

ABRIDGED SUMMARY OF CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND FINDINGS BY THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING – 052-24

Division	Date	Duty-On (X) Off ()	Uniform-Yes (X) No ()
Northeast	11/22/24		

Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force	Length of Service
Officer B	1 year, 1 month
Officer D	10 years, 9 months
Officer J	15 years, 1 month

Reason for Police Contact

Officers responded to a “Possible Attempt Suicide” radio call for a male experiencing suicidal ideations and armed with a handgun. Upon arrival, officers observed the Subject in front of a residence armed with a handgun. Officers attempted to communicate with him multiple times to gain his compliance. During the interaction, the Subject fired the handgun, resulting in an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS). The Subject retreated to the residence out of the officers' view, leading them to request additional resources. Shortly after, he reappeared in front of the house and refused to comply with commands to surrender. Metropolitan Division K-9 resources arrived, and after a K-9 contact occurred, the Subject was taken into custody.

Subject	Deceased ()	Wounded (X)	Non-Hit ()
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Male, 50 years of age.

Board of Police Commissioners' Review

This is a brief summary designed only to enumerate salient points regarding this categorical use of force (CUOF) incident and does not reflect the entirety of the extensive investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department (Department) or the deliberations by the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC). In evaluating this matter, the BOPC considered the following: the complete Force Investigation Division (FID) investigation (including all of the transcribed statements of witnesses, pertinent subject criminal history, and addenda items); the relevant Training Evaluation and Management System materials of the involved officers; the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) recommendations, including any Minority Opinions; the report and recommendations of the Chief of Police (Chief); and the report and recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General. The Department Command staff presented the matter to the BOPC and made itself available for any inquiries by the BOPC.

The following incident was adjudicated by the BOPC on October 28, 2025.

Incident Summary

On November 22, 2024, Communications Division (CD) broadcast a radio call related to a possible attempt suicide at a residence and indicated the Subject was a male Hispanic armed with a gun. Officers A (driver) and B (passenger) arrived near the location and were flagged down by Witness A, who advised the officers that approximately 30 minutes earlier, the Subject had arrived in a car with a female, who Witness A believed was possibly his daughter or granddaughter. Witness A stated the Subject threw bottles toward people who were with Witness A, and moments later, he heard a gunshot.

Officer B broadcast the officers' status and location and saw the Subject sitting in front of the house as they drove closer to the residence. Officer B positioned him/herself behind the passenger-side door, while Officer A positioned him/herself behind the driver-side door.

Officers C (driver) and D (passenger) arrived at scene and positioned their police vehicle west of Officer B's police vehicle. A third unit, with Officers E (driver) and F (passenger), arrived and positioned their vehicle directly behind them. Officer A briefed the other officers and pointed to the house where the Subject was last seen, while Officer B provided a description of the Subject. Officers decided to wait for a police helicopter (Air Unit).

Officer B saw the Subject sitting on the front porch, directed him to stand up, and continued telling other officers about the Subject's actions. Officer B reassured the Subject that he was not in trouble and that officers wanted to check up on him.

Officer F utilized the police vehicle's Public Address (PA) system to communicate with the Subject, assuring him he was not in trouble, and they intended to help him. Officer F asked the Subject to come out slowly with his hands up.

At this point, Officer E retrieved a shotgun from his/her police vehicle, loaded it, and positioned him/herself behind the front passenger door of Officers C and D's vehicle.

Officer B then observed the Subject holding a handgun and yelled, "He's got a gun in his hand, he's got a gun." Officer B drew his/her pistol. After Officer B announced that the Subject had a gun, Officer D positioned him/herself behind the driver-side door of his/her police vehicle and unholstered his/her pistol. Officer A requested a backup and unholstered his/her pistol.

Officer F took over communications from Officer A and started to broadcast, but this broadcast was interrupted when the Subject fired a round. Officer F continued his/her broadcast and said, "Shots fired."

Officer B crouched, moved backward, and fired one round from his/her pistol. After firing his/her first round, Officer B fired a second round when he/she observed the Subject point his gun toward him/her. Officer B's rounds were fired from a distance of approximately 84 feet. Neither of Officer B's rounds struck the Subject. The Subject then fired two more times.

Meanwhile, Officer D holstered his/her pistol and retrieved his/her patrol rifle from his/her vehicle. As Officer D was behind his/her police vehicle, deploying the patrol rifle, the Subject fired his first round. Officer D moved toward the driver-side door of his/her police vehicle as Officer B fired twice, followed by the Subject firing two more times. In response, Officer D fired twice at the Subject from his/her rifle. The investigation determined Officer D fired two rounds from an approximate distance of 90 feet, striking the Subject on the right upper arm and chest.

Officer B informed officers that he/she last observed the Subject behind the trees and heard him scream. Subsequently, Officer B lost sight of the Subject.

Multiple units responded to the scene. Sergeant A arrived and ordered officers to "helmet up" and reposition. He/she identified the officers involved in the OIS. After he/she was briefed, he/she broadcast and advised officers this incident might be a "potential suicide by cop type situation, use sound tactics." Sergeant A directed Officer D to continue as his/her Designated Cover Officer (DCO) and assigned Officer C to provide medical treatment for the Subject.

Metropolitan Division K-9 personnel arrived at scene and Sergeant B briefed them on the incident. Officers were told there might be a young girl and a woman inside the residence with the Subject and that the Subject had fired his weapon prior to the arrival of police.

Officers A and G positioned themselves across the street in an elevated position in front of the target location to maintain a visual of the Subject, who was on the front porch and moved next to his vehicle approximately 80 feet away. Officer G used binoculars and provided updates on the Subject's actions to officers. Officer G informed the Command Post (CP) that the Subject was injured and ensured a Rescue Ambulance (RA) was requested. The CP acknowledged and requested a RA to stand by.

Officer H used Officer B's police vehicle PA system to communicate with the Subject. He/she activated the siren to get the Subject's attention and repeatedly asked him to walk into the front yard. Officer H reminded the Subject that he was injured and assured him medical help was available.

Sometime later, the Subject walked down the driveway toward the sidewalk with his arms raised, staying behind the driver's side of his vehicle. He waved at officers and made the sign of the cross. Officer G continued providing updates, reporting that the Subject was looking into the car and the windows were down. Officer A informed Officer G that the Subject was in that area when he fired at the officers. Officer G relayed this information to officers on the perimeter and that the gun might be inside the vehicle. A kinetic projectile, non-lethal, self-defense weapon was later found inside the Subject's vehicle.

Officer I used the PA system and instructed the Subject to walk toward the street so officers could assist him. Officer I asked the Subject to lift his shirt and he complied using both hands. The Subject stood near his vehicle and lowered his arms toward the rear driver's side.

Officer I repeatedly told the Subject to not get in the car. The Subject raised his arms again and walked toward the street. Officer I ordered him to lie on the ground multiple times, but the Subject placed his hands by his sides and started walking back toward his car. Officer J yelled, "Don't let him get to the car," and directed his/her K-9 dog to deploy on the Subject. The K-9 dog ran approximately 75 feet, approached the Subject, bit him on the right arm, and pulled him to the ground.

After the K-9 contact, Officer J and additional officers approached the Subject to take him into custody. Officer J attempted to remove the K-9 dog from the bite using a "hard-out" technique by pulling the dog's collar; however, the K-9 dog's mouth had become tangled in the Subject's torn T-shirt. To free him, Officer J used a "bite bar," a tool designed to open the K-9 dog's mouth. The Subject was escorted to the CP where Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel treated his injuries and transported him to a hospital.

After the Subject was taken into custody, officers walked to the front door of the residence, knocked on the door several times, and announced, "This is the police." There was no response from anyone inside the house. Officers searched the front house and did not locate any victims. They searched the lower half of the house, where they located a resident, later identified as Witness B, who was evacuated. They searched the garage and three vehicles in the driveway, but no victims were found. Officers later learned that the initial report of a little girl and other victims had been inaccurate.

The Subject's pistol was later recovered from the front garden area of the residence.

Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners' (BOPC) Findings

The BOPC reviews each CUOF incident based upon the totality of the circumstances, namely all of the facts, evidence, statements and all other pertinent material relating to the particular incident. In every case, the BOPC makes specific findings in three areas: tactics of the involved officer(s), drawing/exhibiting of a firearm by any involved officer(s), and the use of force by any involved officer(s). Based on the BOPC's review of the instant case, the BOPC made the following findings:

A. Tactics

The BOPC found Officers B, D, and J and Sergeant C's tactics to warrant a finding of Tactical Debrief.

B. Drawing and Exhibiting

The BOPC found Officers B, D, and J's drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be In Policy.

C. Intermediate Force

The BOPC found Officer J's intermediate force to be In Policy.

D. Lethal Use of Force

The BOPC found Officers B and D's lethal use of force to be In Policy.

Basis for Findings

In making its decision in this matter, the Commission is mindful that every “use of force by members of law enforcement is a matter of critical concern both to the public and the law enforcement community. It is recognized that some individuals will not comply with the law or submit to control unless compelled to do so by the use of force; therefore, law enforcement officers are sometimes called upon to use force in the performance of their duties. The Los Angeles Police Department also recognizes that members of law enforcement derive their authority from the public and therefore must be ever mindful that they are not only the guardians, but also the servants of the public.

The Department’s guiding principle when using force shall be reverence for human life. Officers shall attempt to control an incident by using time, distance, communications, and available resources in an effort to de-escalate the situation, whenever it is safe, feasible, and reasonable to do so. As stated below, when warranted, Department personnel may use objectively reasonable force to carry out their duties. Officers may use deadly force only when they reasonably believe, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary in defense of human life. Officers who use unreasonable force degrade the confidence of the community we serve, expose the Department and fellow officers to physical hazards, violate the law and rights of individuals upon whom unreasonable force or unnecessary deadly force is used, and subject the Department and themselves to potential civil and criminal liability. Conversely, officers who fail to use force when warranted may endanger themselves, the community and fellow officers.” (Special Order No. 23, 2020, Policy on the Use of Force - Revised.)

The Commission is cognizant of the legal framework that exists in evaluating use of force cases, including the United States Supreme Court decision in *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), stating that:

“The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

The Commission is further mindful that it must evaluate the actions in this case in accordance with existing Department policies. Relevant to our review are Department policies that relate to the use of force:

Use of De-Escalation Techniques: It is the policy of this Department that, whenever practicable, officers shall use techniques and tools consistent with Department de-escalation training to reduce the intensity of any encounter with a Subject and enable an officer to have additional options to mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Verbal Warnings: Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of any force, make reasonable efforts to identify themselves as a peace officer and to warn that force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the person is already aware of those facts.

Proportionality: Officers may only use a level of force that they reasonably believe is proportional to the seriousness of the Subjected offense or the reasonably perceived level of actual or threatened resistance.

Fair and Unbiased Policing: Officers shall carry out their duties, including use of force, in a manner that is fair and unbiased. Discriminatory conduct in the basis of race, religion, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, gender, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, housing status, or disability while performing any law enforcement activity is prohibited.

Use of Force – Non-Deadly: It is the policy of the Department that personnel may use only that force which is “objectively reasonable” to:

- Defend themselves;
- Defend others;
- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

Factors Used to Determine Objective Reasonableness: Pursuant to the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor*, the Department examines the reasonableness of any particular force used: a) from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience, in the same situation; and b) based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- The feasibility of using de-escalation tactics, crisis intervention or other alternatives to force;
- The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;
- The level of threat or resistance presented by the suspect;
- Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to the officers or a danger to the community;
- The potential for injury to citizens, officers or suspects;
- The risk or apparent attempt by the suspect to escape;
- The conduct of the suspect being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);
- The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;
- The availability of other resources;
- The training and experience of the officer;
- The proximity or access of weapons to the suspect;
- Officer versus suspect factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number of officers versus suspects;

- The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances; and,
- Whether a person is a member of a vulnerable population.

Drawing or Exhibiting Firearms: Unnecessarily or prematurely drawing or exhibiting a firearm limits an officer's alternatives in controlling a situation, creates unnecessary anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm. Officers shall not draw or exhibit a firearm unless the circumstances surrounding the incident create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary to use the firearm. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm. Any drawing and exhibiting of a firearm shall conform with this policy on the use of firearms. Moreover, any intentional pointing of a firearm at a person by an officer shall be reported. Such reporting will be published in the Department's year-end use of force report.

Intermediate Use of Force: Use of an Electronic Control Device (i.e. TASER), Impact Device (e.g., Baton), Kinetic Energy Projectile (e.g., Beanbag Shotgun, 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher, FN 303), or certain Chemical Agents (e.g., Oleoresin Capsicum) is an appropriate force option when an officer reasonably believes either of the following:

- There is an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; or,
- If the threat is not immediately addressed, there is an articulable risk the incident could escalate to the use of deadly force.

Intermediate force options should not be used on a suspect or subject who is believed to be unarmed, and, is passively resisting or merely failing to comply with commands. Verbal threats of violence alone do not justify the use of an intermediate force option

Use of Force – Deadly: It is the policy of the Department that officers shall use deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary for either of the following reasons:

- To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person; or,
- To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended.

In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible. Before discharging a firearm, officers shall consider their surroundings and potential risks to bystanders to the extent feasible under the circumstances.

Note: Because the application of deadly force is limited to the above scenarios, an officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death

or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.

The Department's Evaluation of Deadly Force: The Department will analyze an officer's use of deadly force by evaluating the totality of the circumstances of each case consistent with the California Penal Code Section 835(a), as well as the factors articulated in *Graham v. Connor*.

Rendering Aid: After any use of force, officers shall immediately request a rescue ambulance for any person injured. In addition, officers shall promptly provide basic and emergency medical assistance to all members of the community, including victims, witnesses, subjects, Subjects, persons in custody, subjects of a use of force and fellow officers:

- To the extent of the officer's training and experience in first aid/CPR/AED; and
- To the level of equipment available to the officer at the time assistance is needed.

Warning Shots: It is the policy of this Department that warning shots shall only be used in exceptional circumstances where it might reasonably be expected to avoid the need to use deadly force. Generally, warning shots shall be directed in a manner that minimizes the risk of injury to innocent persons, ricochet dangers and property damage.

Shooting at or From Moving Vehicles: It is the policy of this Department that firearms shall not be fired at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the officer or another person with deadly force by means other than the vehicle. The moving vehicle itself shall not presumptively constitute a threat that justifies an officer's use of deadly force. An officer threatened by an oncoming vehicle shall move out of its path instead of discharging a firearm at it or any of its occupants. Firearms shall not be fired from a moving vehicle, except in exigent circumstances and consistent with this policy regarding the use of Deadly Force.

Note: It is understood that the policy regarding firing a firearm at or from a moving vehicle may not cover every situation that may arise. In all situations, officers are expected to act with intelligence and exercise sound judgement, attending to the spirit of this policy. Any deviations from the provisions of this policy shall be examined rigorously on a case by case basis. The involved officer must be able to clearly articulate the reasons for the use of deadly force. Factors that may be considered include whether the officer's life or the lives of others were in immediate peril and there was no reasonable or apparent means of escape.

Requirement to Report Potential Excessive Force: An officer who is present and observes another officer using force that the present and observing officer believes to be beyond that which is necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances based upon the totality of information actually known to the officer, shall report such force to a superior officer.

Requirement to Intercede When Excessive Force is Observed: An officer shall intercede when present and observing another officer using force that is clearly beyond that which is necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances, taking into account the possibility that other officers may have additional information regarding the threat posed by a subject.

Definitions

Deadly Force: Deadly force is defined as any use of force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury, including but not limited to, the discharge of a firearm.

Feasible: Feasible means reasonably capable of being done or carried out under the circumstances to successfully achieve the arrest or lawful objective without increasing risk to the officer or another person.

Imminent: Pursuant to California Penal Code 835a(e)(2), “[A] threat of death or serious bodily injury is “imminent” when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to a peace officer or another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.”

Necessary: In addition to California Penal Code 835(a), the Department shall evaluate whether deadly force was necessary by looking at: a) the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience; b) the factors used to evaluate whether force is objectively reasonable; c) an evaluation of whether the officer exhausted the available and feasible alternatives to deadly force; and d) whether a warning was feasible and/or given.

Objectively Reasonable: The legal standard used to determine the lawfulness of a use of force is based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). *Graham* states, in part, “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.”

The force must be reasonable under the circumstances known to or reasonably believed by the officer at the time the force was used. Therefore, the Department examines all uses of force from an objective standard rather than a subjective standard.

Serious Bodily Injury: Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 243(f)(4) Serious Bodily Injury includes but is not limited to:

- Loss of consciousness;
- Concussion;
- Bone Fracture;
- Protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ;
- A wound requiring extensive suturing; and,
- Serious disfigurement.

Totality of the Circumstances: All facts known to or reasonably perceived by the officer at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of force.

Vulnerable Population: Vulnerable populations include, but are not limited to, children, elderly persons, people who are pregnant, and people with physical, mental, and developmental disabilities.

Warning Shots: The intentional discharge of a firearm off target not intended to hit a person, to warn others that deadly force is imminent.

A. Tactics

- Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication*

(Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)

Planning/Assessment – Officers A and B were working together for the first time on the date of this incident. Officers C and D had worked together on a few prior occasions. At the start of their shift, each of the officers discussed tactics with their

partners, including topics such as contact and cover and the ability to switch roles depending on the circumstances. While on their way to the radio call, Officer B read the comments of the call to Officer A and they gathered additional information from a witness upon their arrival. While Officers C and D were responding to the scene, Officer D read the comments of the call to Officer C, and they designated roles amongst themselves and planned to request that CD call the Subject's family to see if he would cooperate with them.

After the OIS, Metropolitan Division K-9 Platoon officers were briefed by personnel at the scene and began formulating a plan to contain the Subject and take him into custody. Officer J and Sergeant C discussed a plan to use a long line, directed deployment to prevent the Subject from gaining access to weapons or victims. They discussed the plan with other K-9 Platoon officers and assessed that the long line was too short, so they decided to let the long line go and pick it back up once the K-9 dog had a hold of the Subject. While communicating with the Subject, the Subject made the sign of the cross, leading Officer I to believe the Subject was preparing to shoot at the police, and it was a sign of his "last rite." The Subject complied briefly before again ignoring commands and moving back toward his car. Officer J assessed that there could have been a weapon in the car and wanted to prevent the Subject from accessing the vehicle. Officer J accordingly deployed the K-9 dog.

Time and Redeployment and/or Containment – As Officers A and B neared the residence, they positioned their police vehicle away from the location and the Subject, which afforded them cover, distance and time. After Officers C and D arrived at the scene, they offset their police vehicle west of Officers A and B's vehicle and used their own vehicle as cover. During the OIS, Officer B redeployed back to get behind more cover. After the OIS, the officers kept their distance and cover as they awaited additional resources and Officer A began establishing containment around the location where the Subject was last seen. Once Metropolitan Division K-9 Platoon officers arrived at the scene, they ensured containment was established and used the police vehicles for cover.

Other Resources, Lines of Communication – Both patrol division officers and Metropolitan Division officers used the PA system to maintain regular lines of communication with the Subject and attempted to gain his compliance. Upon observing the Subject armed with a gun, Officer A requested a backup. As Officer F continued broadcasting, the Subject fired a round, prompting Officer F to broadcast, "shots fired." After the OIS, Officer F broadcast a help call. Officer I broadcast to ask if K-9 resources were needed, and Sergeant B confirmed in the affirmative. After Metropolitan Division K-9 Platoon officers arrived at the scene, requests for Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) resources were made. Officers A and G took an elevated position in front of the residence and broadcast their observations to the other officers at the scene while an Air Unit also circled overhead.

- During its review of this incident, the BOPC noted the following:

Use of Force Warning

As the Subject ceased complying with commands, he placed his hands by his side and walked back toward his car. Officer J told the other officers at the scene not to let the Subject go back to his vehicle and initiated a directed deployment of the K-9 dog. According to Officer J, a verbal warning is typically given prior to a direct deployment, but he/she believed this specific situation was “a little different than a K-9 search based on the circumstances” and believed it was “more like an element of surprise type thing.”

The BOPC evaluated the tactics employed by Officer J as it pertains to issuing a use of force warning prior to the directed deployment of the K-9 dog. The BOPC noted Officer H had provided the Subject with a use of force warning for the K-9 earlier in the incident via the PA system. The BOPC also noted that the K-9 Manual states a verbal warning is not necessary in exigent circumstances where “the constraints of the situation either make the warning unfeasible or will make the use of the K-9 ineffective.” A verbal warning in this instance would have decreased the likelihood of a successful outcome. A warning would have allowed the Subject time to prepare for the bite given the distance and could have allowed him the opportunity to quickly move to his vehicle. Additionally, a verbal warning was not feasible because the Subject had been complying until he started moving toward his vehicle, causing the window of time between when the directed deployment became a reasonable option and when the K-9 dog needed to be deployed to prevent the Subject from accessing the vehicle, to be very brief.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that the tactics employed by Officer J were not a substantial deviation from Department-approved tactical training. Therefore, the BOPC found Officers B, D, and J and Sergeant C’s tactics to warrant a finding of Tactical Debrief.

- **Command and Control**

After officers arrived at the residence, Officer A began establishing command and control of the incident by initially assigning Officer B as the contact officer and then transitioning that role to Officer F, who began using the PA system. Immediately before and after the OIS, Officer A began directing responding officers to set up a perimeter because they lost sight of the Subject and directed responding officers to don their ballistic helmets upon arrival. As the perimeter was being established, Sergeants A and B arrived at scene, and Sergeant A took command and control of the tactics while Sergeant B began establishing a CP and assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC). Sergeant A ensured officers at the scene donned their ballistic helmets and began assigning roles, directing Officer D to be the DCO and directing Officer C to render aid if needed, once the Subject was taken into custody.

Lieutenant A arrived at the CP and assumed the role of IC, and Sergeant D took the role of Watch Commander. Captain A directed Sergeant D to call Sergeant A and direct him to separate Officers B and D and gather a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from each. After Officers B and D gave their PSS, they were told to go to the CP, where Sergeant B monitored them. Metropolitan Division K-9 Platoon personnel arrived at the scene and Officer I was briefed by Sergeant B. Based on the information gathered, Officer I directed all responding Metropolitan Division officers to don protective equipment and to bring their shields, patrol rifles, and entry tools.

After arriving at the target location and assessing all personnel positioning, Officers A and G moved to an elevated position in front of the residence to maintain visual of the Subject, and Officer I directed Officer G to broadcast the Subject's actions. Officer I then formed a plan to take the Subject into custody and assigned roles.

Officer I requested an armored vehicle respond and broadcast that the Subject was being identified as an "open air" barricaded suspect. Lieutenant A called and notified the Department Operations Center (DOC) of the OIS and requested SWAT to respond to the scene. After officers tried to get the Subject to comply with their orders, he walked toward the sidewalk from the porch, and Officer I assumed the role of contact officer, talking to him through the PA system. While Officer I spoke with the Subject, Officer J and Sergeant C began formulating a plan to utilize a long line directed deployment to take him into custody. Before they could finalize their plans, the Subject began walking back toward his car, resulting in a K-9 contact. As the Subject was being taken into custody, a pre-designated team of officers began preparing to breach the front door of the target location.

Once the front door was breached, the search team cleared the residence and did not locate any victims, only locating and evacuating a single resident on the separated lower portion of the house.

The BOPC assessed the command and control employed by Officer I, Sergeants A and C, and Captain A during the incident. With regards to Sergeant A, the BOPC noted that he/she was operating with minimal resources and made the decision to keep Officers B and D involved in the tactical situation, especially because Officer D was the only rifle operator present at the time and was the DCO.

Regarding Officer I and Sergeant C, the BOPC noted they arrived at scene and gathered excellent situational awareness. They were observant and noted they recognized the situation as a possible open-air barricade, ensuring the appropriate request was made for SWAT resources. The BOPC noted they discussed tactics with personnel at the scene and formulated a plan to take the Subject into custody.

The BOPC also noted that Officer I told Officer G to position him/herself on higher ground to observe the Subject's actions and broadcast them to personnel at scene. Additionally, Sergeant C ensured lethal and intermediate force options were appropriately deployed and available, noting he/she directed two patrol officers to holster their weapons to reduce the possibility of contagious fire. Officer I and Sergeant C provided effective command and control and supervisory oversight throughout the entire incident.

The BOPC determined that the overall actions of Officer I and Sergeants A and C were consistent with Department training and the expectations of supervisors and senior officers during a critical incident.

- **Tactical Debrief**

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the BOPC determined that the actions of Officers B, D, and J and Sergeant C were not a deviation from Department-approved tactical training.

Each tactical incident merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this incident, areas were identified where improvements should be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved officers to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident. Although it was determined Sergeant A would not receive formal findings, it was determined that he/she would benefit from attending the Tactical Debrief.

B. Drawing and Exhibiting

- **Officer B (pistol)**

First Occurrence

According to Officer B, he/she unholstered his/her service pistol when the Subject produced a handgun and tried to conceal it behind his back. Officer B had been informed the Subject had fired a round prior to the officers' arrival and believed he/she would possibly need to protect him/herself and/or other officers from serious bodily injury or death.

Second Occurrence

According to Officer B, he/she unholstered his/her service pistol a second time because he/she was tasked with providing lethal cover while "holding the corner" where the Subject was last seen. He/she had already been involved in an OIS with the Subject and believed he/she would possibly need to protect him/herself and/or other officers at scene from serious bodily injury or death.

- **Officer D**

First Occurrence (pistol)

According to Officer D, he/she unholstered his/her service pistol after Officer B announced the Subject had a gun because he/she believed the situation could escalate to the point where deadly force would be justified.

Second Occurrence (rifle)

According to Officer D, he/she estimated the distance to the Subject to be “somewhere between 30 to 40 yards,” which he/she described as being an uncomfortable distance to shoot his/her service pistol. Officer D decided to go to the trunk of his/her police vehicle to retrieve his/her patrol rifle and chamber a round.

- **Officer J (rifle)**

Officer J, equipped with his/her rifle, responded to an incident where the Subject was armed with a gun and shot at officers. Once at scene, Officer J exhibited his/her rifle and had it slung as he/she deployed the K-9 dog.

The BOPC assessed Officers B and D’s drawing and exhibiting of their service pistols, Officer D’s exhibition of his/her patrol rifle and Officer J’s exhibition of his/her rifle. With regards to Officers B and D, the BOPC noted the Subject refused to comply with officers’ commands and chose to produce a handgun instead. The BOPC also noted a witness told the officers he believed the Subject fired a round prior to their arrival. As such, it was reasonable for Officers B and D to believe the situation may escalate to where deadly force may be justified. Regarding Officer D’s exhibition of his/her patrol rifle, the BOPC agreed with his/her assessment that a rifle was more appropriate and accurate given the distance between officers and the Subject. Furthermore, the Subject was not in custody and had already shown his propensity for violence. As such, Officer D’s exhibition of his/her patrol rifle in response to what he/she believed was a situation that could escalate to where deadly force may be justified was reasonable. With regards to Officer J, the BOPC noted he/she was responding to a help call involving an OIS with an armed suspect and it was reasonable for him/her to believe the situation could escalate to where deadly force may be justified.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers B, D, and J, would reasonably believe there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to where deadly force may be justified. Therefore, the BOPC found Officers B, D, and J’s drawing and exhibiting to be In Policy.

C. Intermediate Force

- **Officer J – (directed deployment of the K-9 dog from an approximate distance of 75 feet)**

As commands were given to the Subject, he walked down the driveway toward the sidewalk and kept looking through the open windows of his vehicle. Officer A informed Officer G that the Subject was in that area when he fired at officers and there was a possibility the gun that was used was still in the vehicle. This information was relayed to officers on scene. According to Officer J, he/she and Sergeant C discussed a plan with the possibility of using a long line directed deployment with the K-9 dog. Officer I used the PA system to instruct the Subject to walk toward the street. The Subject complied for a moment before walking back toward his vehicle.

To prevent the Subject from possibly accessing a firearm inside his vehicle and to prevent the situation from escalating to one involving the use of lethal force, Officer J directly deployed the K-9 dog, who ran toward the Subject, bit him on the right arm and pulled him to the ground. After the K-9 contact, Officer J and additional officers approached the Subject and took him into custody. Officer J removed the K-9 dog from the bite using the “hard-out” technique. The K-9 dog released the Subject; however, his teeth became entangled in the Subject’s torn shirt. To free him, Officer J used a “bite bar,” which was a piece of metal inserted into the K-9 dog’s mouth causing him to gag and open his mouth, allowing Officer J to unravel the shirt and move the K-9 dog away from the Subject.

The BOPC assessed Officer J’s use of intermediate force in the form of a directed deployment of the K-9 dog. The BOPC noted that Officer J was designated during the tactical planning to have his/her K-9 dog on standby to provide another intermediate force option. This decision allowed officers greater flexibility and additional tools to de-escalate the situation and avoid further use of deadly force. The BOPC also noted the Subject stopped complying and began to move toward his car, which the officers believed may contain a firearm. The BOPC noted the Subject had already fired at those he knew to be police officers and the directed deployment was an appropriate force option to de-escalate the situation and prevent an escalation to lethal force.

The BOPC discussed Officer J’s use of the “hard out” technique when removing the K-9 dog off his bite. The Department’s Subject Matter Expert (SME) explained the hard out technique is used after a directed deployment and once the handler has gained positive control of the dog. The handler utilizes the collar as a force to interrupt the bite and make the dog open its mouth. The Department’s SME noted the use of the “hard out” is the trained method of removing the dog as opposed to utilizing verbal commands and/or the E-collar, in incidents where officers are making physical contact with a subject. The purpose of this method is to gain immediate control of the dog, to reduce harm to the suspect by preventing secondary bites, and to prevent contact with officers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer J, in the same situation, would reasonably believe his/her use of intermediate force was proportional and objectively reasonable. Therefore, the BOPC found Officer J’s use of intermediate force to be In Policy.

D. Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer B** – (pistol, two rounds in 0.276 seconds from an approximate distance of 84 feet, in a southwesterly direction)

Background – The investigation determined the background was the front door, front windows, and south wall of the front porch of the residence.

According to Officer B, he/she observed the Subject armed with a gun and alerted the other officers at the scene. Officer B then saw the Subject raise the muzzle of his gun and fire approximately two rounds before “he continued in a motion towards” him/her

directly. To protect him/herself from serious bodily injury or death, Officer B discharged two rounds from his/her service pistol. The rounds did not strike the Subject and video evidence depicted the rounds impacting the ground.

- **Officer D** – (rifle, two rounds in 0.209 seconds from an approximate distance of 90 feet, in a southwesterly direction)

Background – The investigation determined the background was the front door, front windows, and south wall of the front porch of the residence.

According to Officer D, he/she holstered his/her service pistol and retrieved his/her patrol rifle from the trunk of his/her vehicle due to the Subject's distance. As Officer D was at the trunk, the Subject fired one round, causing Officer D to move toward the driver's side door of his/her vehicle as Officer B fired twice. The Subject then fired two more times and, to protect him/herself and the other officers from serious bodily injury or death, Officer D discharged two rounds from his/her patrol rifle, striking the Subject on the right upper arm and chest.

The BOPC assessed Officers B and D's use of lethal force. The BOPC noted the radio call comments stated that the Subject might be armed and experiencing suicidal ideations and noted Officers A and B spoke with Witness A, who told them the Subject might have fired a round prior to their arrival. The BOPC also noted officers gave the Subject multiple commands to surrender, but he chose to arm himself with a gun and shoot at the officers. The Subject could have put down his weapon and surrendered, but instead fired two more rounds at the officers, showing his intention to engage officers in a gunfight. The Subject had the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to kill or seriously injure the officers based on his actions and Officers B and D's response to the deadly threat was reasonable and proportional because they fired in a controlled manner, evaluating each shot and stopping when they no longer perceived an imminent deadly threat. Furthermore, the use of lethal force was necessary because there were no other available resources that were reasonably safe and feasible to employ when the Subject fired at the officers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers B and D, in the same situation, would reasonably believe the use of lethal force was objectively reasonable, proportional, and necessary. Therefore, the BOPC found Officers B and D's use of lethal force to be In Policy.

Rendering Aid

- After Officer G observed the Subject to be injured, he/she requested an RA to standby at the CP. Later, Officer J deployed the K-9 dog, who bit the Subject on his right arm and pulled him to the ground. Shortly after the K-9 contact, the Subject was taken into custody and escorted to the RA, where he was treated by LAFD personnel. The Subject was then transported to a hospital for a gunshot wound to his right upper chest and arm and lacerations to his right forearm caused by a dog bite. Officers met the Department's expectations for rendering aid.