- Pre-planned event: zero incidents, or zero percent;
- Ambush: one incident, or one percent;
- Station Call: zero incidents, or zero percent and,
- Other: two incidents, or three percent.

## Source of Activity for CUOF Incidents




Source	2023
Radio Call	35
Observation	14
Citizen Flag Down	6
Pre-Planned	0
Station Call	0
Ambush	1
Off-Duty	5
Other	2
On-Duty, Tactical	1
On-Duty, Non-Tactical	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>

### Officer Involved Shooting Incidents

Of the 70 CUOF incidents in 2023, 34 were OIS occurrences. The 2023 OIS total was an increase of three incidents, or ten percent, more than the 31 OIS incidents in 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, there were a total of 121 OIS occurrences, resulting in an annual average of 30 incidents. The 2023 count was above the 2019 through 2022 four-year annual average by four incidents, or 13 percent.

There were 34 suspects involved in the 34 OIS incidents in 2023. Eighteen of the 34 suspects, or 53 percent, were Hispanic. Nine of the suspects, or 26 percent, were Black. Seven of the suspects, or 21 percent, were White.

### Officer Involved Shooting Incidents by Race




Ethnicity	2023 OIS Suspect	Violent Crime Suspect	City Population
Asian/Pacific Islander	0%	(See Other)	12%
Black	26%	39%	8%
Hispanic	53%	41%	48%
White	21%	7%	28%
Other	0%	3%	4%
Unknown	0%	10%	DNA
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

DNA - Does Not Apply

### Non-Categorical Use of Force Incidents

In 2023, 1,560 NCUOF incidents occurred in the City.



Year	2023
Level I	298
Level II	1,033
Level III	229
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,560</b>

**Note:** Refer to Page 74, Non-Categorical Use of Force Levels, for definition of Level I, Level II and Level III.


### Source of Activity for NCUOF Incidents

In 2023, 849, or 54 percent, of the Department's 1,560 NCUOF incidents originated from radio calls generated by Communications Division. During the same period, 453 incidents, or approximately 29 percent, occurred during field detentions based on officers' observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops).

The following depicts the remaining category totals and their respective percentages:

- Citizen Flag Down: 126 incidents, or approximately eight percent
- Other: 102 incidents, or seven percent;
- Station Call: 20 incidents, or one percent; and,
- Unknown: ten incidents, or less than one percent.

### Source of Activity for NCUOF Incidents



Source	2023
Citizen Flag Down	126
Observation	453
Radio Call	849
Station Call	20
Other	102
Unknown	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,560</b>






# SUSPECT WEAPONS

OR ACTIONS BY PERCENT

## SUSPECT WEAPONS OR ACTION BY PERCENT

The graph below depicts the 2019 through 2023 annual percentages of seven of the most represented weapon/force types utilized by suspects in OIS incidents. As shown, firearms overwhelmingly accounted for the highest volume of weapons utilized by suspects, with a five-year annual average of 51 percent. During the same period, edged weapons consistently accounted for the second highest volume of weapons with a five-year annual average of 27 percent. The OIS incidents involving “other” weapons , replica/pellet weapons and perception based shootings accounted for a five-year annual average of six percent. OIS incidents with Impact devices accounted for three percent of weapons. Lastly, a five-year annual average of one percent of OIS incidents involved no weapons.



	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
None	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%
Other (automobile, physical force, unknown, and Other)	12%	10%	5%	0%	6%
Impact Device	4%	0%	3%	0%	6%
Perception	0%	3%	5%	16%	3%
Edged Weapon	19%	23%	38%	16%	35%
Replica/Pellet	0%	0%	8%	10%	12%
Firearm	65%	58%	41%	58%	38%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

# USE OF FORCE IN PERSPECTIVE

FOR PUBLIC CONTACTS IN 2023

**350,118**


observation-related  
field detentions

**1,137,207**

documented  
public contacts

\*\*\*Infographic not to scale






- It is important to note that a vast majority of police interactions with the public do not result in a use of force. In 2023, the Department had 1,137,207 documented public contacts. During those contacts, 350,118 individuals were stopped during observation-related field detentions (including both vehicle and pedestrian stops), 42,373 arrests were affected, and 1,630 use of force incidents occurred (34 of which were OIS incidents and 1,560 were non-categorical use of force incidents).



## Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) – Qualify four times per year with handguns; once per year with shotgun, twice per year with rifle, if certified, and once per year on a Force Option Simulator (FOS) system. There are years of service and rank exemptions.

**8,965 sworn personnel**  
**2,627 civilian employees**  
**468 sq mi (patrol area)**  
**3.9 million (population)**



## Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) – Qualify four times per year with handguns; no shotgun qualification, and no qualification on an FOS type system. Rifle certification for LASD is a two year qualification which requires deputies to qualify twice on the range the first year, then complete an eight hour class and another range qualification the following year.

**9,132 sworn personnel**  
**5,356 civilian employees**  
**3,159 sq mi (patrol area)**  
**2.9 million (population)**



## Houston Police Department

Houston Police Department (HPD) – Qualify once per year with handguns; once per year with shotgun, and once per year with rifle, if rifle certified. There is no FOS type qualification, but monthly training on a FOS type system is required. There are no years of service and/or rank exemptions.

**5,187 sworn personnel**  
**867 civilian employees**  
**665 sq mi (patrol area)**  
**2.3 million (population)**

## New York Police Department

New York Police Department (NYPD) – Qualify twice per year with handguns; no shotgun or rifle qualification unless certified and part of a specialized unit. There is no FOS type qualification and there are no years of service and/or rank exemptions.

**33,612 sworn personnel**  
**16,611 civilian employees**  
**302 sq mi (patrol area)**  
**8.5 million (population)**



## Chicago Police Department

Chicago Police Department (CPD) – Qualify once per year with handguns; once per year with shotgun, if deploying shotgun in the field, and twice per year with a rifle, if rifle certified. There is currently no FOS type qualification. There are no years of service and/or rank exemptions.

**11,782 sworn personnel**  
**761 civilian employees**  
**234 sq mi (patrol area)**  
**2.7 million (population)**



## Philadelphia Police Department

Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) – Qualify once per year with handguns; twice per year with long gun (rifle or shotgun), if certified, and once a year on an FOS type system. There are no years of service and/or rank exemptions.

**5,435 sworn personnel**  
**817 civilian employees**  
**140 sq mi (patrol area)**  
**1.6 million (population)**





# AGENCY TO AGENCY

## USE OF FORCE COMPARISON

### OIS INCIDENTS

In 2023, the Department had a total of 34 OIS incidents, which was the highest number of OIS incidents in the comparison group and an increase of three OIS incidents, or 10 percent, compared to 2022. When compared to 2022, the Department was the only agency to have an increase in the number of OIS incidents in the comparison group. The New York Police Department (NYPD), which is the largest police department in the comparison group, had the second highest number of total OIS incidents in 2023 with a total of 30 OIS incidents. In 2023, NYPD had a decrease of 10 incidents, or 25 percent, from the previous year. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) had 21 OIS incidents in 2023, which was a decrease of six incidents from the previous year, or 22 percent. The Chicago Police Department (CPD) had the lowest number of OIS incidents in 2023 with 17 incidents which was a decrease of 11 incidents from the previous year, or 39 percent. The Houston Police Department (HPD) had 20 OIS incidents in 2023 compared to 29 incidents in 2022, which was a decrease of nine incidents, or 31 percent. The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), which is the smallest department of the comparison group, had the third highest number of OIS incidents with 23 OIS incidents in 2023, compared to 29 incidents in 2022.

### *OIS Incidents*

Department	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Los Angeles Police Department	26	27	37	31	34
Chicago Police Department	17	36	32	28	17
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	28	32	35	27	21
New York Police Department	25	25	36	40	30
Houston Police Department	20	26	29	29	20
Philadelphia Police Department	9	8	8	29	23

### OIS SUSPECTS DECEASED

In 2023, the Department had a total of 16 suspect fatalities as a result of OIS incidents, which was the highest number of fatalities in the comparison group. In 2023, the Department had an increase of two fatalities compared to 14 fatalities in 2022. HPD had the second highest number of OIS suspect fatalities, with 11 decedents, a decrease of two decedents from the previous year. NYPD had seven decedents a decrease of six decedents from the previous year. CPD had an increase of three decedents

as a result of OIS incidents in 2023 compared to two decedents in 2022. LASD experienced a decrease of one decedent from the previous year with 10 decedents in 2023 and 11 decedents in 2022. PPD experienced no change in the number of suspect fatalities with a total of five in 2022 and 2023, respectively. In 2023, the Department and CPD experienced increases in the number of OIS decedents. In 2023, LASD, HPD, and NYPD experienced decreases in the number of OIS decedents. In 2023, PPD was the single department that experienced no change in the number of OIS decedents.

#### ***OIS Suspects Deceased***

Department	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Los Angeles Police Department	12	7	17	14	16
Chicago Police Department	5	7	7	2	5
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	13	16	11	11	10
New York Police Department	11	8	6	13	7
Houston Police Department	7	9	11	13	11
Philadelphia Police Department	0	1	4	5	5

#### **DECEASED COMPARED TO OIS INCIDENTS**

When comparing the number of deceased OIS suspects to the number of total OIS incidents in 2023, the Department had 47 percent of the OIS incidents resulting in a suspect fatality. HPD had the highest amount in the comparison group with 55 percent of their OIS incidents result in a fatality. LASD had 48 percent of their incidents result in a suspect fatality. NYPD had 23 percent of their OIS incidents result in a suspect fatality. CPD had 29 percent of OIS incidents resulting in a suspect fatality. PPD had the lowest percent in the comparison group with 22 percent of their OIS incidents resulting in a suspect fatality.

#### ***Percentage of Deceased Suspects Compared to OIS Incidents***

Department	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Los Angeles Police Department	46%	26%	46%	45%	47%
Chicago Police Department	29%	19%	22%	7%	29%
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	46%	50%	31%	41%	48%
New York Police Department	44%	32%	17%	33%	23%
Houston Police Department	35%	35%	38%	45%	55%
Philadelphia Police Department	0%	13%	50%	17%	22%

**FATAL OIS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION** (per 100,000 residents) In 2023, the Department's fatal OIS incidents per capita of 0.410 decedents per 100,000 is the second highest of the comparison group. PPD, with the smallest city population in the comparison group, had the fourth highest fatal OIS incidents per capita in 2023, with 0.313 per 100,000. HPD had the highest fatal OIS incidents per capita in the comparison group of 0.480. LASD had the third highest fatal OIS incidents per capita of 0.340 per 100,000 in 2023. CPD, had the second lowest fatal OIS incidents per capita of 0.182. NYPD, which has the largest population in the comparison group, had the lowest fatal OIS incidents per capita of 0.080 per 100,000 in 2023.

#### ***Per Capita Ratio on Deceased OIS to Population***

Department	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Los Angeles Police Department	0.308	0.18	0.462	0.359	0.410
Chicago Police Department	0.182	0.255	0.255	0.073	0.182
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	0.440	0.542	0.372	0.370	0.340
New York Police Department	0.125	0.091	0.068	0.148	0.080
Houston Police Department	0.304	0.391	0.477	0.564	0.480
Philadelphia Police Department	0	0.062	0.249	0.312	0.313

#### **PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM 2019 TO 2023**

In 2023, five departments in the comparison group, LASD, HPD, CPD, PPD, and NYPD, had a reduction in OIS incidents compared to 2022. LASD had a decrease of six incidents, the HPD had a decrease of nine incidents, CPD had a decrease of 11 incidents, PPD had a decrease of six incidents, and NYPD had a decrease of 10 incidents. In 2023, the Department was the single agency in the comparison group that had an increase in OIS incidents compared to 2022. The Department had an increase of three incidents, or an increase of 10 percent.

When comparing OIS suspect fatalities, the Department along with CPD experienced an increase compared to 2022 (LAPD had an increase of two decedents, and CPD had an increase of three decedents). In 2023, LASD, HPD and NYPD had a decrease in the number of suspect fatalities resulting in an OIS (LASD decrease of one decedent, HPD had a decrease of two decedents and NYPD had a decrease of six decedents).

In 2023, PPD had no change in OIS suspect fatalities compared to 2022 (PPD had five decedents in 2022, five decedents in 2023). In 2023, all six agencies combined for a total of 145 incidents, resulting in a total of 54 suspect fatalities, or 37 percent, as the result of an OIS incident. In 2022, all six agencies combined had a total of 184 OIS incidents with a total of 58 suspect fatalities, or 32 percent. This results in a 21 percent decrease in the number of OIS incidents and a seven percent decrease in the number of suspect fatalities.






The Department's publication of various mapping resources assists management in the planning, deployment, and analysis of various assets. Furthermore, mapping resources provide invaluable visual references for field personnel in their daily efforts to prevent crime and to better serve the City.

# DATA MAPPING

BY REPORTING DISTRICT







Prepared by LAPD/ECCCS/GTU 1/17/2024

\* Map excludes UOF incidents that occurred outside the Los Angeles city limits. UOF Occurrence use Jenk's Natural Breaks.

0 2 4 8 Miles








Prepared by LAPD/ECCCSO/GTU 1/17/2024

\* Map excludes OIS incidents that occurred outside the Los Angeles city limits.














Prepared by LAPD/ECCCS/GTU 1/17/2024

\* Map excludes data that occurred outside the Los Angeles city limits. CFS data uses Jenk's Natural Breaks.

## CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

2023 HAD 17 MORE CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS COMPARED TO 2022.

59 percent of Categorical use of force incidents resulted from Calls for service/Citizen flag down initiated call compared to 45 percent in 2022.

## 2023 OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING (OIS)

There were three more OIS incidents in 2023 compared to 2022.

Perception based shootings decreased by 80 percent compared to 2022.

## IN CUSTODY DEATH (ICD)

2023 had four more ICD incidents than 2022.

Two of those incidents were within a police facility.

## USE OF DEADLY FORCE INCIDENTS

2023 had one Use of Deadly Force incident compared to zero in 2022.

## COP DIRECTED

2023 had zero COP Directed CUOF incidents, which was same as 2022.

## ANIMAL SHOOTING

2023 had five animal shooting incidents, which was the same as 2022.

34

70

5

1

5

0

# CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE HIGHLIGHTS

## CAROTID RESTRAINT CONTROL HOLD

2023 had two Carotid Restraint Control Hold (CRCH) incidents, which was the same as 2022.

NOTE: There was no full application of a CRCH, there was only contact with the neck area.

## UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE (UD)

2023 had three more UD incidents than 2022.

Five of the 10 personnel involved in a UD incident were assigned to unit assignments other than Patrol.

## HEAD STRIKE

2023 had one Head Strike incident, which was a decrease of one incident compared to 2022

## LAW ENFORCEMENT RELATED INJURY

2023 had three more Law Enforcement Related Injury (LERI) incidents as compared to 2022.

100 percent of LERI incidents resulted from a radio call, compared to 33 percent in 2022.

## K-9 CONTACT

2023 had five more K-9 Contact incidents as compared to 2022

83 percent occurred during night time hours.

2

10

1

6

6



# OIS INCIDENTS

FOR 2023

## MENTAL HEALTH & HOMELESSNESS

**35%** of suspects involved in an OIS were **experiencing a mental health crisis**.

**23%** of suspects involved in an OIS were **experiencing homelessness**.

**0%**

Did not increase nor decrease from 2022.

An average of **9.6 rounds** were discharged during an OIS compared to an average of **6.9 rounds** discharged per incident in 2022.

**12% increase**

when compared to 2022.

**35%**

of OIS suspects were armed with an edged weapon, compared to 16% in 2022.

**59%**

of OIS suspects were armed with weapons other than firearms.

**62%**

of OIS incidents originated from a call for service, compared to 55% in 2022.

**38%**



of OIS suspects were armed with a firearm.

**8,154**  
**Firearms**  
recovered by officers

**1,232**  
of 8,154 were  
**Ghost Guns**

## ETHNICITY

OF SUSPECTS & OFFICERS IN  
OIS INCIDENTS



## GENDER

OF SUSPECTS & OFFICERS IN  
OIS INCIDENTS



**1.9** Officer to  
incident  
average

2023 had an average of 1.9 officers per incident with 66 Department personnel involved in 34 OIS incidents. This was a 0.1 officers per incident increase, or six percent, when compared with the 2022 average of 1.8 officers per incident, (56 personnel involved in 31 OIS incidents).

**8,331**  
**Violent**

crime-related arrests for 2023.

# NON-CATEGORICAL

## USE OF FORCE HIGHLIGHTS

31%

### TOTAL NON-CATEGORICAL INCIDENTS

Central Bureau remained the top bureau with the most non-categorical uses of force incidents in the City for 2023.

30%

### TOTAL NON-LETHAL FORCE APPLICATIONS

Non-Lethal Force Applications (body weight, firm grips, joint locks, physical force, strikes, and takedowns) in non-categorical uses of force decreased by 30 percent in 2023.

33%

### TOTAL NON-CATEGORICAL INCIDENTS

33 percent of Suspects were under the influence of alcohol and or narcotics during NCUOF incidents.

21%

### SUSPECTS AND MENTAL ILLNESS

21 percent of suspects were experiencing mental illness during the non-categorical use of force incident.

33%

### SUSPECTS AND HOMELESSNESS

33 percent of all suspects were experiencing homelessness at the time of the non-categorical use of force incident.







# 2023

PUBLIC CONTACTS, CRIME, PERSONNEL AND ARRESTS

# HIGHLIGHTS

## GUNS RECOVERED

↓ **DECREASE**

8,154 guns recovered  
(Decrease of 3% compared to 2022).

## GHOST GUNS

↓ **DECREASE**

1,232 ghost guns recovered  
(Decrease of 28% compared to 2022).

## VIOLENT CRIME RATE

↓ **DECREASE**

30,259 violent crime  
(Decrease of 3% compared to 2022).

## 2023 HOMICIDES

↓ **DECREASE**

328 homicides (Decrease of 64 homicides compared to 2022).

## ARMED SUSPECTS


↑ **INCREASE**

Suspects armed with a firearm or edged weapon during OIS incidents increased by nine percent (From 23 suspects in 2022 to 25 suspects in 2023)

## ARRESTS

↓ **DECREASE**

There were 4,080 weapon-related arrests in 2023  
6% Decrease from 2022



**EDGED WEAPONS****↑ INCREASE**

35% (12 suspects)  
involved in OIS incidents were  
armed with an edged weapon  
(Compared to 5 suspects in 2022)

**ARRESTS****↑ INCREASE**

8,331 violent-crime related arrests,  
2% Increase over 2022 with  
8,175 arrests.

**LAPD PERSONNEL****↓ DECREASE**

In 2023, the Department employed  
8,965 sworn personnel which is 3%  
less than the 9,215 sworn personnel  
employed at the close of 2022.

**ROUNDS FIRED****↑ INCREASE**


In 2023, an average of 9.6  
rounds were discharged during OIS  
incidents compared to 6.9 in 2022.

**ATTACKS ON POLICE****↓ DECREASE**

In 2023, there were 772 attacks  
on police officers; this is 5% less  
than 811 in 2022.

**CALLS FOR SERVICE****↓ DECREASE**

In 2023, a total 787,089 calls for  
service were recorded versus  
828,411 for 2022 (5% less).

**NUMBER OF OIS INCIDENTS PER YEAR**






98%

55%

32%

25%

2%



38%

41%

45%

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

In review of the statistics published herein, the Department seeks to identify areas where potentially ineffective or outdated Use of Force-related policies and training can be enhanced, and new innovative practices can be implemented.



# CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

———— STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 2019-2023 ————



# OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Officer-Involved Shooting incidents are incidents in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm (excluding Warning Shot, Animal Shooting, and/or Unintentional Discharge incidents). Officer-Involved Shooting incidents are categorized into Hit or No Hit occurrences.

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in 34 OIS incidents, an increase of three incidents, or ten percent, compared to 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, there were a total of 121 OIS incidents, resulting in an annual average of 30.3 incidents. The 2023 count rose above the 2019 through 2022 annual average by 3.7 incidents, or 12 percent.

OIS	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	26	27	37	31	34


## OIS HIT / NO-HIT

In 2023, 29 of the 34 total OIS incidents, or 85 percent, were categorized as an OIS-Hit incident. This accounted for an 11 percentage-point increase compared to 74 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, OIS-Hit incidents accounted for 116 of the 155 total OIS incidents, or 75 percent.

OIS	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
OIS-Hit	21	12	31	23	29
OIS-No Hit	5	15	6	8	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

In 2023, five of the 34 total OIS incidents, or 15 percent, were categorized as an OIS-No Hit incident. This accounted for an 11 percentage-point decrease compared to 26 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, OIS-No Hit incidents accounted for 39 of the 155 total OIS incidents, or 25 percent.





# OIS INCIDENTS (2019 - 2023)

## Geographical Areas

- |                         |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 Central Area          | 12 77th Street Area     |
| 2 Rampart Area          | 13 Newton Area          |
| 3 Southwest Area        | 14 Pacific Area         |
| 4 Hollenbeck Area       | 16 North Hollywood Area |
| 6 Harbor Area           | 18 Foothill Area        |
| 8 Hollywood Area        | 17 Devonshire Area      |
| 7 Wilshire Area         | 18 Southeast Area       |
| 8 West Los Angeles Area | 19 Mission Area         |
| 9 Van Nuys Area         | 20 Olympic Area         |
| 10 West Valley Area     | 21 Topanga Area         |
| 11 Northeast Area       | ★ Police Stations       |

## All OIS Incidents

- |        |        |
|--------|--------|
| ● 2019 | ● 2022 |
| ● 2020 | ● 2023 |
| ● 2021 |        |



Prepared by LAPD/ECCSD/GTU 1/17/2024  
\* Map excludes OIS incidents that occurred outside the Los Angeles city limits.

## CLASSIFICATION OF OIS INCIDENTS

In 2023, 19 of the 34 total OIS incidents, or 56 percent, were categorized as Classification V shootings. This accounted for a 30-percentage point increase compared to 26 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Classification V shooting incidents were the highest category accounting for 61 of the 155 total OIS incidents, or 39 percent.

In 2023, seven of the 34 total OIS incidents, or 21 percent, were categorized as Classification II shootings. This accounted for an 11-percentage point decrease compared to 32 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Classification II shooting incidents were the second highest compared to other categories accounting for 48 of the 155 total OIS incidents, or 31 percent.

Classification	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
I	8	5	5	8	6
II	10	11	10	10	7
III	1	0	0	0	0
IV	1	1	3	5	2
V	6	9	19	8	19
VI	0	1	0	0	0
VII	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, 21 of the Department's 34 OIS incidents, or 62 percent, originated from radio calls. This accounted for a seven-percentage point increase compared to 55 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, radio calls represented the largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for 82 of the 155 total incidents, or 53 percent.

In 2023, seven of the Department's 34 OIS incidents, or 21 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers' observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). This accounted for an 11-percentage point decrease compared to 32 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, field detentions based on officers' observations represented the second largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for 38 of the 155 total incidents, or 25 percent.

In 2023, three of the Department's 34 OIS incidents, or nine percent, originated from a citizen flag down at scene. This accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to six percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, citizen flag down incidents represented the third largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for 12 of the 155 total incidents, or eight percent.

In 2023, six of the 34 total OIS incidents, or 18 percent, were categorized as Classification I shootings. This accounted for an eight-percentage point decrease compared to 26 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Classification I shooting incidents were the third highest category accounting for 32 of the 155 total OIS incidents, or 21 percent.

Classification	Description
I	Suspect verified with firearm - fired at officer or 3 <sup>rd</sup> party
II	Suspect verified with firearm - firearm in hand or position to fire (but did not fire)
III	Perception shooting - firearm present but not drawn
IV	Perception shooting - no firearm found
V	Suspect armed with weapon other than firearm*
VI	Suspect not armed, but threat of/causing serious bodily injury or death to others
VII	Other

\*Weapons other than a firearm pose a threat to the public and officers and generally fall into two categories: edged weapons and blunt weapons. Edged weapons include any object capable of cutting, slashing, or stabbing. A blunt weapon is any object that can be used to strike a person and inflict serious bodily injury or death.

In 2023, two of the Department's 34 OIS incidents, or six percent, originated from an off-duty incident. This accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, off-duty incidents represented the fourth largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for nine of the 155 total incidents, or six percent.

In 2023, one of the Department's 34 OIS incidents, or three percent, originated from an ambush incident. This accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, ambush incidents represented the sixth largest source category of OIS incidents, accounting for five of the 155 total incidents, or three percent.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Radio Call	11	11	22	17	21
Observation	6	8	7	10	7
Citizen Flag Down	2	1	4	2	3
Pre-Planned	2	3	0	1	0
Station Call	0	2	1	0	0
Ambush	2	1	1	0	1
Off-Duty	3	1	2	1	2
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>



# BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

## OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, 12 of the Department's 34 OIS incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Central Bureau. Compared to 12 OIS incidents that occurred in 2022, there was no change in 2023. Thirty-five percent of the Department's OIS incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department - 34; Central Bureau - 12).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	3	2	3	1	2
Newton	3	3	3	5	4
Northeast	1	1	1	0	2
Rampart	1	0	4	2	3
Hollenbeck	4	1	3	4	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>

## OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, six of the Department's OIS incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of South Bureau, which was a decrease of two incidents, or 25 percent, compared to 2022. Eighteen percent of the Department's OIS incidents occurred in South Bureau (Department - 34; South Bureau - 6).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	2	1	0	0	4
Southeast	3	5	2	3	1
Harbor	2	1	1	3	1
Southwest	0	2	2	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>

## OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, five of the Department's OIS incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of West Bureau. Compared to five OIS incidents that occurred in West Bureau the year prior, 2023 experienced no change. Fifteen percent of the Department's OIS incidents occurred in West Bureau (Department - 34; West Bureau - 5).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	1	2	3	1	1
Olympic	0	1	1	1	4
Pacific	1	0	2	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	1	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, nine of the Department's OIS incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Valley Bureau, which was an increase of four incidents, or 80 percent, compared to 2022. Twenty-Six percent of the Department's OIS incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department - 34; Valley Bureau - 9).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	0	1	0	0	2
Foothill	0	1	1	3	0
Mission	1	0	1	1	1
North Hollywood	0	2	3	0	1
Topanga	0	1	1	0	2
Van Nuys	1	0	2	0	1
West Valley	1	1	2	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>

## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, two of the Department's OIS incidents occurred outside the Department's geographic jurisdiction, which was an increase of one incident, or 100 percent compared to 2022. Six percent of the Department's OIS incidents occurred outside the geographic jurisdiction (Department - 34; Outside Jurisdiction - 2).

OIS	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	2	2	2	1	2

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE


In 2023, August represented the month with the most OIS incidents with eight occurrences, or 24 percent, of the 34 total incidents for the year. September and October had the second most incidents with four occurrences each, or 12 percent. January, May, July and November had the third most incidents with three incidents each, or nine percent. February and June had the fourth highest count with two incidents each, or six percent, respectively. The remaining incidents occurred in the months of March (1) and December (1).

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	0	2	3	3	3
February	2	2	1	1	2
March	0	2	7	1	1
April	5	3	5	1	0
May	3	4	1	3	3
June	3	3	2	6	2
July	2	0	4	8	3
August	4	3	2	2	8
September	1	1	0	4	4
October	2	5	7	1	4
November	3	2	0	1	3
December	1	0	5	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

From 2019 through 2023, August and October represented the months with the most OIS incidents with 19 incidents each of the 155 total incidents, or 12 percent respectively. July represented the month with the second most OIS incidents with 17 of the 155 total incidents, or 11 percent. December represented the month with the least, accounting for seven incidents, or five percent. February had the second fewest with eight incidents, or five percent. November had the third fewest with nine incidents or six percent. The remaining 76 incidents, or 49 percent, were evenly distributed throughout the remaining months of the year.

The OIS percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2019 through 2023 was as follows:

- January – March: 30 incidents, or 19 percent;
- April – June: 44 incidents, or 28 percent;
- July – September: 46 incidents, or 30 percent; and,
- October through December: 35 incidents, or 23 percent



## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, Wednesday represented the day of the week with the most OIS incidents, accounting for nine occurrences, or 26 percent. Friday and Sunday represented the second most frequent days of the week with six incidents each, or 18 percent, respectively. Monday represented the least frequent day of the week with one incident, or three percent.

From 2019 through 2023, Wednesday and Friday represented the days with the most OIS incidents with 27 incidents each of the 155 total incidents, or 17 percent respectively. Saturday represented the day with the fewest OIS incidents with 18 of the 155, or 12 percent. Monday represented the day with the second fewest OIS incidents with 19 of the 155, or 12 percent. The remaining 64 incidents, or 41 percent, were evenly distributed throughout the remaining days of the week.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	7	3	4	4	1
Tuesday	4	2	6	7	4
Wednesday	3	6	5	4	9
Thursday	3	3	4	7	3
Friday	4	4	10	3	6
Saturday	1	4	5	3	5
Sunday	4	5	3	3	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, 18 OIS incidents, or 53 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m., while 16 incidents, or 47 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m.

The five-year annual average for 2019 through 2023 was 14.6 OIS incidents per year occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and 16.4 incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600 - 1759	12	9	23	13	16
1800 - 0559	14	18	14	18	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>





## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received or were pending BOPC “lethal force” adjudicative findings for their involvement in OIS incidents.


In 2023, 66 Department personnel were involved in the 34 OIS incidents throughout the year, resulting in an average of 1.9 officers per incident. This amount was 0.1 officers per incident above, or six percent, compared to the 1.8 officers per incident in 2022.

### OFFICER - GENDER

In 2023, 60 male officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 91 percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for a seven-percentage point decrease compared to 98 percent in 2022. The percentage of male officers involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was ten percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, most officers involved in OIS incidents were male, accounting for 245 of the 260 total employees, or 94 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	5	3	1	6
Male	47	34	49	55	60
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>66</b>

In 2023, six female officers were involved in an OIS incident, which represented nine percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for a seven-percentage point increase compared to two percent in 2022. The percentage of female officers involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was ten percentage points below the Department’s overall female total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, females accounted for 15 of the 260 total involved employees, or six percent.



## OFFICER - ETHNICITY

In 2023, 41 Hispanic officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 62 percent of the 66 total involved employees. This accounted for a two-percentage point decrease compared to 64 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was eight-percentage points above the Department's overall Hispanic officer total of 54 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, a majority of officers involved in OIS incidents were Hispanic, accounting for 160 of the 260 total employees, or 62 percent.

In 2023, 16 White officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 24 percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for a three-percentage point decrease compared to 27 percent in 2022. The percentage of White officers involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was one-percentage point below the Department's overall White officer percentage total of 25 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, White officers represented the second largest ethnic category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for 69 of the 260 total employees, or 27 percent.

In 2023, three Black officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented five percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to two percent in 2022. The percentage of Black officers involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was four-percentage points below the Department's overall Black officer percentage total of nine percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Black officers represented the third largest ethnic category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for 13 of the 260 total employees, or five percent.

In 2023, three Asian/Pacific Islander officers were involved in OIS incidents, which represented five percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for a two-percentage point decrease compared to seven percent in 2022. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander officers involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was six-percentage points below the Department's overall Asian/Pacific Islander officer percentage total of 11 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Asian/Pacific Islander officers represented the fourth largest ethnic category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for 11 of the 260 total employees, or four percent.

In 2023, one employee, or two percent, from an "Other" ethnic category was involved in 2023 OIS incidents. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase from 2022 from zero percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, officers from the "Other" ethnic category represented the second smallest ethnic category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for three of the 260 total employees, or one percent.

The remaining two officers were from the American Indian and Filipino ethnic category, respectively.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	1
Asian/Pacific Islander	2	1	1	4	3
Black	4	2	3	1	3
Filipino	1	0	1	0	1
Hispanic	26	22	35	36	41
White	14	13	11	15	16
Other	0	1	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>66</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	OIS Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	6%
Black	8%	9%	5%
Hispanic	48%	54%	62%
White	28%	25%	24%
Other	4%	<1%	3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e. American Indian not included for city statistics).

Note: For the purposes of comparing Department ethnicity categories, Officers who are Filipino are combined with Asian/Pacific Islander Officers for a total percentage of 11 percent.

## OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in OIS incidents in 2023 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – two percent (one out of 66 total officers);
- 1-5 years of service – 36 percent (24 out of 66 total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 29 percent (19 out of 66 total officers);
- 11-20 years of service – 26 percent (17 out of 66 total officers); and,
- More than 20 years of service – eight percent (five out of 66 total officers).

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	2	0	0	2	1
1 - 5	17	19	24	26	24
6 - 10	13	4	7	12	19
11 - 20	11	11	15	9	17
More than 20	4	5	6	7	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>66</b>

The following is a comparison of 2023 to 2022.

- Less than one year of service – two-percentage point decrease (four percent in 2022, two percent in 2023);
- 1-5 years of service – ten-percentage point decrease (46 percent in 2022, 36 percent in 2023);
- 6-10 years of service – eight-percentage point increase (21 percent in 2022, 29 percent in 2023);
- 11-20 years of service – ten-percentage point increase (16 percent in 2022, 26 percent in 2023); and,
- More than 20 years of service – five-percentage point decrease (13 percent in 2022, 8 percent in 2023).

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, majority of personnel involved in OIS incidents had one to five years of service, accounting for 110 of the 260 total personnel, or 42 percent. Personnel with 11-20 years of service accounted for the second largest category with a total of 63 Department personnel, or 24 percent. Personnel with 6-10 years of service were the third largest group, with 55 personnel, or 21 percent, followed by personnel with more than 20 years of service, which had 27 personnel, or ten percent. Personnel with less than one year of service, which accounted for five personnel, represented only two percent of the total.



## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, 63 employees at the rank of Police Officer were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 95 percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase compared to 93 percent in 2022. The percentage of officers involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was 25-percentage points above the Department's overall Police Officer total of 70 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, most of the personnel involved in OIS incidents were at the rank of Police Officer, accounting for 243 of the 260 total employees, or 93 percent.

In 2023, one employee at the rank of Sergeant was involved in an OIS incident, which represented two percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for a three-percentage point decrease compared to five percent in 2022. The percentage of Sergeants involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was ten percentage points below the Department's overall Sergeant total of 12-percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Sergeants represented the second largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for eight of the 260 total employees, or three percent.

In 2023, one employee at the rank of Detective was involved in an OIS incident in 2023, representing two percent of the 66 total employees. This accounted for no change compared to two percent in 2022. The percentage of Detectives involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was 12 percentage points below the Department's overall Detective total of 14 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Detectives represented the third largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for seven of the 260 total employees, or three percent.

The remaining one employee involved in an OIS incident in 2023, representing two percent of the 66 total personnel, was at the rank of Reserve Officer. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, a single Reserve Officer of the 260 total employees, or less than one percent, has been involved in an OIS incident.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	0	0	0
Lieutenant	0	0	1	0	0
Sergeant	1	2	1	3	1
Detective	2	3	0	1	1
Police Officer	44	34	50	52	63
Detention Officer	0	0	0	0	0
Reserve Officer	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>66</b>

## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, ten personnel assigned to 77th Street Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 15 percent of the 66 total employees. This represented a 15-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 77th Street Division personnel were the ninth most involved in OIS incidents than any other division, accounting for 13 of the 260 total employees, or five percent.

In 2023, eight personnel assigned to Rampart Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent of the 66 total employees. This represented a three-percentage point increase compared to nine percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to Rampart Division accounted for 21 of the 260 total employees involved in OIS incidents, or eight percent.

In 2023, eight personnel assigned to Foothill Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent of the

66 total employees. This represented a three-percentage point increase compared to nine percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to Foothill Division accounted for 16 of the 260 total employees involved in OIS incidents, or six percent.

In 2023, seven personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 11 percent of the 66 total employees. This represented a seven-percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division accounted for 21 of the 260 total employees involved in OIS incidents, or eight percent.

In 2023, five personnel assigned to Newton Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented eight percent of the 66 total employees. This represented a 19-percentage point decrease compared to 27 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through

*continued on page 145*

## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

2023, personnel assigned to Newton Division accounted for 32 of the 260 total employees involved in OIS incidents, or 12 percent.

In 2023, four personnel assigned to Devonshire, Olympic and Southeast Division, respectively, were involved in OIS incidents, which represented six percent each of the 66 total employees. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to Southeast Division accounted for 31 of the 260 total employees involved in OIS incidents, or 12 percent.

The remaining 16 Department personnel, or 24 percent, were evenly distributed amongst the remaining Areas/Divisions.

The following is the employee Bureau assignment for the 66 total personnel involved in OIS incidents in 2023:

- Central Bureau: 16 personnel, or 24 percent;
- West Bureau: seven personnel, or 11 percent;
- South Bureau: 15 personnel, or 23 percent;
- Valley Bureau: 21 personnel, or 32 percent;
- CTSOB: seven personnel, or 11 percent;
- Other: zero personnel, or zero percent.

The following compares 2023 to 2022:

- Central Bureau: 22-percentage point decrease (46 percent in 2022, 24 percent in 2023);
- West Bureau: two-percentage point decrease (13 percent in 2022, 11 percent in 2023);
- South Bureau: two-percentage point decrease (25 percent in 2022, 23 percent in 2023);
- Valley Bureau: 21-percentage point increase (11 percent in 2022, 32 percent in 2023);
- CTSOB: seven-percentage point increase (four percent in 2022, 11 percent in 2023);
- Other: two-percentage point decrease (two percent in 2022, zero percent in 2023).

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	2	0	1	0	10
Central	0	2	2	0	2
Devonshire	0	1	0	0	4
Foothill	1	0	2	5	8
Harbor	5	1	1	7	1
Hollenbeck	8	0	2	6	0
Hollywood	2	3	4	3	2
Mission	2	0	2	1	1
Newton	3	6	3	15	5
North Hollywood	0	0	3	0	2
Northeast	1	1	4	0	1
Olympic	0	1	1	2	4
Pacific	1	1	2	0	0
Rampart	1	0	7	5	8
Southeast	13	8	2	4	4
Southwest	1	7	2	3	0
Topanga	0	1	2	0	3
Van Nuys	0	0	1	0	1
West Los Angeles	0	1	0	1	0
West Valley	1	1	3	0	2
Wilshire	0	0	1	1	1
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	1	1	0
Administrative Units	1	0	0	0	0
Specialized Units	1	0	1	0	0
Bureau Level	0	1	1	0	0
Metropolitan	4	4	4	2	7
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>66</b>

## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, 54 personnel assigned to patrol were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 82 percent of the 66 total personnel. This accounted for a nine-percentage point increase compared to 73 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, a majority of officers involved in OIS incidents were assigned to patrol, accounting for 189 of the 260 total employees, or 73 percent.

In 2023, seven personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 11 percent of the 66 total personnel. This accounted for a seven-percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division represented the third largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for 21 of the 260 total employees, or eight percent.

In 2023, three personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in OIS incidents, which represented five percent of the 66 total personnel. This accounted for an 18-percentage point decrease compared to 23 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to specialized assignments represented the second largest category of personnel involved in OIS incidents, accounting for 45 of the 260 total employees, or 17 percent.

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	1	1	0	0	0
Metropolitan	4	4	4	2	7
Patrol	26	23	45	41	54
Specialized	15	11	3	13	3
Investigative	1	0	0	0	1
Custody	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>66</b>





## OFFICER – INJURIES

In 2023, nine officers sustained injuries during the 34 OIS incidents throughout the year. This accounted for an increase of seven officers, or 350 percent, compared to two in 2022. Additionally, when compared to the 2019 through 2022 annual average of 3.8 injured officers, 2023 had 5.2 more injured officers, or 137 percent, above the four-year annual average.

In 2023, zero Department personnel were killed during an OIS incident. Historically, during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, one officer was killed during an OIS incident.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	5	6	2	2	9
Deceased	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>

## NUMBER OF OFFICERS FIRING PER INCIDENT

In 2023, there were 20 single shooter OIS incidents, which represented 59 percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a four-percentage point increase compared to 55 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of single shooter OIS incidents from 2019 through 2022 of 62 percent, 2023 experienced a three-percentage point decrease.

In 2023, there were nine double shooter OIS incidents, which represented 26 percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a nine-percentage point decrease compared to 35 percent in 2022.

In 2023, there was one triple shooter OIS incident, which represented three percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for no change compared to three percent in 2022.

In 2023, there was one quadruple shooter OIS incident, which represented three percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for no change compared to three percent in 2022.

In 2023, there were three 5-10 shooter OIS incidents, which represented nine percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a six-percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2022.

No. of Shooters	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
1	16	19	23	17	20
2	5	6	13	11	9
3	4	1	1	1	1
4	0	0	0	1	1
5 - 10	1	1	0	1	3
11 or more	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

OFFICER – WEAPON TYPE

In 2023, 59 handguns were utilized during OIS incidents, which represented 89 percent of the 66 total weapon types. This accounted for a six-percentage point decrease compared to 95 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, handguns were the most utilized weapon type during OIS incidents, accounting for 230 of the 260 total weapons, or 88 percent.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Handgun	40	36	42	53	59
Shotgun	3	1	1	1	4
Rifle	4	2	9	2	3
Total	47	39	52	56	66

In 2023, four shotguns were utilized during OIS incidents, which represented six percent of the 66 total weapon types. This accounted for a four-percentage point increase compared to two percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, shotguns accounted for ten of the 260 total weapons, or four percent.

In 2023, three rifles were utilized during OIS incidents, which represented five percent of the 66 total weapon types. This accounted for a one-percentage point increase compared to four percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, rifles were the second most utilized weapon type during OIS incidents, accounting for 20 of the 260 total weapons, or eight percent.

TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED BY OFFICERS PER YEAR

In 2023, a total of 327 rounds were fired during 34 OIS incidents. When compared to the 2022 total of 215 rounds fired, 2023 experienced an increase of 112 rounds, or 52 percent.

OIS	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Total Rounds	263	156	175	215	327

ANNUAL AVERAGE OF ROUNDS FIRED PER INCIDENT

In 2023, an average of 9.6 rounds were fired during OIS incidents. When compared to the 2022 average of 6.9 rounds fired, 2023 experienced an increase of 2.7 rounds, or 39 percent.

OIS	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Average Rounds	10.1	5.7	4.7	6.9	9.6

## TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED BY OFFICERS PER WEAPON TYPE

In 2023, 288 rounds were fired from handguns during OIS incidents, which represented 88 percent of the 327 total rounds fired. This accounted for an 11-percentage point decrease compared to 99 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, rounds fired from handguns were the most frequent round type fired during OIS incidents, accounting for 1,028 of the 1,136 total rounds, or 90 percent.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Handgun	233	148	147	212	288
Shotgun	5	5	1	1	4
Rifle	25	3	27	2	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>327</b>

In 2023, 35 rounds were fired from rifles during OIS incidents, which represented 11 percent of the 327 total rounds fired. This accounted for a ten-percentage point increase compared to one percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, rounds fired from rifles were the second most frequent round type fired during OIS incidents, accounting for 92 of the 1,136 total rounds, or eight percent.

In 2023, four rounds were fired from a shotgun during OIS incidents, which represented one percent of the 327 total rounds fired. This accounted for a less than one-percentage point increase compared to less than one percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, rounds fired from shotguns accounted for 16 of the 1,136 total rounds, or one percent.



## NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED PER INCIDENT BY OFFICERS

In 2023, there were 21 OIS incidents in which 1-5 rounds were fired, which represented 62 percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a seven-percentage point increase compared to 55 percent in 2022.

In 2023, there were seven OIS incidents in which 6-10 rounds were fired, which represented 21 percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a five-percentage point increase compared to 16 percent in 2022.

In 2023, there were three OIS incidents in which 11-15 rounds were fired, which represented nine percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a four-percentage point decrease compared to 13 percent in 2022.

In 2023, there was one OIS incident in which 16-20 rounds were fired, which represented three percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a seven-percentage point decrease compared to ten percent in 2022.

In 2023, there were two OIS incidents in which 51 or more rounds were fired, which represented six percent of the 34 total incidents. This accounted for a six-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022.

No. of Rounds	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
1 - 5	13	18	28	17	21
6 - 10	5	6	5	5	7
11 - 15	3	0	1	4	3
16 - 20	1	2	3	3	1
21 - 25	2	0	0	0	0
26 - 30	0	0	0	0	0
31 - 35	1	1	0	1	0
36 - 40	0	0	0	0	0
41 - 45	0	0	0	0	0
46 - 50	1	0	0	0	0
51 or more	0	0	0	0	2
Unknown	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

## OFFICER – HIT RATIO

The 2023 total number of rounds fired compared to the total number of rounds which struck their intended targets resulted in a hit ratio of 25 percent. This accounted for an 11-percentage point decrease compared to 36 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the hit ratio of all OIS incidents accounting for 342 of the 1,136 total rounds fired, was 30 percent.

OIS	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Rounds Fired	263	156	175	215	327
Hits	73	29	80	77	83
<b>Hit Ratio (%)</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>25%</b>

## SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during OIS incidents.

### SUSPECT – ETHNICITY

In 2023, 18 Hispanic suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 53 percent of the 34 total suspects. This accounted for a 12-percentage point decrease compared to 65 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was five-percentage points above the City's overall Hispanic population total. Additionally, the percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was 12-percentage points above the City's overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group involved in OIS incidents with 90 of the 159 total suspects, or 57 percent.

In 2023, nine Black suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 26 percent of the 34 total suspects. This accounted for a three-percentage increase compared to 23 percent in 2022. The percentage of Black suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was 18-percentage points above the City's overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was 13-percentage points below the City's overall Black violent crime offender total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Black category was the second most represented ethnic group involved in OIS incidents with 43 of the 159 total suspects, or 27 percent.

In 2023, seven White suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 21 percent of the 34 total suspects. This accounted for an 11-percentage point increase compared to ten percent in 2022. The percentage of White suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was seven-percentage points below the City's overall White population total. However, the percentage of White suspects involved in OIS incidents in 2023 was 14-percentage point above the city's overall white violent crime offender total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the White category was the third most represented ethnic group involved in OIS incidents with 19 of the 159 total suspects, or 12 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	8	12	7	7	9
Filipino	0	1	0	1	0
Hispanic	15	13	24	20	18
White	2	2	5	3	7
Other	1	1	1	0	0
Unknown	0	2	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Violent Crime Suspect	OIS Suspect
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	(See other)	0%
Black	8%	39%	26%
Hispanic	48%	41%	53%
White	28%	7%	21%
Other	4%	3%	0%
Unknown	N/A	10%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

## SUSPECT – GENDER

In 2023, 29 male suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 85 percent of the 34 total suspects. This accounted for a 12-percentage point decrease compared to 97 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, most suspects involved in OIS incidents were male, representing 144 of the 159 total suspects, or 91 percent.

In 2023, five female suspects were involved in OIS incidents, which represented 15 percent of the 34 total suspects. This accounted for a 12-percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, female suspects involved in OIS incidents represented a minority with 14 of the 159 total suspects, or nine percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	1	4	3	1	5
Male	25	26	34	30	29
Unknown	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

## SUSPECT – AGE

In 2023, most suspects involved in OIS incidents were in the 30-39 age group. Specifically, 11 of the 34 total suspects, or 32 percent, were included in this age group. The 30-39 age category accounted for a ten-percentage point decrease compared to 42 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 30-39 age group represented the largest age category of suspects involved in OIS incidents with 59 of the 159 total suspects, or 37 percent.

In 2023, the 24-29 age group represented the second largest age category with nine of the 34 total suspects, or 26 percent. The 24-29 age category accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to 23 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 24-29 age group represented the second largest age category of suspects involved in OIS incidents with 31 of the 159 total suspects, or 19 percent.

In 2023, the 40-49 age group represented the third largest age category, with eight of the 34 total suspects, or 24 percent. The 40-49 age category accounted for a 14-percentage point increase compared to ten percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 40-49 age group represented the fourth largest age category of suspects involved in OIS incidents with 26 of the 159 total suspects, or 16 percent.

In 2023, the 50-59 age group represented the fourth largest age category, with three of the 34 total suspects, or nine percent. The 50-59 age category accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to six percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 50-59 age group represented the fifth largest age category of suspects involved in OIS incidents with 12 of the 159 total suspects, or eight percent.

The three remaining suspects, or nine percent, in 2023 were in the age ranges of 18-23, 60 and above and one suspect with an unknown age.

Age	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0-17	0	1	1	0	0
18-23	5	9	1	6	1
24-29	4	4	7	7	9
30-39	10	11	14	13	11
40-49	3	2	10	3	8
50-59	1	2	4	2	3
60 and Above	2	0	0	0	1
Unknown	1	2	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>



## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2023, 12 of the 34 total suspects, or 35 percent, involved in OIS incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for no change compared to 35 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for 48 of the 159 total suspects, or 30 percent.

Per. Mental Illness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	4	6	15	11	12
No	21	23	22	20	22
Unknown	1	2	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

## SUSPECT – HOMELESS

In 2023, 13 of the 34 total suspects, or 38 percent, involved in OIS incidents were experiencing homelessness, compared to eight suspects in 2022. This accounted for a 12-percentage point increase compared to 26 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects experiencing homelessness, involved in OIS incidents accounted for 37 of the 159 total suspects, or 23 percent.

Homeless	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	6	0	10	8	13
No	19	29	25	23	21
Unknown	1	2	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>

## DECEASED SUSPECT TOXICOLOGY RESULTS

Toxicology reports for decedents in 2023 are pending and were not completed at the publication of this report from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner's Office. Complete toxicology for 2023 decedents will be available in the 2024 Use of Force Year-End Review.

Of the 14 decedents involved in 2022 OIS incidents, all of whom have completed toxicology examinations by the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner, 14 individuals, representing 100 percent, had positive results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s).

The 2022 percentage of cases with positive alcohol and/or a controlled substance results, representing 100 percent, accounted for an 18-percentage point increase compared to 82 percent of positive cases in 2021.

Substance Present	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	9	6	14	14	N/A
No	3	1	3	0	N/A
Unknown/Pending	0	0	0	0	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>N/A</b>

## SUSPECT – TOXICOLOGY ANALYSIS

Toxicology reports for decedents in 2023 are pending and were not completed at the publication of this report from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner's Office. Complete toxicology for 2023 decedents will be available in the 2024 Use of Force Year-End Review..

In 2022, nine of the 14 OIS suspect decedents, or 64 percent, had positive results for methamphetamine. The 2022 percentage experienced a 29-percentage point increase compared to 35 percent of the decedents with positive methamphetamine results in 2021 OIS incidents. Historically, 27 of the 50 decedents involved in 2019 through 2022 OIS incidents, representing 54 percent, had positive toxicology results for methamphetamine.

In 2022, six of the 14 OIS decedents, or 43 percent, had positive results for marijuana. The 2022 percentage accounted for a two-percentage point increase compared to 41 percent of decedents with positive marijuana results in 2021 OIS incidents. Historically, 22 of the 50 decedents involved in 2019 through 2022 OIS incidents, representing 44 percent, had positive toxicology results for marijuana.

In 2022, five of the 14 OIS decedents, or 36 percent, had positive results for alcohol. The 2022 percentage accounted for a seven-percentage point increase compared to the 29 percent of decedents with positive alcohol results in 2021 OIS incidents. Historically, 17 of the 50 decedents involved in 2019 through 2022 OIS incidents, representing 34 percent, had positive toxicology results for alcohol.

In 2022, one of the 14 OIS decedents, or seven percent, had positive results for cocaine and/or cocaine derived stimulants. The 2022 percentage accounted for a 17-percentage point decrease, compared to 24 percent of decedents with positive cocaine results in 2021 OIS incidents. Historically, seven of the 50 decedents involved in 2019 through 2022 OIS incidents, representing 14 percent, had positive toxicology results for cocaine and/or cocaine derived stimulants.

In 2022, two of the 14 OIS decedents, or 14 percent, had positive results for opiates and/or opiate derived substances. The 2022 percentage accounted for a 14-percentage point increase, compared to zero percent of decedents in 2021 OIS incidents. Historically, two of the 50 decedents involved in 2019 through 2022 OIS incidents, representing four percent, had positive toxicology results for opiates and/or opiate derived substances.

Substance	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Alcohol	42%	29%	29%	36%	N/A
Cocaine	0%	14%	24%	7%	N/A
Marijuana	42%	57%	41%	43%	N/A
Methamphetamine	50%	71%	35%	64%	N/A
Opiates	0%	0%	0%	14%	N/A
PCP	0%	0%	0%	7%	N/A
Psychiatric Medication	0%	0%	12%	0%	N/A
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	N/A
Unknown	0%	0%	0%	0%	N/A
None	8%	14%	18%	0%	N/A

Substance	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Alcohol	5	2	5	5	N/A
Cocaine	1	1	4	1	N/A
Marijuana	5	4	7	6	N/A
Methamphetamine	7	5	6	9	N/A
Opiates	0	0	0	2	N/A
PCP	0	0	0	1	N/A
Psychiatric Medication	3	0	2	0	N/A
Other	0	0	0	0	N/A
Unknown	0	0	0	0	N/A
None	3	1	3	0	N/A
Pending	1	0	0	0	N/A

## SUSPECT – WEAPON/FORCE

In 2023, 13 firearms were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 38 percent of the 34 total weapon types. This accounted for a 20-percentage point decrease compared to 58 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, firearms were the most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS incidents, representing 81 of the 159 total weapons, or 51 percent.

In 2023, 12 edged weapons were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 35 percent of the 34 total weapon types. This accounted for a 19-percentage point increase compared to 16 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, edged weapons were the second most utilized weapon type by suspects during OIS incidents, representing 43 of the 159 total weapons, or 27 percent.

In 2023, four Replica/Pellet guns were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented 12 percent of the 34 total weapon types. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase compared to ten percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Replica/Pellet guns represented ten of the 159 total weapons, or six percent, utilized by suspects during OIS incidents.

In 2023, two impact weapons were utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented six percent of the 34 total weapon types. This accounted for a six-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, impact weapons represented four of the 159 total weapons, or three percent, utilized by suspects during OIS incidents.

In 2023, two automobiles utilized by suspects during OIS incidents, which represented six percent of the 34 total weapon types. This accounted for a six-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, automobiles represented four of the 159 total weapons, or three percent, utilized by suspects during OIS incidents.

In 2023, there was one perception-based OIS incident, which represented three percent. This accounted for a 13-percentage point decrease compared to 16 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, perception-based OIS incidents represented nine of the 159 total Suspect Weapon/Force category, or six percent, utilized by suspects during OIS incidents.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Automobile	0	1	1	0	2
Edged Weapon	5	7	14	5	12
Firearm	17	18	15	18	13
Impact Device	1	0	1	0	2
Perception	0	1	2	5	1
Physical Force	2	0	0	0	0
Replica/Pellet	0	0	3	3	4
Other	0	2	1	0	0
Unknown	1	0	0	0	0
None	0	2	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>



## SUSPECT – INJURIES

In 2023, 16 suspects died from police gunfire, or 47 percent of the 34 total suspects involved in OIS incidents. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase in comparison to 45 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, deceased suspects during OIS incidents accounted for 66 of 159 total suspects, or 42 percent.

In 2023, 14 suspects sustained non-fatal injuries, or 41 percent of the total 34 suspect involved in OIS incidents. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase in comparison to 39 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, injured suspects during OIS incidents accounted for 62 of the 159 total suspects, or 39 percent.

In 2023, four suspects, or 12 percent of the 34 total suspects involved in OIS incidents, were uninjured during OIS incidents. This accounted for a four-percentage point decrease compared to 16 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects in the uninjured category during OIS incidents accounted for 28 of the 159 total suspects, or 18 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	10	12	14	12	14
Deceased	12	7	17	14	16
Unknown	1	2	0	0	0
None	3	10	6	5	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>34</b>



## ETHNICITY OF DECEASED SUSPECTS

Of the 16 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2023, nine individuals, or 56 percent, were Hispanic. This accounted for a 23-percentage point decrease compared to 79 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, a majority of deceased suspects involved in OIS incidents were Hispanic, accounting for 43 of the 66 total decedents, or 65 percent.

Of the 16 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2023, four individuals, or 25 percent were Black. This accounted for an 11-percentage point increase compared to 14 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Black suspects represented the second highest ethnic decedent count, accounting for 12 of the 66 total decedents, or 18 percent.

Of the 16 decedents involved in OIS incidents in 2023, three individuals, or 19 percent were White. This accounted for a 12-percentage point increase compared to seven percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, White suspects represented the third highest ethnic decedent count, accounting for nine of the 66 total decedents, or 14 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	2	1	3	2	4
Filipino	0	1	0	0	0
Hispanic	8	4	11	11	9
White	1	1	3	1	3
Other	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>



DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>13</sup>

TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)


In 2022, 23 of the 56 total OIS Tactics findings, representing 41 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 17-percentage point decrease compared to 58 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, most adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, accounting for 110 of the 194 total Tactics findings, or 57 percent.

In 2022, 56 of the 56 total OIS Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for no change compared to 100 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, a majority of adjudicated Drawing/Exhibiting findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, accounting for 189 of the 194 total Drawing/ Exhibiting findings, or 97 percent.

In 2022, 37 of the 56 total Lethal force findings, representing 66 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for a seven-percentage point decrease compared to 73 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, most of the adjudicated Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, accounting for 143 of the 194 total findings, or 74 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	34	23	30	23	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	44	37	52	56	N/A
Non-Lethal	2	5	1	1	N/A
Less-Lethal	2	1	0	1	N/A
Lethal	42	26	38	37	N/A

<sup>13</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was omitted from this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.





## ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, 33 of the 56 total OIS Tactics findings, representing 59 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to 42 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, 84 of the 194 total Tactics findings, accounting for 43 percent, resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” outcome.

In 2022, none of the 56 total OIS Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing zero percent, were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for no change compared to zero percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, five of the 194 Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing three percent were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).”

In 2022, 19 of the 56 total Lethal force findings, representing 34 percent, were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” This accounted for a seven-percentage point increase compared to 27 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, 51 of the 194 total Lethal force findings, representing 26 percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	13	16	22	33	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	3	2	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	3	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	1	N/A
Lethal	5	13	14	19	N/A



# ANIMAL SHOOTING INCIDENTS

An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm at an animal.

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in five Animal Shooting incidents, which accounted for no change compared to 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, there were a total of 16 Animal Shooting incidents, resulting in an annual average of four incidents per year. The 2023 count exceeded the 2019 through 2022 annual average by one incident, or 25 percent.

OIS - Animal	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	2	4	5	5	5

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, three of the Department's five Animal Shooting incidents, or 60 percent, originated from a radio call. This accounted for a 40 percent increase compared to 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Animal Shooting incidents resulting from radio calls from 2019 through 2022 of 50 percent, 2023 experienced a ten-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, radio calls represented the largest source category of Animal Shooting incidents, accounting for 11 of the 21 total incidents, or 52 percent.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Radio Call	1	3	3	1	3
Observation	0	0	0	1	1
Citizen Flag Down	0	0	0	0	1
Pre-Planned	1	0	2	2	0
Station Call	0	0	0	0	0
Ambush	0	0	0	0	0
Off-Duty	0	1	0	1	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

In 2023, one of the Department's five Animal Shooting incidents, or 20 percent, originated from an Observation incident, resulting in no change compared to 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Animal Shooting incidents resulting from an Observation incident from 2019 through 2022 of six percent, 2023 experienced a 14-percentage point increase.

The remaining one of the five Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the Citizen Flag Down category. When compared to the aggregate percentage of Animal Shooting incidents resulting from a Citizen Flag Down incident from 2019 to 2022 of zero percent, 2023 experienced a 20-percentage point increase.

## BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

### OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, four of the Department's Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of Central Bureau, which was an increase of four incidents compared to 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, one Animal Shooting incident occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.25 incidents.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	0	0	1	0	1
Newton	0	0	0	0	2
Northeast	0	0	0	0	1
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>

### OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, one of the Department's Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of South Bureau, which was a decrease of one incident compared to 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, nine Animal Shooting incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 2.3 incidents.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	1	1	1
Southeast	1	1	3	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	1	0
Southwest	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

### OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, none of the Department's Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of West Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

### OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, none of the Department's Animal Shooting incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of Valley Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	1	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	1	0
North Hollywood	0	1	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>



## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, none of the Department's Animal Shooting incidents occurred outside the Department's geographical jurisdiction, which was a decrease of one incident compared to 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, two Animal Shooting incidents occurred outside the Department's geographical jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of 0.5 incidents.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	0	1	0	1	0

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, September represented the month with three Animal Shooting incidents. May and November represented the months with one Animal Shooting incident each.

The Animal Shooting percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2019 through 2023 was as follows:

- January – March: three incidents, or 14 percent;
- April – June: three incidents, or 14 percent;
- July – September: eight incidents; or 38 percent; and,
- October through December: seven incidents, or 34 percent.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	1	0	0	0	0
February	0	0	0	0	0
March	0	1	1	0	0
April	0	0	0	0	0
May	0	0	0	0	1
June	0	0	0	2	0
July	0	0	2	0	0
August	0	1	1	1	0
September	0	0	0	0	3
October	1	1	0	1	0
November	0	0	0	1	1
December	0	1	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, Tuesday represented the day of the week with the most Animal Shooting incidents, accounting for three of the five incidents or 60 percent. From 2019 through 2023, Monday and Tuesday represented the days with the most Animal Shooting incidents with 12 of the 21 total, or 57 percent. From 2019 through 2023, Sunday represented the day with the third most Animal Shooting incidents with three of the 21 total, or 14 percent. The remaining incidents were evenly distributed throughout the remaining days of the week.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	0	0	4	2	1
Tuesday	0	0	1	1	3
Wednesday	1	1	0	0	0
Thursday	0	1	0	1	0
Friday	1	0	0	1	0
Saturday	0	0	0	0	0
Sunday	0	2	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, four Animal Shooting incidents occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m. In 2023, one Animal Shooting Incident occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. The five-year annual average for 2019 through 2023 was 3.4 Animal Shooting incidents occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and 0.8 incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600 - 1759	2	3	5	3	4
1800 - 0559	0	1	0	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received, or were pending, BOPC “lethal force” adjudicative findings for their involvement in Animal Shooting incidents.

In 2023, five Department personnel were involved in the five Animal Shooting incidents, resulting in an average of one officer per incident. This accounted for a zero percent change compared to an average of one officer per incident in 2022. The 2023 officer to incident average remained unchanged compared to the 2019 through 2022 aggregate annual average of one officer per incident.

### OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, five male officers were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 100 percent of the total employees. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 88 percent, 2023 experienced a 12-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents were male, accounting for 19 of the 21 total employees, or 90 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	1	0	1	0
Male	2	3	5	4	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, four Hispanic officers were involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented 80 percent of the five total employees. This accounted for a no change compared to 80 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2023 was 26-percentage points above the Department's overall Hispanic total of 54 percent. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 75 percent, 2023 experienced a five-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents were Hispanic, accounting for 16 of the 21 total employees, or 76 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	0	0	1	0	1
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	1	4	3	4	4
White	1	0	1	1	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

In 2023, one Black officer was involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented 20 percent of the five total employees. This accounted for an increase of 100 percent compared to zero in 2022. The percentage of Black officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2023 was 11-percentage points above the Department's overall Black total of nine percent. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2019 through 2022 of six percent, 2023 experienced a 14-percentage point increase.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, White officers represented the second largest ethnic category of personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents, accounting for three of the 21 total employees, or 14 percent.

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	OIS-Animal Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	0%
Black	8%	9%	20%
Hispanic	48%	54%	80%
White	28%	25%	0%
Other	4%	<1%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

## OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in Animal Shooting incidents in 2023 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – zero percent (zero out of five total officers);
- 1-5 years of service – 20 percent (one out of five total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 40 percent (two out of five total officers);
- 11-20 years of service – 20 percent (one out of five total officers); and,
- More than 20 years of service – 20 percent (one of the five total officers).

The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – no change (zero percent in 2022, zero percent in 2023);
- 1-5 years of service – no change (20 percent in 2022, 20 percent in 2023);
- 6-10 years of service – 20-percentage point increase (20 percent in 2022, 40 percent in 2023);
- 11-20 years of service – 40-percentage point decrease (60 percent in 2022, 20 percent in 2023); and,
- More than 20 years of service – 20-percentage point increase (zero percent in 2022, 20 percent in 2023).

The following compares 2023 to the aggregate percentage of 2019 through 2022 of each year of service classification.

- Less than one year of service – no change (zero percent during four-year period, zero percent in 2023);
- 1-5 years of service – 11-percentage point decrease (31 percent during four-year period, 20 percent in 2023);
- 6-10 years of service – 21-percentage point increase (19 percent during four-year period, 40 percent in 2023);
- 11-20 years of service – 11-percentage point decrease (31 percent during four-year period, 20 percent in 2023); and,
- More than 20 years of service – three-percentage point increase (19 percent during four-year period, 20 percent in 2023).

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the largest officer categories with involved in Animal Shooting incidents had 1-5 years of service and 11-20 years of service, accounting for 12 each of the 21 total employees, or for a combined 58 percent.

Officers with 6-10 years of service accounted for the second largest categories with a total of five employees, or 24 percent each.

Officers with more than 20 years of service were the third largest group, with four employees, or 19 percent.

Officers with less than one year of service did not have any officers involved Animal Shooting incident within the past five years.

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	0	0	0	0	0
1 - 5	0	3	1	1	1
6 - 10	1	0	1	1	2
11 - 20	1	1	0	3	1
More than 20	0	0	3	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>





## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, one employee assigned to 77th Street Division was involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented 20 percent of the five total employees.

In 2023, one employee assigned to Central Division was involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented 20 percent of the five total employees.

In 2023, two employees assigned to Newton Division were involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented 40 percent of the five total employees.

In 2023, one employee assigned to Northeast Division was involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented 20 percent of the five total employees.

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	1	1
Central	0	0	1	0	1
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	1	0
Hollenbeck	0	0	0	0	0
Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	1	0
Newton	0	0	0	0	2
North Hollywood	0	1	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	1
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	1	0
Southeast	1	1	2	0	0
Southwest	0	1	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	1	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	1	0	0
Administrative Units	0	0	0	0	0
Specialized Units	0	0	0	0	0
Bureau Level	1	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	1	1	0	0
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>



## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, four employees at the rank of police officer were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 80 percent of the five total employees. In 2023, one Sergeant was involved in an animal shooting incident which represented 20 percent respectively of the five total employees.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of employees involved in Animal Shooting incidents were at the rank of police officer, accounting for 17 of the 21 total employees, or 81 percent.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	0	0	0
Lieutenant	0	0	0	0	0
Sergeant	0	0	0	0	1
Detective	0	0	0	1	0
Police Officer	2	3	5	3	4
Detention Officer	0	0	0	0	0
Reserve Officer	0	1	0	1	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, four employees assigned to patrol were involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 80 percent of the five total personnel.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in Animal Shooting incidents were assigned to patrol, accounting for 13 of the 21 total employees, or 62 percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to specialized assignment was involved in Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 20 percent of the five total personnel.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, employees assigned to specialized assignments, accounted for five of the 21 total employees, or 24 percent. In 2023, no employee assigned to a unit classified as Other was involved in an Animal Shooting incident, which represented zero percent of the five total personnel.

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	1	1	0	0
Patrol	1	3	3	2	4
Specialized	1	0	1	2	1
Investigative	0	0	0	0	0
Custody	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## OFFICER – INJURIES

No officers were killed during an Animal Shooting incident. One Department employee was injured during an Animal Shooting incident in 2023.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	0	1	1	1	1
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

## OFFICER – WEAPON TYPE

In 2023, five handguns were utilized during Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 100 percent of the total weapon types. This accounted for no change compared to 2022.

In 2023, no rifles or shotguns were utilized during Animal Shooting incidents. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, rifles accounted for zero of the 21 total weapons used, or zero percent. In 2023, no shotguns were utilized during Animal Shooting incidents.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Handgun	2	4	5	5	5
Shotgun	0	0	0	0	0
Rifle	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED BY OFFICERS PER YEAR

In 2023, 12 rounds were fired during the five Animal Shooting incidents.

OIS - Animal	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Total Rounds	7	5	6	13	12

## ANNUAL AVERAGE OF ROUNDS FIRED PER INCIDENT

In 2023, an average of 2.4 rounds were fired during Animal Shooting incidents.

OIS - Animal	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Average Rounds	3.5	1.3	1.2	2.6	2.4

## TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED BY OFFICERS PER WEAPON TYPE

In 2023, 12 rounds were fired from handguns during Animal Shooting incidents, which represented 100 percent of the 12 total rounds fired.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, rounds fired from handguns were the only round type fired during Animal Shooting incidents, accounting for 43 of the 43 total rounds, or 100 percent.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Handgun	7	5	6	13	12
Shotgun	0	0	0	0	0
Rifle	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>





## DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>14</sup>

### TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2022, all five Animal Shooting Tactics findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This remained the same compared to 2021.

In 2022, five of the total Animal Shooting Drawing/Exhibiting findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, all Animal Shooting Drawing/Exhibiting findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome.

In 2022, four Animal Shooting Lethal force findings, representing 80 percent, were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).”

Historically, from 2019 through 2022, a majority of adjudicated Lethal Force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, accounting for 14 of the 16 total findings, or 88 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	1	2	5	5	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	2	4	5	5	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	2	3	5	4	N/A

### ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, one of the five Animal Shooting Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval).” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, two of the 16 Lethal force findings, or 13 percent, resulted in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	1	2	0	0	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	0	1	0	1	N/A

<sup>14</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was omitted from this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents from 2023 will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.

# UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE (UD) INCIDENTS

The unintentional discharge of a firearm by a Department employee regardless of cause. Unintentional discharges are evaluated and then determined to be Tactical or Non-Tactical. During the adjudication, they are then classified as “Accidental Discharges” or “Negligent Discharges.”

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in ten Unintentional Discharge incidents, an increase of three incidents, or 43 percent, compared to 2022. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there were a total of 41 Unintentional Discharge incidents, resulting in an annual average of 8.2 incidents.

Unintentional Discharge	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	11	5	8	7	10

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, six of the Department's ten Unintentional Discharge incidents, or 60 percent, occurred during on-duty non-tactical situations (e.g., weapon inspections, weapon cleaning, etc.). Three incidents, or 30 percent, occurred while an officer was off-duty. Lastly, one incident occurred during an on duty tactical situation (field operation circumstances wherein deployment of the weapon system was warranted).

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Off-Duty	4	0	4	3	3
On-Duty, Tactical	1	2	0	1	1
On-Duty, Non-Tactical	6	3	4	3	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

From 2019 through 2023, on-duty non-tactical situations were the most frequent source of Unintentional Discharge incidents, accounting for 22 of the 41 total incidents, or 54 percent. off-duty situations were the second most common, accounting for 14 incidents, or 34 percent, followed by on-duty Tactical situations, accounting for five incidents, or 12 percent.

# BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

## OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, three of the Department's Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of Central Bureau, which increased by two incidents compared to 2022.

In the four-year period from 2019-2022, four Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of one incident. The Central Bureau count for 2023 rose above the 2019-2022 annual average by two incidents or approximately 200 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	0	0	0	0	0
Newton	0	0	0	1	0
Northeast	0	0	1	0	1
Rampart	0	0	0	0	1
Hollenbeck	0	2	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>

## OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, zero of the Department's Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of South Bureau, which remained the same compared to 2022.

In the four-year period from 2019-2022, five Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.3 incidents. The South Bureau count for 2023 fell below the 2019-2022 annual average by 1.3 incidents, or 100 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	2	0	0	0	0
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	2	0	0
Southwest	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

## OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, zero of the Department's Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of West Bureau, which remained the same compared to 2022.

In the four-year period from 2019-2022, eight Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of two incidents. The West Bureau count for 2023 fell below the 2019-2022 annual average by two incidents, or 100 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	1	1	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	2	0	1	0	0
West Los Angeles	1	0	1	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

## OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, five of the Department's Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of Valley Bureau, which was an increase of two incidents, compared 2022.

In the four-year period from 2019-2022, seven Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average 1.8 incidents. The Valley Bureau count for 2023 rose above the 2019-2022 annual average by 3.2 incidents, or 178 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	0	1	0	0	1
Foothill	0	1	0	0	1
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	1	2
Topanga	0	0	0	0	1
Van Nuys	0	0	0	1	0
West Valley	2	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>



## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, two of the Department's Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred outside the Department's jurisdiction, which remained the same compared to 2022.

In the four-year period from 2019-2022, seven Unintentional Discharge incidents occurred outside the Department's jurisdiction, resulting in an annual average of 1.8 incidents. The outside jurisdiction count for 2022 exceeded the 2019-2022 annual average by 0.2 incidents, or 11 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	2	0	3	2	2

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, April, May, and December represented the months with the most Unintentional Discharge incidents with two occurrences each, or 20 percent respectively, of the 10 total incidents for the year. March, June, August, and October each had one incident for 2023.

From 2019 through 2023, April represented the month with the most Unintentional Discharge incidents with 10 occurrences from a total of 41, or 24 percent. September and December represented the month with the second most Unintentional Discharge incidents with five occurrences each from a total of 41, or 12 percent respectively. October represented the month with the third most occurrences with four, or 10 percent. January, May, June, and August had 3 occurrences each from a total of 41, or 29 percent. March and November had two occurrences each from a total of 41, or 10 percent. July had one occurrence from a total of 41, or two percent.

The Unintentional Discharge incident percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2019 through 2023 was as follows:

- January – March: five incidents, or 12 percent;
- April – June: 16 incidents, or 39 percent;
- July – September: nine incidents; or 22 percent; and,
- October through December: 11 incidents, or 27 percent.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	1	1	1	0	0
February	0	0	0	0	0
March	0	0	1	0	1
April	2	1	2	3	2
May	1	0	0	0	2
June	0	0	1	1	1
July	0	1	0	0	0
August	1	0	1	0	1
September	2	1	0	2	0
October	2	0	1	0	1
November	0	1	1	0	0
December	2	0	0	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, Saturday and Sunday represented the days of the week with the most Unintentional Discharge incidents, with a total of six, or 60 percent. Monday represented the second most frequent day of the week with two incidents, or 20 percent. Tuesday and Wednesday represented the third most frequent days of the week with one incident each, or 10 percent respectively. Thursday and Friday had zero incidents.

From 2019 through 2023, Wednesday represented the day with the most Unintentional Discharge incidents with nine of the 41 total, or 22 percent. Sunday and Monday accounted for the second highest count with seven incidents, or 17 percent. Tuesday and Saturday accounted for the third highest count with six incidents or 15-percent respectively. The remaining six incidents, or 15 percent, were distributed throughout the remaining days of the week.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	2	1	1	1	2
Tuesday	3	1	1	0	1
Wednesday	2	1	2	3	1
Thursday	0	0	0	2	0
Friday	1	1	1	1	0
Saturday	1	0	2	0	3
Sunday	2	1	1	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, six Unintentional Discharge incidents, or 60 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while four incidents, or 40 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

Historically from 2019 through 2023, 22 Unintentional Discharges, or 54 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m. Nineteen incidents, or 46 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

The five-year annual average for 2019 through 2023 was 4.4 Unintentional Discharges occurring between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and 3.8 incidents between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600 - 1759	6	2	3	5	6
1800 - 0559	5	3	5	2	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received or were pending BOPC “Unintentional Discharge” adjudicative findings for their involvement in Unintentional Discharge incidents.

In 2023, 10 Department personnel were involved in the 10 Unintentional Discharge incidents throughout the year, resulting in an average of one officer per incident. This represented no change when compared to the officer per incident average in 2022. Similarly, the 2022 officer to incident average represented no change when compared to the officer per incident aggregate annual average from 2019 through 2022.

### OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, nine male officers were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 90 percent of the ten total employees. This accounted for a 10-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. In 2023, one female officer was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident which represented 10 percent of the ten total employees. The percentage of male officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2023 was nine-percentage points above the Department’s overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 90 percent, 2023 remained the same. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents were male, representing 37 of the 41 total employees, or 90 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	1	1	1	0	1
Male	10	4	7	7	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## OFFICER INFORMATION

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, seven Hispanic officers were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 70 percent of the ten total employees. This accounted for a 13-percentage point increase compared to 57 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2023 was 16-percentage points above the Department's overall Hispanic officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 45 percent, 2023 experienced an 25-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, most of officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents were Hispanic, representing 21 of the 41 total employees, or 51 percent.

In 2023, two Asian/Pacific Islander officers were involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 20 percent of the ten total employees. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2023 was nine-percentage points above the Department's overall Asian/Pacific Islander officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Asian/Pacific Islander personnel from 2019 through 2022 of three percent, 2023 experienced a 17-percentage point increase.

In 2023, one Filipino officer was involved in Unintentional Discharge incident. Which represented 10 percent of the 10 total employees. This accounted for a 100 percent increase compared to zero in 2022. The percentage of Filipino officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2023 was one-percentage point below the Department's overall Asian/Pacific Islander total officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Filipino personnel from 2019 through 2022 of three percent, 2023 experienced a seven-percentage point increase.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	1	0	0	0	2
Black	4	0	2	1	0
Filipino	1	0	0	0	1
Hispanic	3	3	4	4	7
White	2	2	2	2	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	UD Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	30%
Black	8%	9%	0%
Hispanic	48%	54%	70%
White	28%	25%	0%
Other	4%	1%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).





## OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2023 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – zero percent (zero out of ten total officers);
- 1-5 years of service – 20 percent (two out of ten total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 30 percent (three out of ten total officers);
- 11-20 years of service – 30 percent (three out of ten total officers); and,
- More than 20 years of service – 20 percent (two out of ten total officers).

In 2023, there were percentage point increases in four of the five categories and a decrease in one, when compared to 2022. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – 43-percentage point decrease (43 percent in 2022, zero percent in 2023);
- 1-5 years of service – six-percentage point increase (14 percent in 2022, 20 percent in 2023);
- 6-10 years of service – 16-percentage point increase (14 percent in 2022, 30 percent in 2023);
- 11-20 years of service – 16-percentage point increase (14 percent in 2022, 30 percent in 2023); and,
- More than 20 years of service – six-percentage point increase (14 percent in 2022, 20 percent in 2023).

In 2023, there were percentage point increases in two of the five years of service categories, and decreases in three, when compared to the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents during the four-year period from 2019 through 2022. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – 16-percentage point decrease (16 percent during four-year period, zero percent in 2023);
- 1-5 years of service – nine-percentage point decrease (29 percent during four-year period, 20 percent in 2023);
- 6-10 years of service – 11-percentage point increase (19 percent during four-year period, 30 percent in 2023);
- 11-20 years of service – 24-percentage point increase (six percent during four-year period, 30 percent in 2023)
- More than 20 years of service – nine-percentage point decrease (29 percent during four-year period, 20 percent in 2023).

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	2	0	0	3	0
1 - 5	6	1	1	1	2
6 - 10	2	3	0	1	3
11 - 20	0	0	1	1	3
More than 20	1	1	6	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, eight employees at the rank of Police Officer were involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 80 percent of the ten total employees. This accounted for a six-percentage point decrease compared to 86 percent in 2022. The percentage of Police Officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents in 2023 was 16-percentage points above the Department's overall Police Officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of Police Officer from 2019 through 2022 of 87 percent, 2023 experienced a seven-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents were at the rank of Police Officer, accounting for 35 of the 41 total employees, or 85 percent.

In 2023, one employee at the rank of Sergeant was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented ten percent of the ten total employees. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Sergeant rank accounted for three of the 41 total employees, or seven percent.

In 2023, one employee at the rank of Detective was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented ten percent of the ten total employees. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Detective rank accounted for three of the 41 total employees, or seven percent.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	0	0	0
Lieutenant	0	0	0	0	0
Sergeant	1	1	0	0	1
Detective	0	0	1	1	1
Police Officer	10	4	7	6	8
Detention Officer	0	0	0	0	0
Property Officer	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, one employee assigned to Central Division was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented ten percent of the total 10 employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, Central Division accounted for two of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or five percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to Foothill Division was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 10 percent of the total 10 employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, Foothill Division accounted for three of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or seven percent.

In 2023, two employees assigned to North Hollywood Division were involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 20 percent of the total 10 employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, North Hollywood Division accounted for three of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or seven percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to Rampart Division was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 10 percent of the total 10 employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, Rampart Division accounted for one of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or two percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to an Administrative unit was involved in an unintentional discharge incident which represented 10 percent of total ten employees. In the five year period from 2019-2023 Administrative units accounted for two of the total 41 incidents, or five percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to a Specialized unit was involved in an unintentional discharge incident which represented 10 percent ten of total employees. In the five year period from 2019-2023 Specialized units accounted for two of the total 41 incidents, or five percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to a Bureau level unit was involved in an unintentional discharge incident which represented 10 percent of ten total employees. In the five year period from 2019-2023 Bureau level units accounted for one of the total 41 incidents, or two percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to Metropolitan Division was involved in an unintentional discharge incident which represented 10 percent of ten total employees. In the five year period from 2019-2023 Metropolitan Division accounted for three of the total 41 incidents, or seven percent.

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	2	0	0	0	0
Central	0	1	0	0	1
Devonshire	0	1	0	0	0
Foothill	1	1	0	0	1
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	1	0	1	0
Hollywood	1	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	1	1	0
Newton	0	0	0	1	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	1	2
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	1	0
Pacific	1	1	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	1
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	1	0	1	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	1
Van Nuys	1	0	0	1	0
West Los Angeles	1	0	2	0	0
West Valley	2	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	1	1	0
Administrative Units	0	0	1	0	1
Specialized Units	0	0	1	0	1
Bureau Level	0	0	0	0	1
Metropolitan	1	0	1	0	1
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, one employee assigned to an Administrative Unit was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented ten percent of the total 10 employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, Administrative Units accounted for two of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or five percent.

In 2023, one employee assigned to Metropolitan Division was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 10 percent of the total 10 employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, Metropolitan Division accounted for three of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or seven percent.

In 2023, five personnel assigned to patrol were involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 50 percent of the ten total employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, Personnel assigned to Patrol Divisions accounted for 27 of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or 66 percent. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2019 through 2022 of 71 percent, 2023 experienced a 21-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents were assigned to patrol representing 27 of 41 total employees, or 66 percent.

In 2023, two personnel assigned to Specialized Units were involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented 20 percent of the 10 total employees. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to

Specialized Units from 2019 through 2022 of 13 percent, 2023 experienced a seven-percentage point increase. Historically the Specialized Unit Category represents the second highest category of officer involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents with six of the 41, or 15 percent.

In 2023, one person assigned to an Investigative Unit was involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, which represented ten percent of the ten total employees. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, Investigative Units accounted for two of the 41 total Unintentional Discharge incidents, or five percent.

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	0	0	1	0	1
Metropolitan	1	0	1	0	1
Patrol	10	4	4	4	5
Specialized	0	1	0	3	2
Investigative	0	0	1	0	1
Custody	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## OFFICER – INJURIES

No Department personnel were killed as a result of Unintentional Discharge incidents during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023. However, two officers of the 41, or five percent, sustained injuries because of Unintentional Discharge incidents during the same five-year period.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	1	0	0	1	0
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

## OFFICER – WEAPON SYSTEM

In 2023, nine handguns were utilized during Unintentional Discharge incidents, which represented 90 percent of the ten total weapons. This accounted for a ten-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of handguns utilized during Unintentional Discharge incidents from 2019 through 2022 of 71 percent, 2023 experienced a 19-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, handguns represented the highest weapon type count in Unintentional Discharge incidents with 31 of the 41 total firearms, or 76 percent.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Handgun	6	4	5	7	9
Shotgun	2	0	1	0	1
Rifle	3	1	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>



## TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED BY OFFICERS PER WEAPON SYSTEM

During all Unintentional Discharge incidents from 2019 through 2023, only one round was fired per incident.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Handgun	6	4	5	7	9
Shotgun	2	0	1	0	1
Rifle	3	1	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

## OFFICER – HANDGUN TYPE

In 2023, nine Unintentional Discharges incidents involved the use of a handgun. Of those nine incidents, five or 56 percent involved a Striker-Fired pistol. During the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, striker fire pistols were the most frequent handgun type involved in Unintentional Discharge incidents, accounting for 24 out of 30 total handgun incidents, or 80 percent.

Handgun Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Striker-Fired	4	4	4	7	5
Decocker	0	0	1	0	0
1911	0	0	0	0	2
Revolver	1	0	0	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>



## DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>15</sup>

### TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2022, seven officers involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident received Tactics findings. Six of those officers, representing 86 percent, received findings that were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This represented a two-percentage point decrease compared to 88 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” findings from 2019 through 2021 of 83 percent, 2022 experienced a three-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, the majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, accounting for 26 of the 31 total Tactics findings, or 84 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	11	2	7	6	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	1	2	0	1	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Unintentional Discharge	0	0	0	0	N/A

In 2022, one officer involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident received a “Drawing and Exhibiting” force finding. One for “Drawing and Exhibiting” force findings were “In Policy (No Further Action)” compared to zero in 2021. During the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, adjudicated Drawing/Exhibiting findings that resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, accounted for four of the six total Drawing/ Exhibiting findings, or 67 percent.

### ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, seven officers involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident received a Tactics finding. One of the seven officers, or 14 percent, involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident, received a Tactics finding that was adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This represented a one-percentage point increase when compared to 13 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” findings from 2019 through 2021 of 17 percent, 2022 experienced a three-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, five of the 31 total Tactics findings, or 16 percent, resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” outcome.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	0	3	1	1	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	1	1	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Unintentional Discharge	11	5	8	7	N/A

In 2022, seven officers involved in an Unintentional Discharge incident received a “Unintentional Discharge” force finding. All seven, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy.” This represented no change compared to 100 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, 31 of the 31 total Unintentional Discharge force findings, or 100 percent, resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” outcome.

<sup>15</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was omitted from this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.

# IN-CUSTODY DEATH INCIDENTS (ICD)

In-Custody Death (ICD) incidents are defined as the death of an arrestee or detainee who is in the custodial care of the Department (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

Note: Per Special Order No.10 (dated May 10, 2011), the Department is authorized to reclassify CUOF ICD investigations to death investigations when the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner's Office determines that the concerned subject's death was caused by natural, accidental, or undetermined means, and when the incident did not involve a UOF, negligence or misconduct, and there is no evidence of foul play. Additionally, per Department Special Order 18 – Policy to revise police facility in-custody death adjudication protocols, dated August 6, 2020, all ICD's occurring within a police facility, regardless of cause or manner of death, shall be evaluated as a CUOF.

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in five ICD incidents, which represented a 400 percent increase, compared to 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, there were a total of nine ICD incidents, resulting in an annual average of 2.3 incidents. The 2023 count rose above the 2019 through 2022 annual average by 2.7 incidents, or 117 percent.

In-Custody Death	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	3	2	3	1	5

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, two of the Department's five ICD incidents, or 40 percent, originated from a "Citizen Flag Down" request for service. This accounted for a 40-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD incidents resulting from flag down requests for service from 2019 through 2022 of zero percent, 2023 experienced a 40-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, ICD incidents resulting from a "Citizen Flag Down" request for service represented the smallest source type, accounting for two of the 14 total incidents, or 14 percent.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Radio Call	0	2	1	0	0
Observation	2	0	1	0	1
Citizen Flag Down	0	0	0	0	2
Pre-Planned	0	0	0	0	0
Station Call	0	0	0	0	0
Ambush	0	0	0	0	0
Off-Duty	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	1	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

In 2023, two of the Department's five ICD incidents, or 40 percent, originated from a source type categorized as "Other." This accounted for a 60-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage from 2019 through 2022 of ICD incidents originating from a source type of "Other," of 33 percent, 2023 experienced a seven-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, ICD incidents originating from "Other" source types represented the largest source type, accounting for five of the 14 total incidents, or 36 percent.

In 2023, one of the Department's five ICD incidents, or 20 percent, originated from an Officer initiated field detention. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD incidents resulting from Officer initiated field detentions from 2019 through 2022 of 33 percent, 2023 experienced a 13-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, ICD incidents resulting from an Officer initiated field detention accounted for four of the 14 total incidents, or 29 percent.



# BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

## OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, one of the Department's ICD incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Central Bureau, which represented an increase of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to 2022. Historically from 2019 through 2023, two of the 14 ICD incidents, or 14 percent have occurred within the geographical area of Central Bureau. This results in an annual average of 0.4 ICD incidents within Central Bureau. (Department – 5; Central Bureau – 1)

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	1	0	0	0	1
Newton	0	0	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

## OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, one of the Department's ICD incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of South Bureau, which represented an increase of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to 2022. compared to 2023 (Department – 5; South Bureau – 1)

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	1
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

## OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, none of the Department's ICD incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Valley Bureau, which was no change when compared to 2022. Zero percent of the Department's ICD incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department – 5; Valley Bureau – 0).

Historically from 2019 through 2023, three of the 14 ICD incidents, or 21 percent have occurred within the geographical area of Valley Bureau. This results in an annual average of 0.6 ICD incidents within the Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	1	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	0
Van Nuys	1	1	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

## OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, one of the Department's ICD incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of West Bureau, which represented an increase of one incident compared to zero in 2022 (Department – 5; West Bureau – 1)

In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, two ICD incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.5 incidents. The West Bureau count for 2023 was above the 2019 through 2022 annual average by 0.5 incidents, or 100 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	0	0	1	0	1
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

## CUSTODY SERVICES DIVISION

In 2023, two of the five, or 40 percent of the Department's ICD incidents occurred under the command of Custody Services Division. This was an increase of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to 2022 (Department - 5; Custody Services Division - 2).

In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, three ICD incidents occurred in Custody Services Division, resulting in an annual average of 0.6 incidents. The Custody Services Division count for 2023 was above the 2019 through 2022 annual average by 1.4 incidents, or 233 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Custody Services	1	0	1	1	2

## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, zero of the five, or zero percent of ICD incidents occurred outside the Department's geographic jurisdiction. Compared to zero percent of 2022, there was no change in percentage points in 2023. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, one ICD incident occurred outside the Department's jurisdiction. (Department - 5; Outside Jurisdiction - 0).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	0	0	1	0	0

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, January, March, May, July and October represented the months with the ICD incidents each having one occurrence. From 2019 through 2023, July represented the month with the most ICD incidents with four of the 14 total incidents, or 29 percent. February and May had the second highest count with two incidents each or 14 percent, respectively. September, November and December had the least with zero incidents during the same five-year period.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	0	0	0	0	1
February	1	0	0	1	0
March	0	0	0	0	1
April	1	0	0	0	0
May	0	0	1	0	1
June	0	0	1	0	0
July	1	1	1	0	1
August	0	1	0	0	0
September	0	0	0	0	0
October	0	0	0	0	1
November	0	0	0	0	0
December	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, Friday represented the day of the week with the most ICD incidents, accounting for two of the five total incidents, or 40 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Friday was the day of the week that accounted for the most ICD incidents, with four of the 14 total, or 29 percent.

In 2023, Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday each had one of the five ICD incidents, or 20 percent, respectively. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Tuesday and Saturday represented the days of the week that accounted for the second most ICD incidents, with three each of the 14 total, or 21 percent, respectively.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	1	0	0	0	0
Tuesday	1	1	0	0	1
Wednesday	0	0	0	1	0
Thursday	0	0	0	0	1
Friday	0	1	1	0	2
Saturday	0	0	2	0	1
Sunday	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

# TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, three of the five total ICD incidents, or 60 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., while two incidents, or 40 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

Historically from 2019 through 2023, nine of the 14 ICD incidents, or 64 percent occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and the remaining five incidents, or 36 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600 - 1759	3	1	1	1	3
1800 - 0559	0	1	2	0	2
Total	3	2	3	1	5





## OFFICER INFORMATION

In 2023, 17 Department personnel were involved in the five ICD incidents throughout the year, resulting in an average of 3.4 officers per incident. This accounted for a decrease of 7.6 officers per incident, or 69 percent decrease compared to the total of 11 officers for a single incident in 2022. The 2023 officer to incident average was below the 2019 through 2022 aggregate annual average of 3.8 officers per incident by 0.4 officer per incident, or 11 percent.

### OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, 16 male officers were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 94 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to 91 percent in 2022. The percentage of male officers involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 13-percentage points above the Department's overall male total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 74 percent, 2023 experienced a 20-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in ICD incidents were male, accounting for 41 of the 51 total employees, or 80 percent.

In 2023, one female officer was involved in an ICD incident, which represented six percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a three-percentage point decrease compared to nine percent in 2022. The percentage of female officers involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 13-percentage points below the Department's overall female total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved female personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 26 percent, 2023 experienced a 20-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, females accounted for 10 of the 51 total involved employees, or 20 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	1	7	1	1
Male	3	8	4	10	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>

## OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, 13 Hispanic officers were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 76 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a 31-percentage point increase compared to 45 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 22-percentage points above the Department's overall Hispanic total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 47 percent, 2023 experienced a 29-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in ICD incidents were Hispanic, accounting for 29 of the 51 total employees, or 57 percent.

In 2023, two White officers were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 12 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to nine percent in 2022. The percentage of White officers involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 13-percentage points below the Department's overall White officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 32 percent, 2023 experienced a 20-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, White officers represented the second largest ethnic category of personnel involved in ICD incidents, accounting for 13 of the 51 total employees, or 25 percent.

In 2023, two Black officers were involved in ICD incidents which represented 12 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a 15-percentage point decrease compared to 27 percent in 2022. The percentage of Black officers involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was three-percentage points above the Department's overall Black officer total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 12 percent, 2023 experienced no change. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Black officers accounted for six of the 51 total employees, or 12 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	1	0
Black	0	0	1	3	2
Filipino	0	0	1	1	0
Hispanic	1	5	5	5	13
White	2	4	4	1	2
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	ICD Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	0%
Black	8%	9%	12%
Hispanic	48%	54%	76%
White	28%	25%	12%
Other	4%	<1%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).



## OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

The following depicts the percentage of personnel involved in ICD incidents in 2023 based on their respective years of service classifications:

- Less than one year of service – six percent (one out of 17 total officers);
- 1-5 years of service – 53 percent (nine out of 17 total officers);
- 6-10 years of service – 24 percent (four out of 17 total officers);
- 11-20 years of service – 12 percent (two out of 17 total officers); and,
- More than 20 years of service – six percent (one out of 17 total officers).

In 2023, there were percentage point decreases in two of the years of service categories and an increase in three categories compared to the percentage of personnel involved in ICD incidents to 2022. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – six-percentage point increase (zero percent in 2022, six percent in 2023);
- 1-5 years of service – 35-percentage point increase (18 percent in 2022, 53 percent in 2023);
- 6-10 years of service – six-percentage point increase (18 percent in 2022, 24 percent in 2023);
- 11-20 years of service – 33-percentage point decrease (45 percent in 2022, 12 percent in 2023); and,
- More than 20 years of service – 12-percentage point decrease (18 percent in 2022, six percent in 2023).

In 2023, there were percentage point increases in three of the years of service categories and decreases in two of the years of service categories when compared to the aggregate percentage of personnel involved in ICD incidents during the four-year period from 2019 through 2022. The following depicts these changes:

- Less than one year of service – six-percentage point increase (zero percent during four-year period, six percent in 2023);
- 1-5 years of service – six-percentage point increase (47 percent during four-year period, 53 percent in 2023);
- 6-10 years of service – nine-percentage point increase (15 percent during four-year period, 24 percent in 2023);
- 11-20 years of service – 14-percentage point decrease (26 percent during four-year period, 12 percent in 2023);
- More than 20 years of service – six-percentage point decrease (12 percent during four-year period, six percent in 2023).

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of the officers involved in ICD incidents had one to five years of service, accounting for 25 of the 51 total employees, or 49 percent. Officers with 11-20 years of service were the second largest

group, with 11 personnel, or 22 percent. Officers with six to 10 years of service accounted for the third largest category with a total of nine employees, or 18 percent, during the same five-year period followed by officers with more than 20 years of service, which accounted for five officers and represented ten percent of the total. Finally, officers with less than one year of service accounted for one officer, or two percent.

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	0	0	0	0	1
1 - 5	2	7	5	2	9
6 - 10	0	2	1	2	4
11 - 20	0	0	4	5	2
More than 20	1	0	1	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>



## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, eight officers assigned to Custody Services Division were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 47 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase compared to 45 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Custody Services Division personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 35 percent, 2023 experienced a 12-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Custody Services Division personnel accounted for 20 of the total 51 employees involved in ICD incidents, or 39 percent.

In 2023, four officers assigned to Pacific Division were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 24 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a 31-percentage point decrease compared to 55 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Pacific Division personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 18 percent, 2023 experienced a six-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Pacific Division personnel accounted for 10 of the total 51 employees involved in ICD incidents, or 20 percent.

In 2023, three officers assigned to Central Division were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 18 percent of the 17 total employees. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Central Division personnel accounted for three of the total 51 employees involved in ICD incidents, or six percent.

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	0
Central	0	0	0	0	3
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	0	0	0	0
Hollywood	0	0	1	0	0
Mission	0	5	0	0	0
Newton	0	0	0	0	1
North Hollywood	0	0	3	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	6	4
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	0
Van Nuys	2	4	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	0	0	1
Administrative Units	1	0	0	0	0
Specialized Units	0	0	0	0	0
Bureau Level	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	0	0	0	0
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Custody Services	0	0	7	5	8
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>

## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, 11 of the 17 Department personnel involved in ICD incidents were at the rank of Police Officer, which represented 65 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a 29-percentage point increase compared to 36 percent in 2022. The percentage of officers involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was five-percentage points below the Department's overall Police Officer rank total percentage. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of Police Officer from 2019 through 2022 of 53 percent, 2023 experienced a 12-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of personnel involved in ICD incidents were at the rank of Police Officer, accounting for 29 of the 51 total employees, or 57 percent.

In 2023, six of the 17 Department personnel involved in ICD incidents were at the rank of Detention Officer, which represented 35 percent of the 17 total employees. This accounted for a one-percentage point decrease compared to 36 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 16 of 51 total employees, or 31 percent, involved in an ICD incident were the rank of Detention Officer.

## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, eight of the 17 Department personnel involved in ICD incidents accounting for 47 percent, were assigned to patrol. This accounted for an 11-percentage point increase compared to 36 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2019 through 2022 of 56 percent, 2023 experienced a nine-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of personnel involved in ICD incidents were assigned to patrol, accounting for 27 of the 51 total employees, or 53 percent.

In 2023, eight of the 17 Department personnel involved in ICD incidents accounting for 47 percent, were assigned to Custody Services Division. This accounted for a two percentage-point increase compared to 45 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to Custody Services from 2019 through 2022 of 35 percent, 2023 experienced a 12-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 20 of 51 total employees, or 39 percent, were assigned to Custody Services while involved in an ICD incident.

## OFFICER – INJURIES

No Department personnel were killed as a result of ICD incidents during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023. However, two officers sustained injuries during the same five-year period, one in 2021 and one in 2023.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	1	1	0
Lieutenant	1	0	0	1	0
Sergeant	0	0	1	1	0
Detective	0	0	0	0	0
Police Officer	2	9	3	4	11
Detention Officer	0	0	6	0	6
Reserve Officer	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>17</b>

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	1	0	0	2	0
Metropolitan	0	0	0	0	0
Patrol	2	9	4	4	8
Specialized	0	0	0	0	1
Investigative	0	0	0	0	0
Custody	0	0	7	5	8
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	0	0	1	0	1
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

# SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during occurrences investigated and/or later classified as ICD incidents.

## SUSPECT – GENDER

In 2023, five male suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 100 percent of the five total suspects. This accounted for no change when compared to the 2022 total of 100 percent. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male suspects from 2019 through 2022 of 89 percent, 2023 experienced an 11-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of suspects involved in ICD incidents were male, accounting for 13 of the 14 total suspects, or 93 percent.

In 2023, no female suspects were involved in ICD incidents. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, female suspects involved in ICD incidents accounted for one of the 14 total suspects, or seven percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	0	1	0	0
Male	3	2	2	1	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Violent Crime Suspect	ICD Suspect
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	(See other)	20%
Black	8%	39%	60%
Hispanic	48%	41%	20%
White	28%	7%	0%
Other	4%	3%	0%
Unknown	N/A	10%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

## SUSPECT – ETHNICITY

In 2023, three Black suspects were involved in ICD incidents, which represented 60 percent of the five total suspects. This accounted for a 60-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. The percentage of Black suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 21-percentage points above the City's overall Black population total. Additionally, the percentage of Black suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 21-percentage points above the City's overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2019 through 2022 of 33 percent, 2023 experienced a 27-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Black category was the most represented ethnic group involved in ICD incidents with six of the 14 total suspects, or 43 percent.

In 2023, one Hispanic suspect was involved in an ICD incident, which represented 20 percent of the five total suspects. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase when compared to 2022. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 28-percentage points below the City's overall Hispanic population total. Additionally, the percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was 21-percentage points below the City's overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2019 through 2022 of 44 percent, 2023 experienced a 24-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Hispanic category was the second largest represented with five of the 14 total suspects involved in ICD incidents, or 36 percent.

In 2023, one Asian/Pacific Islander suspect was involved in an ICD incident, which represented 20 percent of the five total suspects. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase when compared to 2022. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander suspects involved in ICD incidents in 2023 was eight-percentage points above the City's overall Asian/Pacific Islander population total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Asian/Pacific Islander category accounted for one of the 14 total suspects involved in ICD incidents, or seven percent.

In 2023, no White suspects were involved in an ICD incident, which represented zero percent of the five total suspects. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White suspects from 2019 through 2022 of 22 percent, 2023 experienced a 22-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the White category represented the third largest ethnic group with two of the 14 total suspects involved in ICD incidents, or 14 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	1
Black	0	1	2	0	3
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	3	1	0	0	1
White	0	0	1	1	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>



## SUSPECT – AGE

In 2023, two of the five suspects involved in ICD incidents, or 40 percent, were in the 30-39 age category. This age category accounted for a 60-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 30-39 age range from 2019 through 2022 of 44 percent, 2023 experienced a four-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 30-39 age group accounted for six of the 14 total suspects involved in ICD incidents, representing 43 percent.

In 2023, one of the five suspects involved in an ICD incident, or 20 percent, was in the 50-59 age category. The 50-59 age range accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects within the 50-59 age range from 2019 through 2022 of 22 percent, 2023 experienced a two-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 50-59 age group accounted for three of the 14 total suspects involved in ICD incidents, representing 21 percent.

In 2023, one of the five suspects involved in an ICD incident, or 20 percent, was in the 40-49 age category. The 40-49 age range accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 40-49 age group accounted for only one of the 14 total suspects involved in ICD incidents, representing seven percent.

In 2023, one of the five suspects involved in an ICD incident, or 20 percent, was in the “60 and above” age category. The “60 and above” age category accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the “60 and above” age category accounted for only one of the 14 total suspects involved in ICD incidents, representing seven percent.

Age	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0-17	0	0	0	0	0
18-23	0	0	1	0	0
24-29	0	0	2	0	0
30-39	1	2	0	1	2
40-49	0	0	0	0	1
50-59	2	0	0	0	1
60 and Above	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2023, one of the five total suspects involved in an ICD incident was perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for an 80-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2019 through 2022 of 33 percent, 2023 experienced a 13-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for four of the 14 total suspects, or 29 percent.

Per. Mental Illness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	1	0	1	1	1
No	2	2	2	0	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

## DECEASED SUSPECT TOXICOLOGY RESULTS

Toxicology reports from the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner’s Office, for decedents in 2023, are pending and not completed prior to the publication of this report. Complete toxicology for 2023 decedents will be available in the 2024 Year End Use of Force Report.

The single decedent involved in a 2022 ICD incident, representing 100 percent, had positive results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance. When compared to the aggregate percentage of decedents with positive toxicology results for alcohol and/or a controlled substance(s) during ICD incidents from 2019 through 2021 of 100 percent, 2022 experienced no change.

Substance Present	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	3	2	3	1	N/A
No	0	0	0	0	N/A
Unknown/Pending	0	0	0	0	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>N/A</b>

## SUSPECT – TOXICOLOGY ANALYSIS

In 2022, the single ICD decedent toxicology analysis resulted in positive results for methamphetamine. This accounted for 67-percentage point increase when compared to decedents with positive methamphetamine results in 2021 ICD incidents. In the four-year period of 2019 through 2022, seven of the 14 decedents involved in ICD incidents, representing 50 percent, had positive toxicology results for methamphetamine.

In 2022, the single ICD decedent toxicology analysis resulted in positive results for marijuana. This accounted for no change when compared to 100 percent of 2021 ICD incident decedents with positive marijuana results. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, five of the 14 decedents involved in ICD incidents, representing 36 percent, had positive toxicology results for marijuana.

In 2022, the single ICD decedent toxicology analysis resulted in positive results for opiates. This accounted for a 33-percentage point increase when compared to 67 percent of 2021 ICD incident decedents with positive results for opiates. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, three of the 14 decedents involved in ICD incidents, representing 21 percent, had positive toxicology results for opiates.

Substance	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Alcohol	0%	0%	100%	0%	N/A
Cocaine	0%	0%	0%	0%	N/A
Marijuana	33%	0%	100%	100%	N/A
Methamphetamine	100%	100%	33%	100%	N/A
Opiates	0%	0%	67%	100%	N/A
PCP	0%	0%	0%	100%	N/A
Psychiatric Medication	33%	0%	33%	0%	N/A
Other	0%	0%	0%	100%	N/A
Unknown	0%	0%	0%	0%	N/A
None	0%	0%	0%	0%	N/A

Substance	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Alcohol	0	0	3	0	N/A
Cocaine	0	0	0	0	N/A
Marijuana	1	0	3	1	N/A
Methamphetamine	3	2	1	1	N/A
Opiates	0	0	2	1	N/A
PCP	0	0	0	1	N/A
Psychiatric Medication	1	0	1	0	N/A
Other	0	0	0	1	N/A
Unknown	0	0	0	0	N/A
None	0	0	0	0	N/A
Pending	0	0	0	0	N/A

## SUSPECT – HOMELESS<sup>16</sup>

In 2023, none of the five total suspects involved in an ICD incident, or zero percent, were homeless. This accounted for a 100-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were homeless from 2019 through 2022 of 33 percent, 2023 experienced a 33-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were homeless accounted for three of the 14 total suspects, or 21 percent.

Homeless	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	1	0	1	1	0
No	2	2	2	0	5
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

<sup>16</sup> The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has since implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.

## SUSPECT – WEAPON/FORCE

In 2023, one of the five suspects involved in an ICD incident, or 20 percent, was armed with a firearm. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were armed with a firearm from 2019 through 2022 of 11 percent, 2023 experienced a nine-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were armed with a firearm accounted for two of the 14 total suspects, or 14 percent.

In 2023, one of the five suspects involved in an ICD incident, or 20 percent, was armed with an edged weapon. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were armed with an edged weapon from 2019 through 2022 of 11 percent, 2023 experienced a nine-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were armed with a firearm accounted for two of the 14 total suspects, or 14 percent.

In 2023, one of the five suspects involved in an ICD incident, or 20 percent, used physical force during an ICD incident. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who used physical force from 2019 through 2022 of 11 percent, 2023 experienced a nine-

percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who used physical force accounted for two of the 14 total suspects, or 14 percent.

In 2023, no weapons and/or force were utilized by two of the five total ICD suspects in 2023, or 40 percent. This accounted for a 60-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were not armed from 2019 through 2022 of 67 percent, 2023 experienced a 27-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were not armed accounted for eight of the 14 total suspects, or 57 percent.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Automobile	0	0	0	0	0
Edged Weapon	0	1	0	0	1
Firearm	0	0	1	0	1
Impact Device	0	0	0	0	0
Perception	0	0	0	0	0
Physical Force	1	0	0	0	1
Replica/Pellet	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
None	2	1	2	1	2
DNA	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

## SUSPECT – INJURIES

Because ICD incidents only involve suspects who are deceased, this section does not include those who only sustained injuries (those who sustained injuries that required hospitalization, but are not deceased, are included in the LERI section).

In 2023, five individuals died while in the Department's custody. When compared to the 2022 total of one decedent, 2023 accounted for a 400 percent increase. When compared to the 2019 through 2022 annual average of 3.5 decedents

from ICD incidents, 2023 was 0.5 decedents, or 14 percent, below the four-year annual average.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	0	0	0	0	0
Deceased	3	2	3	1	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>

## SUSPECT – MANNER OF DEATH <sup>17</sup>

In 2022, the single decedent, representing 100 percent, died from an overdose. This represents change when compared to 100 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of ICD decedents who died from overdoses during the three-year period from 2019 through 2021 of 25 percent, 2023 experienced a 75-percentage point increase. Historically, during the period from 2019 through 2022, overdose deaths accounted for three of the nine total ICD deaths, or 33 percent.

Manner	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Accidental	2	0	0	0	N/A
Homicide	0	1	1	0	N/A
Overdose	0	1	1	1	N/A
Suicide	0	0	1	0	N/A
Undetermined	1	0	0	0	N/A
Pending	0	0	0	0	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>N/A</b>

<sup>17</sup> The Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner determines the manner of death.



# DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>18</sup>

## TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2022, zero of the two total ICD Tactics findings, representing zero percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 100-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Tactical Debrief” from 2019 through 2021 of 82 percent, 2022 experienced an 82-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, the majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a “Tactical Debrief” outcome, accounting for 18 of the 24 total Tactics findings, or 75 percent.

In 2022, four of the four total ICD “Inmate Welfare Procedures” findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief”. In the two-year period from 2021 through 2022, “Inmate Welfare Procedures” findings resulting in a “Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief” outcome, accounted for four of the eight total “Inmate Welfare Procedures” findings, or 50 percent.

In 2022, four of the four total ICD “Inmate Emergency Medical Procedures” findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief”. In the two-year period from 2021 through 2022, “Inmate Emergency Medical Procedures” findings resulting in a “Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief” outcome, accounted for seven of the seven total “Inmate Emergency Medical Procedures” findings, or 100 percent.

In 2022, three of the three total ICD “Post-In-Custody Death Procedures” findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief”. In the two-year period from 2021 through 2022, “Post-In-Custody Death Procedures” findings resulting in a “Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief” outcome, accounted for four of the four total “Post-In-Custody Death Procedures” findings, or 100 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	3	5	10	0	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	5	1	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	3	8	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	1	0	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Inmate Intake Procedures	N/A	N/A	4	0	N/A
Inmate Welfare Procedures	N/A	N/A	0	4	N/A
Inmate Emergency Medical Procedures	N/A	N/A	3	4	N/A
Post-In-Custody Death Procedures	N/A	N/A	1	3	N/A

## ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, two of the two total ICD Tactics findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This accounted for a 100-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of “Administrative Disapproval” Tactics findings from 2019 through 2021 of 18 percent, 2022 experienced an 82-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, Tactics findings resulting in an “Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)” outcome accounted for six out of the 24 total Tactics findings, or 25 percent.

In 2022, five of the five total ICD “Inmate Intake Procedures” findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Not Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief”. In the two-year period from 2021 through 2022, “Inmate Intake Procedures” findings resulting in a “Not Consistent with Established Criteria, Tactical Debrief” outcome, accounted for five of the five total “Inmate Intake Procedures” findings, or 100 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	0	4	0	2	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	1	0	0	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Inmate Intake Procedures	N/A	N/A	0	5	N/A
Inmate Welfare Procedures	N/A	N/A	4	5	N/A
Inmate Emergency Medical Procedures	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A
Post-In-Custody Death Procedures	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A

<sup>18</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was not included in this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.



# CAROTID RESTRAINT CONTROL HOLD INCIDENTS

A carotid restraint is defined as a vascular neck restraint or any similar restraint, hold, or other defensive tactic, including a c-clamp in which pressure is applied to the sides of a person's neck that involves a substantial risk of restricting blood flow and may render the person unconscious in order to subdue or control the person (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

On June 8, 2020 the BOPC placed a moratorium on the use of the Carotid Restraint Control Hold (CRCH). Prior to the Moratorium the Department considered the CRCH a Lethal Use of Force application. Following the Moratorium, On September 30, 2020, the Governor of California signed into law Assembly Bill No. 1196, which prohibits law enforcement agencies from using the CRCH effective January 1, 2021.

As a result, Special Order No. 29, approved by the BOPC December 8, 2020, revised various Department Manual sections pertaining to carotid restraints in accordance with the new law.

Note: The Department does not authorize the use of upper body control holds, including the use of a modified carotid, full carotid, or locked carotid hold; therefore, any use is unauthorized and shall be investigated as a categorical use of force (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in two CRCH incidents, which was no change compared to two incidents in 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, there were a total of seven CRCH incidents, resulting in an annual average of 1.8 incidents per year. The 2023 count rose above the 2019 through 2022 annual average by 0.2 incidents or 11 percent.

CRCH	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	1	1	3	2	2

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, two of the two Department's CRCH incidents, or 100 percent, originated from a radio call. This accounted for a 50-percentage point increase compared to 50 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, six of the nine total CRCH incidents, or 67 percent, resulted from a radio call.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Radio Call	1	0	2	1	2
Observation	0	1	1	1	0
Citizen Flag Down	0	0	0	0	0
Pre-Planned	0	0	0	0	0
Station Call	0	0	0	0	0
Ambush	0	0	0	0	0
Off-Duty	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1	1	3	2	2



## BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

### OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, one of the Departments two CRCH incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Central Bureau, which was an increase of one incident, or 100 percent compared to 2022.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	0	1	0	0	0
Newton	0	0	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	1
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	0	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

### OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, No CRCH incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of South Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	1	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

### OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

No CRCH incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of West Bureau during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

### OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, one of the Departments two CRCH incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Valley Bureau, there was no change compared to one CRCH incident in 2022.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	0	1
Topanga	0	0	1	1	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

No CRCH incidents occurred outside the Department's geographic jurisdiction during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023.

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the month of occurrence for CRCH incidents.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	0	0	0	0	0
February	0	0	0	0	0
March	0	0	1	0	0
April	0	1	0	0	0
May	0	0	0	2	0
June	1	0	0	0	0
July	0	0	1	0	0
August	0	0	0	0	0
September	0	0	1	0	0
October	0	0	0	0	1
November	0	0	0	0	0
December	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for CRCH incidents.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	0	0	1	0	0
Tuesday	1	0	0	0	1
Wednesday	0	0	1	0	1
Thursday	0	0	0	0	0
Friday	0	1	1	1	0
Saturday	0	0	0	1	0
Sunday	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, both CRCH incidents, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m. This was no change compared to two CRCH incidents that occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m. in 2022. Historically, in the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, five of the nine total CRCH incidents, or 56 percent occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600-1759	0	0	1	2	2
1800-0559	1	1	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received or were pending BOPC “lethal force” adjudicative findings for their involvement in CRCH incidents.

### OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, both officers involved in CRCH incidents were male. Historically, in the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, all nine involved personnel in CRCH incidents were male.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	0	0	0	0
Male	1	1	3	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, both officers involved in CRCH incidents were Hispanic. This accounted for a 100-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 57 percent, 2023 experienced a 43-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in CRCH incidents were Hispanic accounting for six of the nine total personnel, or 67 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	0	0	0	1	0
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	0	1	3	0	2
White	1	0	0	1	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	CRCH Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	0%
Black	8%	9%	0%
Hispanic	48%	54%	100%
White	28%	25%	0%
Other	4%	<1%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

### OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

In 2023, one of the two officers involved in CRCH incidents, or 50 percent, was within the 11-20 years of service category. This accounted for a 50-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in CRCH incidents were part of the 11-20 years of service category accounting for four of the nine total personnel, or 44 percent.

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	0	0	0	0	0
1 – 5	0	1	0	1	0
6 – 10	0	0	0	1	0
11 – 20	1	0	2	0	1
More than 20	0	0	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

In 2023, one of the two officers involved in CRCH incidents, or 50 percent, was within the “20 years or greater” years of service category. This accounted for a 50-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, officers involved in CRCH incidents that were part of the “20 years or greater” years of service category accounted for two of the nine total personnel, or 22 percent.



## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, both Department personnel, involved in CRCH incidents were at the rank of Police Officer. This accounted for no change compared to 100 percent in 2022. The percentage of officers involved in CRCH incidents in 2023 was 30-percentage points above the Department's overall Police Officer total of 70 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, eight of the nine Department personnel, or 89 percent, involved in CRCH incidents were at the rank of Police Officer.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	0	0	0
Lieutenant	0	0	0	0	0
Sergeant	0	0	1	0	0
Detective	0	0	0	0	0
Police Officer	1	1	2	2	2
Detention Officer	0	0	0	0	0
Reserve Officer	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, officers involved in CRCH incidents were assigned to Patrol duties. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, eight of nine, or 89 percent of officers involved in CRCH incidents were assigned to Patrol.

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	0	0	0	0	0
Metro	0	0	0	0	0
Patrol	1	0	3	2	2
Specialized	0	1	0	0	0
Investigative	0	0	0	0	0
Police Officer	0	0	0	0	0
Custody	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>



## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with an employee's Area/division and/or bureau of assignment for CRCH incidents.

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	0
Central	0	1	0	0	0
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	0	2	0	0
Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
Newton	0	0	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	0	1
Northeast	0	0	0	0	1
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast	1	0	0	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	1	0
Topanga	0	0	1	1	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	0	0	0
Administrative Units	0	0	0	0	0
Specialized	0	0	0	0	0
Bureau Level	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	0	0	0	0
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## OFFICER – INJURIES

No Department personnel were killed during as a result of CRCH incidents during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023.

In 2023 zero officers were injured during CRCH incidents. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, four officers sustained injuries during CRCH incidents during the five-year period.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	0	0	3	1	0
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

# SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied “lethal” force against during CRCH incidents.

## SUSPECT – ETHNICITY

In 2023, one Hispanic suspect was involved in a CRCH incident, which represented 50 percent of the two total suspects. This accounted for no change when compared to 50 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group involved in CRCH incidents with five of the nine total suspects, or 56 percent.

In 2023, one black suspect was involved in a CRCH incident, which represented 50 percent of the two total suspects. This accounted for no change when compared to 50 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Black category was the second most represented ethnic group involved in CRCH incidents with four of the nine total suspects, or 44 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	0	1	1	1	1
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	1	0	2	1	1
White	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Violent Crime Suspect	CRCH Suspect
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	(See other)	0%
Black	8%	39%	50%
Hispanic	48%	41%	50%
White	28%	7%	0%
Other	4%	3%	0%
Unknown	N/A	10%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

## SUSPECT – GENDER

All nine suspects involved in CRCH incidents during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023 were male.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	0	0	0	0
Male	1	1	3	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## SUSPECT – AGE

In 2023, one of two suspects involved in CRCH incidents, or 50 percent, was in the 30-39 age group. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 30-39 age group represented the largest age category of suspects involved in CRCH incidents with four of the nine total suspects, or 44 percent.

In 2023, one of two suspects involved in CRCH incidents, was in the 24-29 age group. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 24-29 age group represented the second largest age category of suspects involved in CRCH incidents with three of the nine total suspects, or 33 percent.

Age	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0-17	0	0	0	0	0
18-23	0	0	1	1	0
24-29	1	0	0	1	1
30-39	0	1	2	0	1
40-49	0	0	0	0	0
50-59	0	0	0	0	0
60 and Above	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>



## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2023, all the suspects in CRCH incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 100-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for three of the nine total suspects, or 33 percent.

Per. Mental Illness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	1	0	0	0	2
No	0	1	3	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## SUSPECT – HOMELESS <sup>19</sup>

In 2023, none of the suspects involved in CRCH incidents were experiencing homelessness. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects involved in CRCH incidents who were determined to be homeless accounted for one of the nine total suspects, or 11 percent.

Homeless	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	0	1	0	0	0
No	1	0	3	2	2
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## SUSPECT – WEAPON/FORCE

In 2023, both of the suspects used physical force during a CRCH incident. This accounted for a 100-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, physical force represented seven of the nine total weapons/force type, or 56 percent, utilized by suspects during CRCH incidents.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Automobile	0	0	0	0	0
Edged Weapon	0	0	0	0	0
Firearm	0	1	0	0	0
Impact Device	0	0	0	0	0
Perception	0	0	0	0	0
Physical Force	1	0	2	0	2
Replica/Pellet	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
None	0	0	1	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

## SUSPECT – INJURIES

In 2023, none of the suspects, or zero percent, involved in CRCH incidents were injured. Historically from 2019 through 2023, five suspects sustained injuries resulting from a CRCH incident. No suspects were killed during CRCH incidents during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023. Although CRCH is considered a Lethal Use of Force Application, historically in the last 20 years, zero suspects have died as the result of a CRCH application.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	1	1	1	2	0
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>

<sup>19</sup> The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has since implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.

# DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>20</sup>

## TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2022, none of the Tactics findings for the CRCH incidents were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 67-percentage point decrease compared to 67 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, two of seven Tactics findings, or 29 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.”

In 2022, one of the two total Non-Lethal force findings, adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, most adjudicated Non-Lethal force findings resulted in an “In Policy (No Further Action)” outcome, accounting for six of the seven total Non-Lethal force findings, or 86 percent.

In 2023, Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, one of seven, or 14 percent of the Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).”

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	0	0	2	0	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	1	N/A
Non-Lethal	1	1	3	1	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	0	1	0	0	N/A

## ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, two of the total CRCH Tactics findings, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, five of seven Tactics findings, or 71 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.”

In 2022, one of the two total Non-Lethal force findings, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, Non-Lethal force adjudicated findings resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” outcome, accounted for one of the seven total Non-Lethal force findings, or 14 percent.

In 2022, two Lethal force findings, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, six of seven, or 86 percent of the Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.”

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	1	1	1	2	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	1	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	1	10	3	2	N/A

<sup>20</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was not included in this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.





# LAW ENFORCEMENT RELATED INJURY (LERI) INCIDENTS

A use of force incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization, commonly referred to as a law enforcement related injury (LERI) (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in six LERI incidents, an increase of three incidents, or 100 percent, compared to 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, there were a total of 20 LERI incidents, resulting in an annual average of five incidents. The 2023 count increased when compared to the 2019 through 2022 annual average by one incident, or 20 percent.

LERI	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	4	7	6	3	6

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, six of the six total LERI incidents, representing 100 percent, resulted from radio calls. This accounted for a 67-percentage point increase compared to 33 percent of LERI incidents resulting from radio calls in 2022. When compared to the 2019 through 2022 aggregate percentage of LERI incidents resulting from radio calls of 65 percent, 2023 experienced a 35-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 19 of the 26 total LERI incidents, or 73 percent, resulted from radio calls.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Radio Call	3	3	6	1	6
Observation	1	0	0	2	0
Citizen Flag Down	0	0	0	0	0
Pre-Planned	0	4	0	0	0
Station Call	0	0	0	0	0
Ambush	0	0	0	0	0
Off-Duty	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	4	7	6	3	6

## BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

### OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, one of the Department's six LERI incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Central Bureau, which was a decrease of two incidents, or 67 percent, compared to 2022. Seventeen percent of the Department's LERI incidents occurred in Central Bureau (Department – six; Central Bureau – one).

In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, nine LERI incidents occurred in Central Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 2.3 incidents. The 2023 Central Bureau count fell below the four-year annual average by 1.3 incidents, or 57 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	1	1	0	0	1
Newton	1	0	0	3	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	1	0	2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

### OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, three of the Department's six LERI incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of South Bureau, which was an increase of three incidents compared to 2022. (Department – six; South Bureau – three).

In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, two LERI incidents occurred in South Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 0.5 incidents. The 2023 count for South Bureau rose above the four-year annual average by 2.5 incidents, or 500 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	2
Southeast	1	0	1	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>

### OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, two of the Department's six LERI incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of West Bureau, which was an increase of two incidents compared to zero in 2022. (Department – six; West Bureau – two).

In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, five LERI incidents occurred in West Bureau, resulting in an annual average of 1.3 incidents. The 2023 West Bureau count rose above the four-year annual average by 0.7 incidents, or 54 percent.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	0	2	0	0	1
Olympic	0	1	1	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	1	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>

### OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, Zero of the Departments six LERI incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Valley Bureau. (Department – six; Valley Bureau – zero).

In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, four LERI incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, resulting in an annual average of one incident.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	1	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	1	0	0
Van Nuys	0	1	1	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, none of the Department's LERI incidents occurred outside the Department's geographic jurisdiction (Department – six; Outside Jurisdiction – zero).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	0	0	0	0	0

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, August represented the month with the most LERI incidents representing two out of the total six, or 33 percent. The remaining three LERI incidents, or 67 percent, were divided with one each in February, June and July. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, February, March, June, July, August and October represented the months with the most LERI incidents, accounting for 19 of the total 26 incidents, or 73 percent. May and September represented the months with the second most LERI incidents, accounting for two each of the 26 total incidents, or eight percent, respectively. January, April and December represented the months with the third most LERI incidents, together accounting for three of the 26 total incidents, or 12 percent. Zero LERI incidents occurred in the month of November within the past five years.

The LERI incident percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2019 through 2023 was as follows:

- January – March: seven incidents, or 27 percent;
- April – June: six incidents, or 23 percent;
- July – September: nine incidents, or 35 percent; and,
- October – December: four incidents, or 15 percent.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	0	1	0	0	0
February	1	0	0	1	1
March	1	0	2	0	0
April	1	0	0	0	0
May	0	2	0	0	0
June	0	1	1	0	1
July	1	0	1	1	1
August	0	1	0	0	2
September	0	1	0	0	1
October	0	1	2	0	0
November	0	0	0	0	0
December	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>

## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, three of the six total LERI incidents, or 50 percent, occurred on a Monday. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Monday was the day of the week with the most LERI incidents, accounting for seven of the 26 total incidents, or 27 percent.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	1	2	0	1	3
Tuesday	1	1	3	0	1
Wednesday	2	1	1	0	1
Thursday	0	0	0	1	0
Friday	0	0	1	1	1
Saturday	0	2	0	0	0
Sunday	0	1	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, four of the six total LERI incidents occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m., and two LERI incidents occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no significant statistical trend associated with the time of occurrence for LERI incidents.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600 - 1759	3	3	4	1	4
1800 - 0559	1	4	2	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>



## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received or were pending BOPC “non-lethal,” “less-lethal,” and “lethal” force adjudicative findings for their involvement in LERI incidents.

In 2023, 15 Department personnel were involved in six LERI incidents throughout the year, resulting in an average of 2.5

officers per incident. This accounted for a 0.5 officers per incident increase, or 25 percent, compared to an average of 2.0 officers per incident in 2022. When compared to the aggregate average of involved Department personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 3.7 officers per incident, 2023 experienced a decrease of 1.2 officers per incident, or 32 percent.

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, five Hispanic officers were involved in LERI incidents, which represented 33 percent of the 15 total employees. This accounted for a zero-percentage point change compared to 33 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 21-percentage points below the total percentage of Hispanic officers in the Department. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 53 percent, 2023 experienced a 20-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, most of the officers involved in LERI incidents were Hispanic, accounting for 44 of the 88 total employees, or 50 percent.

In 2023, three Black officers were involved in a LERI incident, which represented 20 percent of the 15 total employees. This accounted for a 20-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. The percentage of Black officers involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 11-percentage points above the total percentage of Black officers in the Department. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 10 percent, 2023 experienced a 10-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Black officers involved in LERI incidents accounted for 10 of the 88 total employees, or 11 percent.

In 2023, six White officers were involved in LERI incidents, which represented 40 percent of the 15 total employees. This accounted for a 27-percentage point decrease compared to 67 percent in 2022. The percentage of White officers involved in LERI incidents in 2022 was 15-percentage points above the total percentage of White officers in the Department. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 27 percent, 2023 experienced a 13-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2018 through 2023, White officers involved in LERI incidents accounted for 26 of the 88 total employees, or 30 percent.

In 2023, one Asian/Pacific Islander officer was involved in a LERI incident compared to zero in 2022. In 2023, zero American Indian, Filipino and Other officers were involved in LERI incidents.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	2	2	2	0	1
Black	2	1	4	0	3
Filipino	0	0	1	0	0
Hispanic	10	9	18	2	5
White	1	9	6	4	6
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	LERI Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	7%
Black	8%	9%	20%
Hispanic	48%	54%	33%
White	28%	25%	40%
Other	4%	<1%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

## OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, 15 male officers were involved in LERI incidents, which represented 100 percent of the 15 total employees. This accounted for a zero-percentage point change compared to 100 percent in 2022. The percentage of male officers involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 19-percentage points above the total percentage of male officers in the Department. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved male personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 88 percent, 2023 experienced a 12-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in LERI incidents were male, accounting for 79 of the 88 total employees, or 90 percent.

In 2023, no female officers were involved in LERI incidents, which represented zero percent of the 15 total employees. This accounted for a zero-percentage point change compared to zero percent in 2022. The percentage of female officers involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 19-percentage points below the total percentage of female officers in the Department. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved

female personnel from 2019 through 2022 of 12 percent, 2023 experienced a 12-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, females accounted for nine of the 88 total involved employees, or 10 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	1	3	5	0	0
Male	14	18	26	6	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>

## OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

In 2023, seven of the 15 involved employees in LERI incidents, or 47 percent, were within the 1-5 years of service category. This accounted for a 14-percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel within the 1-5 years of service category from 2019 through 2022 of 48 percent, 2023 experienced a one-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 42 of the 88 total employees involved in LERI incidents, or 48 percent, were within the 1-5 years of service category.

In 2023, three of the 15 involved employees in LERI incidents, or 20 percent, were within the 6-10 years of service category. This accounted for a three-percentage point increase compared to 17 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel within the 6-10 years of service category from 2019 through 2022 of 11 percent, 2023 experienced a nine-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 11 of the 88 total employees involved in LERI incidents, or 13 percent, were within the 6-10 years of service category.

In 2023, five of the 15 involved employees in LERI incidents, or 33 percent, were within the 11-20 years of service category. This accounted for a 16-percentage point increase compared to 17 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel within the 11-20 years of service category from 2019 through 2022 of 26 percent, 2023 experienced a seven-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 24 of the 88 total employees involved in LERI incidents, or 27 percent, were within the 11-20 years of service category.

In 2023, zero of the 15 involved employees in LERI incidents, or zero percent, were within the less than one year of service or 20 or more years of service category.

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	2	0	1	0	0
1 - 5	9	11	13	2	7
6 - 10	2	1	4	1	3
11 - 20	2	6	10	1	5
More than 20	0	3	3	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>

## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, 15 employees at the rank of Police Officer were involved in LERI incidents, which represented 100 percent of the 15 total employees. This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to 83 percent in 2022. The percentage of officers involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 30-percentage points above the total percentage of personnel with the rank of Police Officer in the Department. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel at the rank of Police Officer from 2019 through 2022 of 95 percent, 2023 experienced a five-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of personnel involved in LERI incidents were at the rank of Police Officer, accounting for 84 of the 88 total employees, or 95 percent.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	0	0	0
Lieutenant	0	0	0	0	0
Sergeant	1	1	1	1	0
Detective	0	0	0	0	0
Police Officer	14	20	30	5	15
Detention Officer	0	0	0	0	0
Reserve Officer	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>

## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, seven personnel, or 47 percent of the 15 personnel involved in LERI incidents were assigned to Central Division. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 12 personnel assigned to Central Division were involved in LERI incidents, which represented 14 percent of the 88 total involved employees in all LERI incidents.

In 2023, four personnel, or 27 percent of the 15 personnel involved in LERI incidents were assigned to Southwest Division. From 2019 through 2022, zero personnel assigned to Southwest Division were involved in LERI incidents, which represented zero percent of the 73 total involved employees in all LERI incidents during the same four-year period.

In 2023, two of the 15 total personnel involved in LERI incidents, or 13 percent, were assigned to 77th Street Division. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, four of the total 88 officers, or three percent, involved in LERI incidents were assigned to 77th Street Division.

In 2023, one officer from Hollywood Division and one officer from Wilshire Division, accounting for seven percent respectively, were involved in LERI incidents.

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	2	0	0	2
Central	5	0	0	0	7
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	2	0	6	0	0
Hollywood	0	4	0	0	1
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
Newton	2	0	0	6	0
North Hollywood	0	8	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	2	9	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast	6	2	2	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	0	4
Topanga	0	0	4	0	0
Van Nuys	0	1	10	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	6	0	0	0	1
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	0	0	0
Administrative Units	0	0	0	0	0
Specialized	0	0	0	0	0
Bureau Level	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	2	0	0	0
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>



## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, 15 personnel involved in LERI incidents were assigned to patrol, which represented 100 percent of the 15 total employees. This accounted for a 50-percentage point increase compared to 50 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved personnel assigned to patrol from 2019 through 2022 of 82 percent, 2023 experienced an 18-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in LERI incidents were assigned to patrol, accounting for 75 of the 88 total employees, or 85 percent.

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	2	0	0	0
Patrol	10	16	31	3	15
Specialized	5	3	0	3	0
Investigative	0	0	0	0	0
Custody	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>

## OFFICER – INJURIES

No Department personnel were killed as a result of a LERI incident during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023. However, seven officers sustained injuries during LERI incidents during the same five-year period.

In 2023, one officer sustained an injury during the six LERI incidents throughout the year. This accounted for an increase of one injured officer when compared to zero injured officers in 2022. From 2019 through 2023, 2022 represented the only year that zero officers sustained an injury from LERI incidents.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	3	2	1	0	1
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

## SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during LERI incidents.

### SUSPECT – ETHNICITY

In 2023, two Hispanic suspects were involved in LERI incidents, which represented 33 percent of the six total suspects. This accounted for a zero-percentage point change compared to 33 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 15-percentage points below the total percentage of the City's Hispanic population. Additionally, the percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was eight-percentage points below the City's overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Hispanic suspects from 2019 through 2022 of 59 percent, 2023 experienced a 26-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group involved in LERI incidents with 15 of the 28 total suspects, or 54 percent.

In 2023, three Black suspects were involved in a LERI incident, which represented 50 percent of the six total suspects. This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2022. The percentage of Black suspects involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 42-percentage points above the total percentage of the City's Black population. Additionally, the percentage of Black suspects involved in LERI incidents in 2023 was 11-percentage points above the City's overall Black violent crime offender total. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved Black suspects from 2019 through 2022 of 14 percent, 2023 experienced a 36-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Black category accounted for six of the 28 total suspects involved in LERI incidents, or 21 percent.

In 2023, one White suspect was involved in a LERI incident, which represented 17 percent of the six total suspects. This accounted for a 16-percentage point decrease compared to 33 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved White suspects from 2019 through 2022 of 23 percent, 2023 experienced a six-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the White category accounted for six of the 28 total suspects involved in LERI incidents, or 21 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	1	0	0
Black	1	0	1	1	3
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	3	5	4	1	2
White	0	4	0	1	1
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Violent Crime Suspect	LERI Suspect
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	(See other)	0%
Black	8%	39%	50%
Hispanic	48%	41%	33%
White	28%	7%	17%
Other	4%	3%	0%
Unknown	N/A	10%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

## SUSPECT – GENDER

In 2023, five suspects involved in LERI incidents were male, which represented 83 percent of the six total suspects. This accounted for a 17-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2022. During the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, males accounted for 24 of the 28 total LERI suspects, or 86 percent.

In 2023, one female suspect was involved in LERI incidents. This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. During the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, females accounted for four of the 28 total LERI suspects, or 14 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	2	1	0	1
Male	4	7	5	3	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>

## SUSPECT – AGE

In 2023, one of the six suspects involved in LERI incidents, or 17 percent, were in the 18-23 age category. This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of LERI suspects in the 18-23 age category from 2019 through 2022 of zero percent, 2023 experienced a 17-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 18-23 age category accounted for one of the 28 total LERI suspects, or four percent.

In 2023, one of the six suspects involved in LERI incidents, or 17 percent, were in the 24-29 age category. This accounted for a 16-percentage point decrease compared to 33 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of LERI suspects in the 24-29 age category from 2019 through 2022 of 27 percent, 2023 experienced a ten-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 24-29 age category accounted for seven of the 28 total LERI suspects, or 25 percent.

In 2023, three of the six suspects involved in LERI incidents, or 50 percent, was in the 30-39 age category. This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of LERI suspects in the 30-39 age category from 2019 through 2022 of 23 percent, 2023 experienced a 27-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 30-39 age category accounted for eight of the 28 total LERI suspects, or 29 percent.

In 2023, one of the six suspects involved in LERI incidents, or 17 percent, was in the 40-49 age category. This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of LERI suspects in the 40-49 age category from 2019 through 2022 of 27 percent, 2023 experienced a ten-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 40-49 age category accounted for seven of the 28 total LERI suspects, or 25 percent.

Age	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0-17	1	1	0	0	0
18-23	0	0	0	0	1
24-29	0	5	0	1	1
30-39	0	1	3	1	3
40-49	1	2	3	0	1
50-59	1	0	0	0	0
60 and above	1	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>

## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2023, three of the six total suspects, or 50 percent, involved in LERI incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. This accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to 33 percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of involved suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis from 2019 through 2022 of 32 percent, 2023 experienced an 18-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, LERI suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for 10 of the 28 total suspects, or 36 percent.

Per. Mental Illness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	2	1	3	1	3
No	2	8	3	2	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>



## SUSPECT – WEAPON/FORCE

In 2023, three of the six suspects, representing 50 percent, involved in LERI incidents utilized an edged weapon against officers. This specific weapon/force type category accounted for a 50-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which an edged weapon was utilized by the suspect during LERI incidents from 2019 through 2022 of 18 percent, 2023 experienced a 32-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the edged weapon category accounted for seven of the 28 total suspect weapon/force types utilized during LERI incidents, or 25 percent.

In 2023, one of the six suspects, representing 17 percent, involved in LERI incidents utilized an Impact Device against officers. This specific weapon/force type category accounted for a 17-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. When compared to the aggregate percentage of incidents in which an Impact Device was utilized by the suspect during LERI incidents from 2019 through 2022 of 14 percent, 2023 experienced a three-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Impact Device category accounted for four of the 28 total suspect weapon/force types utilized during LERI incidents, or 14 percent.

In 2023, two of the six suspects, representing 33 percent, involved in LERI incidents utilized no weapon/force against officers. This specific weapon/force type category accounted for a 34-percentage point decrease compared to 67 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the no weapon/force category accounted for six of the 28 total suspect weapon/force types utilized during LERI incidents, or 21 percent.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Automobile	0	0	0	0	0
Edged Weapon	1	0	3	0	3
Firearm	0	1	0	0	0
Impact Device	0	2	1	0	1
Perception	0	0	0	0	0
Physical Force	3	3	2	1	0
Replica/Pellet	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	1	0	0	0
None	0	2	0	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>

## SUSPECT – HOMELESS<sup>21</sup>

In 2023, four of the six total suspects, or 67 percent, involved in LERI incidents were experiencing homelessness. This accounted for no percentage point change compared to 67 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, homeless suspects involved in LERI incidents accounted for 11 of the 28 total suspects, representing 39 percent.

In 2023, two of the six total suspects, or 33 percent, involved in LERI incidents were not experiencing homelessness. This accounted for no percentage point change compared to 33 percent in 2022. From 2019 through 2023, suspects not experiencing homelessness involved in LERI incidents accounted for 17 of the 28 total suspects, representing 61 percent.

Homeless	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	2	0	3	2	4
No	2	9	3	1	2
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>

<sup>21</sup> The Department was directed by the BOPC to track homeless data for suspects involved in CUOF incidents starting in 2016. Force Investigation Division has since implemented new procedures to capture this statistic.

## SUSPECT - INJURIES

As the category indicates, LERI incidents are those wherein suspects sustain injuries as a result of Department action. This section only includes those suspects who sustained injuries as a result of the incident.

In 2023, six suspects sustained injuries during the six LERI incidents throughout the year. The number of involved suspects in 2023 increased by three individuals, or 100 percent, when compared to 2022. Additionally, the 2023 count increased by 0.5 suspects compared to the 2019 through 2022 annual average of 5.5 suspects.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	4	9	6	3	6
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>



## DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>22</sup>

### TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2022, six officers involved in a LERI incident, received a Tactics finding. Three of those six officers' Tactics findings, representing 50 percent, were adjudicated as "Tactical Debrief." This accounted for a 37-percentage point decrease compared to 87 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "Tactical Debrief" Tactics findings from 2019 through 2021 of 85 percent, 2022 experienced a 35-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, the majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in a "Tactical Debrief" outcome, accounting for 61 of the 74 total Tactics findings, or 82 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	15	16	27	3	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	6	1	11	1	N/A
Non-Lethal	16	14	21	5	N/A
Less-Lethal	2	2	11	1	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A

In 2022, five officers involved in a LERI incident received a Non-lethal force finding. All five of those five officers' Non-Lethal force findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as "In Policy (No Further Action)." This was a no percentage point change compared to 100 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "In Policy (No Further Action)" Non-Lethal force findings from 2019 through 2021 of 98 percent, 2022 experienced a two-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, the majority of adjudicated Non-Lethal force findings resulted in an "In Policy (No Further Action)" outcome, accounting for 56 of the 57 total findings, or 98 percent.

In 2022, one officer involved in a LERI incident received a Less Lethal force finding. The one officer who received Less-Lethal force findings, representing 100 percent, was adjudicated as "In Policy (No Further Action)." This accounted for a 21-percentage point increase compared to 79 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "In Policy (No Further Action)" Less-Lethal force findings from 2019 through 2021 of 68 percent, 2022 experienced a 32-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, the majority of adjudicated Less-Lethal force findings resulted in an "In Policy (No Further Action)" outcome, accounting for 16 of the 23 total findings, or 70 percent.

<sup>22</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was not included in this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.



## ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY<sup>23</sup>

In 2022, six officers involved in a LERI incident, received a Tactics finding. Three of those six officers' Tactics findings, representing 50 percent, were adjudicated as "Administrative Disapproval." This accounted for a 37-percentage point increase compared to 13 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "Administrative Disapproval" Tactics findings from 2019 through 2021 of 15 percent, 2022 experienced a 35-percentage point increase. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, 13 of the 74 total Tactics findings, accounting for 18 percent, resulted in an "Administrative Disapproval" outcome.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	1	5	4	3	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	1	0	0	N/A
Less Lethal	0	4	3	0	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A

In 2022, five officers involved in a LERI incident received a Non-Lethal force finding. Zero of those five officers' Non-Lethal force findings were adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)." This accounted for a zero-percentage point change compared to zero percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" Non-Lethal force findings from 2019 through 2021 of two percent, 2022 experienced a two-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, one of the 57 total Non-Lethal force findings, representing two percent, resulted in an "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" outcome.

In 2022, one officer involved in a LERI incident received a Less Lethal force finding. Zero of the Less-Lethal force findings, representing zero percent, were adjudicated as "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)." This accounted for a 21-percentage point decrease compared to 21 percent in 2021. When compared to the aggregate percentage of "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" Less-Lethal force findings from 2019 through 2021 of 32 percent, 2022 experienced a 32-percentage point decrease. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, seven of the 23 total Less-Lethal force findings, representing 30 percent, resulted in an "Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)" outcome.

<sup>23</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was omitted from this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.



# HEAD STRIKE INCIDENTS

All intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight, etc.) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization, or death (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, one Department employee was involved in a Head Strike incident. This is accounted for a 50 percent decrease compared to two Head Strike incidents in 2022. In the four-year period from 2019 through 2022, there were a total of five Head Strike incidents, resulting in an annual average of 1.3 incident per year. The 2023 count decreased by 23 percent when compared to the 2019 through 2022 annual average.

Head Strike	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	1	1	1	2	1

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, the single Head Strike incident originated from a Radio Call. This accounted for a 50-percentage point increase compared to 50 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, three of the six total Head Strike incidents, or 50 percent, resulted from Radio Calls.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Radio Call	1	0	0	1	1
Observation	0	1	0	0	0
Citizen Flag Down	0	0	0	0	0
Pre-Planned	0	0	1	0	0
Station Call	0	0	0	0	0
Ambush	0	0	0	0	0
Off-Duty	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>





## BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

### OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, the single Head Strike incident occurred within the geographic Areas of Central Bureau, which was no change compared to one incident in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, three of the six total Head Strike incidents, or 50 percent, occurred in Central Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	0	0	0	0	1
Newton	0	0	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	1	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

### OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

No Head Strike incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of South Bureau in 2023. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, zero Head Strike incidents occurred in South Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

### OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

No Head Strike incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of West Bureau in 2023. Two Head Strike incident occurred in West Bureau during the four-year period from 2019 through 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, two of the six total Head Strike incidents, or 33 percent, occurred in West Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	0	0	1	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

### OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

No Head Strike incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Valley Bureau in 2023. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, there has been one Head Strike incident within the geographic Areas of Valley Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	1	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

No Head Strike incidents occurred outside of the Department's geographic jurisdiction in 2023.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	0	0	0	0	0

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

The single 2023 Head Strike incident occurred in the month of June. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, four of the six total Head Strike incidents, or 33 percent, occurred in the months of March and June, combined. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, one incident occurred in May and one incident in August.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	0	0	0	0	0
February	0	0	0	0	0
March	0	1	1	0	0
April	0	0	0	0	0
May	0	0	0	1	0
June	0	0	0	1	1
July	0	0	0	0	0
August	1	0	0	0	0
September	0	0	0	0	0
October	0	0	0	0	0
November	0	0	0	0	0
December	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, the single Head Strike incident occurred on a Monday. Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for Head Strike incidents.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	1	0	0	0	1
Tuesday	0	0	0	1	0
Wednesday	0	0	0	0	0
Thursday	0	0	0	0	0
Friday	0	1	0	0	0
Saturday	0	0	1	1	0
Sunday	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, the single Head Strike incident occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m. Compared to the 2019-2022 four-year average of 0.5 incidents per year, 2023 was 100 percent, or 0.5 incidents above the four-year average.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600 - 1759	1	0	0	1	1
1800 - 0559	0	1	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

The time distribution for the six Head Strike incidents from 2019 through 2023 was as follows:

- 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m.: three incidents, or 50 percent; and,
- 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.: three incidents, or 50 percent

## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received or were pending BOPC Less-Lethal or Lethal Force adjudicative findings for their involvement in Head Strike incidents.

### OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, the single Head Strike incident involved a male officer. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all of the officers involved in Head Strike incidents were male, accounting for seven total employees.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	0	0	0	0
Male	1	1	1	3	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, the single Head Strike incident involved an officer of Hispanic descent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, three of the seven total employees, or 43 percent, involved in Head Strike incidents were Hispanic.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, three of the seven total employees, or 43 percent, involved in Head Strike incidents were White. The other employee, or 14 percent, was from the Black ethnic category.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	1	0	0	0	0
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	0	1	0	1	1
White	0	0	1	2	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	Head Strike Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	0%
Black	8%	9%	0%
Hispanic	48%	54%	100%
White	28%	25%	0%
Other	4%	1%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

### OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

In 2023, the single officer involved in a Head Strike incident was within the 1-5 years of service category. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, one of the seven total employees, or fourteen percent, involved in Head Strike incidents were within the 1-5 years of service category.

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 6-10 years of service category had the majority of the officers involved in a Head Strike incidents accounting for four of the seven officers, or 57 percent.

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	0	0	0	0	0
1 - 5	0	0	0	0	1
6 - 10	1	0	1	2	0
11 - 20	0	1	0	0	0
More than 20	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

## OFFICER – RANK

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all seven employees, representing 100 percent, involved in Head Strike incidents were at the rank of Police Officer.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	0	0	0
Lieutenant	0	0	0	0	0
Sergeant	0	0	0	0	0
Detective	0	0	0	0	0
Police Officer	1	1	1	3	1
Detention Officer	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with an employee's Area/Division and/or Bureau of assignment for Head Strike incidents.

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	0
Central	0	0	0	0	1
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	1	0	0	0
Hollywood	0	0	1	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	1	0
Newton	0	0	0	1	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	1	0	0	0	0
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	0	0	0
Administrative Units	0	0	0	0	0
Specialized Units	0	0	0	0	0
Bureau Level	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	0	0	1	0
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>





## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, the single officer involved in a Head Strike incident was assigned to patrol. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, a majority of officers involved in Head Strike incidents were assigned to patrol, accounting for four of the seven total employees, or 57 percent.

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	0	0	0	1	0
Patrol	1	0	1	1	1
Specialized	0	1	0	1	0
Investigative	0	0	0	0	0
Custody	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>

## OFFICER – INJURIES

In 2023, zero officers sustained injuries stemming from a Head Strike incident. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, two of the seven total employees, representing 29 percent, sustained injuries during Head Strike incidents.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	1	0	1	0	0
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>



## SUSPECT INFORMATION

The Suspect sections below includes data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during Head Strike incidents.

### SUSPECT – ETHNICITY

In 2023, one White suspect was involved in a Head Strike incident which represent 100 percent of the total Suspects. This accounted for no change in percentage point compared to 100 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, three of the six suspects involved in Head Strike incidents, or 50 percent, were White.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	1	0	1	0	0
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	0	1	0	0	0
White	0	0	0	2	1
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Violent Crime Suspect	Head Strike Suspect
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	(See other)	0%
Black	8%	39%	0%
Hispanic	48%	41%	0%
White	28%	7%	100%
Other	4%	3%	0%
Unknown	N/A	10%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

### SUSPECT – GENDER

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all suspects involved in Head Strike incidents were male.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	0	0	0	0
Male	1	1	1	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

### SUSPECT – AGE

In 2023, the single suspect involved in a Head Strike incident was part of the 30-39 age group. Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with a suspect's age for Head Strikes.

Age	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0-17	0	0	0	0	0
18-23	0	1	0	0	0
24-29	0	0	1	0	0
30-39	0	0	0	0	1
40-49	0	0	0	2	0
50-59	1	0	0	0	0
60 and Above	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2023, the single suspect involved in a Head Strike incident was perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, one of the six total suspects, or 17 percent, were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or mental health crisis.

Per. Mental Illness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	0	0	0	0	1
No	1	1	1	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

## SUSPECT – HOMELESS

In 2023, the single suspect involved in the Head Strike incident was experiencing homelessness. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, two of the six total suspects, or 33 percent, were experiencing homelessness.

Homeless	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	1	0	0	0	1
No	0	1	1	2	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

## SUSPECT – WEAPON/FORCE

Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with a suspect's weapons used for Head Strikes.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Automobile	0	0	0	0	0
Edged Weapon	0	0	0	1	1
Firearm	0	1	0	0	0
Impact Device	1	0	0	0	0
Perception	0	0	0	0	0
Physical Force	0	0	0	0	0
Replica/Pellet	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	1	0	0
None	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

## SUSPECT - INJURIES

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all six total suspects involved in Head Strike incidents sustained injuries.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	1	1	1	2	1
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

## DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>24</sup>

### TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2022, two of the three total Head Strike Tactics findings, representing 67 percent were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.” This accounted for a 33-percentage point decrease compared to 100 percent in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, three of six Tactics findings, or 50 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.”

In 2022, three of the three total Head Strike Less-Lethal force findings, representing 100 percent were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).” This accounted for no change compared to 2021 Less-Lethal force findings of 100 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, all five Less-Lethal force findings, or 100 percent, during Head Strike incidents were adjudicated as “In Policy (No Further Action).”

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	0	0	1	2	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	1	1	0	1	N/A
Non-Lethal	1	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	1	0	1	3	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A

### ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, one Head Strike Tactics findings were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy.” This was an increase of 100 percent compared to zero percent of Tactics findings in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, Tactics findings resulting in an “Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy” outcome accounted for three of the six total Tactics findings, or 50 percent.

In 2022, Zero Head Strikes, Non-Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, Head Strike incident Non-Lethal force findings resulting in a “Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy” outcome accounted for one of the two total Non-Lethal force findings, or 50 percent.

In 2022, zero Head Strike Lethal force findings were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, Head Strike Lethal force findings resulting in an “Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy” outcome accounted for two of the two total Head Strike Lethal force findings, or 100 percent.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	1	1	0	1	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	1	0	0	N/A
Less Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	1	1	0	0	N/A

<sup>24</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was not included in this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.





# K-9 CONTACT INCIDENTS

An incident in which a member of the public has contact with a Department canine and hospitalization is required.

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in six K-9 Contact incidents. This was an increase of five incidents, or 500 percent, compared to 2022. In the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there were a total of nine K-9 Contact incidents, resulting in an annual average of 1.8 incidents.

K-9 Contact	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	1	0	1	1	6

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, one K-9 Contact incident originated from a radio call and five incidents originated from an officer observation. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of K-9 Contact incidents originated from officer observations accounting for seven of the nine total incidents, or 78 percent.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Radio Call	1	0	0	0	1
Observation	0	0	1	1	5
Citizen Flag Down	0	0	0	0	0
Pre-Planned	0	0	0	0	0
Station Call	0	0	0	0	0
Ambush	0	0	0	0	0
Off-Duty	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1	0	1	1	6



# BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

## OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, two K-9 Contact incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of Central Bureau. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, there have been a total of three K-9 Contact incidents that occurred in Central Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	0	0	0	0	0
Newton	0	0	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	1
Rampart	0	0	0	1	1
Hollenbeck	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

## OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, three K-9 Contact incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of South Bureau. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, there have been a total of three K-9 Contact incidents that occurred in South Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	1
Southeast	0	0	0	0	1
Harbor	0	0	0	0	1
Southwest	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>

## OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, no K-9 Contact incidents occurred within the geographic Areas of West Bureau. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, a total of one K-9 Contact incident occurred in West Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	1	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

## OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, one K-9 Contact incident occurred within the geographic Areas of Valley Bureau. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, there have been a total of two K-9 Contact incidents that occurred in Valley Bureau.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	1
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	1	0	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>

## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, no K-9 Contact incidents occurred outside the Department's geographic jurisdiction. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, there were no K-9 Contact incidents that occurred outside of the Department's jurisdiction.

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	0	0	0	0	0

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, two K-9 Contact incidents, or 33 percent, occurred in the month of February and October, respectively. In 2023, one K-9 Contact incident occurred in the month of September and November. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, six of the nine total K-9 Contact incidents, or 66 percent, occurred in the months of February and October.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	0	0	0	0	0
February	0	0	1	0	2
March	0	0	0	0	0
April	0	0	0	0	0
May	0	0	0	0	0
June	0	0	0	0	0
July	0	0	0	1	0
August	0	0	0	0	0
September	0	0	0	0	1
October	1	0	0	0	2
November	0	0	0	0	1
December	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, two K-9 Contact incidents, or 33 percent, occurred on a Monday. Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for K-9 Contact incidents.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	1	0	0	0	2
Tuesday	0	0	0	1	0
Wednesday	0	0	0	0	0
Thursday	0	0	0	0	1
Friday	0	0	1	0	1
Saturday	0	0	0	0	1
Sunday	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, five K-9 Contact incidents occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, six of the nine total K-9 Contact incidents, or 67 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 5:59 a.m. and the remaining three incidents, or 33 percent, occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m.

Time of Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0600 - 1759	1	0	0	1	1
1800 - 0559	0	0	1	0	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>



## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received or were pending BOPC K-9 Contact deployment and force adjudicative findings for their involvement in K-9 Contact incidents.

### OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, six K-9 Contact incidents occurred in which the officer involved was a male. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all nine Department personnel involved in K-9 Contact incidents were male.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	0	0	0	0
Male	1	0	1	2	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, two of the six total officers, or 33 percent, involved in a K-9 Contact incident were Hispanic. This accounted for a 17-percentage point decrease compared to 50 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in K-9 Contact incidents in 2023 was 21-percentage points below the Department's overall Hispanic total.

In 2023, two of the six total officers, or 33 percent, involved in a K-9 Contact incident were Black. This accounted for a 17-percentage point decrease compared to 50 percent in 2022. The percentage of Black officers involved in K-9 Contact incidents in 2023 was 24-percentage points above the Department's overall Black total.

In 2023, two of the six total officers involved in a K-9 Contact incident, or 33 percent, were White. This accounted for a 50-percentage point increase compared to zero percent in 2022. The percentage of White officers involved in K-9 Contact incidents in 2023 was 8-percentage points above the Department's overall White total.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	0	0	0	1	2
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	0	0	0	1	2
White	1	0	1	0	2
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	K-9 Contact Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	0%
Black	8%	9%	33%
Hispanic	48%	54%	33%
White	28%	25%	33%
Other	4%	<1%	<1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

### OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

In 2023, five of the six officers involved in a K-9 Contact incident, or 83 percent, were in the 11-20 years of service category. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, five of the ten total officers, or 50 percent, were in the 11-20 years of service category.

In 2023, one of the six officers involved in a K-9 Contact incident, or 17 percent, was in the "More than 20" years of service category. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, five of the ten total officers, or 50 percent, were in the "More than 20" years of service category.

Years	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Less than 1	0	0	0	0	0
1 - 5	0	0	0	0	0
6 - 10	0	0	0	0	0
11 - 20	0	0	0	0	5
More than 20	1	0	1	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, all six Department personnel involved in involved in a K-9 Contact incident were at the rank of Police Officer. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, nine of the 10 Department personnel involved in a K-9 Contact incident, or 90 percent, were of the Police Officer rank classification.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Captain and Above	0	0	0	0	0
Lieutenant	0	0	0	0	0
Sergeant	0	0	0	1	0
Detective	0	0	0	0	0
Police Officer	1	0	1	1	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

## OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, all six officers involved in a K-9 Contact incident were assigned to Metropolitan Division. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all ten Department personnel involved in K-9 Contact incidents were assigned to Metropolitan Division.

Division/Area/Bureau	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	0	0	0	0	0
Central	0	0	0	0	0
Devonshire	0	0	0	0	0
Foothill	0	0	0	0	0
Harbor	0	0	0	0	0
Hollenbeck	0	0	0	0	0
Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0
Newton	0	0	0	0	0
North Hollywood	0	0	0	0	0
Northeast	0	0	0	0	0
Olympic	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	0	0	0	0
Rampart	0	0	0	0	0
Southeast	0	0	0	0	0
Southwest	0	0	0	0	0
Topanga	0	0	0	0	0
Van Nuys	0	0	0	0	0
West Los Angeles	0	0	0	0	0
West Valley	0	0	0	0	0
Wilshire	0	0	0	0	0
All Traffic Divisions	0	0	0	0	0
Administrative Units	0	0	0	0	0
Specialized Units	0	0	0	0	0
Bureau Level	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	1	0	1	2	6
Security Services	0	0	0	0	0
Other Areas	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

## OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, all six officers involved in a K-9 Contact incident were assigned to Metropolitan Division. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all 10 Department personnel involved in K-9 Contact incidents were assigned to Metropolitan Division.

Unit	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	0	0	0	0	0
Metropolitan	1	0	1	2	6
Patrol	0	0	0	0	0
Specialized	0	0	0	0	0
Investigative	0	0	0	0	0
Custody	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>

## OFFICER – INJURIES

Historically, from 2019 through 2023 there have been no K9 Contact incidents in which involved officers were killed or injured.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	0	0	0	0	0
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>



# SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied force against during K-9 Contact incidents.

## SUSPECT – ETHNICITY

In 2023, four of the six total suspects, or 67 percent, involved in K-9 Contact incidents were Hispanic. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group involved in K-9 Contact incidents with five of the nine total incidents, or 56 percent.

In 2023, two of the six total suspects, or 33 percent, involved in K-9 Contact incidents were Black. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, K-9 Contact incidents in which the suspect was Black represented two of the nine total incidents, or 22 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	0	0
Black	0	0	0	0	2
Filipino	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	1	0	0	0	4
White	0	0	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Violent Crime Suspect	K-9 Contact Suspect
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	(See other)	0%
Black	8%	41%	33%
Hispanic	48%	39%	67%
White	28%	7%	0%
Other	4%	3%	0%
Unknown	N/A	10%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e. American Indian not included for city statistics).

## SUSPECT – GENDER

In 2023, six K-9 Contact incidents occurred, in which all six suspects were male. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all nine suspects involved in K-9 Contact incidents were male.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	0	0	0	0	0
Male	1	0	1	1	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

## SUSPECT – AGE

In 2023, three of the six suspects, or 50 percent, involved in K-9 Contact incidents were in the 18-23 age group. This was an increase of three suspects compared to zero in 2022.

In 2023, two of the six suspects, or 33 percent, involved in K-9 Contact incidents were in the 24-29 age group. This was an increase of one suspect, compared to one suspect in 2022.

In 2023, one of the six suspects, or 17 percent, involved in K-9 Contact incidents was in the 30-39 age group. This was an increase of one suspect compared to zero suspects in 2022.

Age	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0-17	0	0	0	0	0
18-23	0	0	0	0	3
24-29	0	0	0	1	2
30-39	1	0	1	0	1
40-49	0	0	0	0	0
50-59	0	0	0	0	0
60 and Above	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>



## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2023, none of the six total suspects, or zero percent, involved in K-9 Contact incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis. Historically from 2019 through 2023, no suspects involved in K-9 Contact incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis.

Per. Mental Illness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	0	0	0	0	0
No	1	0	1	1	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

## SUSPECT – HOMELESS

In 2023, no K-9 Contact incidents occurred in which the suspect was determined to be homeless. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were determined to be homeless during K-9 Contact incidents, represented one of the nine total suspects, or 11 percent.

Homeless	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	0	0	1	0	0
No	1	0	0	1	6
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

## SUSPECT – WEAPON/FORCE

In 2023, three of the six total suspects, representing 50 percent, involved in K-9 Contact incidents were armed with a firearm. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were armed with a firearm during K-9 Contact incidents, accounted for three of the nine total suspects, or 33 percent.

In 2023, three of the six total suspects, representing 50 percent, involved K-9 Contact incidents were not armed with a weapon. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were not armed during K-9 Contact incidents, accounted for five of the nine total suspects, or 56 percent.

Weapon Type	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Automobile	0	0	0	0	0
Edged Weapon	0	0	1	0	0
Firearm	0	0	0	0	3
Impact Device	0	0	0	0	0
Perception	0	0	0	0	0
Physical Force	0	0	0	0	0
Replica/Pellet	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
None	1	0	0	1	3
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

## SUSPECT - INJURIES

In 2022, six suspects involved in a K-9 Contact incident sustained an injury. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, all nine suspects involved in K-9 Contact incidents sustained an injury.

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Injured	1	0	1	1	6
Deceased	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>

# DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>25</sup>

## TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

Historically, from 2019 through 2022, two officers involved in a K-9 Contact incident received a Tactics finding; one in 2019 and one in 2021. Both of those Tactics findings, representing 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Tactical Debrief.”

In 2022, two Department personnel received a “K-9 Deployment” finding. Both of those findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, all four “K-9 Deployment” findings have been adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria.”

In 2022, two Department personnel received a “K-9 Contact” finding. Both of those findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, all four “K-9 Contact” findings have been adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria.”

In 2022, two Department personnel received a “K-9 Post Contact Procedures” finding. Both of those findings, or 100 percent, were adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, all four “K-9 Post Contact Procedures” findings have been adjudicated as “Consistent with Established Criteria.”

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	1	0	1	0	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
K-9 Deployment	1	0	1	2	N/A
K-9 Contact	1	0	1	2	N/A
K-9 Post Contact Procedures	1	0	1	2	N/A

## ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, there were zero “K-9 Deployment,” “K-9 Contact,” and “K-9 Post Contact Procedures” findings to be adjudicated as “Not Consistent with Established Criteria.” Historically, from 2019 through 2022, zero “K-9 Deployment,” “K-9 Contact,” and “K-9 Post Contact Procedures” findings were adjudicated as “Not Consistent with Established Criteria.”

Category	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	0	0	0	0	N/A
Drawing & Exhibiting	0	0	0	0	N/A
Non-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Less-Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
Lethal	0	0	0	0	N/A
K-9 Deployment	0	0	0	0	N/A
K-9 Contact	0	0	0	0	N/A
K-9 Post Contact Procedures	0	0	0	0	N/A

<sup>25</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was not included in this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.



**DEPARTAMENTO DE POLICIA DE LOS  
LINEA DE POLICIA - POR FAVOR NO**

# CHIEF OF POLICE DIRECTED

The Chief of Police (COP) has the authority to redirect or reclassify a Non-Categorical Use of Force investigation to a Categorical Use of Force investigation based on details of the incident at his discretion. The Los Angeles Police Department titles these reclassified incidents as a Chief of Police Directed incidents.

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, there were zero COP Directed incidents. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, two COP directed incidents occurred, averaging 0.4 incidents per year.

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, one of the two total COP directed incidents, or 50 percent, resulted from Radio Call activities and one COP directed incident, or 50 percent, resulted from an occurrence classified as Other.

## BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

### OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

## MONTH, DAY, AND TIME OF OCCURRENCE

Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the month, day, and time of occurrences for COP incidents.

## OFFICER INFORMATION

Historically, from 2019 through 2023, there was an average of one officer involved per incident.

### OFFICER – GENDER

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OFFICER – YEARS OF SERVICE

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OFFICER – RANK

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OFFICER – AREA/DIVISION OF ASSIGNMENT

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OFFICER – UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### OFFICER – INJURIES

No Department personnel were involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

Note: In 2021, all three COP Directed Incidents involved Department Personnel making contact with the Suspect's neck. For statistical analysis purposes, these three incidents will now be included in "CRCH" section.



## SUSPECT INFORMATION

There were no suspects involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### SUSPECT – WEAPON/FORCE

There were no suspects involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

### SUSPECT - INJURIES

There were no suspects involved in COP Directed incidents in 2023.

## DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>26</sup>

### TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

Historically, from 2019 through 2022, five officers involved in COP Directed incidents received Tactics findings. Two of those five officers' findings for "Tactics," were adjudicated as "Tactical Debrief/In Policy."

Historically, from 2019 through 2022, four officers involved in a COP Directed incident received "Non-Lethal" and "Less Lethal" findings. Four of those findings were adjudicated as "In Policy, (No Further Action)."

### ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

Historically, from 2019 through 2022, five officers involved in COP Directed incidents received Tactics findings. Three of those five officers' findings for "Tactics," were adjudicated as "Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy."

Historically, from 2019 through 2022, five officers involved in a COP Directed incident received "Lethal" findings. All five findings were adjudicated as "Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy."



<sup>26</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was omitted from this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.

# USE OF DEADLY FORCE INCIDENT

Deadly force is defined as the force which creates a substantial risk of causing serious bodily injury or death. The utilization of objects that can cause serious bodily injury or death not specifically designated as a force option can result in the initiation of a Use of Deadly Force (UODF) incident.

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in one UODF incident. This was an increase of one incident, or 100 percent, compared to zero incidents in 2022. Historically, from 2019-2023, Department personnel have been involved in a total of three UODF incidents. All three UODF incidents involved Officer's decision to use a police patrol vehicle as a force option.

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, the single UODF incident originated from a radio call. Historically, from 2019-2023, all three UODF incidents have originated from a radio call.

## BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, zero UODF incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of Central Bureau. Historically from 2019-2023, one UODF incident has occurred within Central Bureau.

## OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, zero UODF incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of South Bureau. Historically from 2019-2023, one UODF incident has occurred within South Bureau.

## OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, zero UODF incidents occurred within the geographical Areas of West Bureau. Historically, from 2019-2023, zero UODF incidents have occurred within West Bureau.

## OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, one UODF incident occurred within the geographical Areas of Valley Bureau. Historically, from 2019-2023, one UODF incident has occurred within Valley Bureau.

## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, zero UODF incidents occurred in any Outside Jurisdictions. Historically, from 2019-2023, zero UODF incidents have occurred within Outside Jurisdictions.

## MONTH, DAY, AND TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, the single UODF incident occurred in the month of February. In the four-year period from 2019-2022, one UODF incident occurred in June and one in July.

In 2023, the single UODF incident occurred on a Wednesday. Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the day of occurrence for UODF incidents.

In 2023, the single UODF incident occurred between the hours of 6 a.m. and 5:59 p.m. Based on the data for the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, there appears to be no statistical trend associated with the time of occurrence for UODF incidents.

## OFFICER INFORMATION

In 2023, a single officer was involved in an UODF incident. Historically, from 2019-2023, three officers have been involved in UODF incidents.

## SUSPECT INFORMATION

In 2023, one White suspect was involved in a UODF incident which represents 100 percent of the total Suspects. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, two of the three suspects involved in UODF incidents, or 67 percent, were Hispanic.

## DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>27</sup>

### TACTICAL DEBRIEF/IN-POLICY (NO FURTHER ACTION)

In 2022, there were zero UODF adjudications of "Tactical Debrief/In-Policy findings." There were zero UODF Incidents with findings adjudicated as Tactical Debrief/In-Policy during the four-year period from 2019 through 2022.

In 2022, there were zero UODF Lethal force findings adjudicated as "In Policy No Further Action." Historically from 2019 through 2022 there have been zero total Lethal force findings adjudicated as "In Policy No Further Action."

### ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL/OUT OF POLICY

In 2022, there were zero Tactics findings adjudicated as "Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy." Historically, from 2019 through 2022, Tactics findings resulting in an "Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy" outcome accounted for the two total Tactics findings or 100 percent.

In 2022, zero UODF Lethal findings were adjudicated as "Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy." Historically, from 2019 through 2022, Lethal findings resulting in an "Administrative Disapproval/Out of Policy" outcome accounted for the two total Lethal findings or 100 percent.

<sup>27</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was not included in this Report since the vast majority of the CUOF incidents will be adjudicated by the BOPC in 2024.





# WARNING SHOT INCIDENTS

The intentional discharge of a firearm off target not intended to hit a person, to warn others that deadly force is imminent (2023 LAPD Manual 1/556.10).

In the five-year period from 2019-2023, the Department had zero warning shot incidents. The last two Warning Shot incidents occurred in 2017.









# NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE

———— STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 2019-2023 ————

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

In 2023, Department personnel were involved in 1,560 Non-Categorical Use of Force incidents.

Incident Count	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	2,319	2,201	2,256	2,213	1,560

**Note:** In February 2023, NCUOF classification and reporting criteria changed thus decreasing the number of reportable NCUOF total incidents. See Page 36.

## LEVEL TOTALS

In 2023, 1,033 NCUOF incidents were Level II occurrences, which represented 66 percent of the 1,560 total incidents. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of NCUOF incidents were Level II occurrences, accounting for 9,307 of the 10,549 total incidents, or 88 percent.

Level	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Level I	189	139	189	198	298
Level II	2,130	2,062	2,067	2,015	1,033
Level III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	229
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,319</b>	<b>2,201</b>	<b>2,256</b>	<b>2,213</b>	<b>1,560</b>

In 2023, 298 NCUOF incidents were Level I occurrences, which represented 19 percent of 1,560 total incidents. Historically from 2019 through 2023, Level I NCUOF occurrences accounted for 1,013 of the 10,549 total incidents, or ten percent.

In 2023, 229 NCUOF incidents were Level III occurrences, which represented 15 percent of the 1,560 total incidents.

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

In 2023, 849 of the Department's 1,560 NCUOF incidents, or 54 percent, originated from radio calls. Historically from 2019 through 2023, radio calls represented the largest source category of NCUOF incidents, accounting for 6,294 of the 10,549 total incidents, or 60 percent.

In 2023, 453 of the Department's 1,560 NCUOF incidents, or 29 percent, originated from field detentions based on officers' observations (i.e. pedestrian and traffic stops). Historically from 2019 through 2023, field detentions based on officers' observations represented the second largest source category of NCUOF incidents, accounting for 2,797 of the 10,549 total incidents, or 27 percent.

The remaining 258 NCUOF incidents, or 17 percent, in 2023 occurred during citizen flag downs, station calls, occurrences with "other" designations, and those with "unknown" classifications.

Source	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Citizen Flag Down	159	163	148	127	126
Observation	639	555	592	558	453
Radio Call	1,333	1,335	1,392	1,385	849
Station Call	19	19	22	26	20
Other	169	129	102	115	102
Unknown	0	0	0	2	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,319</b>	<b>2,201</b>	<b>2,256</b>	<b>2,213</b>	<b>1,560</b>

## FORCE OPTION

In 2023, TASERS were utilized in 204, or 13 percent, of the 1,560 NCUOF incidents. This accounted for a four-percentage point increase compared to nine percent in 2022.

In 2023, beanbag shotguns were utilized in 17, or one percent, of the 1,560 NCUOF incidents. This accounted for no change compared to one percent in 2022.

In 2023, 40mm launchers were utilized in 74, or five percent, of the 1,560 incidents. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2022.

In 2023, strikes/kicks/punches were utilized in 160, or 10 percent, of the 1,560 NCUOF incidents. This represented a four-percentage point increase when compared to six percent in 2022.

In 2023, batons or other impact devices were utilized in 14, under one percent, of the 1,560 NCUOF incidents. This represented no change, when compared to 2022.

### *Number of NCUOF Incidents Each Force Option Was Applied*

Force Option	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
40MM LL Launcher	61	69	75	69	74
Baton/Impact Device	34	34	35	18	14
Beanbag Shotgun	48	33	48	21	17
Body Weight	1,819	1,669	1,682	1,503	1,084
Firm Grip/Joint Lock	2,166	2,077	2,132	2,039	1,366
OC Spray	20	15	19	8	14
Other	401	345	382	370	241
Physical Force	1,607	1,637	1,761	1,528	858
Strike/Kick/Punch	173	161	166	140	160
Takedown/Leg Sweep	915	834	789	733	664
TASER	282	217	239	201	204
Unknown	0	9	8	61	82

Note: In April of 2021 the Board of Police Commissioners approved K-9 Contacts to be a reportable Use of Force. Starting in 2022, NCUOF K-9 Contacts were included in the "Other" category.

### *Percentage of NCUOF Incidents Each Force Option Was Applied*

Force Option	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
40MM LL Launcher	3%	3%	3%	3%	5%
Baton/Impact Device	1%	2%	2%	1%	1%
Beanbag Shotgun	2%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Body Weight	78%	76%	75%	68%	69%
Firm Grip/Joint Lock	93%	94%	95%	92%	88%
OC Spray	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Other	17%	16%	17%	17%	15%
Physical Force	69%	74%	78%	69%	55%
Strike/Kick/Punch	7%	7%	7%	6%	10%
Takedown/Leg Sweep	39%	38%	35%	33%	43%
TASER	12%	10%	11%	9%	13%

Note: The query period included for all NCUOF incidents is from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023. Due to late reportings after the stated query period, the percentages/figures will experience variances within various categories. Additionally, the variances will also account for discrepancies between previous versions of the Use of Force, Year-End Review.



## TASER INFORMATION

TASER Activations	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	607	544	562	432	458

## ANNUAL EFFECTIVENESS TOTALS &amp; PERCENTAGES

In 2023, Department personnel activated a TASER 458 times during 204 NCUOF incidents in which TASERs were utilized, resulting in an average of 2.25 activations per incident. This accounted for a 0.1 activation or five percent increase compared to the 2022 average activations per incident of 2.15.

In 2023, TASER activations were effective 253 times during NCUOF incidents, which represented 55 percent of the 458 total activations. This accounted for a four-percentage point increase, compared to 51 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, TASER activations were effective 1,369 times of the 2,603 total activations, or 53 percent.

TASER Effectiveness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	329	276	292	219	253
No	278	268	270	213	205
<b>Total</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>544</b>	<b>562</b>	<b>432</b>	<b>458</b>

TASER Effectiveness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Effectiveness Percentage	54%	51%	52%	51%	55%

## BEANBAG SHOTGUN INFORMATION

Beanbag Shotgun Discharges	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	87	72	97	40	35

## ANNUAL EFFECTIVENESS TOTALS &amp; PERCENTAGES

In 2023, Department personnel discharged a beanbag Shotgun 35 times during 17 NCUOF incidents in which beanbag Shotguns were utilized, resulting in an average of 2.06 rounds discharged per incident. This accounted for an eight percent increase compared to the 1.9 average rounds discharged per incident in 2022.

In 2023, beanbag rounds were effective 12 times during NCUOF incidents, which represented 34 percent of the 35 total rounds discharged. This accounted for a one-percentage point decrease compared to 35 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, beanbag rounds were effective 152 times of the 331 total rounds discharged, or 46 percent.

Beanbag Shotgun Effectiveness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	43	47	36	14	12
No	44	25	61	26	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>35</b>

Beanbag Shotgun Effectiveness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Effectiveness Percentage	49%	65%	37%	35%	34%







## 40MM LESS LETHAL LAUNCHER INFORMATION

40MM Less-Lethal Launcher Discharges	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Department Total	106	115	137	138	133

## ANNUAL EFFECTIVENESS TOTALS & PERCENTAGES

In 2023, Department personnel discharged a 40mm launcher 133 times during 74 NCUOF incidents in which 40mm Launchers were utilized, resulting in an average of 1.8 40mm launcher rounds discharged per incident. This accounted for a 10 percent decrease, or 0.2 rounds, compared to two average rounds discharged per incident in 2022.

In 2023, 40mm Launcher rounds were effective 49 times during NCUOF incidents, which represented 37 percent of the 133 total rounds discharged. This accounted for a four-percentage point decrease compared to 41 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 40mm Launcher rounds were effective 272 times of the 629 total rounds discharged, or 43 percent.

40MM Less-Lethal Launcher Effectiveness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	56	47	64	56	49
No	50	68	73	82	84
<b>Total</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>133</b>

40MM Less-Lethal Launcher Effectiveness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Effectiveness Percentage	53%	41%	47%	41%	37%

# BUREAU OF OCCURRENCE

## OPERATIONS-CENTRAL BUREAU

In 2023, approximately 31 percent of the Department's NCUOF incidents occurred in Central Bureau compared to 29 percent in 2022 (Department – 1,560; Central Bureau - 485).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Central	271	232	268	229	167
Newton	136	134	119	138	120
Northeast	85	73	79	72	41
Rampart	112	147	136	134	79
Hollenbeck	93	68	73	68	78
<b>Total</b>	<b>697</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>675</b>	<b>641</b>	<b>485</b>

## OPERATIONS-SOUTH BUREAU

In 2023, approximately 27 percent of the Department's NCUOF incidents occurred in South Bureau which was a two-percentage point increase compared to 25 percent in 2022 (Department – 1,560; South Bureau - 414).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
77th Street	172	180	202	208	144
Southeast	78	79	76	62	45
Harbor	191	185	168	167	135
Southwest	135	102	104	112	90
<b>Total</b>	<b>576</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>549</b>	<b>414</b>

## OPERATIONS-WEST BUREAU

In 2023, approximately 14 percent of the Department's NCUOF incidents occurred in West Bureau which was a decrease of three-percentage points compared to 17 percent in 2022 (Department – 1,560; West Bureau - 222).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Hollywood	135	133	156	147	65
Olympic	96	84	77	73	41
Pacific	75	88	85	61	41
West Los Angeles	24	40	52	44	28
Wilshire	57	65	41	57	47
<b>Total</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>410</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>222</b>

## OPERATIONS-VALLEY BUREAU

In 2023, 398 of the Department's NCUOF incidents occurred in Valley Bureau, which was a decrease of 204 incidents, or 34 percent, compared to 2022. Approximately 26 percent of the Department's NCUOF incidents occurred in Valley Bureau (Department – 1,560; Valley Bureau - 398).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Devonshire	44	58	73	69	43
Foothill	64	76	70	69	58
Mission	130	111	97	113	75
North Hollywood	130	111	124	105	66
Topanga	46	43	53	65	47
Van Nuys	121	89	90	87	60
West Valley	80	70	73	94	49
<b>Total</b>	<b>615</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>580</b>	<b>602</b>	<b>398</b>



## OUTSIDE JURISDICTION

In 2023, 41 of the Department's NCUOF incidents occurred outside of the Department's jurisdiction, which was an increase of two incidents, or five percent, compared to 2022. Approximately three percent of the Department's NCUOF incidents occurred in areas outside of the Department's jurisdiction (Department – 1,560; Outside Areas - 41).

Area	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Outside Jurisdiction	44	33	40	39	41

## MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, January represented the month with the most NCUOF incidents with 183 occurrences, or approximately 12 percent of the 1,560 total incidents throughout the year. August had the second highest count with 144 incidents or nine percent. September had the third highest count with 142 incidents, or nine percent. December had the lowest monthly count with 107 occurrences, or approximately seven percent. November had the second lowest monthly count with 111 occurrences, or approximately seven percent. The remaining 773 incidents, or 50 percent, were evenly distributed throughout the remaining months of the year.

From 2019 through 2023, January represented the month with the most NCUOF incidents with 945 of the 10,549 total incidents, or nine percent. December represented the month with the fewest incidents during the same period with 771 incidents, or approximately seven percent.

The NCUOF percentage breakdown on a quarterly basis from 2019 through 2023 was as follows:

- January through March: 2,641 incidents, or approximately 25 percent;
- April through June: 2,767 incidents, or approximately 26 percent;
- July through September: 2,647 incidents or approximately 25 percent; and
- October through December: 2,494 incidents or approximately 24 percent.

Month	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	192	192	194	184	183
February	160	186	183	141	118
March	218	210	184	178	118
April	210	233	188	171	129
May	187	225	202	178	128
June	215	177	207	193	124
July	218	154	212	196	118
August	203	178	188	203	144
September	178	156	175	182	142
October	190	187	196	211	138
November	178	146	174	192	111
December	170	157	153	184	107
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,319</b>	<b>2,201</b>	<b>2,256</b>	<b>2,213</b>	<b>1,560</b>



## DAY OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, Sunday represented the day of the week with the most NCUOF incidents, accounting for 239 occurrences, or approximately 15 percent. Friday had the second highest count with 234 occurrences, or 15 percent. From 2019 through 2023, Sunday represented the day with the most NCUOF incidents with 1,576 of the 10,549 total, or 15 percent. Tuesday represented the day with the fewest number of incidents, with 1,446 occurrences, or 14 percent.

Day	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Monday	327	315	293	329	225
Tuesday	345	310	283	287	221
Wednesday	321	321	339	294	210
Thursday	312	319	327	295	232
Friday	360	304	311	346	234
Saturday	331	317	351	315	199
Sunday	323	315	352	347	239
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,319</b>	<b>2,201</b>	<b>2,256</b>	<b>2,213</b>	<b>1,560</b>

## TIME OF OCCURRENCE

In 2023, 372 of the 1,560 total NCUOF incidents, or approximately 24 percent, occurred between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 7:59 p.m. The time category with the second highest count was 8:00 p.m. to 11:59 p.m. which accounted for 358 incidents, or 23 percent. The time period with the lowest count was 4:00 a.m. to 7:59 a.m., which accounted for 103 incidents, or seven percent. The time period with the second lowest count was 12:00 a.m. to 3:59 a.m., which accounted for 183 incidents, or 12 percent. The remaining 544 incidents, or 35 percent, were evenly distributed amongst the remaining time categories.

Time	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0000 - 0359	291	284	298	294	183
0400 - 0759	170	152	195	149	103
0800 - 1159	381	335	336	361	247
1200 - 1559	421	436	388	436	297
1600 - 1959	553	468	489	454	372
2000 - 2359	503	526	550	519	358
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,319</b>	<b>2,201</b>	<b>2,256</b>	<b>2,213</b>	<b>1,560</b>

During the five-year period from 2019 through 2023, 2,456 NCUOF incidents occurred between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 11:59 p.m., which represented 23 percent of the 10,549 total incidents. The time category with the second highest count was 4:00 p.m. to 7:59 p.m., which accounted for 2,336 incidents, or 22 percent. The time category with the fewest number of NCUOF incidents was 4:00 a.m. to 7:59 a.m., which had 769 incidents, or seven percent.





## OFFICER INFORMATION

The officer sections below include data for all employees who received, or were pending, NCUOF findings for their involvement in NCUOF incidents.

In 2023, 5,671 Department personnel were involved in 1,560 NCUOF incidents, resulting in an average of 3.6 officers per incident.

### OFFICER – GENDER

In 2023, 4,957 male officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 87 percent of the 5,671 total employees. This accounted for no percentage change compared to 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in NCUOF incidents were male, accounting for 35,914 of the 41,402 of total employees involved, or 87 percent.

In 2023, 712 female officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 13 percent of the 5,671 total employees. This accounted for no change when compared to 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, females accounted for 5,478 of the 41,402 total involved employees, or 13 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	1,170	1,233	1,228	1,135	712
Male	7,752	7,839	8,030	7,336	4,957
Non-Binary	0	2	5	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,922</b>	<b>9,074</b>	<b>9,263</b>	<b>8,472</b>	<b>5,671</b>

### OFFICER – ETHNICITY

In 2023, 3,543 Hispanic officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 62 percent of the 5,671 total employees. This accounted for a two-percentage point increase compared to 60 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was eight-percentage points above the Department's overall Hispanic officer total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of officers involved in NCUOF incidents were Hispanic, accounting for 24,098 of the 41,402 total employees, or 58 percent.

In 2023, 1,132 White officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 20 percent of the 5,671 total employees. This accounted for a two-percentage point decrease compared to 22 percent in 2022. The percentage of White officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 is five-percentage points lower than the Department's overall White officer total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, White officers represented the second largest ethnic category of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, accounting for 9,837 of the 41,402 total employees, or 24 percent.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	51	37	48	50	27
Asian/Pacific Isl.	799	858	917	807	509
Black	650	696	682	649	440
Hispanic	4,997	5,174	5,335	5,049	3,543
White	2,375	2,258	2,209	1,863	1,132
Other	50	51	72	54	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,922</b>	<b>9,074</b>	<b>9,263</b>	<b>8,472</b>	<b>5,671</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Department Personnel	NCUOF Personnel
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	11%	9%
Black	8%	9%	8%
Hispanic	48%	54%	62%
White	28%	25%	20%
Other	4%	<1%	<1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e. American Indian not included for city statistics).

In 2023, 509 Asian/Pacific Islander officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented nine percent of the 5,671 total employees. This represented a one-percentage point decrease when compared to 10 percent of involved Asian/Pacific Islander officers in 2022. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was two-percentage points below the Department's overall Asian/Pacific Islander officer total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Asian/Pacific Islander officers accounted for 3,890 of the 41,402 total employees involved in NCUOF incidents, or nine percent.

In 2023, 440 Black officers were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented eight percent of the 5,671 total employees. This represented no change when compared to eight percent

of involved Black officers in 2022. The percentage of Black officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was one-percentage point below the Department's overall Black officer total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, Black officers accounted for 3,117 of the 41,402 total employees involved in NCUOF incidents, or eight percent.

The remaining 47 employees, or approximately one percent, involved in 2023 NCUOF incidents included, 27 American Indian officers, and 20 officers with "other" ethnic designations.

## OFFICER – RANK

In 2023, 5,018 employees at the rank of police officer were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 88 percent of the 5,671 total employees. This accounted for a one-percentage point increase compared to 87 percent in 2022. The percentage of police officers involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was 18-percentage points above the Department's overall police officer total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents were at the rank of police officer, accounting for 35,640 of the 41,402 total employees, or 86 percent.

In 2023, 473 employees at the rank of sergeant were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented eight percent of the 5,671 total employees. This represented a two percent decrease when compared to the ten percent of involved employees at the rank of sergeant in 2022. The percentage of sergeants involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was four-percentage points below the Department's overall sergeant total of 12 percent. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, sergeants accounted for 4,028 of the 41,402 total number of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 10 percent.

In 2023, 97 employees at the rank of detention officer were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented two percent of the 5,671 total employees. This accounted for no change when compared to two percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, detention officers accounted for 980 of the 41,402 total personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, representing two percent.

The remaining 83 employees, or one percent, involved in 2023 NCUOF incidents included: one command staff employee, 12 lieutenants, 22 detectives, and 22 civilian personnel.

Rank	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Command Staff	7	7	5	3	1
Lieutenant	24	24	17	17	12
Sergeant	874	957	914	810	473
Police Officer	7,566	7,743	7,974	7,339	5,018
Reserve Police Officer	8	6	7	1	0
Detective	112	74	72	66	48
Detention Officer	261	211	219	192	97
Civilian	70	52	55	44	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,922</b>	<b>9,074</b>	<b>9,263</b>	<b>8,472</b>	<b>5,671</b>

Rank	No. of Sworn Personnel	Department
Captain and Above	117	1%
Lieutenant	233	3%
Sergeant	1,085	12%
Detective	1,245	14%
Police Officer	6,285	70%
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,965</b>	<b>100%</b>

## OFFICER – ASSIGNMENT

In 2023, 4,634 personnel assigned to patrol were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 82 percent of the 5,671 total personnel. This represented a two-percentage point decrease when compared to 84 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents were assigned to patrol, accounting for 34,285 of the 41,402 total employees, or 83 percent.

In 2023, 573 personnel assigned to specialized assignments were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 10 percent of the 5,671 total personnel. This represented a two-percentage point increase compared to eight percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to specialized assignments accounted for the second largest category of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 3,667 of the 41,402 total employees, or nine percent.

In 2023, 222 personnel assigned to administrative assignments were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented four percent of the 5,671 total personnel. This represented a one-percentage point increase compared to three percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to administrative accounted for the third largest category of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 1,446 of the 41,402 total employees, or three percent.

In 2023, 130 personnel assigned to custody assignments were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented two percent of the 5,671 total personnel. This represented a one-percentage point decrease compared to three percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, personnel assigned to custody accounted for the fourth largest category of personnel involved in NCUOF incidents, representing 1,242 of the 41,402 total employees, or three percent.

Assignment	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Administrative	319	354	298	253	222
Custody	342	276	265	229	130
Case-Carrying Investigator	123	77	63	80	65
Patrol	7,251	7,498	7,777	7,125	4,634
Reserve Police Officer	7	6	5	1	0
Specialized Enforcement	806	789	780	719	573
Traffic	68	73	72	56	35
Other	5	1	3	5	5
Unassigned	1	0	0	4	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,922</b>	<b>9,074</b>	<b>9,263</b>	<b>8,472</b>	<b>5,671</b>

## OFFICER – INJURIES

No Department personnel were killed during or resulting from NCUOF incidents during the five-year period from 2019 through 2023. However, 3,724 officers sustained injuries during the same five-year period.

In 2023, 563 officers sustained injuries during the 1,560 NCUOF incidents. This accounted for a 21 percent decrease compared to 715 injured officers in 2022.

Injuries	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
No	8,036	8,321	8,456	7,757	5,108
Yes	886	753	807	715	563
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,922</b>	<b>9,074</b>	<b>9,263</b>	<b>8,472</b>	<b>5,671</b>

## SUSPECT INFORMATION

The suspect sections below include data for all individuals that Department personnel applied NCUOF against.

### SUSPECT – GENDER

In 2023, 1,353 male suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 84 percent of the 1,613 total suspects. This accounted for a five-percentage point increase compared to 79 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the majority of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents were male, accounting for 8,981 of the 11,131 total suspects, or 81 percent.

Gender	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Female	473	466	434	471	239
Male	1,944	1,857	1,972	1,855	1,353
Unknown	3	20	5	18	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,411</b>	<b>2,344</b>	<b>1,613</b>

In 2023, 239 female suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 15 percent of the 1,613 total suspects. This accounted for a five-percentage point decrease compared to 20 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, females accounted for 2,083 of the 11,131 total suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, or 19 percent.

The remaining 21 suspects, or one percent, involved in 2023 NCUOF incidents had unknown gender classifications.



## SUSPECT – ETHNICITY

In 2023, 801 Hispanic suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 50 percent of the 1,613 total suspects. This accounted for a four-percentage point increase compared to 46 percent in 2022. The percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was two-percentage points above the City's overall Hispanic population total. Additionally, the percentage of Hispanic suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was nine-percentage points above the City's overall Hispanic violent crime offender total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Hispanic category was the most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, accounting for 5,043 of 11,131 total suspects, or 45 percent.

In 2023, 589 Black suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 37 percent of the 1,613 total suspects. This represented a one-percentage point increase when compared to 36 percent of suspects who were Black in 2022 NCUOF incidents. The percentage of Black suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was 29 percentage points above the City's overall Black population total. However, the percentage of Black suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was two-percentage points below the City's overall Black violent crime offender total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the Black category was the second most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents with 4,100 of the 11,131 total suspects, or 37 percent.

In 2023, 170 White suspects were involved in NCUOF incidents, which represented 11 percent of the 1,613 total suspects. This represented a three-percentage point decrease compared to 14 percent in 2022. The percentage of White suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was 17-percentage points below the City's overall White population total. However, the percentage of White suspects involved in NCUOF incidents in 2023 was four-percentage points above the City's overall White violent crime offender total. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the White category was the third most represented ethnic group of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, with 1,537 of the 11,131 total, or 14 percent.

The remaining 53, or three percent, involved in 2023 NCUOF incidents included one American Indian, 11 Asians, 34 with "other" ethnic designations, and seven with unknown ethnicities.

Ethnicity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian	2	3	1	1	1
Asian	29	33	21	29	11
Black	885	863	917	846	589
Hispanic	1,066	997	1,102	1,077	801
White	379	366	300	322	170
Other	56	58	61	50	34
Unknown	3	23	9	19	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,411</b>	<b>2,344</b>	<b>1,613</b>

Ethnicity	City Population	Violent Crime Suspect	NCUOF Suspect
Asian/Pacific Isl.	12%	(See other)	1%
Black	8%	39%	37%
Hispanic	48%	41%	50%
White	28%	7%	11%
Other	4%	3%	2%
Unknown	N/A	10%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

\*\*\*Ethnicity categories for the city population differ from LAPD ethnicity categories (i.e., American Indian not included for city statistics).

## SUSPECT – AGE

In 2023, the 28-32 age group accounted for 351 of the 1,613 total suspects involved in NCUOF incidents, or 22 percent. This represented no change when compared to 22 percent in 2022 for the same age category. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 28-32 age group represented the largest age category of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents with 2,407 of 11,131 total suspects, or 22 percent.

In 2023, the 23-27 age group represented the second largest age category, with 265 of the 1,613 total suspects, or 16 percent. The 23-27 age category accounted for a two-percentage point decrease compared to 18 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 23-37 age group represented the second largest age category of suspects involved in NCUOF incidents with 2,205 of the 11,131 total suspects, or 20 percent.

In 2023, the 33-37 age group represented the third largest age category, with 264 of the 1,613 total suspects, or 16 percent. The 33-37 age category accounted for a one-percentage point decrease when compared to 17 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 33-37 age group represented the third largest age category with 1,638 of the 11,131 total suspects, or 15 percent.

In 2023, the 18-22 age group represented the fourth largest age category, with 190 of the 1,613 total suspects, or 12 percent. The 18-22 age category accounted for a one-percentage point increase compared to 11 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 18-22 age group represented the fourth largest age category with 1,303 of the 11,131 total suspects, or 12 percent.

In 2023, the 38-42 age group represented the fifth largest age category, with 173 of the 1,613 total suspects, or 11 percent. The 38-42 age category accounted for a one-percentage point decrease compared to 12 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, the 38-42 age group represented the fifth largest age category with 1,176 of the 11,131 total suspects, or 11 percent.

Consistent with 2019 through 2023 figures, the remaining 2023 NCUOF suspect age categories experienced diminishing totals as age increased.

Age	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
0 - 17	130	98	104	104	91
18 - 22	291	262	296	264	190
23 - 27	504	506	497	433	265
28 - 32	497	531	518	510	351
33 - 37	320	324	343	387	264
38 - 42	247	229	255	272	173
43 - 47	137	134	141	138	116
48 - 52	125	108	112	84	60
53 - 57	79	75	65	53	44
58 and Above	78	66	66	71	51
Unknown	12	10	14	28	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,411</b>	<b>2,344</b>	<b>1,613</b>

## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED MENTAL ILLNESS

In 2023, 338 of the 1,613 total suspects, or 21 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/ or a mental health crisis. This represented a seven-percentage point decrease when compared to 28 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, suspects who were perceived to suffer from a mental illness and/or a mental health crisis accounted for 3,265 of the 11,131 total NCUOF suspects, or 29 percent.

Mental Illness	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	786	731	743	667	338
No	1,627	1,605	1,661	1,664	1,262
Unknown	7	7	7	13	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,411</b>	<b>2,344</b>	<b>1,613</b>

## SUSPECT – PERCEIVED IMPAIRMENT

In 2023, 535 of the 1,613 total suspects, or 33 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be impaired by drugs and/or alcohol. This represented a four-percentage point decrease when compared to 37 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 4,275 suspects involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be impaired by drugs and/or alcohol, representing 38 percent of the 11,131 total suspects.

Impairment	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Alcohol Impaired	366	286	272	261	175
Drug & Alcohol Impaired	84	83	80	76	43
Drug Impaired	415	421	449	368	220
Drug or Alcohol Impaired	146	113	159	161	97
No Impression	1,289	1,318	1,341	1,309	941
Unknown	120	122	110	169	137
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,411</b>	<b>2,344</b>	<b>1,613</b>

## SUSPECT – HOMELESS

In 2023, 528 of the 1,613 total suspects, or 33 percent, involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be homeless. This accounted for two-percentage point decrease compared to 35 percent in 2022. Historically, from 2019 through 2023, 3,809 suspects involved in NCUOF incidents were perceived to be homeless, representing 34 percent of the 11,131 total suspects.

Homeless	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	821	805	835	820	528
No/Unknown	1,599	1,538	1,576	1,524	1,085
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,411</b>	<b>2,344</b>	<b>1,613</b>

## SUSPECT – INJURIES

In 2023, 1,239 suspects sustained injuries during the 1,560 NCUOF incidents throughout the year, which represented 77 percent of the 1,613 total suspects. This represented a 12-percentage point increase compared to 65 percent in 2022. Historically from 2019 through 2023, 7,838 suspects involved in NCUOF incidents sustained injuries, representing 70 percent of the 11,131 total suspects.

Injuries	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Yes	1,826	1,605	1,644	1,524	1,239
No	593	737	764	817	372
Unknown	1	1	3	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,420</b>	<b>2,343</b>	<b>2,411</b>	<b>2,344</b>	<b>1,613</b>



DEPARTMENT ADJUDICATION<sup>28</sup>  
ADMINISTRATIVE APPROVAL

In 2022, 8,171 of the 8,539 total NCUOF Tactics findings, representing 96 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Approval.” This accounted for a one-percentage point decrease compared to 97 percent of “Administrative Approval” Tactics findings in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, the vast majority of adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in an “Administrative Approval” outcome, accounting for 34,877 of the 35,862 total tactics findings, or 97 percent.

Admin. Approval	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	8,789	8,894	9,023	8,171	N/A
Force	27,992	28,326	29,642	25,502	N/A

In 2022, 25,502, of the 25,650 total NCUOF Force findings, representing 99 percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Approval.” This represented no change when compared to 99 percent of “Administrative Approval” Force findings in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, the vast majority of adjudicated Force findings resulted in an “Administrative Approval” outcome, accounting for 111,462 of the 111,954 total Force findings, or greater than 99 percent.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL

In 2022, 368 of the 8,539 total NCUOF Tactics Findings, representing four percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This accounted for a one-percentage point increase compared to three percent of “Administrative Disapproval” Tactics findings in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, 985 adjudicated Tactics findings resulted in an “Administrative Disapproval” outcome, representing three percent of the 35,862 total Tactics findings.

Admin. Disapproval	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Tactics	150	188	279	368	N/A
Force	87	110	147	148	N/A

In 2022, 148 of the 25,650 total NCUOF Force findings, representing less than one percent, were adjudicated as “Administrative Disapproval.” This represented no change when compared to less than one percent of “Administrative Disapproval” Force findings in 2021. Historically, from 2019 through 2022, adjudicated Force findings resulting in an “Administrative Disapproval” outcome, accounted for 492 of the 111,954 total Force findings, or less than one percent.

<sup>28</sup> Adjudication data for 2023 was not included in this Report since a vast majority of the NCUOF incidents will be adjudicated in 2024.



# OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING

— SYNOPSES AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF  
RECOVERED SUSPECT WEAPONS —

**F001-23: January 02, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a violation of a restraining order. The suspect refused to surrender and became increasingly agitated, prompting officers to employ de-escalation tactics for an extended period. The suspect went to the kitchen and armed himself with a large butcher type knife and officers deployed two tasers and pepper spray. The less lethal options initially caused the suspect to drop the knife on the floor; however, he immediately picked up the knife, raised it above his head, and an OIS occurred.

**F003-23: January 03, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a male who threw an unknown metal object at a passing vehicle. When the driver pulled over and exited, he was confronted by the suspect, who threatened him with a knife. The officers ultimately located the suspect standing on the second-story landing of the residence holding what appeared to be a metal pipe. The officers ascended to the top of the landing and pushed open the rear door. They were confronted moments later by the suspect, who stepped toward them while holding a two-foot-long metal object with an approximate three-inch spike protruding from one end. An OIS occurred along with a simultaneous deployment of a less-lethal munition.

**F004-23: January 21, 2023**

Uniformed officers were conducting a stolen vehicle investigation. Officers observed three suspects associated with the vehicle walking eastbound on the street. Officers exited their patrol vehicle and followed the suspects on foot. As they contacted and attempted to detain the three suspects, one suspect fled westbound on the street. Officers gave chase and a short foot pursuit ensued. As the suspect emerged from the sidewalk and onto the street, he turned toward one of the officers and pointed what appeared to be a firearm in their direction, and an OIS occurred.

**F005-23: February 07, 2023**

Uniformed officers observed a male riding his bicycle and the officers had prior knowledge that the suspect was wanted for a murder warrant and named on an Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) shooting Investigative Report (IR). The officers ordered the suspect to stop, however the suspect failed to comply with the officers' commands. The officers drove alongside the suspect, causing him to contact the passenger side mirror. The suspect got off his bicycle and fled on foot. As the passenger officer prepared to exit the police vehicle to pursue the suspect, a Tactical Unintentional Discharge (TUD) occurred. The officers continued to chase the suspect and during the foot pursuit, the suspect removed a handgun from his waistband, turned and pointed it at one of the officers resulting in an OIS.





#### **F010-23: February 22, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call for an “Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) Suspect There Now.” Officers responded and observed a female armed with what appeared to be a firearm and was running southbound on the east sidewalk towards the officers. The suspect ignored the officers’ commands and continued running. She then abruptly stopped, turned, and pointed the weapon in the officers’ direction resulting in an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS).



#### **F011-23: March 08, 2023**

Plain clothes officers were conducting surveillance for a Parolee-At-Large who was also a named suspect on an Investigative Report for Extortion. During the surveillance, the suspect was observed on foot, however, Officers lost sight of the suspect inside the perimeter and Metropolitan K9 personnel were requested to respond. K9 personnel located the suspect and the suspect failed to surrender, which resulted in the deployment of a chemical agent. During the deployment of the chemical agent, the suspect began firing a handgun at several K9 officers which resulted in an OIS.



#### **F017-23: May 02, 2023**

Uniformed officers were approached by a male who informed the officers that a suspect brandished a knife at him. Officers observed the suspect in possession of a knife and the suspect failed to comply with their commands. The suspect fled, confronted a female, and struck her in the head with an unknown object. The suspect continued to flee and while on the sidewalk, stabbed a male victim in his left shoulder. The suspect took a position behind a parked vehicle, while still in possession of the knife. While still holding the knife, the suspect charged at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.



#### **F018-23: May 05, 2023**

Uniformed officers were conducting crime suppression when officers engaged in a consensual conversation with the suspect and another individual. Based on his demeanor, the officers formed the opinion that the suspect was possibly armed with a handgun. The suspect and the female then abruptly entered their vehicle and sped away. The officers initiated a vehicle pursuit. During the pursuit the vehicle stopped, and a suspect exited and began to run away. During the foot pursuit, the suspect tripped and fell in an open lot underneath the freeway. As the officers caught up to him, a struggle ensued as the suspect attempted to remove an object from a satchel slung over his chest. The suspect produced a firearm from the satchel and an OIS occurred.



**F022-23: May 26, 2023**

Uniformed officers were conducting patrol due to high gang activity in the area. Officers observed a male clutching his waistband and believed he was in possession of a firearm. The officers attempted to conduct a pedestrian stop on the suspect and a short foot pursuit ensued. During the foot pursuit, the suspect produced a firearm while running and tripped over a trashcan, falling onto the roadway. As the officers approached him, the suspect pointed a firearm at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

**F027-23: June 25, 2023**

Uniformed patrol officers received a radio call of an Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) suspect there now at a hotel. The suspect was reported to be armed with a knife threatening staff and under the influence of an unknown narcotic. Officers gave him numerous verbal commands, which were ignored. The suspect suddenly pulled a knife from the pocket of his sweater. The suspect ignored officers' commands and began to advance at one of the officers, resulting in an OIS.

**F028-23: June 28, 2023**

Uniformed officers conducted a traffic stop. When officers were speaking with the driver, they heard multiple gunshots coming from a strip mall directly south of them. The officers observed a male through a short, wrought iron fence separating the two properties. The suspect was walking toward an occupied, open business while firing multiple rounds from a handgun. The officers immediately engaged the suspect resulting in an OIS.

**F029-23: July 09, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to multiple radio calls involving a suspect randomly assaulting several victims. When the officers arrived in the area, they encountered the suspect in the parking lot of a gas station. The suspect immediately began walking toward the officers while holding an approximate 15-inch metal bar above her head. Despite officers giving the suspect numerous commands to drop the weapon, she continued to advance toward them. One officer fired a 40-millimeter less-lethal projectile; however, it had no effect. The suspect continued to walk toward the officers with the metal bar raised above her head. As the suspect approached within approximately five feet of the officer, she attempted to strike one of the officers with the metal bar, resulting in an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS) and simultaneous deployment of the TASER.



#### **F031-23: July 20, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) suspect. Officers arrived at the location and met with security, who advised that the suspect was located on the 6th floor of the hotel. Upon the elevator doors opening on the 6th floor, the officers encountered the suspect who was armed with a knife and an umbrella. The suspect raised the knife above his head and advanced towards the officers, resulting in an OIS and simultaneous deployment of one 40mm less-lethal projectile.



#### **F032-23: July 25, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) suspect at multi-unit shopping center. As officers arrived in front of the location, they encountered the suspect who was kneeling on top of a bloodied victim, while armed with a utility knife. One officer fired two 40mm less-lethal projectiles toward the suspect which were ineffective. The suspect then began to stab the victim which resulted in an OIS.



#### **F034-23: August 06, 2023**

Uniformed officers were driving when they observed the suspect standing in the opposing lanes of traffic pointing a handgun in their direction. As the officers stopped their vehicle in the roadway, the suspect fired at them, which resulted in an OIS.



#### **F035-23: August 09, 2023**

Multiple radio calls were broadcasted for a missing/stolen Department of Water and Power (DWP) vehicle, later to be confirmed stolen. Uniformed officers located the vehicle and a pursuit ensued. During the pursuit, the suspect navigated up a steep narrow driveway, ramming through a secured metal gate into a secondary parking lot and conducted a U-turn. The suspect then accelerated his vehicle towards officers who were following behind. The suspect intentionally struck two police vehicles, injuring two officers and collided with an uninvolved van which was occupied by a citizen. The suspect's vehicle became temporarily disabled as officers tactically approached his position and an OIS occurred. The suspect's vehicle became operable and suddenly accelerated towards officers which resulted in a second OIS.



**F037-23: August 12, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a “Man with a Gun” inside a convenience store. Upon their arrival, the officers discovered the suspect had left the location. About an hour later, while canvassing the area, officers observed the suspect carrying what appeared to be a black assault rifle. As officers issued verbal commands to the suspect, he raised the rifle in the direction of the officers resulting in an OIS. The suspect fled the location on foot. Officers deployed both Bean Bag Shotguns and 40mm Less-Lethal Launchers (LLL) at him. The suspect again raised his rifle in the direction of the officers, which resulted in a second OIS. The suspect continued to flee to a multi-unit shopping center and parking lot. Officers again fired the 40mm LLL rounds at the suspect and the suspect again pointed his rifle in the direction of officers resulting in a third OIS.

**F038-23: August 13, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a “Grand Theft Auto (GTA)” suspect there now. When officers arrived at the location they were met by the victim, who directed the officers to the driveway and advised that the suspect was seated inside their parked vehicle. Officers approached and opened the driver’s door, and observed the suspect’s arm protruding from the back seat while holding a black handgun. Officers ordered the suspect to exit the vehicle and drop the handgun. The suspect initially complied by exiting the vehicle but refused to drop the handgun. One officer deployed the 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher (LLL) which was not effective. The suspect then pointed the handgun at the officers and an OIS occurred.

**F040-23: August 18, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an Assault with a Deadly Weapon (ADW) suspect armed with a gun. When the officers arrived in the area, they located the suspect standing in the alley and stopped their vehicle to investigate. The suspect then assumed a seated position and removed what appeared to be a handgun from his rear waistband area. Officers ordered the suspect to drop the gun; however, he did not comply. The suspect then stood up and began to raise the gun with his right hand, resulting in an OIS.

**F041-23: August 24, 2023**

An off-duty Reserve police officer observed a possible residential burglary suspect loitering. While seated in his personal vehicle, the officer telephonically notified 9-1-1 to report the activity. As the officer was communicating with the 9-1-1 operator, the suspect produced a handgun and fired multiple rounds at the officer from across the street, which resulted in an OIS. The officer drove away from the location and awaited the arrival of on-duty personnel from an outside agency. Upon their arrival, the suspect began firing at officers from the outside agency, resulting in an OIS with the outside agency.




#### **F042-23: August 24, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a “Possible ADW suspect there now.” The Person Reporting (PR) (suspect) advised that he was “armed with a gun and going to hurt someone” in one of the apartments. Upon arrival, responding officers walked up a narrow stairway leading up to the second floor and as they neared the top, the PR appeared in the hallway and walked towards the officers while holding a large kitchen knife in his right hand. The knife was held with the blade pointed down and towards the officers as he continued advancing toward officers, resulting in an OIS.



#### **F043-23: August 27, 2023**

Uniformed officers observed an individual whom they believed to be loitering near the front door of an apartment complex. The officers exited their vehicle and began questioning the individual as to where he lived. Moments later, he began running toward the officers while holding a knife in his right hand, with the blade pointed toward them. The officers immediately ordered him to drop the knife; however, he did not comply, resulting in an OIS.



#### **F045-23: September 09, 2023**

Uniformed officers were flagged down by security guards in front of a nightclub. The officers observed the suspect, who was inside his parked vehicle. The suspect drove his vehicle in reverse, negotiated a turn and stopped in the middle of the street. As the officers drove towards the suspect's vehicle, the suspect while still seated, pointed a handgun outside of the driver's side window and fired approximately four to five rounds toward people on the west sidewalk, which resulted in an OIS.



#### **F048-23: September 13, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a “415 Man with a Knife.” Upon arrival, officers searched the area and located the suspect walking through an unoccupied fenced parking lot. Officers attempted to verbalize with the suspect who was armed with a large kitchen knife. After several minutes of commands, the suspect, while still armed with the knife in his right hand, ran toward officers, resulting in an OIS.



**F049-23: September 15, 2023**


Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of a “Hot Prowl Burglary.” As responding officers arrived, two suspects were taken into custody without incident. The third suspect was observed by the Air Unit, on the roof of the apartment building. Moments later, the suspect jumped off the building and landed on the roof of an adjacent single-story structure. He then fell from the roof of that structure and landed on a cement walkway between the two buildings. As officers approached the suspect, he reached into his front waistband and removed what officers believed to be a firearm. The suspect then appeared to point the object in the officers’ direction, resulting in an OIS and simultaneous deployment of a 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher.

**F053-23: September 27, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call of an “ADW Shooting.” The officers located the suspect who was holding both a shotgun and an assault rifle. Officers immediately gave numerous commands to drop the weapons, but the suspect refused and walked away. Officers maintained a view of the suspect and as he neared the end of the complex, he turned and looked toward the officers, while still holding the weapons, when an OIS occurred.

**F054-23: October 01, 2023**

Uniformed officers received a radio call regarding a child custody dispute. After a lengthy discussion, officers facilitated the peaceful transfer of custody, of a single minor child. After the child exchange, the suspect entered her vehicle, and appeared to drive toward the parking lot exit. She then drove her vehicle to the location of the victim as well as one of the officers. The suspect’s vehicle suddenly accelerated, collided with the victim and nearly struck one of the officers. The suspect then accelerated her vehicle toward an additional officer, when an OIS occurred.

**F057-23: October 07, 2023**

Uniformed officers received a radio call of a male holding a handgun while seated inside a vehicle. Officers observed the vehicle parked in the lot and positioned their police vehicles behind it. The officers approached the vehicle and observed the suspect seated in the driver seat, and a second individual in the front passenger seat. Both individuals appeared to be intoxicated and did not respond to commands to exit. After opening the passenger side door, an officer observed a handgun in the suspect’s waistband and ordered him multiple times not to reach for the handgun. Moments later, the suspect lowered his right hand toward his waistband and an OIS occurred.

Photograph not available

#### **F059-23: October 11, 2023**

An off-duty detective was alerted by his home security camera system of an unknown person in front of his residence. The detective observed via the camera, two males wearing dark clothing, black ski masks, and black gloves in the driveway of the residence. They appeared to have gained entry into the detective's personal vehicle. A vehicle was observed parked in front of the residence, and later determined to be occupied by two additional male suspects. Moments later, the two suspects in the driveway, left and entered the waiting vehicle. The detective then called 9-1-1 and exited the front of his home to confront the suspects. As the suspects began to drive away, one of the suspect's pointed a handgun at the detective and an OIS occurred. The suspects continued driving and fired multiple rounds in the direction of the detective as they fled the area to an unknown location.



#### **F060-23: October 14, 2023**

Uniformed officers were flagged down by a community member, directing them to a man armed with a knife. The officers located the suspect and ordered him to drop the knife. He refused to comply with commands and continued walking away, while still holding the knife. Officers deployed two 40mm Less-Lethal-Launchers (LLL), which were ineffective, and the suspect ran on foot. The suspect continued toward a group of pedestrians, when officers deployed one additional 40mm LLL. Still armed with the knife, the suspect ran into the street and charged towards one officer, resulting in an OIS.



#### **F064-23: November 01, 2023**


Uniformed officers responded to an "Assault with a Deadly Weapon, suspect there now." The suspect was armed with a machete and struck a victim several times causing minor injuries. During the attack, the suspect dropped the machete and produced a knife, causing the victim to run away. Officers arrived on scene and observed the suspect holding a knife. The suspect ran from officers, and Officers continued to follow the suspect in their vehicle, when they observed the suspect also armed with a glass bottle. Officers continued to verbalize with the suspect who refused to comply, resulting in two TASER deployments. The suspect, still armed with the knife, stood up, and ran inside a restaurant outdoor seating area with numerous patrons inside the restaurant. The suspect turned towards the officers holding up the knife and an OIS occurred.



#### **F067-23: November 29, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to an "Assault with a Deadly Weapon, Suspect there now" radio call. As officers were driving, they observed the suspect in the middle of the roadway attempting to stab a male with a knife. The suspect ignored the officer's commands and continued moving toward the victim while swinging the knife. The victim, using a dresser drawer found discarded on the sidewalk, held the drawer up in front of his chest as a shield to avoid being stabbed by the suspect when an OIS occurred.



**F068-23: November 30, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to a radio call for an “Assault with a Deadly Weapon, suspect there now,” at a business. The suspect assaulted an employee inside the location, then exited and walked across the street to the sidewalk. As Officers were completing a crime report, the suspect returned and approached the officers while holding a drywall hammer with combined hatchet blade in his left hand and appeared to be wearing numerous layers of clothing. The suspect then began crossing the street toward the officers with the hammer in his hand. The suspect refused to comply with commands resulting in officers utilizing numerous less lethal munitions including a TASER, 40mm less-lethal-launchers and beanbag shotguns, which were ineffective. The suspect continued to advance on one officer, while still armed with the hammer in his right hand stating, “Shoot it, shoot it,” at which point an OIS occurred.

**F069-23: December 01, 2023**

Uniformed officers responded to an “Assault with a Deadly Weapon, Suspect there now,” radio call. Upon their arrival, the officers and a sergeant observed that the house was on fire. The sergeant located the PR in a neighbor’s backyard who advised that the suspect was in the backyard of the above location. Officers searched the area behind the garage and observed the suspect who immediately pointed a handgun at an officer, resulting in an OIS.

# DEFINITIONS

## **CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE ADJUDICATION FINDINGS:**

Tactics, drawing/exhibiting a firearm, and UOF shall be evaluated during the adjudication process (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.10).

## **DRAWING AND EXHIBITING AND/OR USE OF FORCE-ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL-OUT OF POLICY:**

Finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the actions of the employee relative to drawing/exhibiting a firearm or UOF were not within the Department's policies (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.10).

## **ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL – NEGLIGENT DISCHARGE:**

Finding, where it was determined that the unintentional discharge of a firearm resulted from operator error, such as the violation of a firearm safety rule (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**TACTICS-ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL:** A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**ANIMAL SHOOTING:** An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm at an animal.

**CANINE (K9) CONTACT:** An incident in which a member of the public has contact with a Department K9 and hospitalization is required (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**CAROTID RESTRAINT CONTROL HOLD:** All uses of an upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the modified carotid, full carotid, and locked carotid hold (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

## **CATEGORICAL UOF INCIDENT**

A CUOF is defined as:

- An incident involving the use of deadly force (e.g., discharge of a firearm) by a Department employee;
- All uses of an upper body control hold by a Department employee, including the use of a modified carotid, full carotid or locked carotid hold;
- All deaths while the arrestee or detainee is in the custodial care of the Department (also known as an In-Custody Death or ICD);
- A UOF incident resulting in death;
- A UOF incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization (commonly referred to as a LERI);
- All intentional head strikes with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight, etc.) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that result in serious bodily injury, hospitalization or death;

- All other unintentional head strikes shall be investigated as Level I NCUOF incidents;
- Officer involved animal shootings;
- Non-tactical unintentional discharges; and,
- An incident in which a member of the public has contact with a Department canine and hospitalization is required (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

## **CRIME**

- **Part I Crime:** The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program classifies the following offenses as Part I crimes: criminal homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft (except motor vehicle theft), motor vehicle theft, and arson.
- **Part II Crime:** The FBI's UCR Program classifies all violations of state or local laws not specifically identified as Part I offenses (except traffic violations) as Part II crimes.
- **Violent Crime:** The FBI defines violent crime in its UCR program as those offenses which involve force or threat of force. As such, violent crime is comprised of four offenses (criminal homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault).

**FIELD DETENTION:** Refer to Public Contact.

**FORCE OPTIONS:** All Department-approved physical force techniques (e.g. firm grip, strike, takedown) or devices (e.g., OC spray, baton, TASER) available to an officer. Force Options fall into the following three categories: Deadly Force; Intermediate force (e.g., TASER, bean bag), and Non-Lethal force (e.g., firm grip, takedown).

**GENERAL TRAINING UPDATE:** Standardized training provided by the employee's command or Training Division personnel to personnel involved in a CUOF incident. The General Training Update is not an inquiry into the specific details of the CUOF. The intent of the update is to provide involved personnel with standardized training material in tactical issues and actions readily identified in the CUOF incident as well as an update on the UOF policy. Training should be provided as soon as practicable. (2023 LAPD Manual 3/796.35).

**HEAD STRIKES:** An intentional head strike with an impact weapon or device (e.g., baton, flashlight) and all unintentional (inadvertent or accidental) head strikes that results in serious bodily injury, hospitalization, or death (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**HOMELESSNESS:** Per the Department's Special Order No. 13, The terms "homelessness, homeless individual, and homeless person" shall refer to the following: (2023 LAPD Manual 1/240.07).

- An individual or family who lacks a fixed, regular, and



adequate nighttime residence;

- An individual or family with a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings (including a car, park, abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground);
- An individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately-operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements (including hotels and motels paid for by federal, state, or local government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing); or,
- An individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily resided.

**IN-CUSTODY DEATH:** The death of any arrestee or detainee who is in the custodial care of the Department (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05)

**LAW ENFORCEMENT RELATED INJURY INVESTIGATION:** A UOF incident resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization, commonly referred to as a LERI (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**MANNER OF DEATH:** The Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner defines the different manners of death based on the following criteria:

- **Natural:** Due entirely (or nearly so) to natural disease processes;
- **Homicide:** Due to a volitional act of another person;
- **Suicide:** Due to injury that occurred with the intent to induce self-harm or cause one's own death;
- **Accident:** Due to injury when there is no evidence of intent to harm (for purposes of this Report, accidental deaths are further categorized into causes of death attributed to narcotic/alcohol overdose); and,
- **Undetermined:** Inadequate information regarding the circumstances of death to determine manner.

*Example:* An individual is found unconscious with massive subdural hemorrhage. In the absence of information on the events leading up to death, it is impossible to determine if the hemorrhage was due to accidental fall, homicidal violence, etc.

**NON-CATEGORICAL UOF:** An incident in which any on-duty Department employee, or off-duty employee whose occupation as a Department employee is a factor, uses physical force or a control device to compel a person to comply with the employee's direction; defend themselves, defend others, effect an arrest or detention, prevent escape overcome resistance (2023 LAPD Manual 4/245.05).

**OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE:** The legal standard used

to determine the lawfulness of a UOF is the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Graham states in part, "The reasonableness of a particular UOF must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight (2023 LAPD Manual 1/556.10).

**OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING:** An incident in which a Department employee intentionally discharges a firearm (excluding Warning Shot, Animal Shooting, and/or Tactical Intentional Discharge incidents). Officer Involved Shooting incidents are categorized into Hit or No Hit occurrences.

**PART I CRIME:** Refer to Crime.

**PART II CRIME:** Refer to Crime.

**PUBLIC CONTACT:** For this report, public contacts are comprised of calls for service and field detentions:

- **Calls for Service:** Any radio call generated by communications in response to a call from the public.
- **Field Detentions:** Those incidents where officers utilize lights, emergency lights & siren, or a verbal command for a person to stop. The person stopped is not free to leave during the encounter. The detention is based on the reasonable suspicion that the suspect(s) to be stopped are involved in criminal activity
- **Pedestrian Stop:** A detention of a person who is on foot.
- **Vehicle Stop:** A detention of either a driver and/or a passenger in a motor vehicle.

**SERIOUS BODILY INJURY:** California Penal Code Section 243(f)(4), defines Serious Bodily Injury as including but not limited to: loss of consciousness, concussion, bone fracture, protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member, organ, a wound requiring extensive suturing, and serious disfigurement (2023 LAPD Manual 1/556.10).

## SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

- **Radio Call:** Call for service directed by Communications Division;
- **Observation:** Contact initiated by officers based on reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or as a consensual encounter;
- **Citizen Flag Down:** Private person alert officers to a subject, an activity, or a location not otherwise observed by officers or reported to Communications Division;
- **Pre-Planned:** Any type of activity that requires an operational plan (e.g. search/arrest warrant services, task forces);
- **Station Call:** Non-coded or low priority incidents

where officers are directed to a location by Department personnel, other than Communications Division;

- **Ambush:** An act or an instance to attack by surprise or, lure officers resulting in an officer involved shooting; and,
- **Off-Duty:** Incident where officers are off-duty and not conducting official Department business.

**SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED PERSONNEL:** Employee(s) applying force or who had a significant tactical or decision making role in the incident (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**SUICIDE BY COP:** Those incidents where the suspect appeared to intentionally provoke officers into believing that he posed a deadly threat that resulted in an OIS.

**TACTICAL DEBRIEF:** The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance. The Tactical Debrief is conducted by the Categorical Use of Force Debrief Facilitator (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE:** The unintentional discharge of a firearm regardless of cause. Unintentional discharges are evaluated then determined to be Accidental Discharges or Negligent Discharges (2023 LAPD Manual 3/792.05).

**USE OF DEADLY FORCE (OTHER):** An incident involving the use of deadly force by Department personnel. This type of force will encompass those forces that are not included in other CUOF classifications such as Firearm, CRCH, and Head Strike.

**USE OF FORCE:** In a complex urban society, officers are confronted daily with situations where control must be exercised to effect arrests and to protect the public safety. Control may be exercised through advice, warnings, persuasion, or by use of physical force. Officers are permitted to use force that is objectively reasonable to defend themselves or others, to effect an arrest or detention, and/or to prevent escape or overcome resistance, consistent with the Department's Policy on the UOF (2023 LAPD Manual 1/240.10).

**USE OF FORCE - TACTICS DIRECTIVE:** A written directive that contains procedures and/or insight into UOF and tactics issues. Use of Force policy will continue to be expressed in the Department Manual but may be reiterated in UOF-Tactics Directives. All Use of Force-Tactics Directives will be reviewed and approved by the Chief of Police. Use of Force-Tactics Directives supersedes any Training Bulletins that have been published regarding the subject matter of the directives (2023 LAPD Manual 1/240.12).

**USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD:** The UOF Review Board shall convene at the direction of the Chair of the Board and

shall: Avail itself of any facilities of the Department necessary to conduct a complete examination of the circumstances involved in the incident under investigation, report its findings and to the Chief of Police and upon adjournment, forward the UOF Internal Process Report, and other related reports to the Chief of Police (2023 LAPD Manual 2/092.50).

**VIOLENT CRIME:** Refer to Crime.

**WARNING SHOTS:** It is the policy of this Department that warning shots shall only be used in exceptional circumstances where it might reasonably be expected to avoid the need to use deadly force. Generally, warning shots shall be directed in a manner that minimizes the risk of injury to innocent persons, ricochet dangers and property damage (2023 LAPD Manual 1/556.10).

**WEAPONS OTHER THAN FIREARM:** Weapons other than a firearm pose a threat to the public and officers and generally fall into two categories: edged weapons and blunt weapons. Edged weapons include any object capable of cutting, slashing, or stabbing. A blunt weapon is any object that can be used to strike a person and inflict serious bodily injury or death.



# ACRONYMS

**AB – ASSEMBLY BILL**

**AD – ADMINISTRATIVE DISAPPROVAL**

**ADSD – APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT AND  
SUPPORT DIVISION**

**AED – AUTOMATED EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATOR**

**AG – ATTORNEY GENERAL**

**ASCC – ADVANCED STRATEGIES FOR COMMAND  
AND CONTROL**

**ASLA – AUTISM SOCIETY LOS ANGELES**

**BOPC – BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS**

**BSS – BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE SERVICES**

**BWV – BODY-WORN VIDEO**

**CAMP – CASE ASSESSMENT MANAGEMENT  
PROGRAM**

**CAPOS – CRIMES AGAINST PEACE OFFICERS  
SECTION**

**CARE – COMPREHENSIVE CLEANING AND RAPID  
ENGAGEMENT**

**CCS – COMPLAINT CLASSIFICATIONS SECTION**

**CIRD – CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW DIVISION**

**CITY – CITY OF LOS ANGELES**

**CMS – COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

**CO – COMMANDING OFFICER**

**COP – CHIEF OF POLICE**

**CP – COMMAND POST**

**CPD – CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**CPR – CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION**

**CRCH – CAROTID RESTRAINT CONTROL HOLD**

**CRESS – COMMUNITY CALL RE-DIRECTION TO  
ENSURE SUICIDE SAFETY**

**CSD – CUSTODY SERVICES DIVISION**

**CSPB – COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP  
BUREAU**

**CSP – COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP**

**CTFO – CRITICAL THINKING AND FORCE OPTIONS**

**CTSOB – COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS BUREAU**

**CUOF – CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE**

**DCO – DESIGNATED COVER OFFICER  
DEPARTMENT (OR LAPD) – LOS ANGELES POLICE  
DEPARTMENT**

**DICVS – DIGITAL IN-CAR VIDEO SYSTEM**

**DMH – DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH**

**DOC – DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER**

**DOJ – DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**ECCCS – EMERGENCY COMMAND CONTROL  
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS DIVISION**

**ECD – ELECTRONIC CONTROL DEVICE**

**FBI – FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**FID – FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION**

**FOS – FORCE OPTION SIMULATOR**

**FOTAC – FIELD OPERATIONS TACTICS AND  
CONCEPTS**

**FSD – FORENSIC SCIENCE DIVISION**

**FTO – FIELD TRAINING OFFICER**

**FTQ – FAILURE TO QUALIFY**

**GCI – GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY INTOXIMETER**

**GRYD – GANG REDUCTION AND YOUTH  
DEVELOPMENT**

**GTU – GENERAL TRAINING UPDATE**

**HOPE – HOMELESS OUTREACH AND PROACTIVE  
ENGAGEMENT**

**HMD – HEAD MOUNTED DISPLAY**

**HPD – HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**IAD – INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION**

**IC – INCIDENT COMMANDER**

**ICD – IN-CUSTODY DEATH**

**ICS – INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM**

**IMD – INNOVATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION**

**IPR – INTERNAL PROCESS REPORT**

**ISTS – IN-SERVICE TRAINING SECTION**

**ITB – INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY BUREAU**

**JSID – JUSTICE SYSTEM INTEGRITY DIVISION**

**K-9 – CANINE**

**LACDA – LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT  
ATTORNEY**

**LAFD – LOS ANGELES FIRE DEPARTMENT**

**LAHSA – LOS ANGELES HOMELESS SERVICE  
AUTHORITY**

**LAMC – LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE**

**LAPD – LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT**



**LASAN – LOS ANGELES SANITATION AND  
ENVIROMENT**

**LASD – LOS ANGELES SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT**

**LAX – LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT**

**LD – LEARNING DOMAIN**

**LERI – LAW ENFORCEMENT-RELATED INJURY**

**LETAC – LAW ENFORCEMENT TACTICAL**

**APPLICATION COURSE**

**LMS – LEARNING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

**MALDEF – MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE  
AND EDUCATION FUND**

**MEU – MENTAL EVALUATION UNIT**

**MHIT – MENTAL HEALTH INTERVENTION TRAINING**

**MSD – MEDICAL SERVICES DIVISION**

**MTA – METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY**

**MVTR – MASS VIOLENCE TACTICAL RESPONSE**

**NALEO – NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LATINO**

**ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS**

**NAMI – NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS**

**NCUOF – NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE**

**NEA – NEIGHBORHOOD ENGAGEMENT AREAS**

**NMI – NEUROMUSCULAR INCAPACITATION**

**NYPD – NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**OCB – OPERATIONS CENTRAL BUREAU**

**OC – OLEORESIN CAPSICUM (SPRAY)**

**OCPP – OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING  
AND POLICY**

**OIC – OFFICER-IN-CHARGE**

**OIG – OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**OIS – OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING**

**OO – OFFICE OF OPERATIONS**

**OSB – OPERATIONS SOUTH BUREAU**

**OSO – OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

**OSS – OFFICE OF SUPPORT SERVICES**

**OVV – OPERATIONS VALLEY BUREAU**

**OWB – OPERATIONS WEST BUREAU**

**PATROL – PLANNING, ASSESSMENT, TIME,  
REDEPLOYMENT (AND/OR CONTAINMENT), OTHER  
RESOURCES, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION**

**PBL – PROBLEM BASED LEARNING**

**PCP - PHENCYCLIDINE**

**PEH – PEOPLE EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS**

**POST – CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON PEACE**

**OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING**

**PPD – PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**PR – PERSON REPORTING**

**PSB – PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU**

**PSD – POLICE SERVICE DOG**

**PSL – POLICE SCIENCES AND LEADERSHIP**

**PSM – PUBLIC SAFETY MEETINGS**

**PSS – PUBLIC SAFETY STATEMENT**

**PTE – POLICE TRAINING AND EDUCATION**

**RA – RESCUE AMBULANCE**

**RCB – RAPID CONTAINMENT BATON**

**RBC – REGULAR BASIC COURSE**

**RCB – RAPID CONTAINMENT BATON**

**REPORT – USE OF FORCE YEAR-END REVIEW**

**RESET – RESOURCE ENHANCEMENT AND  
SERVICES ENFORCEMENT TEAM**

**RFC – RELEASE FROM CUSTODY (ARREST  
REPORT)**

**RIPA – RACIAL AND IDENTITY PROFILING ACT**

**SIP – SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED PERSONNEL**

**SMART – SYSTEM-WIDE MENTAL ASSESSMENT  
RESPONSE TEAM**

**SQUAB – SHOOTING QUALIFICATION AND BONUS**

**SWAT – SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS**

**TASER – THOMAS A. SWIFT ELECTRIC RIFLE**

**TD – TRAINING DIVISION**

**TEAMS – TRAINING EVALUATION AND  
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

**TID – TECHNICAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION**

**TSB – TRANSIT SERVICES BUREAU**

**UCR – UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING**

**UD – UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE**

**UHRC – UNIFIED HOMELESSNESS RESPONSE  
CENTER**

**UODF – USE OF DEADLY FORCE (OTHER)**

**UOF – USE OF FORCE**

**UOFRB – USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD**

**USC – UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA**

**VHFSZ – VERY HIGH FIRE SEVERITY ZONE**

**VR – VIRTUAL REALITY**

**WIC – WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE**

# METHODOLOGY

## CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS

The Department classifies incidents as a CUOF's when a suspect dies while in the Department's custody, a suspect is hospitalized as a result of a UOF and when various types of force are used, i.e.: firearms, intentional head strikes, upper body control holds, etc. The FID investigation may reveal that multiple force options were used during an incident. Each one of the force options could potentially be classified as different CUOF categories if captured separately. For tracking purposes, and to avoid duplicate records of an incident, the Department classifies an incident based on the highest level of force used by Department personnel. All aspects of CUOF's are fully investigated and adjudicated, including additional force options not captured under the primary classification.

Critical Incident Review Division queried the CUOF data for the 2023 Use of Force Year-End Review from the Department's internal databases. Although FID was instrumental in providing outstanding information on cases from their records, they were unable to provide information on every open case as some cases were still being investigated at the time of this Report.

## ANNUAL DEPARTMENT TOTALS

The query period included all CUOF incidents from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023.

## BUREAU AND AREA/DIVISION OF OCCURRENCE

The Bureau and Area/Division of occurrence is the location where the CUOF incident occurred, regardless of where the incident originated or where the involved personnel were assigned. The exception is ICD incidents, where CSD is the Area/Division of occurrence, not the geographic Area where the jail facility is located.

## INVOLVED DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

For purposes of this Report, only Department personnel who received an adjudication finding, or have a pending finding, in the concerned force type for each respective CUOF incident are counted as involved employees. Department personnel are often at scene as part of the tactical situation, but do not apply force or have a part in the tactical decision-making. The personnel who did not utilize the relevant force or who were not involved in a tactical decision-making were not counted as "involved" in this Report.

All employee statistics were based on their current status as of the date of the UOF incident.

## DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL BY CUOF INCIDENT TYPE

This Report included all employees who received, or were pending, BOPC adjudicated findings for their involvement in the following types of incidents:

- Officer-Involved Shootings (OIS);
- Animal Shootings;
- Unintentional Discharges (UD);
- Warning Shots;
- Carotid Restraint Control Hold (CRCH) or any variation of a Choke Hold;
- Head Strike Incidents;
- K-9 Contact Incidents Resulting in Hospitalization;
- Law Enforcement Related Injuries (LERI);
- In Custody Deaths (ICD);
- Chief of Police (COP) Directed; and/or,
- Use of Deadly Force (Other).

**Note:** The County of Los Angeles Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner, determines the cause and manner of death of a suspect. The ICD's are classified as CUOF's when the Coroner rules that a UOF was a primary or contributing factor to a suspect's cause of death, where the death is ruled a suicide or is undetermined. Additionally, per Department Special Order 18 – Policy to revise police facility in-custody death adjudication protocols, dated August 6, 2020, all ICD's occurring within a police facility, regardless of cause or manner of death, would be investigated as a CUOF.

## OFFICER - INJURIES

Officer injuries were recorded based on the number of those who sustained injuries during CUOF incidents, regardless if the injuries were caused by the suspect's actions or other factors.

## INVOLVED SUSPECTS

Suspects included in this Report were those subject to categorical force used by Department personnel. The exception is ICD incidents, which also included individuals whose death occurred while in the custodial care of a Department employee, or the Department, regardless if force was used.

## SUSPECT – INJURIES

Suspect injuries include self-inflicted injuries, pre-existing medical conditions aggravated during the incident, accidental injuries, and those caused by the force applied by Department personnel. The manner of death of decedents is determined by the Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner - Coroner.



## DECEASED SUSPECT TOXICOLOGY RESULTS

Toxicology results for deceased suspects were obtained by FID from the County of Los Angeles Department of Medical Examiner – Coroner. It is uncommon for suspects to release their medical records to the Department. Therefore, toxicology results could only be obtained for deceased suspects involved in OIS-Hit and ICD incidents.

### Suspect – Perceived Mental Illness

A suspect was identified as having a perceived mental illness based on the following:

1. Officer(s) and/or investigator(s) perception of the suspect;
2. Suspect having self-reported mental illness;
3. Third-party statement; and/or,
4. Prior MEU contact resulting in a 5150 WIC hold or referral.

### Suspect – Homelessness –See Definition

The terms “homelessness,” “homeless individual,” and “homeless person” shall refer to the following: (2023 LAPD Manual 1/240.07)

## NON-CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS

The CIRD queried the NCUOF data for the 2023 Use of Force Year-End Review from TEAMS II and RIPA Dashboard.

### Annual Department Totals

The query period included all NCUOF incidents from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023.

### Bureau And Area/Division Of Occurrence

Incident by bureau and Area detailed where the NCUOF incident occurred, rather than where the involved officers were assigned.

### Force Option Used

Regardless of the number of times the force option was applied by one or more Department personnel, each force option was counted only once per incident. The force options were not mutually exclusive, as multiple force options could have been utilized in a single incident. In such cases, all force options used were counted once per incident.

## TASER

### TASER Activations

TASER activations were measured by the total number of times a TASER device was activated on a suspect during a NCUOF incident. All TASER activations were included in the total count when multiple activations occurred in an incident. Therefore, the total number of TASER activations exceeds the number of incidents in which a TASER was used.

## TASER Effectiveness

Effectiveness captured whether a TASER activation caused the suspect to submit to arrest. Multiple TASER activations may have been required for the force option to prove effective.

### Involved Department Personnel

For purposes of this Report, only Department personnel who received or are pending an adjudication finding, in the concerned force type for each respective NCUOF incident are counted as involved employees. Department personnel are often at scene as part of the tactical situation, but do not apply force. The officers who did not utilize the relevant force were not counted as “involved” in this Report. All employee statistics were based on their status as of the date of the UOF incident.

### Officer – Injuries

Officer injuries included all injuries sustained by a Department employee during the NCUOF incident regardless of whether they were caused by the suspect’s actions or other factors.

### Involved Suspects

Suspects included in this Report are those subject to Non-Categorical force used by Department personnel.

### Suspect – Perceived Mental Illness

A suspect’s perceived mental illness for NCUOF incidents was determined based on officers’ observations and was not verified by MEU.

### Suspect – Perceived Impairment

Officers’ observations were used to determine if a suspect was under the influence of alcohol and/or narcotics for NCUOF incidents. Suspects’ impairment status was not verified through field sobriety tests.

### Suspect – Perceived Homelessness

Perceived homelessness for NCUOF incidents was determined based on officers’ observations and statements made by suspects.

### Suspect - Injuries

Suspect injuries included injuries sustained by a suspect during a NCUOF incident that were caused by Department personnel.

## OTHER

### Attacks On Police Officers

Attacks on Police Officers include all battery and assault with a deadly weapon incidents against Department personnel.





# INDEX

## #s

37-Millimeter Projectile Launcher – 36, 37, 60, 63  
40-Millimeter Less-Lethal Launcher – 10, 36, 37, 42, 59, 62, 246, 249, 268, 269, 271-273  
72-Hour Briefing – 78, 81

## A

Animal Shooting (OIS Animal) – 35, 91, 106, 124, 135, 160-168, 274, 275, 280  
Arrests – 5, 33-37, 39-41, 59, 66, 68, 69, 74, 75, 101, 102, 111, 127, 130, 131, 179, 274-276, 279, 282

## B

Ballistic Shield – 60, 272  
Baton – 36, 37, 60, 63, 218, 246, 272, 279  
Beanbag Shotgun – 10, 36, 37, 59, 62, 246, 247, 273  
Behavioral Science Services (BSS) – 21, 41, 81, 91, 278  
Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC) – 5, 12, 13, 18, 27, 33, 60, 61, 73, 79, 80-84, 87, 88, 141, 158, 163, 168, 172, 178, 190, 192, 194, 197, 201, 202, 207, 213, 215, 216, 221, 226, 231, 236, 239, 241, 246, 278, 280  
Board of Rights – 88  
Body Worn Video – 36, 42, 60, 64-66, 70, 71, 74, 91, 106, 125, 228-236, 246, 278, 280

## C

Canine Contact (K-9) – 5, 35, 36, 52, 60, 64, 65, 66, 106, 125, 228, 229, 230-236, 246, 266, 274, 278  
Carotid Restraint Control Hold (CRCH) – 35, 36, 106, 125, 194-203, 274, 276, 278, 280  
Citations – 101, 102  
Core Values – 7, 10, 14  
COVID- 46  
Crime

- Part I - 98, 274, 275
- Part II - 98, 274, 275
- Violent – 5, 9, 94-98, 101, 107, 118, 127, 130, 131, 151, 188, 200, 211, 224, 234, 259, 274, 276

Critical Incident Community Briefing – 5, 72, 73

## D

Data Mapping - 116  
De-escalation, Tactical – 9, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 42-44, 50, 51, 53, 56, 61, 75, 81, 265  
Department of Mental Health (DMH) – 9, 27, 29, 43, 278  
Digital In-Car Video System – 10, 36, 70, 71, 278

## F

Field Detentions – 101, 102, 106, 107, 110, 111, 137, 179, 245, 274, 275  
Force Investigation Division (FID) – 23, 36, 37, 80-84, 87, 190, 201, 213, 278, 280, 282, 286  
FN-303 – 60  
Force Option Simulator (FOS) – 43-45, 81, 112, 113, 278

## G

General Training Update (GTU) – 43, 78, 81, 274, 278

## H

Head Strike – 36, 91, 106, 125, 218-226, 274, 276, 280  
HOPE - Homeless Outreach and Proactive Engagement – 31, 278  
Homelessness – 27, 31, 42, 43, 126, 128, 153, 201, 213, 225, 274, 279, 282

## I

Implicit Bias – 43  
In-Custody Death Incidents (ICD) – 12, 35, 84, 91, 106, 124, 179-192, 214, 274, 275, 278, 280, 282  
Internal Process Report – 75, 84, 276, 278

## K

K-9 – 5, 35, 36, 52, 60, 64-67, 106, 125, 228-239, 246, 266, 274, 278, 280

## L

Law Enforcement-Related Injury Investigation (LERI) – 35, 106, 125, 191, 204-216, 274, 275, 279, 280  
Law Enforcement Tactical Application Course (LETAC) – 43, 279  
Los Angeles Homeless Service Authority (LAHSA) – 31, 278

**M**

Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) – 27, 29, 43, 52, 279, 282, 286

Mental Health – 9, 27-29, 41, 43, 44, 126, 153, 189, 201, 212, 225, 235, 261, 278

Mental Health Intervention Training (MHIT) – 9, 27, 42, 43, 279

**N**

National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) – 29, 279

Non-Categorical Use of Force Incidents (NCUOF) – 35, 36, 37, 66, 74-77, 80, 87, 88, 106, 107, 111, 128, 238, 244-247, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255-263, 274, 275, 279, 282

**O**

Officer Involved Shooting Incidents (OIS) – 9, 23, 33, 43, 80, 81, 84, 91, 106, 107, 109, 111, 114, 118-121, 124, 126, 127, 130, 131, 135-160, 163, 167, 265-273, 275, 276, 279, 280, 282

**P**

PATROL (acronym) – 51, 54, 55, 279

Personnel Complaint – 23, 37, 45-47, 75, 77, 79, 82-84, 86-88

Personnel Figures, for Department – 99

Police Sciences Leadership (PSL) - 43, 279

Population, City – 98

Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) – 23, 87, 88, 279

Public Contacts – 101, 102, 110, 111, 130, 275

Public Safety Statement (PSS) – 80, 279

**Q**

Qualification (Firearm) – 44-47, 112, 113

**R**

Resource Enhancement and Services Enforcement Team (RESET) – 31-279

Reverence for Human Life - 33, 39, 40, 43, 50, 51, 59, 81

**S**

Systemwide Mental Assessment Response Team (SMART) – 27, 29, 279

**T**

Tactical Debrief – 43, 44, 79, 82-84, 158, 168, 178, 192, 202, 215, 226, 236, 239, 241, 276

TASER – 36, 37, 42, 59-61, 63, 246, 247, 265, 272, 273, 274, 279, 282

Training

- Academy – 39, 41-43, 45
- Firearm – 45, 46, 51, 65, 81, 83
- In-Service – 39, 41, 42

**U**

Unintentional Discharge (UD) – 106, 125, 135, 169-178, 265, 274, 276, 279

Use of Deadly Force – 33-35, 106, 124, 240, 274, 276, 279, 280

Use of Force

- Department Policy – 33-37, 43, 50
- Legal Standards – 33, 37
- Review Board (UOFRB) – 21, 44, 79-84, 279

**V**

Video Footage - 73

**W**

Warning Shot – 35, 106, 135, 242, 275, 276, 280

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## 2023 USE OF FORCE YEAR-END REVIEW

The Los Angeles Police Department's guiding principle when using force shall be Reverence for Human Life. Officers shall attempt to control an incident by using time, distance, communication, and available resources in an effort to de-escalate the situation, whenever it is safe, feasible and reasonable to do so. When warranted, Department personnel may use objectively reasonable force to carry out their duties.

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