

**ABRIDGED SUMMARY OF CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND
FINDINGS BY THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS**

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING – 031-24

<u>Division</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Duty-On (X) Off ()</u>	<u>Uniform-Yes (X) No ()</u>
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Mission	6/15/24		
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<u>Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force</u>	<u>Length of Service</u>
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Officer A	4 years, 2 months
Officer B	4 years, 3 months

Reason for Police Contact

Mission Patrol Division uniformed police officers responded to a radio call of a violent female with a mental illness. The comments of the call indicated that the Subject was armed with a knife and threatening the Person Reporting (PR), who was locked inside his/her bedroom. Upon arrival, Communications Division (CD) broadcast that the Subject was attempting to enter the bedroom, using the knife to open the door.

The officers approached the residence's front door, knocked, and identified themselves as police officers. The officers ordered the Subject to exit the residence multiple times, but she did not comply. The officers heard a loud banging noise inside the residence and believed the Subject was trying to enter the bedroom to stab and injure the occupants. An officer kicked the front door open, at which time the Subject appeared and advanced toward the officers while armed with a knife.

Officers issued verbal commands to the Subject to drop the knife. As the Subject continued to advance toward the officers, she raised the knife in her hand, resulting in an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS). Simultaneously, a TASER was discharged. The Subject was struck by gunfire and the TASER probes and subsequently died from her gunshot wound.

<u>Subject(s)</u>	<u>Deceased (X)</u>	<u>Wounded ()</u>	<u>Non-Hit ()</u>
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Female, 23 years of age.

Board of Police Commissioners' Review

This is a brief summary designed only to enumerate salient points regarding this Categorical Use of Force incident and does not reflect the entirety of the extensive investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department (Department) or the deliberations by the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC). In evaluating this matter, the BOPC considered the following: the complete Force Investigation Division investigation

(including all of the transcribed statements of witnesses, pertinent subject criminal history, and addenda items); the relevant Training Evaluation and Management System materials of the involved officers; the Use of Force Review Board recommendations, including any Minority Opinions; the report and recommendations of the Chief of Police; and the report and recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General. The Department Command staff presented the matter to the BOPC and made itself available for any inquiries by the BOPC.

The following incident was adjudicated by the BOPC on May 20, 2025.

Incident Summary

On Saturday, June 15, 2024, at approximately 0034 hours, a CD Emergency Board Operator (EBO) received a 911 call from Witness A. Witness A reported that his/her sister was on drugs and armed with a knife and threatening him/her. When the EBO asked Witness A if his/her sister had a mental illness, Witness A confirmed she did and indicated the Subject was drunk.

At approximately 0035 hours, CD broadcast a call for a violent female with a mental illness and under the influence of “unknown narco,” who was armed with a knife. The call included a SMART (Systemwide Mental Assessment Response Team) request.

At 0036:42 hours, Officers A and B advised CD to assign the call to them.

Note: Officers A and B had been assigned as partners for approximately ten deployment periods. According to the officers, they have had prior tactics discussions regarding contact/cover responsibilities, their weapon systems, lethal/less-lethal options, and traffic/pedestrian stops.

Officer A broadcast and acknowledged that they were equipped with a 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher (LLL). Communications Division then broadcast a request for a supervisor to respond.

At approximately 0037 hours, as CD waited for a supervisor to acknowledge the supervisor request broadcast, Officers C and D advised CD they were backing the primary unit. Communications Division acknowledged and then broadcast a request for a supervisor. Sergeant A advised CD that he/she would be responding.

Note: Officers C and D had been assigned as partners on approximately three to four occasions. According to the officers, they have had prior tactics discussions regarding perimeters, contact/cover responsibilities, and lethal/less-lethal options.

At 0037:54 hours, Officer B activated the vehicle’s lightbar system and responded Code-Three to the location. As the officers responded, BWV captured Officer A reading the comments of the call to Officer B. Officer A provided Officer B with the Subject’s descriptors and advised him/her that she was armed with a knife.

At 0038:37 hours, CD broadcast that the Subject did not suffer from mental illness, was under the influence of meth, and was attempting to enter Witness A's bedroom.

At 0039:02 hours, Officer A broadcast that they were Code-Six.

The officers arrived at the scene and parked their police vehicle. Officers A and B opened their respective doors and exited their police vehicle. Officer B then removed the 40mm LLL from the vehicle's gun rack. The officers began to walk north on the east sidewalk, toward the location. At that time, Officer B obtained a 40mm round from the holder and inserted the round into the chamber.

Meanwhile, at 0039:21 hours, Officer C activated the vehicle's lightbar system and responded Code-Three to the location.

At 0040:00 hours, CD broadcast that the Subject did not make entry into the room and was attempting to gain entry with using a knife to open the door.

Officers A and B arrived at the front entrance of a two-story multi-unit apartment complex secured by a security gate. Officer A inputted the security code to open the security door, opened the door, and entered the complex while Officer B held the security door open. Officer A obtained a plastic trash container from inside the complex and utilized the container to prop open the front security gate.

The officers entered the apartment complex, walked east in the courtyard walkway, and began discussing tactics. The officers' BWVs captured Officer B advising Officer A that he/she would be the designated less-lethal officer and that Officer A would be the lethal officer. At that time, Officer A unholstered his/her service pistol and held his/her gun in his/her right hand as he/she held his/her flashlight in his/her left hand.

The officers continued east in the courtyard walkway and heard a voice. They observed Witnesses B and C on a stairwell leading to the second-floor landing. Officer A began to interact with Witness C. Officer A asked Witness C where the apartment was located, and he/she confirmed it was up the stairs where they were standing. Witness C advised the officers that he/she arrived at the apartment to pick up Witness D. According to Officer B, he/she directed Witness B and C down the stairs to prevent a hostage situation.

At approximately 0041 hours, Officers C and D arrived at the scene, opened their respective doors, and exited their police vehicle. Officer D removed the 40mm LLL from the vehicle's gun rack, obtained a 40mm round from the holder, and inserted the round into the chamber. Officer C, leading the way, followed by Officer D, proceeded to the apartment complex's entrance, and entered.

Meanwhile, Officer A ascended the stairwell, followed by Officer B. Upon reaching the second-floor landing, Officer A noted that the front door to the apartment was closed, and there was no sign of forced entry. With his/her pistol in his/her right hand, Officer A

requested Officer B to open the door to the apartment. Officer B approached the front door, turned the door handle with his/her left hand, and discovered the door was locked. Officer B then knocked on the door.

After Officer B knocked on the door, Officer A advised to back up. Officer B re-deployed, stood on the stairwell, and announced their presence by yelling, "LAPD. Open up," as Officer A stood in front of him/her on the second-floor landing. According to Officer B, he/she did not hear anything from inside the apartment. Officer A retrieved his/her hand-held radio and broadcast a request to have Witness A step out. Body Worn Video then captured Officer A directing Officer B to move down the stairwell in the event the Subject exited the apartment armed with a knife. Officer B moved to the landing between the first and second floors while Officer A positioned himself/herself on the stairwell leading to the second-floor landing.

Officers C and D arrived and located Officers A and B on the stairwell. Officer C asked Officers A and B if they possessed a 40mm LLL, and Officer B confirmed he/she had one in his/her possession. Officers C and D then joined Officers A and B on the stairwell.

At 0043:03 hours, CD broadcast that Witness A could not step out and the Subject was at her bedroom door attempting to gain entry. Officer B then relayed that they were in front of the location and to have Witness A step outside.

At 0043:15 hours, Officer D, knowing there was already a 40mm LLL at the scene, opened the launcher chamber, removed the 40mm round, and returned it to the holder. He/She then held the 40mm LLL in his/her right hand.

As the officers stood on the stairwell, Officer B heard the balcony sliding glass door of the apartment open. Officers A and B then directed their attention toward the balcony. At that time, Officer A announced, "It's the police department," followed by Officer B yelling, "LAPD." Officer B's BWV captured him/her informing the officers that the balcony door was open.

At 0043:55 hours, CD broadcast that Witness A was attempting to get someone to open the door, and that the Subject was impeding them from stepping out. Officer A acknowledged the broadcast.

Officer C proceeded down the stairwell and initiated a conversation with Witness B, gathering information on the residents of the apartment. Witness B informed Officer C that Witnesses D and E resided and were inside the apartment. Officer C then relayed that information to Officers A and B.

At 0044:38 hours, Officer B yelled, "Hello! LAPD, come out with your hands up! Right now!" The officers received no response from the occupants.

At 0044:53 hours, Officer B's BWV captured the audible sound of the balcony door of the apartment being forcefully shut. Officer B immediately inquired, "Who is that? Who's slamming the door?"

At 0045:14 hours, Officer A broadcast a request to verify the apartment number and that Witness A was stepping out. Communications Division responded with the apartment number and that Witness A was unable to step out. The Subject was at his/her door with a knife and preventing Witness E to step out as well.

At 0045:26 hours, Officer A's BWV captured the Subject speaking incoherently inside the apartment. Officers A and B began to give the Subject commands to open the door and exit the residence with her hands up. Officer B then requested that Officers C and D join them on the stairwell as the arrest team.

At 0046:33 hours, Officers A and B's BWVs captured them discussing the exigency to kick open the apartment door.

At approximately 0047 hours, Sergeant A arrived at the scene. Sergeant A opened his/her respective door, exited his/her police vehicle, and began to walk north.

Meanwhile, Officers A and B continued verbalizing with the Subject and attempted to establish a rapport with her. Officer B asked the Subject to open the door and told her they wanted to ensure everyone was okay. The Subject replied that everyone was okay. Officer B advised the Subject that he/she needed verification that they were okay. According to Officer B, the Subject appeared to be jiggling the doorknob on the front door from the inside. The officers ordered the Subject to open the door multiple times, but she did not comply.

At 0048:19 hours, Officer B approached the front door of the apartment, attempted to open the door handle with his/her left hand with negative results, and then knocked on the door. The officers' BWVs captured the Subject indicating she was the victim as Officers A and B continued their attempts to have the Subject exit the residence. The Subject continued to curse and speak incoherently.

At 0048:55 hours, Sergeant A arrived and joined the officers on the stairwell. Officer C briefed Sergeant A and advised him/her that Witnesses D and E were locked in a bedroom inside the apartment and that the Subject was inside the location drunk and armed with a knife. Officer C informed Sergeant A that the Subject did not reside at the location and was not supposed to be there.

In the interim, Officer B removed his/her TASER from his/her left hip with his/her right hand while his/her 40mm LLL was slung in front of his/her torso.

Officer D's BWV captured Officer B transitioning the TASER to his/her left hand while he/she opened the 40mm LLL chamber with his/her right hand. Officer B removed a 40mm round from the chamber and placed the round in the holder with his/her left hand. Officer B then positioned the slung 40mm LLL along the left side of his/her torso.

At 0049:41 hours, Officer A asked Sergeant A if they were going to force entry into the location. Sergeant A asked if Witness A was still on the line with CD. Officer C said Witness A was still on the line; however, he/she could not exit because the Subject was blocking the door.

Sergeant A then broadcast for CD to verify that there was no way for the witnesses to step out.

At 0050:17 hours, in response to Sergeant A's broadcast, CD broadcast that Witness A did not want to step out and that he/she was in fear. CD said that the Subject had put a knife to Witness A's neck earlier and that there were two additional people in the living room with the Subject.

At 0050:28 hours, the officers' BWVs captured three loud bangs emanating from inside the apartment. Officers A and D advised Sergeant A that the Subject was banging on the door while Officer B commanded the Subject to open the door.

At 0050:34 hours, Sergeant A broadcast to advise Witness A that officers were making entry. Communications Division acknowledged Sergeant A's broadcast.

Note: The entry team did not have a shield prior to making entry.

Officers A and B positioned themselves with both feet firmly planted on the second-floor landing and removed themselves from the stairwell. Officer A then holstered his/her service pistol. Officer A told the Subject that they would kick down the door if she did not come out with her hands up. Officer B was to the right of Officer A, armed with his/her TASER, while Officer D was behind them on the stairwell with his/her pistol holstered. Officer C and Sergeant A were on the landing between the 1st and 2nd floors and had their pistols holstered.

As soon as Officer D acknowledged that he/she was ready, Officer A approached the door and began kicking it with his/her left foot. After five unsuccessful attempts with his/her left foot, Officer A transitioned to his/her right foot and kicked the door open. As the door opened, Officer B's BWV captured the Subject in the apartment hallway.

At 0050:53 hours, Officer B's BWV depicts him/her arming his/her TASER, pointing it toward the Subject, and taking the safety off while Officer A unholstered his/her service pistol.

Officer A was positioned near the strike plate of the door frame, while Officer B was placed at the hinge portion of the open door just outside the apartment door. Officer B's BWV captured the Subject emerge from the hallway armed with a knife. The Subject faced the officers and held the knife in her right hand, with the blade pointed down, alongside her right leg. Officer B ordered the Subject to put the knife down as he/she aimed the red and green TASER laser beams at her.

Once Officer A unholstered his/her service pistol, he/she held his/her gun in a standing two-hand shooting position with the barrel pointed toward the Subject. According to Officer A, he/she noticed there was blood on the blade of the Subject's knife and believed she had possibly injured someone. The Subject looked in the officers' direction and began advancing toward them with the knife in her right hand. The officers' BWVs captured Officer B yell, "Put the knife down," as Officer A yelled, "Drop the knife." The Subject did not comply with the commands and continued advancing toward the officers with the knife in her right hand.

Officer B's BWV captured the Subject raise the knife with her right arm as she advanced toward the officers. Officer A feared that the Subject was going to stab and potentially kill him/her or Officer B.

At 0050:58 hours, Officer B's BWV depicts Officer A discharging one round from his/her pistol and Officer B deploying the TASER from an approximate distance of eight feet. The Subject was struck by the TASER darts and bullet and released the knife, causing it to land on the living room floor. The Subject immediately grasped her stomach area as Officer A continued to give verbal commands to drop the knife. The Subject stumbled, dropped to her knees, and buried her face into a couch cushion.

Note: The Force Investigation Division (FID) Video Technology Unit (VTU) completed a review of the video and audio files. They determined that there was one gunshot fired by Officer A and one TASER discharge by Officer B. Based on the review of the audio and video files, it was determined that Officer A fired his/her pistol first, followed .225 seconds later by Officer B firing his/her TASER.

The AXON TASER log report indicates a half-second electrical charge was delivered to the suspect, followed by arcing, indicating that the TASER was no longer effective.

Note: The living room of the apartment was illuminated by artificial lighting from an overhanging porch light on the second-floor landing outside the apartment, an overhanging hallway light inside the apartment, and Christmas tree light strings hung along the living room.

Officer B entered the residence, followed by Officers A, C, D, and Sergeant A. Officer D grasped the Subject's left arm with both hands, while Officer B grasped the Subject's right arm with his/her right hand. Officers B and D then placed the Subject's hands

behind her back, at which time Officer D handcuffed her. Officer D then double-locked the handcuffs.

At 0051:20 hours, Officer A broadcast a shots fired, officer needs help call.

According to Sergeant A, he/she knew a TASER had been deployed; however, he/she was unaware that an OIS occurred. Following Officer A's broadcast of shots fired, Sergeant A told Officer A, "I thought it was a TASER." Sergeant A then inquired with Officers B and D about the Subject's condition, to which Officer B confirmed that the Subject had been struck in the stomach.

At 0051:53 hours, Sergeant A requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA).

Note: From the time the Subject was handcuffed until an RA was requested, approximately seven seconds had elapsed. From the time of the OIS until an RA was requested, approximately 55 seconds had elapsed.

At 0052:24 hours, Officer A broadcast that the Subject was in custody.

Sergeant A inquired if a pat-down search of the Subject had been performed. Officer D informed Sergeant A that a pat-down had not been conducted. Officer C donned a pair of latex gloves, patted the outer surfaces of the Subject's clothing for any weapons, and did not locate any additional weapons. Officers C and D initially believed that the Subject had been tased.

At 0052:30 hours, the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) incident details report indicates the LAFD was advised of the shooting.

At approximately 0053 hours, Sergeant B's BWV depicts him/her arriving at the scene, exiting his/her police vehicle, and running toward the apartment complex.

At 0053:33 hours, the CD EBO advised that the RA was en route.

At 0054:10 hours, LAFD received the alarm to respond to the scene.

At 0055:46 hours, Sergeant B inquired about where the Subject was shot. Officer C replied, "Right in the center." Sergeant B then directed Officers C and D to provide medical aid to the Subject.

At 0055:59 hours, Sergeant A advised Officers C and D to remove the Subject's handcuffs and place her in the recovery position. As Officer D removed the left handcuff, Officer C's BWV captured him/her asking Officer D, "It was just a TASER right?" Officer D responded, "No. She's got a gunshot wound." It was at this time that Officer C learned that the Subject had been shot.

Once the handcuffs were removed, Officers C and D placed the Subject on her back and then into the right lateral recumbent position.

At 0100:02 hours, Sergeant B broadcast that he/she was the Incident Commander.

At approximately 0101 hours, Officers E and F relieved Officers C and D and began to monitor the Subject.

At approximately 0101:18 hours, the DICVS from Officers A and B's police vehicle captured LAFD arriving at the scene. At approximately 0103:06 hours, the DICVS from Officers C and D's police vehicle captured the RA arriving at the scene.

At approximately 0103:45 hours, Sergeant A's BWV captured LAFD personnel entering the apartment to administer emergency medical treatment to the Subject for a gunshot wound to her abdomen.

Note: From the time Sergeant A requested an RA until LAFD personnel arrived at the scene, approximately 11 minutes and 52 seconds had elapsed.

At approximately 0118 hours, the Subject was transported to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, the Subject was rushed into the emergency room, where lifesaving protocols were initiated. Despite the efforts, the Subject did not respond to the treatment, and at 0129 hours, the doctor pronounced her death.

BWV and DICVS Policy Compliance

NAME	TIMELY BWV ACTIVATION	FULL 2- MINUTE BUFFER	BWV RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT	TIMELY DICVS ACTIVATION	DICVS RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT
Officer A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Officer B	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sergeant A	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A

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Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners' Findings

The BOPC reviews each Categorical Use of Force incident based upon the totality of the circumstances, namely all of the facts, evidence, statements and all other pertinent material relating to the particular incident. In every case, the BOPC makes specific findings in three areas: Tactics of the involved officer(s); Drawing/Exhibiting of a firearm by any involved officer(s); and the Use of Force by any involved officer(s). Based on the BOPC's review of the instant case, the BOPC made the following findings:

A. Tactics

The BOPC found Officers A and B's tactics to warrant a tactical debrief and Sergeant A's tactics to warrant an administrative disapproval.

B. Drawing and Exhibiting

The BOPC found Officer A's drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be in policy.

C. Intermediate Use of Force

The BOPC found Officer B's intermediate use of force to be in policy.

C. Lethal Use of Force

The BOPC found Officer A's lethal use of force to be in policy.

Basis for Findings

In making its decision in this matter, the Commission is mindful that every use of force by members of law enforcement is a matter of critical concern both to the public and the law enforcement community. It is recognized that some individuals will not comply with the law or submit to control unless compelled to do so by the use of force; therefore, law enforcement officers are sometimes called upon to use force in the performance of their duties. The Los Angeles Police Department also recognizes that members of law enforcement derive their authority from the public and therefore must be ever mindful that they are not only the guardians, but also the servants of the public.

The Department's guiding principle when using force shall be reverence for human life. Officers shall attempt to control an incident by using time, distance, communications, and available resources in an effort to de-escalate the situation, whenever it is safe, feasible, and reasonable to do so. As stated below, when warranted, Department personnel may use objectively reasonable force to carry out their duties. Officers may use deadly force only when they reasonably believe, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary in defense of human life. Officers who use unreasonable force degrade the confidence of the community we serve, expose the Department and fellow officers to physical hazards, violate the law and rights of

individuals upon whom unreasonable force or unnecessary deadly force is used, and subject the Department and themselves to potential civil and criminal liability. Conversely, officers who fail to use force when warranted may endanger themselves, the community and fellow officers. (Special Order No. 23, 2020, Policy on the Use of Force - Revised.)

The Commission is cognizant of the legal framework that exists in evaluating use of force cases, including the United States Supreme Court decision in *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), stating that:

“The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

The Commission is further mindful that it must evaluate the actions in this case in accordance with existing Department policies. Relevant to our review are Department policies that relate to the use of force:

Use of De-Escalation Techniques: It is the policy of this Department that, whenever practicable, officers shall use techniques and tools consistent with Department de-escalation training to reduce the intensity of any encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Verbal Warnings: Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of any force, make reasonable efforts to identify themselves as a peace officer and to warn that force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the person is already aware of those facts.

Proportionality: Officers may only use a level of force that they reasonably believe is proportional to the seriousness of the suspected offense or the reasonably perceived level of actual or threatened resistance.

Fair and Unbiased Policing: Officers shall carry out their duties, including use of force, in a manner that is fair and unbiased. Discriminatory conduct in the basis of race, religion, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, gender, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, housing status, or disability while performing any law enforcement activity is prohibited.

Use of Force – Non-Deadly: It is the policy of the Department that personnel may use only that force which is “objectively reasonable” to:

- Defend themselves;
- Defend others;
- Effect an arrest or detention;
- Prevent escape; or,
- Overcome resistance.

Factors Used to Determine Objective Reasonableness: Pursuant to the opinion issued by the United States Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor*, the Department examines the reasonableness of any particular force used: a) from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience, in the same situation; and b) based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- The feasibility of using de-escalation tactics, crisis intervention or other alternatives to force;
- The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;
- The level of threat or resistance presented by the suspect;
- Whether the suspect was posing an immediate threat to the officers or a danger to the community;
- The potential for injury to citizens, officers or suspects;
- The risk or apparent attempt by the suspect to escape;
- The conduct of the suspect being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);
- The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;
- The availability of other resources;
- The training and experience of the officer;
- The proximity or access of weapons to the suspect;
- Officer versus suspect factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number of officers versus suspects;
- The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances; and,
- Whether a person is a member of a vulnerable population.

Drawing or Exhibiting Firearms: Unnecessarily or prematurely drawing or exhibiting a firearm limits an officer's alternatives in controlling a situation, creates unnecessary anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of the firearm. Officers shall not draw or exhibit a firearm unless the circumstances surrounding the incident create a reasonable belief that it may be necessary to use the firearm. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm. Any drawing and exhibiting of a firearm shall conform with this policy on the use of firearms. Moreover, any intentional pointing of a firearm at a person by an officer shall be reported. Such reporting will be published in the Department's year-end use of force report.

Use of Force – Deadly: It is the policy of the Department that officers shall use deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of circumstances, that such force is necessary for either of the following reasons:

- To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person; or,
- To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended.

In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible. Before discharging a firearm, officers shall consider their surroundings and potential risks to bystanders to the extent feasible under the circumstances.

Note: Because the application of deadly force is limited to the above scenarios, an officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.

The Department's Evaluation of Deadly Force: The Department will analyze an officer's use of deadly force by evaluating the totality of the circumstances of each case consistent with the California Penal Code Section 835(a), as well as the factors articulated in *Graham v. Connor*.

Rendering Aid: After any use of force, officers shall immediately request a rescue ambulance for any person injured. In addition, officers shall promptly provide basic and emergency medical assistance to all members of the community, including victims, witnesses, subjects, suspects, persons in custody, suspects of a use of force and fellow officers:

- To the extent of the officer's training and experience in first aid/CPR/AED; and
- To the level of equipment available to the officer at the time assistance is needed.

Warning Shots: It is the policy of this Department that warning shots shall only be used in exceptional circumstances where it might reasonably be expected to avoid the need to use deadly force. Generally, warning shots shall be directed in a manner that minimizes the risk of injury to innocent persons, ricochet dangers and property damage.

Shooting at or From Moving Vehicles: It is the policy of this Department that firearms shall not be discharged at a moving vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is immediately threatening the officer or another person with deadly force by means other than the vehicle. The moving vehicle itself shall not presumptively constitute a threat

that justifies an officer's use of deadly force. An officer threatened by an oncoming vehicle shall move out of its path instead of discharging a firearm at it or any of its occupants. Firearms shall not be discharged from a moving vehicle, except in exigent circumstances and consistent with this policy regarding the use of Deadly Force.

Note: It is understood that the policy regarding discharging a firearm at or from a moving vehicle may not cover every situation that may arise. In all situations, officers are expected to act with intelligence and exercise sound judgement, attending to the spirit of this policy. Any deviations from the provisions of this policy shall be examined rigorously on a case by case basis. The involved officer must be able to clearly articulate the reasons for the use of deadly force. Factors that may be considered include whether the officer's life or the lives of others were in immediate peril and there was no reasonable or apparent means of escape.

Requirement to Report Potential Excessive Force: An officer who is present and observes another officer using force that the present and observing officer believes to be beyond that which is necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances based upon the totality of information actually known to the officer, shall report such force to a superior officer.

Requirement to Intercede When Excessive Force is Observed: An officer shall intercede when present and observing another officer using force that is clearly beyond that which is necessary, as determined by an objectively reasonable officer under the circumstances, taking into account the possibility that other officers may have additional information regarding the threat posed by a suspect.

Definitions

Deadly Force: Deadly force is defined as any use of force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury, including but not limited to, the discharge of a firearm.

Feasible: Feasible means reasonably capable of being done or carried out under the circumstances to successfully achieve the arrest or lawful objective without increasing risk to the officer or another person.

Imminent: Pursuant to California Penal Code 835a(e)(2), "[A] threat of death or serious bodily injury is "imminent" when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to a peace officer or another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed."

Necessary: In addition to California Penal Code 835(a), the Department shall evaluate whether deadly force was necessary by looking at: a) the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience; b) the factors used to evaluate whether force is objectively reasonable; c) an evaluation of whether the officer exhausted the available and feasible alternatives to deadly force; and d) whether a warning was feasible and/or given.

Objectively Reasonable: The legal standard used to determine the lawfulness of a use of force is based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). *Graham* states, in part, “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” The force must be reasonable under the circumstances known to or reasonably believed by the officer at the time the force was used. Therefore, the Department examines all uses of force from an objective standard rather than a subjective standard.

Serious Bodily Injury: Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 243(f)(4) Serious Bodily Injury includes but is not limited to:

- Loss of consciousness;
- Concussion;
- Bone Fracture;
- Protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ;
- A wound requiring extensive suturing; and,
- Serious disfigurement.

Totality of the Circumstances: All facts known to or reasonably perceived by the officer at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the suspect leading up to the use of force.

Vulnerable Population: Vulnerable populations include, but are not limited to, children, elderly persons, people who are pregnant, and people with physical, mental, and developmental disabilities.

Warning Shots: The intentional discharge of a firearm off target not intended to hit a person, to warn others that deadly force is imminent.

A. Tactics

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- **Planning**
- **Assessment**
- **Time**
- **Redeployment and/or Containment**
- **Other Resources**
- **Lines of Communication**

(Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his/her or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – Officers A and B had been assigned as partners for approximately ten deployment periods. According to both officers, they have had prior tactics discussions regarding contact/cover responsibilities, their weapon systems, lethal/intermediate force options, and traffic/pedestrian stop scenarios. While responding to the radio call, Officer A read the comments of the call to Officer B which included the Subject's descriptors and that she was armed with a knife.

As part of their planning, Officer B advised Officer A that he/she would be the designated less-lethal officer and that Officer A would be the designated cover officer (DCO). In planning for the response of additional resources, officers propped a nearby trash can to hold the entry gate open for responding resources.

Upon Officers A and B's arrival to the scene, Officer B considered the potential deployment of intermediate force options and equipped himself with the 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher (LLL) and inserted a round into the chamber.

Prior to breaching the front door of the residence to make entry, each officer assumed a specific role; Officer A remained as the DCO, Officer B was assigned to intermediate force options, Officers C and D functioned as the arrest team, and Sergeant A maintained command and control of the incident.

Assessment – Upon locating the apartment, Officer A assessed the front door did not have signs of forced entry. Due to the limited confined space of the second story platform leading to the victim's apartment, Officer B assessed intermediate force options with Officer A and opted to transition from the 40mm LLL to the TASER. According to Officer A, the TASER also afforded him/her the ability to readily discharge a second TASER cartridge if needed.

As the officers remained outside the apartment, they continuously assessed the exigency to make entry. After hearing three loud bangs coming from inside, the officers assessed the noise and believed it was the Subject trying to make entry into the bedroom and harm the occupants. After kicking the front door down, both Officers A and B observed the Subject armed with a knife and assessed her proximity and body movement. Officer A observed blood on the knife and assessed the Subject had possibly injured someone. Officer A assessed after firing one round and observed the Subject drop the knife.

Time, Redeployment, and/or Containment – Prior to breaching the front door, officers utilized time to attempt to establish a rapport with the Subject by communicating with her through the door, even offering to help her and take a report for her.

Officers A and B redeployed down the stairwell after their initial door knock, verbalizing the space was small and they needed distance in case the Subject exited the apartment with a knife. In redeploying away from the front door, Officers A and B also discussed their position relative to maintaining a line of sight of the apartment door.

Other Resources/Lines of Communication – Due to the edged weapon protocols, Officer A knew a supervisor was dispatched to their location. Additionally, both Officers A and B also knew an additional unit was responding as Officers C and D broadcast their response. As Officers C and D arrived at the location, Officer C (a Spanish speaker) attempted to gather as much information as possible from Witness B, who lived across the courtyard. Officer C then relayed the information to Officers A, B, and D and Sergeant A. However, the information garnered by Officer C was limited, as Witness B did not have any details about what prompted the police response.

Upon door knocking the apartment, Officer B announced their presence by yelling, "LAPD, open up!" Officers A and B attempted to establish a rapport with the Subject and ordered her to open the door multiple times. Officers also communicated with Witness A, who remained on the line with CD. Officers asked Witness A if he/she was able to exit the apartment, which he/she was not, and advised him/her when they were making entry. After kicking the front door down, Officers A and B ordered the Subject to put the knife down.

After the OIS, Officer A broadcast a help call, leading to the response of additional resources. Sergeant A requested the response of LAFD personnel to provide medical attention to the Subject. Sergeant A communicated post-incident roles and responsibilities of units at scene.

During the review of the incident, no Debriefing Points were identified; however, the following Additional Tactical Debrief Topics were noted:

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

- **Designated Cover Officer:** Officer A was assigned as the DCO when the decision was made to breach the door. Prior to kicking the front door open, Officer A holstered his/her service pistol. As such, Officer A limited his/her ability to act as the DCO. Alternatively, his/her partner or an additional officer at scene could have assumed the role of DCO while Officer A kicked the door open. To enhance future performance, the Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.
- **Situational Awareness:** In transitioning to his/her TASER, Officer B downloaded his/her 40mm LLL by removing a round from the breach of the weapon system and placing it back into the holding sleeve. Alternatively, Officer B could have maintained his/her 40mm LLL loaded in the event it was needed. To enhance future performance, the Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control

- At 0048:55 hours, Sergeant A arrived at scene and was briefed on the incident by Officers C and D. After obtaining situational awareness, Sergeant A verified with CD the PR was not able to exit as the Subject was blocking the door. Shortly after, officers heard three loud bangs from inside the apartment and advised Sergeant A of the exigency to make entry. Sergeant A advised CD officers were going to make entry and monitored the officers' approach as Officer A kicked open the front door. Following the OIS, Sergeant A requested a rescue ambulance (RA) for the Subject.

At approximately 0053 hours, Sergeant B arrived at scene and gained situational awareness of the scene. At 0055:46 hours, Sergeant B inquired where the Subject was shot and directed Officers C and D to provide medical aid to her. At 0100:02 hours, Sergeant B declared himself/herself IC.

Sergeant C responded to the scene to assist and was directed by Sergeant A to obtain a Public Safety Statement (PSS) and initiate separation and monitoring protocols. At approximately 0105 hours, Lieutenant A notified the Department Operations Center (DOC) of the OIS.

The overall actions of Sergeants B and C were consistent with Department training and the Chief's expectations of supervisors during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

- In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and the BOPC concurred, the actions of Officers A and B were not a deviation from Department-approved tactical training. Each tactical incident merits a comprehensive debriefing. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for involved

personnel to discuss individual actions which occurred during this incident. Therefore, the BOPC found Officers A and B's tactics to warrant a finding of Tactical Debrief.

- The OIS occurred at 0050:58 hours, and Officer A broadcast a "shots fired, officer needs help" call at 0051:20 hours. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant A confirmed with Officers C and D that an OIS had occurred.

At 0051:53 hours, Sergeant A requested an RA for a female with a gunshot wound. However, he/she took no action at that time to ensure that officers rendered medical aid, repositioned the Subject from where she fell on the couch, or placed her in a recovery position. Instead, his/her next inquiry at 0052:22 focused on whether the Subject had been patted down. Even when CD asked where LAFD should stage at 0053:33, Sergeant A advised that the incident was "Code Four" and that LAFD was clear to enter, but still did not instruct officers to begin medical treatment. It was not until 0055:46, nearly 3 minutes and 53 seconds after Sergeant A's RA request, that another supervisor, Sergeant B, arrived on scene, declared himself/herself the IC, asked where the Subject had been shot, and immediately directed Officers C and D to render aid. Only then, at 0055:59, did Sergeant A advise officers to remove the Subject's handcuffs and place her in a recovery position.

The Subject was not moved into a recovery position until approximately 0057:45, nearly seven minutes after the shooting. During this time, Sergeant A did not direct officers to apply pressure to the wound or otherwise provide basic medical assistance, despite being on scene at the time of the OIS, aware of the Subject's injury, and responsible for managing the response, at least until Sergeant B arrived.

These delays are inconsistent with approved Department tactical training and the requirement to render aid, which places an affirmative duty on officers, including supervisors, to provide – or in the case of supervisors, to direct officers to provide – prompt basic and emergency medical assistance following a use of force. Sergeant A did not direct officers to immediately render aid or to reposition the Subject into a recovery position after she had been handcuffed and searched. Instead, she was allowed to remain face down on the couch where she fell after being shot. Sergeant A's actions contributed to a significant delay in the Subject receiving basic medical attention.

In light of the above circumstances, the BOPC found that Sergeant A's delay in directing the officers under his/her command to render aid as soon as it was safe and practicable to do so or to reposition the Subject into a recovery position after she had been handcuffed and searched represented a substantial and unjustified deviation from approved Department tactical training and warranted a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

B. Drawing and Exhibiting

Officer A

- **First Occurrence**

According to Officer A, prior to entering the security gate of the apartment complex, the radio call was upgraded to an “ADW suspect there now” and suspect was armed with a knife. Moreover, Officer A stated he/she was not sure of the layout of the apartment complex or where the apartment was located. Believing the situation could escalate to where deadly force could be justified, Officer A unholstered his/her service pistol.

Second Occurrence

Officer A holstered his/her service pistol prior to kicking the front door open and unholstered his/her service pistol a second time once the door opened. According to Officer A, he/she was the DCO and was going to make entry first as his/her partner was designated less-lethal.

The UOFRB assessed Officer A’s drawing and exhibiting of his/her service pistol. Regarding Officer A’s first occurrence, the Board noted Officers A and B responded to a radio call involving an ADW suspect armed with a knife. Additionally, the Board noted Officer A voiced he/she would be the cover officer. In terms of Officer A’s second occurrence, the Board noted Officer A was assigned the role of DCO. The Board concluded both of Officer A’s drawing and exhibiting of his/her service pistol were reasonable and appropriate as the circumstances surrounding the incident created a reasonable belief amongst the officers the situation may rise to where lethal force may be justified.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer A would reasonably believe there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified. Therefore, the BOPC found Officer A’s drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Intermediate Force

- **Officer B, TASER** – One discharge from an approximate distance of eight feet.

Use of Force Warning – Officer B reported it was not feasible to give a Garner warning as the Subject was refusing to comply with officers’ commands to drop the knife while she advanced toward them.

After Officer A kicked the front door open, Officer B observed the Subject emerge from the hallway armed with a knife. The Subject faced the officers and held the knife in her right hand, with the blade pointed down, alongside her right leg. Officers

A and B ordered the Subject to drop the knife; however, she did not comply with their commands and continued advancing toward them as she raised the knife with her right arm. According to Officer B, he/she was fearful for the safety of himself/herself and his/her partners as he/she believed the Subject was advancing forward to stab them. In response, Officer B discharged one cartridge from his/her TASER at the Subject to protect himself/herself and his/her partner from the immediate threat of serious bodily injury.

The UOFRB assessed Officer B's use of intermediate force. In their assessment, the Board noted Officer B stood at the hinged portion of the open door as he/she directed the Subject to drop her knife. Despite Officer B's multiple attempts to communicate with the Subject to drop the knife, she did not comply and instead raised her right arm, which held the knife, and advanced toward the officers, at which point Officer B discharged his/her TASER at her. Based on the Subject's deadly actions, the Board opined that she posed an immediate threat to the safety of both Officers A and B and opined the use of force warning was not feasible. As a result, the Board opined Officer B's actions and decision were in response to the Subject's erratic deadly behavior as she continued to be armed and posed an immediate threat as she advanced toward the officers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer B in the same situation, would reasonably believe the use of intermediate force were proportional and objectively reasonable.

Therefore, the BOPC found Officer B's intermediate use of force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

C. Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer A** – 9-millimeter pistol, one round discharged from an approximate distance of eight feet.

Background – Officer A stated his/her background was a wall and there was no one behind the Subject.

According to Officer A, upon observing the Subject, he/she noticed there was blood on the blade of the knife the Subject was holding and believed she had possibly injured someone. The Subject then looked in the officers' direction and began advancing toward them. Although Officers A and B gave the Subject commands to, "Drop the knife," she did not comply and continued advancing toward them. Believing the Subject was going to stab and potentially kill him/her or his/her partner, Officer A discharged one round from his/her service pistol at the Subject.

The UOFRB assessed Officer A's use of lethal force. According to Officer A's statements and as depicted in body worn video (BWV), when he/she kicked the apartment door open he/she positioned himself/herself near the strike plate of the

door frame where he/she observed the Subject holding what he/she described as an 18-inch knife with blood on the blade, which the Board opined added to Officer A's reasonable belief she had possibly injured someone with it and was not just carrying around a kitchen knife. Despite Officer A's repeated commands to the Subject to drop the knife, she failed to comply and instead chose to advance toward Officers A and B with the knife raised to shoulder height. Based on the Subject's erratic and deadly behavior, the Board opined the Subject presented herself as an imminent deadly threat to both officers. Furthermore, the Board noted Officer A feared the Subject was going to stab or kill him/her or his/her partner and discharged one round from his/her service pistol at the Subject to stop her deadly threat. The Board opined Officer A's belief that the Subject was a deadly threat was confirmed by the Subject being armed with a knife, the knife appeared to have blood on it and her advancing towards officers with the knife raised in a manner that would lead him/her to believe it was being used in a deadly way. The Board noted Officer A's fire discipline as he/she only discharged one round and assessed the Subject no longer posed an imminent threat. The Board further opined the totality of circumstances led to Officer A's objectively reasonable belief that the Subject posed an imminent threat of death to him/her and his/her partner and the need to defend himself/herself was necessary. The Board opined the manner in which Officer A defended himself/herself was proportional to the threat posed by the Subject. As such, the Board determined Officer A's use of lethal force was objectively reasonable, proportional and necessary to defend himself/herself and his/her partner.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer A, in the same situation, would reasonably believe the use of lethal force was objectively reasonable, proportional, and necessary.

Therefore, the BOPC found Officer A's use of lethal force to be In Policy, No Further Action.